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**THE**  
***Great Revolution***  
**OF**  
**1857**

**BY**

**SYED MOINUL HAQ**

**PAKISTAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY**

**30 NEW KARACHI HOUSING SOCIETY  
KARACHI 5**

**1968**

وَلَا تَحْزَبِ الَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ مِنْ أَمْوَالِهِمْ

*Al-Qur'ān, 3 : 169.*

*[Think not of those, who are slain in the way  
of Allāh, as dead]*



# **The Great Revolution of 1857**

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## NOTE ON transliteration

ا = a	د = d
او = aw	ط = t
ای = ay	ظ = z
ب = b	ع = ' (ayin)
و and ث = t	غ = gh
ث = th	ف = f
ج = j	ق = q
ح = h	ک = k
خ = kh	گ = g
د = d	ل = l
ذ = dh	م = m
ر = r	ن = n
ز = z	و = ū; w; aw
س = s	ه = h
ش = sh	ی = i; y
ص = s	' = ' (dal)

Long vowels : ā, ī, ū

Short vowels : a, i, u

*Note* :—Popular spellings of well-known persons and places have been retained, as, for instance, Syed Ahmad Khan (Sayyid Ahmad Khān), Zaka Allah (Dhaka Allāh), Delhi (Dilhi), Lucknow (Lakhnaw), Calcutta (Kalkattah) etc.

## ABBREVIATIONS

<i>C H I</i>	...	...	<i>The Cambridge History of India</i>
<i>F S U P</i>	...	...	<i>Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh</i> (Lucknow, 1957)
<i>H F M</i>	...	...	<i>A History of the Freedom Movement</i> (Karachi, 1957-62)
<i>Intelligence Records</i>	...	Muir, Sir William,	<i>Records of the Intelligence Department of the Government of the North-West Provinces during the Mutiny of 1857</i> (Edinburgh, 1902)
<i>J P H S</i>	..	...	<i>Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society</i> (Karachi)
<i>Kaye's Papers</i>	...	Papers of Sir John Kaye in the India Office Library.	
<i>Memoirs</i>	...	<i>Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah</i> (Karachi, 1958)	
<i>Mutiny Records</i>	...	<i>Mutiny Records: Correspondence</i> (Lahore, 1911).	
<i>Press-List of Mutiny Papers</i>		<i>Press list of Mutiny Papers, 1857</i> (Calcutta, 1921)	
<i>Secret Letters</i>	...	<i>Enclosures to secret letters from the Government of India</i> (I. O. Library, London)	
<i>State-Papers</i>	..	Forrest, G. W.,	<i>Selections from the letters, despatches and other state papers of the Government of India</i> (Calcutta, 1893).
<i>T N N</i>	..	...	Metcalf, Sir T., <i>Two Native Narrative's of the Mutiny at Delhi</i> (Westminster, 1898)
<i>Trial</i>	...	..	<i>Trial of Muhammad Bahadur Shah</i> (ed. H. L. O. Garrett), (Lahore, 1952)

## PREFACE

In 1957, the centenary of the Great Revolution, was celebrated at different places in the subcontinent. The Pakistan Historical Society decided to mark the occasion by publishing a true and objective account of the various aspects of this great chapter of our history. On my suggestion the late Mr. Fazlur Rahman, who was then President of the Society, invited a number of local scholars to a meeting held on February 27, 1957. It was decided that a single volume history of the movement based on original and contemporary sources should be published by the Society. The work of preparing this volume was entrusted to me.

It is regretted that although the book was completed in 1961, it could not be published earlier.

I am thankful to Mr. H. H. Kahle and Mr. Sharif al-Mujahid for reading some chapters of the manuscript, and to my colleagues, Mufti Intizamullah Shahabi and Mr. Ayub Qadri for their assistance in collecting material and making valuable suggestions.

The Pakistan Historical Society is grateful to the Board of Directors, National Bank of Pakistan particularly the then Managing Director Mr. Mumtaz Hasan, for a special grant for the publication of this important work.

*Karachi :*  
*June 1968*

S. MOINUL HAQ

*Note : Printing errors are regretted. Please see corrigenda at the end.*

## FOREWORD

The entire course of the Revolt of 1857 was marked by hatred and barbarous cruelties. In the earlier stages the Revolutionaries showed little mercy to those Britishers on whom they could lay their hands, and after the collapse of the revolt the officers and soldiers of British armies behaved like tyrants. Karl Marx was not wrong in his remarks, although he used rather strong language when he wrote that "the Calmuck hordes of Gingham Khan and Taimur, falling upon a city like a swarm of locusts, and devouring everything that came in their way, must have been a blessing to the country, compared with the eruption of these Christian, civilised and gentle British soldiers . . . These methodic Englishmen bring along with them their prize-agents, who convert loot into a system, who register the plunder, sell it by auction, and keep a sharp lookout that British heroism is not defrauded of a tittle of its reward."<sup>1</sup>

No wonder then, that the War left behind bitter and seemingly inextinguishable memories. Evidently the British officers belonging to the generation of Canning and Colin Campbell could not be expected to have had any sympathy with the "mutineers;" one can easily understand why the latter are frequently referred to in official correspondence as well as private letters as *badmashes* (scoundrels). These prejudices naturally affected the tone of contemporary literature, and, to a large extent, influenced the writings of the succeeding generations also. George Forrest, who had full access to original records, wrote his *History of the Indian Mutiny* in 1904-12, nearly half a century after the Revolution, but he also relates its story in the same strain and makes

1 Karl Marx in *New York Herald Tribune*, 26 June 1858, reprinted in *New Age*, 1857 centenary special (New Delhi, August 1957).

the Revolt of 1857 remained almost a banned subject for a number of years. No doubt the first edition of V. D. Savarkar's *The War of Independence* had appeared in 1909 but it was written, in the style of a propagandist rather than a historian, emotion and not objectivity being its motive force. Virulently communalistic and narrow-minded in his later years Savarkar's outlook was marked by irrepressible hatred for the British in his younger days. However, his book remained under an interdict for nearly forty years and it was only in 1947, that it was reprinted and became accessible to students of history. At the close of the first quarter of the century Khwājah Hasan Nizāmī of Delhi created an interest in the study of this chapter of our history by publishing a series of tracts and treatises on Delhi and its role in the Revolution. Of course he was careful enough not to injure the sentiments of his British rulers, but there can be no doubt that they contain valuable material; another Urdu writer, Mufti Intizamullah Shahabi, brought to light the role of the religious leaders by publishing two small tracts. Nevertheless no serious attempt was made by any Hind-Pakistani historian to study this Movement in a proper perspective and on scientific lines before 1947.

In the years preceding the hundredth anniversary of the Revolution in May 1957 several books were published in Urdu by individual scholars, both in Pakistan and Bharat. In these works an attempt has been made to present "the other side of the picture," but they are not comprehensive, nor based on a critical examination of original authorities and records. Prof. Sen's *Eighteen fifty-seven* (Delhi, 1957), an official publication of the Indian Government, and Dr. R. C. Majumdar's *The Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt of 1857*, are the two outstanding English works published in the post-partition period. The writers of both of these works have almost totally ignored the oriental sources.

The Pakistan Historical Society also decided to publish a detailed and objective account of the Revolution, and entrusted to me the task of preparing this book. It is obvious that a more



comments which are not dissimilar to those of Charles Ball and John Kaye. What strikes the modern student of history most is the astonishing fact that these writers never tried to examine the nature of this great upheaval in its true perspective. As the sepoys of the Company's Army constituted the bulk of the fighters in the ranks of the Revolutionaries they declared the entire movement to be a *mutiny*. The Hind-Pakistani writers could not, under the prevailing conditions, give expression to their real opinions and reactions. Those who decided to write something followed and repeated the views of the western historians. Zakā Allāh, one of the greatest Muslim historians of the nineteenth century, was an eye-witness to what had happened in Delhi, but throughout his voluminous book on the subject he seems to be anxious to emphasize the views expressed by the English historians. Our great poet, *Ghālīb*, is another contemporary writer; his short treatise — *Dastanbū*—and the few references that we come across in his letters, leave an impression that he wanted to establish his own loyalty to the British Government. Zāhīr Dihlawī (*Dastān-i-Ḡhadr*) and Ḥusaynī (*Qayṣar al-Tawārīkh*) also wrote in the same strain. Kanhayya Lāl (*Tārīkh-i-Baghāwat-i-Hind*) was in British employ. Besides these other cases could also be mentioned.

In short, almost all contemporary and nearly contemporary literature presents more or less a one-sided picture of this great event. The college and school text books prepared on the basis of these works gave widespread publicity to the theory that the rising of 1857 was a *mutiny* and no one bothered to think of it but as a *ghadr*. It may be mentioned that several British writers thought that there was some sort of national sentiment behind the Revolution, but they did not take pains to analyse this view in detail and left only a vague impression about the nature of the Revolt.<sup>1</sup>

Before the close of the last century Hind-Pakistani scholars had begun to study their history on modern lines, but

1 For some relevant quotations see Majumdar, R. C., *The Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt of 1857*, p. 214 et. seq.

detailed account of the various incidents of the War could be given but that would have made the book too voluminous.

In conclusion, it may be added that the Revolution of 1857 is one of the most important chapters of modern history because it was the first major attempt of an eastern people to throw off the domination of a western Power. I hope this book will create an interest in this problem and scholars engaged in research will devote their attention to it. Their labours would certainly prove fruitful, as there is ample material which has not yet been adequately explored and much more which needs careful examination.

S. MOINUL HAQ

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Map of Hind-Pakistan on the eve of the Great Revolution  
of 1857 (at the end)

## CHAPTER I

### THE IMPACT OF BRITISH RULE

#### The decline of the Mughul Empire

'Ālamgir's death in 1707 marks the end of a great age; the mighty Empire of the Mughuls, having reached the apex of its glory and greatness, began its downward journey. The process of decline was rather fast; in fact it would have been faster if the structure of the Mughul administrative system had not been laid on solid foundations. The main cause of the disintegration of the Empire was not the wearing of its machinery of government; it was incompetent leadership. Within twelve years of the death of 'Ālamgir as many rulers sat on the throne as had occupied it during its entire history of one and three-quarters of a century before that event. The reason was that self-seeking politicians had captured authority and formed their own groups among the courtiers. Instead of consolidating the resources of the Empire and enabling it to suppress the forces of disruption they frittered their energies away on internecine wars. The Sayyid Brothers, 'Abd Allāh and Husayn 'Alī, who are sometimes referred to as 'king-makers', had full control of government for six or seven years (1714-20). They blindly followed ill-conceived policies and did not even hesitate to call the Marathas to their aid.<sup>1</sup> No step could be more ruinous. The Marathas could now easily see where their opportunity lay; Balaji began to conceive plans of materialising the ideal of *Hindūpad pādshāhī*.<sup>2</sup>

1 Husayn 'Alī, the younger of the two brothers, was the governor of the Deccan. When he was asked by his brother, Quṭb al-Mulk 'Abd Allāh, to reach Delhi, he took along with him 11,000 Marathas commanded by the Peshwa, Balaji Vishvanath; he had offered him excessively liberal conditions for their aid. See *The Cambridge History of India* (Cambridge, 1937), IV, 338.

2 *Ibid.*, 395 n. 2

Muhammad Shāh's long reign (1719-1748) witnessed the break-up of the Empire: Bengal, Awadh, Rohilkhand and the Deccan, besides the extensive territories of the Maratha chiefs, became virtually independent. It was at this advanced stage of disintegration that the Empire received a rude shock from the invasion of Nādir Shāh in 1739; it deprived the Mughuls of much of their wealth and adversely affected their prestige. The Marathas who had already started plundering on a large scale, now extended their raids to such distant territories as Bengal and Orissa. In the south, the representatives of the English and French East India Companies took the law in their own hands and began to fight regular wars. The first of the three Anglo-French Wars was fought in 1744-48. Evidently the Mughuls had become too weak to assert their sovereignty by controlling these forces of disruption.

Taking advantage of the situation, the French governor, Dupleix, changed the role of his employers from traders to that of rulers; the English followed suit. The French had confined their political activities to the Deccan, but the English found better opportunities in Bengal. Robert Clive, who has earned the admiration and gratitude of his countrymen for laying the foundations of British dominion in the subcontinent, achieved far greater successes than his French rival. His policy, however, was devoid of morals, and "a hard dishonesty enters into his character". With remarkable candour he has himself referred to this aspect of his public activities. In a letter to Orme he promises to supply him with an account of "Fighting, tricks, chicanery, Intrigues, Politics and the Lord knows what; in short, there will be a fine Field for you to display your Genius in."<sup>1</sup> The Battle of Plassey fought in 1757 was undoubtedly a master stroke of "chicanery and Intrigues"; nevertheless, British 'victory' over Sirāj al-Dawlah, the Nawab of Bengal, made Clive a hero in the eyes of his colleagues and the East India Company a power to be reckoned with. Its sphere of influence was extended to the entire province

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Thompson, Edward, and Garrat, G.T., *The Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India* (London, 1934), p. 89.

of Bengal, which, in those days, included Bihar and Orissa. In 1764, the British defeated the combined forces of the Nawabs of Bengal and Awadh supported by the Mughul prince, 'Āli Guhar, in the Battle of Buxar. In the following year the prince (now Emperor Shāh 'Ālam II) conferred the right of *dīwānī* on the Company by an Imperial *farmān*, which made it the undisputed master of vast revenues running into crores of rupees.<sup>1</sup>

### Shah 'Ālam and Akbar Shah II

The tradition laid down by Clive was followed by his successors. Warren Hastings, Wellesley and Dalhousie are counted among the most eminent of British statesmen who ruled over India, and none of them ever allowed the slightest scruples of conscience to stand in the path of their expansionist policies; sometimes they even flouted the instructions of their own employers. Within fifty years of the Battle of Plassey the authorities of the Company extended their rule up to Delhi in the north and over areas later covered by the presidencies of Madras and Bombay in the south. It is not surprising therefore that Wellesley (1798-1805) conceived the idea of making it the paramount power in the subcontinent. In fact his predecessors had already adopted a policy which aimed at an unlimited extension of British rule.

Since his defeat at Buxar the Emperor had been residing in Allahabad. The British wanted to seize this opportunity and keep him under their protection, but they failed in their efforts and could not persuade him to give up the idea of returning to Delhi. However, they tried to keep themselves in touch with the developments at the Imperial Court. In 1782, Hastings sent Major James Browne as his agent to Delhi; but he had definite instructions

1 A contemporary Muslim historian refers to the grant of *dīwānī* in these words, "And a business of so much importance was settled . . . with greater ease and smoothness than is required for the sale of a jack-ass or a beast of burden." Ṭabāṭabāī, Ghulām Ḥusayn, Sīyar al-Mutā'akkhkhīn (Calcutta edition), II, 3547.

2 For the English version of the Imperial *farmān* see Muir, Ramsay, *The Making of British India, 1756-1858* (Manchester, 1915), pp. 84-85.

to avoid discussion of "unpleasant topics" such as the payment of the tribute and the restoration of Allahabad to the Emperor. The Governor-General's object in sending an agent to Delhi was to get authentic information about the activities of the Mughul Government.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the authorities at Calcutta realized that it would be premature on their part to interfere in the politics of Delhi. Cornwallis was shy of helping Shāh 'Ālam against his captor, Ghulām Qādir Ruhilah;<sup>2</sup> his successor, John Shore, officially acknowledged the suzerainty of the Mughul Emperor by agreeing "to be invested with a *khil'at* or dress of honour by the princes whom he visited at Banaras in 1797".<sup>3</sup>

Under Wellesley, however, the Company's outlook underwent a drastic change. Imperialistic by nature, the new Governor-General initiated a policy of naked aggression; he thought that it was an effective method of counteracting Napoleon's ambitions in the East. He had successfully checkmated a French-Mysore alliance by fighting a war with Tipū Sulṭān; in Delhi also, he had reasons to believe, the French were planning to place themselves at the disposal of the Emperor.<sup>4</sup> It was under these circumstances, that General Lake opened negotiations with Shāh 'Ālam before his final clash with Sindhia's forces near Delhi. On the latter's defeat in a battle fought not far from the city the British forces had no difficulty in crossing the Jamuna and entering the Mughul capital, where they were hailed as friends. Shāh 'Ālam granted an interview to Lake on 16 September, 1803.

Lake, who had already informed the Emperor that he was "cordially disposed to render Your Majesty every demonstration

1 See, for instance, *C.H.I.*, V, 601.

2 *Cornwallis Correspondence* (I, 352) quoted in *C.H.I.*, V, 603.

3 *C.H.I.*, V, p. 604.

4 A paper written by a French officer had fallen into Wellesley's hands. It said that Shāh 'Ālam "ought to be the undisputed sovereign of the Mughul Empire . . . ; the Emperor of Delhi has a real and indisputable right to transmit to whomsoever he may please to select, the sovereignty of his dominions, as well as the arrears due him from the English." *Wellesley Despatches* (IV, 652) quoted in *C.H.I.*, V, 604.

of my loyalty and attachment," was now treated by him as a "loyal" and capable officer ; his services were appreciated by the award of a title.<sup>1</sup> The British commander-in-chief had confirmed it by accepting the title and the Imperial *khil'at*. This was the beginning of a long controversy between Calcutta and Delhi, where contradictory interpretations were given to statements regarding the status of the Company *vis-a-vis* the *de jure* sovereignty of the Emperor ; the Governor-General thought the Emperor had come under the protection of the British, while the Palace view was that the Company had returned to obedience and loyalty.<sup>2</sup> *Shāh 'Ālam*'s political acumen was soon put to test. A sum of nearly five and a half lakhs of rupees had been entrusted to the Imperial treasurer by Dugeon, the French commandant of the Palace. Lake wanted to seize the money ; *Shāh 'Ālam* held that it belonged to him. However, when the pressure became unbearable he sent the money to Lake with a message that it was a gift from the Emperor to 'the brave army'. It was received by Lake and distributed among the troops. Wellesley soon "saw his mistake" and ordered "the Commander-in-Chief to pay into the royal treasury the sum of six lacs of rupees, with a view to provide for the immediate exigencies of his Majesty's house-hold."<sup>3</sup> No

1 The title conferred on Lake was : *Ṣamṣām al-Dawlah 'Ashja' al-Mulk, Khān Daiwān Khān Bahādūr Sipah Sālār Fatḥ Jang*.

General Lake to Wellesley, dated 21 September, 1803.

2 It is interesting to note that Wellesley referred to the victory of British arms as "the happy instrument of your Majesty's restoration to a state of dignity and tranquillity under the power of the British Crown"; *Shāh 'Ālam*, on the other hand, wrote : "Be this great victory and success, happy and prosperous to us, and to all the servants of our illustrious Court, especially to your Lordship." The Governor-General was styled as *Farzand-i-Sa'adatmand*. In a previous letter, dated 29 August, *Shāh 'Ālam* had been more clear in his expressions ; he had said, "that hereafter there be no want of obedience or cause of dissatisfaction to me". See Majumdar, J. K., *Raja Bammohun Roy and the Last Moghuls : a selection from Official Records* (Calcutta, 1939), p. 6 ; also see Spear, Percival, *Twilight of the Mughuls*, p. 36.

3 Majumdar, pp. 316-318.



matter, what interpretation Wellesley gave to the transaction, Shāh 'Ālam had scored a clear diplomatic victory.

As in the time of Sindhia's primacy, the Emperor was to receive a fixed annual payment. It was accepted by him as *pish-kash* or tribute, while the Company thought it was giving a stipend or at best a pension. In fact, this money was to be raised from the lands of the Assigned Territory; if the revenues yielded a surplus it was to go to the Imperial treasury, while a deficit in the receipts had to be made up by the Company. In Delhi, a civil and a criminal court were to be established, and in the latter, Muslim criminal law was to be administered through a *qāḍī* and a *mufti*; the Emperor's confirmation was necessary in cases of capital punishment. Inside the Red Fort the Emperor's authority was undisputed; the *Salāḡins* or members of the Imperial family 'enjoyed diplomatic immunity'. The Court etiquette, and traditions of the *Darbār* were to continue; "the Resident attended the *Darbār* in the *Dīwan-i-khās* regularly as a suitor. He dismounted like any other courtier at the *Naqar Khana*, and was conducted on foot through the *Lal Purdah* to the imperial presence where he stood respectfully like the rest." <sup>1</sup>

In 1806 Shāh 'Ālam died and was succeeded by his son, Akbar Shāh II <sup>2</sup> The new Emperor demanded that the *pish-kash* be raised to thirty lakhs of rupees, seizing upon "the provisional figure mentioned by Wellesley at the very beginning." <sup>3</sup> Besides the enhancement of the *pish-kash* the question of the Emperor's sovereignty was also involved. In 1808 the Emperor decided to send a mission led by Shāh Hāji to Calcutta. The Persian secretary to the Company's Government received this mission; about a year later he wrote to the resident that "it is obviously necessary that the mission of Shāh Haujee should terminate

1 Letter of the chief secretary to Government containing orders on "the subject of the provision for H M. Shah Allum and his family", dated 23 May, 1805. See Majumdar, pp. 27-31.

2 He ascended the throne on 6 *Ramaḡān*, 1221 A.H. See Muḡammad Faqir, *Jāmi' al-Tawā'riḡh* (Calcutta, 1836), p. 365.

3 Spear, p. 39.

unsuccessfully.”<sup>1</sup> Shāh Hājī had taken with him a *khil'at* for the Governor-General; “this measure,” he declared, “was not only preparatory to the execution of His Majesty’s design of conferring similar honours on the principal Chiefs and Princes of India, but that after such an acknowledgement of submission on the part of the British Government, any Chiefs who should refuse to pay His Majesty due homage should be reputed delinquents and punished accordingly”.<sup>2</sup> The *khil'at* and the Emperor’s letters were not received by the Governor-General publicly, as the envoy wanted, but through his Persian secretary. The result of these long negotiations was disappointing; in June 1809 the Company agreed to raise the amount from 90,000 rupees to a lakh. Shortly after this, Akbar Shāh was deceived by a resident of Murshidabad named Pran Kishan. With the help of some friends he succeeded in obtaining from the Emperor large sums of money for taking a mission to Calcutta from where he sent fabricated accounts. Subsequently he informed the Emperor that he wanted to go to London to pursue the matter there; in course of time, however, the fraud was discovered; Akbar Shāh regretted his credulity.<sup>3</sup>

The presentation of *nadhirs* to the Emperor was an old practice; it implied the recognition of his sovereign status. Soon after taking charge of his office Lord Hastings stopped the *nadhirs* which were presented seven times during the year on behalf of the Governor-General. Subsequently the *nadhirs* of the commander-in-chief were also stopped. The stoppage of the Governor-General’s *nadhirs* could be justified on the ground that he was the head of the Company’s Government but no such argument could be produced in respect of the commander-in-chief. However, he presented *nadhirs* when he attended the *Darbār*. Later, the agent at Delhi and the commandant of the Palace Guard alone presented *nadhirs*; in 1844 “Lord Ellenborough, in Olympian mood, abolished this

1 Letter dated 8 March, p. 86.

2 Quoted in Majumdar, XXXVIII.

3 For a detailed account of the incident see Kaye, Sir John, *Life and Correspondence of Charles Lord Metcalfe* (London, 1858), I, 252-54.

also" ... because "even this inferior token of feudal submission is inconsistent with the relative position of the king of Delhi."<sup>1</sup> The Court of Directors took a different view. In their despatch of December 1844 they said, "We were unwilling to withhold from an individual without any offence on his part, compliments which he had been in the habit of receiving and therefore in our letter of the 1st May last ... we stated that we should have preferred if in deference to the feelings of the House of Timoor this change had been postponed till the occasion of a succession to their nominal throne ;..."<sup>2</sup> The Directors had also said, "We presume that this has been acted upon ;" the actual fact, however, was otherwise. The Company's authorities did not even inform the Emperor about the instructions which they had received from their employers. Bahādur Shāh, who had ascended the Mughul throne in 1837, "got wind of the Directors' decision"; but he pretended to believe that their despatch which, he was given to understand, contained a disapproval of Ellenborough's action, had been misplaced. "I hope from your Lordship's high and pre-eminent character for justice and liberality," the Emperor wrote to the Governor-General, "that you will have the kindness to cause search to be made among the records of Government in Calcutta, and on finding that such instructions were received from Europe, be so gracious as to pass the necessary orders...." The Emperor did receive "the substance of the Directors' despatch", but "it did *not* concern *nadhirs*"; the game of chicanery played by the Company's authorities was carried to its logical end when the Governor-General wrote to the Emperor: "I must observe that no reliance should be placed by your Majesty on any statements that may be made to you on the subject of the Court's orders, except those conveyed in due form by the Governor-General's Agent in Delhi."<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately for the Emperor, the commencement of hostilities with the Sikhs left the Directors no

1 Cf Spear, pp. 55-56.

2 See Majumdar, p. 293.

3 Quoted in Spear, p. 57.

time for a probe into the conduct of their employees in the subcontinent.

Another blow to Mughul sovereignty came in the form of the abolition of the *alqāb* and other formal expressions used in correspondence. The Governor-General's letter was officially called '*arqī* (petition), and at the end he styled himself as *fidwī* (slave) of the Emperor. Originally, the petition began with these expressions, "*Ba 'arq-i-aqdas-i-Bāryābān-i-Āstānah-i Sidrah Nishān-i Khadiw-i Zamīn-wa-Zamān Qiblah i 'Ālam-wa-Ālamiyān Ka'bah-i-Jahān-wa-Jahāniān Haḍrat Zill-i Subhānī.*"<sup>1</sup> These words were replaced by expressions which in appearance looked as dignified as the above formula, but they contained no reference to the suzerainty of the person to whom they were addressed.<sup>2</sup>

### The Emperor sends an envoy to England

In 1827 Akbar Shāh sent a 'paper' to Calcutta, demanding "the fulfilment of the pledges". But he was shocked to learn that the letters containing 'pledges' referred to by him were treated by the British Government as merely complimentary. The Emperor obviously could not accept this interpretation. He decided to send an envoy to London; Rammohun Roy,<sup>3</sup> who was to be entrusted with this important mission was given the title of *Rājāh*, and authorised to prepare a memorandum on the demands of the Emperor. The document was carefully drafted; the British monarch is addressed as "My Brother" and in "the language of fraternity". A reference is made to "a small portion of your

1 The formula contains definite references to the sovereignty of the Mughul Emperor

2 The changed formula was: "*Durrat al-Tāj-i-Afsar-i-Salṭanat-wa-Shahī-yarī zib afzā-i-Awraq-i-Khilāfat-wa-Jahāndārī, Khusrāw-i-Mamlakat-i-'Adl wa-Rif'at Shahr Yai-i Kishwar-i-Dad wa Nafat Khalladallahu Mulkuhu wa Salṭatuluḥu baṭ lawh-i-Ḍamū-i-Munir Mihr Tanwīr Muḥarrar-wa-munkashaf bād* At the end also the Governor-General calls himself *Niāz Mand-i-Dargāh-i-Ilāhī*

3 Rammohun Roy was born in May, 1772, at Radhanagar in Hugli district. He received his education under the then prevailing system and grew to be an admirer of Muslim sufistic thought. The study of the *Qur'ān* had created in him an aversion to idolatry and "throughout his subsequent life, Rammohun

Majesty's subjects (who) are permitted to exercise the Government of these vast and populous territories which it was the glory of my ancestors to rule in person"; the Emperor expresses a hope that "Your Majesty will not permit them wantonly to violate the solemn engagements of their faith and honour pledged to the once dreaded and illustrious but now powerless House of Timur". He was reminded of the accompanying articles of the *iqār-nāmah*, "which were transmitted to my august father from the Governor-General in Council in conformity with the promise made by Lord Lake", and which laid down "the mutual obligations of the contracting parties." The Emperor raises several questions including the enhancement of the *pish-kash*. In the end, however, he made it emphatically clear, and, constitutionally speaking, this is the most important part of the document, that "I will not condescend to accept and your Majesty will disdain to confer as favour that which is due as a right. I rest my cause in your Majesty's high-minded sense of honour and justice."<sup>1</sup> It is rather significant that no reference was made to the generosity or kindness of the addresser. Akbar Shāh's selection of Raja Rammohun as his envoy was perhaps not very wise. The Raja was trying to lay the foundations of Hindu nationalism by giving his co-religionists a new lead in politics. The basic concept of the movement was to bring them nearer to the Company's Govern-

Roy never entirely shook off these early Mohamedan influences," (Pundit Siva-nath Sastri in Centenary Purity Booklet no. 1, June, 1933, p. 9)

In private life his habits were more akin to those of a Muslim nobleman than a Hindu Raja; he wore Muslim dress, and his meals though served in English fashion, mainly consisted of popular Muslim dishes.

It is interesting that the culturally Moslemized Rammohun was the first great communalist leader of the Hindus. All his efforts were directed at the preservation and reform of Hinduism and its followers; the problems of the Muslims as a people never worried him, although he was convinced that under Muslim rule "the natives of this country enjoyed every political privilege in common with Mussulmans". For his views on Muslim rule in Hind-Pakistan, see *The English Works of Raja Ram Mohun Roy* (Ed. by J.C. Ghose, Calcutta, 1901), II, 312-13.

<sup>1</sup> For the text of the Emperor's "Letter to His Britannic Majesty" see Majumdar, pp. 196-203.

ment in the political, cultural and economic fields. Obviously he could not afford to incur the displeasure of the British authorities; nor perhaps did he consider it wise to miss the opportunity of visiting Europe. Before embarking for England he informed the Governor-General, Bentinck, that "I have determined not to appear there as the Envoy of His Majesty Akbar the Second, but as a private individual."<sup>1</sup> However, he presented the document which he had carried "as a private individual" to the Directors. They sent a delayed reply that they could agree to raise the *pish-kash* to 15 lakhs, provided the Emperor gave a *rāḍināmah* that he would receive it "in full satisfaction of all claims of every description that he may be supposed to possess". This "so pleasing a piece of intelligence" was communicated to the Emperor; his "gracious reply" was that his claims were "of higher nature and the Royal Agent I have sent for the purpose of prosecuting them is still in England; until I receive information from him I must decline acceding to the conditions proposed." The Company's Government took this as a refusal on the part of the Emperor.

Soon after his accession in 1837, Bahādur Shāh reopened the question of the enhancement of the *pish-kash*, but as he too was not prepared to surrender his claims as a sovereign the Company decided in 1840 that "it being impossible for us to waive this condition the king must be considered as having declined the offered benefit".

### Lord Amherst attends the Imperial Darbar

A more delicate problem was that of the ceremonial on the occasion of the Governor-General's visit to the Emperor. Akbar Shāh wanted the Governor-General to come to him on a visit and was prepared to concede to some extent on the question of

1 Majumdar (p. LVII) quoting Collet's *Life and Letters of Rammohun Roy*.

The Emperor, it appears, was kept in the dark as to what was happening in Calcutta. As early as 1 April, 1829, Akbar Shāh had told the resident of his "intention of deputing Baboo Ram Mohun Rac to England as his Agent to present a letter . . ." Letter dated 2 April, 1829, from the resident at Delhi, to the deputy secretary to Government. p. 203.

ceremonial; Lord Hastings also was "very desirous of paying his personal respects to His Majesty", but he was not prepared to acquiesce in a ceremonial which would imply the supremacy of the Emperor over the Company's Government. They could not meet, because "the more or the less of the distinctions to be shown to me could have no effect where my resistance was to the admission of any foreign supremacy over our dominions, . . ." <sup>1</sup> Akbar Shāh's firm attitude on the question of Mughl sovereignty severely hurt the Governor-General's vanity; it is not surprising, therefore, that he writes in his *Journal* that "nothing has kept up the floating notion of a duty owed to the imperial family but our gratuitous and persevering exhibition of their pretensions—an exhibition attended with much servile obeisance in the etiquettes imposed upon us by the ceremonial of the Court. I have thence held it right to discountenance any pretension of the sort, either as it applies to us or to any of the native princes." <sup>2</sup> To avenge himself on the Emperor, Hastings went a step further: if the Emperor at Delhi was not prepared to meet the Governor-General on a footing of equality, the latter could create a new *roi faineance* at Lucknow where the Head of the East India Company would be hailed as a king-maker.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor was naturally hurt by this action of Hastings, but he could do nothing.

However, in 1827, Lord Amherst who had succeeded Hastings as Governor-General decided to meet the Emperor. He was permitted to sit in the Emperor's presence and was exempted from the presentation of *nadhr*, privileges which had been refused to his

1 *The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings* (London, 1858), I, pp. 318-19

2 *Ibid*, p. 320.

3 Hastings thought his act "would benefit the British Government by causing a division between these important leaders of the Muhammadan community. The change was, however, regarded with the greatest contempt and aversion by the Indian princes and unfavourably contrasted with the conduct of the Nizam of Hyderabad who had refused to accede to a similar suggestion made to him, as being an act of rebellion against the emperor." *C.H.I.*, V., 575.

predecessor. On 3 March, Mirzā Salim conducted Amherst to the Palace; Sir Charles Metcalfe, then resident for the second time, alighted from the elephant near the *Naqqār Khānah*, but the Governor-General was carried in a "tonjohn" right up to the steps of the *Diwān-i-Khāṣ*. The Emperor came from the *Taṣbiḥ-Khānah* exactly at the same moment as Amherst entered the Hall; when they had embraced each other, the Emperor occupied the throne while the Governor-General took his seat on the chair in front of it to the right. After a brief exchange of complimentary expressions Akbar Shāh took a string of pearls and emeralds from his neck and placed it around that of Amherst; then he offered him 'attar and left the *Darbār*. When the Emperor returned the visit, the Imperial throne had to be taken to the residency for the brief ceremony. For Akbar Shāh the meeting had great significance: after all, the Governor-General had come to the *Darbār* and sat on an ordinary chair while the Emperor occupied the throne. In the early years of Bahādur Shāh's reign Auckland wanted to meet him, but on a footing of "perfect equality." Bahādur Shāh was not prepared to waive the Court etiquette beyond what had been done for Amherst; Auckland therefore had to "forgo the pleasure he had promised himself of becoming personally acquainted with His Majesty."<sup>1</sup>

### **Bahadur Shah's efforts to save his de-jure sovereignty**

Though advanced in age at the time of his accession, Bahādur Shāh<sup>2</sup> had not entirely lost the vigour and strength of his early days. He was acquainted with the history of the repeated attempts of his father and grandfather to make the Company's authorities fulfil their obligations and pledges. Not discouraged by their failures he decided to continue the struggle. Like his father he also sent

1 Letter from secretary to Government, dated 12 February, 1838, quoted in Majumdar, p. 257.

2 Bahādur Shāh was the eldest son of Akbar Shāh II, but he wanted his third son, Mirzā Jahāngīr, to succeed to the throne. The British supported Bahādur Shāh and the Emperor had to agree.



a letter (*nāmah*) to the British sovereign. George Thompson who was to take the Imperial *nāmah* was given the title of *Safir al-Dawlah Mushīr-al-Mulk Bahādur Muṣliḥ Jang*. He exhibited greater courage and integrity than Rammohun Roy, for, in his official communication to the president of the Board of Control he made it clear that "I have the honour to hold the appointment of Agent to the King of Delhi." Ḥakīm Aḥsan-Allah *Khān*<sup>1</sup> explained to him the history and implications of the case which he was to present before the British Government in London.

Bahādur *Shāh*'s *nāmah* makes interesting reading : after referring to the greatness and virtues of his ancestor, Timūr, the aged Emperor analyses the causes of the decline of the Mughul Empire, attributing it mainly to "the disloyalty of our own servants." Then he refers to the East India Company's offer "to aid His Imperial Majesty with the means at their disposal." Continuing, Bahādur *Shāh* added that "His Majesty *Shāh* 'Ālam, confiding in the honour of the British Government, gratefully accepted the proffered assistance ... Thus was our friendship renewed..., and thank God..., every statesman and Governor who has come here from your throne to rule the British possessions in India, has exhibited the loyalty and respect due to this House,...But now unhappily the present authorities of India have adopted such measures as have totally destroyed the flower and name of this kingdom. The etiquette and tokens of respect which former Governors always observed towards this House, have been completely abolished. In consequence I have suffered much ruin of heart in my old age, and am reluctantly constrained to trouble you ... I do so, in the hope of receiving aid from your goodwill and friendship." The Emperor scrupulously avoided mentioning his specific grievances or issues that he wanted to raise. What he expected of Queen Victoria was "that Your Majesty will in consideration of the friendship which

<sup>1</sup> Aḥsan Allāh *Khān* was the personal physician and chief adviser of Bahādur *Shāh*. For his life and the role played by him in the Revolution, see "Introduction" to his *Memoirs*, edited by the present writer and published by the Pakistan Historical Society (Karachi, 1958).

has so long existed between Your Majesty's predecessors, and this ancient House, command Your servants, under whose protection the Chiefs of India have placed themselves, to give a prompt and just consideration to the representations and claims I have laid before them."<sup>1</sup> The letter leaves no doubt as to how jealously the helpless Emperor wanted to guard his *de jure* sovereignty. Bahādur Shāh could not have been ignorant of the nature of British imperialism and its expansionist activities; perhaps he also knew that Queen Victoria would not take any drastic steps to stop them. Nevertheless, he thought it necessary to keep the struggle alive so that the parties concerned should not forget that the Mughul Emperor was still the *de jure* Sovereign in the subcontinent. This point has been elucidated by some of the modern writers in a thoroughly convincing manner. "It seems clear," says an English writer, "that the King of Delhi could have no juristic obligation of obedience to a power which having ceased to recognize his paramount authority had neglected to exact from him any acknowledgement of formal dependence upon his late ceremonial subordinate... He had the right, but not the power... the legal rights were dormant, not extinct, and were ready to be revived the moment they could be clothed with power..." Such a moment arrived on 11 May, 1857; Bahādur Shāh exercised his 'dormant rights' by taking over the administration in his hands. Percival Spear is perfectly right in declaring that Bahādur Shāh "waged war.....But he was no rebel against constituted authority... he had merely exercised rights which Indian opinion had conceded to his ancestors through eleven generations."<sup>2</sup>

### Constitutional Theory of the "Mutiny"

The steps taken by the last two Emperors of Delhi to have their claims for sovereignty recognised by the British authorities in Hind-Pakistan or in England look like a fruitless effort. Actually it is otherwise. If the Mughul Emperor had

1 For the Imperial *nāmah* and other relevant documents, see Majumdar, pp. 284-89.

2 Spear, *op. cit.* pp. 225-26.

allowed the Company to assume the *de jure* sovereignty along with powers to govern the subcontinent the chances of a revolution and the War of Independence would have become considerably meagre. The people of Hind-Pakistan, particularly the Muslims, were closely attached to the occupant of the Mughul throne, however powerless and inefficient he might be. No better evidence for this pro-Mughul sentiment can be adduced than the fact that the Revolutionaries of 1857 accepted Bahādur Shāh as their emperor-leader. In the areas where British authority was overthrown the local leaders who assumed powers of administration proclaimed the suzerainty of the Emperor by a beat of drums. Even Ḥaḍrat Mahal, who represented the Nawab-Wazirs of Awadh, on whom 'Kingship' had been "conferred" by Lord Hastings with the object of setting up a rival to the 'King' of Delhi, reverted to the old position: her son Birjis Qadr was only the *nā'ī* of Awadh, and the sovereignty of Bahādur Shāh was proclaimed soon after the outbreak of the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> Wherever practicable the local chiefs had their positions confirmed by the Emperor; in nearly all cases the Revolutionary sepoys and *Ghāzīs* sent contingents to Delhi. In short, the Mughul Emperor became automatically the leader of the Great Revolution, and therefore judged from a strictly constitutional point of view the "Mutiny" was a rebellion of the Company's authorities against their *de jure* Sovereign.<sup>2</sup> On 11 May, 1857, Bahādur Shāh resumed administrative powers which his grandfather had delegated to the East India Company; he took this step because it may be argued, the Company had failed to govern the

1 See, for instance, the proclamation made by the public *crier*, in Ḥusaynī, Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥaydar *Qaysar al-Tawārikh* (Lucknow, 1906), II.

2 Even Sir Syed Ahmed Khān who, after 1857, has nothing but contempt for Bahādur Shāh, admits that the people, excepting in Delhi, considered him to be their Emperor and regarded the Hon'ble East India Company as merely the administrator of the territories of Hindustān. See, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, *Risālah Ashāb-i-Bagh̃ īwat-i-Hind* (ed. by Mahmud Husain, Karachi, 1955), p. 6, also see, Buckler, F W., *The Political Theory of the Indian Mutiny*, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series, V, pp. 71 seq. and VII, pp. 131-65.

people to their satisfaction. The contribution of Bahādur Shāh and his predecessor to his peoples' struggle for freedom was to provide a constitutional background for the Revolution of 1857; those who sacrificed their lives in the course of the War of Independence believed that they were doing it for a cause. This was not a mean contribution.

### Policy of economic exploitation

The Company's rule in Hind-Pakistan lasted just one hundred years (1757-1858). The first thirty years are marked by acquisition of wealth and extension of political influence. In less than fifteen years (1757-1771) the Company had managed to collect nearly twenty-nine crores of rupees by bringing about frequent changes in the *Nāzims* of Bengal and collecting presents, and other measures of similar nature.<sup>1</sup> The methods adopted by Warren Hastings to replenish the Company's treasury are well-known and may be referred to only briefly. He stopped the payment of twenty-six lakhs of rupees which, under the *farmān* of the *dīwānī*, the Company had to pay annually to the Emperor, and sold the districts of Karah and Allahabad, which belonged to him, for fifty lakhs of rupees. He was satisfied with these 'achievements' and wrote to the Directors: "I have been happily furnished with an accidental concourse of circumstances to relieve the Company in the distress of their affairs."<sup>2</sup> In 1773, Hastings lent his forces to the Nawab-Wazir of Awadh for the destruction of

1 In 1757 Mir Ja'far was made to pay £ 12, 38, 575 as the price of his office; in 1760 Mir Qāsim was given the same office for £ 2,00,269; three years later Mir Ja'far was brought back and paid £ 5,00,165; in 1765 Najm al-Dawlah paid £ 2,30,356 on his accession to the *masnad*. "Besides these sums received in presents amounting within eight years to £ 21, 69,665, further sums were claimed and obtained as restitution within this period amounting to £ 3,770,833." Dutt, Romesh, *The Economic History of India* (London, 1906), p. 33.

These figures have been taken from the House of Commons Committee's Third Report, 1773, p. 311.

2 Quoted in Thompson and Garrat, p 126.

the Ruhilahs.<sup>1</sup> The Raja of Banaras was asked in 1778 to pay five lakhs in addition to his regular annual payments; the demand was repeated in 1779 and again in 1780. The Raja offered a bribe of 2 lakhs; it was accepted, but, to quote the words of the Select Committee of 1873, "with 2,23,000 of the raja's money in his pocket, he persecutes him to destruction." To punish the Raja the Governor-General sent to Banaras "a boy of twenty-one, ignorant of Persian and everything else that was relevant, but entirely Hasting's creature." The Raja was fined fifty lakhs, and ultimately deposed; a new Raja was appointed and the annual tribute was raised to forty lakhs.<sup>2</sup>

The conduct of Hastings in the affair of the Begams of Awadh (mother and grandmother of Nawab Āṣaf al-Dawlah) is most reprehensible. Āṣaf al-Dawlah, whom the Company's servants "robbed. . . without scruple by loans advanced at an exorbitant interest," suggested to the Governor-General that he should be allowed to seize the Begams' wealth "to enable him to discharge his obligations to the Company". He was not only given permission to plunder the ladies, but the British authorities helped the Nawab in extorting money from them. The combined forces of the Company and the Nawab besieged the Begams' palace in Fyzabad; their attendants were tortured and they themselves were subjected to severe hardships and forced to surrender a million sterling.<sup>3</sup> Thornton rightly remarks that "it seems impossible to exempt those to whom they owe their suffering from the charge of cruelty, or to deny that the series of transactions of which those sufferings form part, present a very

1 The Nawab's offer said: "Should the Rohilla Sirdars be guilty of a breach of their agreement, and the English gentlemen will thoroughly exterminate them and settle me in their country, I will in that case pay them fifty lakhs of rupees in ready money, and besides exempt them from paying any tribute to the King out of the Bengal revenues" *Ibid.*, p. 129.

The occasion of a breach of agreement by the "Rohilla Sirdars" did not arise, but "the English gentlemen" did exterminate them and settled the Nawab in their country and thus got the promised reward.

2 Cf. Thompson and Garrat, pp. 160-61. 150

3 *Ibid.*, p. 163.

discreditable passage in history of the connection of England and India".<sup>1</sup>

Cornwallis who succeeded Hastings as Governor-General in 1785 was not unscrupulous in his methods, but the permanent settlement and some other administrative measures of his regime adversely affected the economic condition of the territories governed by the Company. In his lengthy minute 'respecting the permanent Settlement' Sir John Shore has discussed the various aspects of the economic conditions in Bengal. "The Company", he wrote, "are merchants as well as sovereigns of the country. The remittances to Europe of revenues are made in the commodities of the country which are purchased by them.....Every information from the time of Bernier to the acquisition of the *Dewani* shows the internal trade of the country.....to have been very considerable.....But from the year 1765 the reverse has taken place....."<sup>2</sup>

#### **Decline of indigenous industry**

Besides annexations of large territories the first quarter of the nineteenth century is marked by a decline in industries, particularly weaving which, in the words of Romesh Dutt, was "the national industry of the people." The manufacture of silk cloth was discouraged by a mandate according to which silk-winders were not allowed to work anywhere except in the Company's factories; as far as cotton fabrics were concerned "the people who had exported these goods to the markets of Europe and Asia in previous centuries began to import them in increasing quantities."<sup>3</sup> In addition to the steps taken by the Company's government to discourage textile industry in the subcontinent prohibitive duties were levied on the export of Hind-Pakistani goods.<sup>4</sup>

1 Thornton, Edward, *The History of the British Empire in India* (London, 1843), II, 332.

2 For Sir John Shore's Minute see the Fifth Report, 1812, paras. 131, 135.

3 In 1794, cotton goods worth £ 156 were sent out from England to "parts east of the Cape of Good Hope", twenty years later (1813) the figure stood at £ 108, 824. Cf. Dutt, pp. 256-57.

4 "It is also a melancholy instance of the wrong done to India by the country on which she has become dependent. It was stated ...(in 1813) that the

Even agriculture, on which nearly four-fifths of the people of the subcontinent depended, could not escape the effects of the changes made by the Company's Government; "in Bengal the Land Tax was fixed at over 90 per cent of the rental, and in Northern India at over 80 per cent. of the rental, between 1793 and 1822.....The last Mahomedan ruler of Bengal, in the last year of his administration (1764) realised a land revenue of £ 8,17,553; within thirty years the British rulers raised a land revenue of £ 26,80,000 in the same Province."<sup>1</sup> In other parts of the subcontinent also the revenue realised by the British was much more than in the time of the previous rulers. Bishop Heber who had travelled extensively in British territories and the Princely States wrote in 1826: "No Native Prince demands the rent which we do"; four years later Colonel Briggs corroborated this view in these words: "A land Tax like that which now exists in India, professing to absorb the whole of the land-lord's rent, was never known under any Government in Europe or Asia."<sup>2</sup> Under the Muslim rulers not only was the rate of land-tax much less than what was demanded by the Company, but the people enjoyed another advantage also. Whatever was collected by them in the form of taxes was spent in the subcontinent and over its people. "The gorgeous palaces and monuments they

cotton and silk goods of India up to the period could be sold for a profit in British market at a price from 50 to 60 per cent. lower than those fabricated in England. It consequently became necessary to protect the latter by duties of 70 and 80 per cent. on their value. or by positive prohibition. . . Had India been independent, she would have retaliated, would have imposed prohibitive duties upon British goods, and would thus have preserved her own industry from annihilation. This act of self-defence was not permitted her; she was at the mercy of the stranger. British goods were forced upon her without paying any duty; and the foreign manufacturer employed the arm of political injustice to keep down and ultimately strangle a competitor with whom he could not have contended on equal terms." J. Mill, *History of British India*, Wilson's continuation, Book I, chap. VIII, note (London, 1858); also quoted in Dutt, pp 262-63.

1 Dutt, p. IX.

2 *Ibid* p X.

built", Dutt rightly points out, "as well as the luxuries and displays in which they indulged, fed and encouraged the manufactures and artisans of India. Nobles and Commanders of the army, Subadars, Dewans, and Kazis, and a host of inferior officers in every province and every district followed the example of the Court; and mosques and temples, roads, canals and reservoirs, attested to their wide liberality, or even to their vanity... the proceeds of taxation flowed back to the people and fructified their trade and industry. But a change came over India under the rule of the East India Company.....In one shape or another all that could be raised in India by an excessive taxation flowed to Europe, after paying for a starved administration."<sup>1</sup> To these comments may be added the very significant fact that "the luxuries and displays" of Muslim rulers and noblemen have immensely enriched the cultural and artistic wealth of the subcontinent. The *Tāj Maḥal* at Agra and the *Jāmi' Masjids* of Delhi and Lahore will do honour to the cultural heritage of any people.

### **Economic Drain**

An important feature of the financial side of the Company's Government was that the Indian tax-payer was made to pay not only for the administration of the territories under British control and their costly wars of conquest and aggression, but also for handsome dividends to the share-holders in England. During a period of forty-six years (1791-1837) there was a net surplus of thirty-two million sterling; this amount was sent to England for the payment of dividends. The money sent from India not being sufficient for the purpose, "there was an increasing debt—called the Public Debt of India—adding to the burdens of the tax-payers who had to pay the interest. This is the saddest episode in the sad financial history of India."<sup>2</sup> The Indian Debt was an ever-growing burden on her people: from seven million sterling in 1792 it had risen to thirty million in 1829. The extent of economic ruin which this policy of draining millions

1 Dutt, p. XII.

2 For a detailed statement of relevant figures, see Dutt, pp. 398-420.



of pounds from India must have caused can be guessed if one bears in mind the fact that the wages of a labourer in those days did not exceed three pence a day.<sup>1</sup> According to the Charter Act of 1833 the Company had ceased to be a trading concern, but a provision was made to continue the payment of interest on its stock from the revenues of the subcontinent at the high rate of 10½ per cent. Dutt considers it to be "an act of injustice to India". The Directors and officers of the Company could not have been unaware of this "injustice"; but it appears that extensive conquests and annexations had made them selfish and power-drunk; in providing solutions to administrative problems they never thought that it was their duty to see the Indian side also.<sup>2</sup> Bentinck's 'Settlement'<sup>3</sup> of the North-Western Provinces and resumption of rent-free holdings of persons who could not "prove the original validity of their titles", were measures which created discontent among the land-lords. Dalhousie's *Inam Commission* confiscated more than twenty thousand estates during five years preceding the Great Revolution. Whatever arguments might have been advanced in favour of these "reforms" they certainly added to the growth of disaffection against foreign rule.

1 'Allāmah Fādl-i-Haqq refers to the economic distress of the people caused by the Company's financial policy in his article on the Great Revolution. An English translation by the present writer under the title, "*The Story of the War of Independence*" has been published in the *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi, Vol. V, Part I.

2 Some Englishmen gifted with political foresight tried to draw the attention of the authorities concerned to the evil consequences of their policies. Montgomery Martin, for instance, wrote: "I do not think it possible for human ingenuity to avert entirely the evil effects of a continued drain of three or four million pounds a year from a distant country like India, and which is never returned to it in any shape." Quoted in Dutt, p. 410.

3 The evils of the settlement became evident in the course of its practical working. In an address to the Lieutenant-Governor the petitioners called it "an instrument of our destruction". Their main grouse was that the officers paid no heed to their interests because they had unlimited powers. They feared that "the poor will be slaves of the rich and subject themselves to the oppression of the great". *Vide, Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh* (Information Department, U P, Lucknow, 1957), I, 165.

## Activities of the Christian missionaries

Perhaps no aspect of British impact on Indian life embittered the feelings of the people against foreign rule more intensely than the activities of Christian missionaries and their patronage by the Company's authorities. Throughout the long period of Muslim ascendancy the non-Muslims had enjoyed complete freedom of religion. The message of Islam was mostly conveyed to the people by the *ṣūfi shaykhs* of the various *silsilahs* and other religious leaders; the State and the rulers as such did not interfere with the religious life and practices of the people. Under the Mughul Emperors who were remarkably liberal in their policies the Christian missionaries enjoyed the liberty of preaching their faith. Akbar<sup>1</sup> and Jahāngir showed great regard to Christianity and its followers; *Shahjahan* was forced to take action against the Portuguese pirates for their undesirable activities, but even in his time the crown-prince, *Dārā Shukoh*, had taken a Christian wife.<sup>2</sup> In 'Ālamgīr's time "the Jesuits have a Church in Agra, and a building which they call a college, where they privately instruct in the doctrines of our religion the children of five-and-twenty or thirty Christian families..."<sup>3</sup> The Emperor's *farmān* conferring grants and properties on Hindu and Jain temples and shrines or their priests exist even to this day.<sup>4</sup> In the earlier stages of the history of the European settlement some leading Roman ecclesiastics, including St. Francis Xavier, came to the subcontinent and "not without some degree of compulsion, a large Roman Catholic community

1 He went to the extent of placing his ten-year old son, Murād, under Father Monserrate for "instruction in the Portuguese language and Christian morals." The missionaries who visited the Imperial Court and stayed there for a number of years, however, "did not succeed in converting either the Sovereign or his nobles, or indeed in making many converts of any kind." Cf. Smith, V. A., *The Oxford History of India* (Third ed., 1958), p. 352.

2 Šābri, Imdād, *Firangiun kā Jāl* (Delhi, 1949), p. 33.

3 Bernier, Francois, *Travels in the Mogul Empire, A D. 1656-1668*, (London, 1914), p. 286.

4 See, for instance, *J.P.H.S.*, Vol. VI. 55-56.

was formed on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts,"<sup>1</sup> In the beginning of the eighteenth century some German protestant missionaries came to the Danish settlement of Tranquebar, south of Madras; they were subsequently followed by Swartz, a well-known missionary figure in the south.<sup>2</sup> In 1799 William Carey (1761-1834) came out to India and worked for seven years in Malda; in the same year two other missionaries, Ward and Marshman, arrived with the intention of assisting him, but they were not allowed to settle in the territories of the Company, because they had come without a licence from the India House. They found an asylum in the Danish settlement of Serampur; Carey also joined them. The fraternity of the Serampur Missionaries is known for their educational work which, they thought, was necessary for any success in their missionary activities. Their sustained efforts, however, met with only a limited success; nevertheless, some influential Hindu families of Bengal accepted Christianity.

Under Wellesley, who has been described as "the first ruler of India to stand forth decisively as a Christian", the missionaries began to receive official patronage. In his opinion the "low tone which marked the Indian services" was due to "the neglect of Christian duties, the ignorance of Christian doctrines." To meet this deficiency he laid down the principle that the head of Fort William College "shall always be a clergyman of the Church of England." The result of the patronage extended by the Governor-General to the missionaries could not long remain in doubt<sup>3</sup>; they soon began to abuse this privilege and started interfering with the religious activities of the people. One of the causes of the "mutiny" at Vellur in 1806 was stated to be "the general uneasiness which had taken possession of the native mind in consequence of the supposed activity of Christian

1 Marshman, J.C., *The History of India* (Serampur, 1867), Part I, p. 342.

2 It is interesting to note that in 1779 Swartz went to Haydai "All to get something out of him, but "threatening messages" were all that he brought back. C. H. I., V, 281.

3 Hutton, Rev. W. F., *The Marquess of Wellesley in "Rulers of India Series"* (Oxford, 1897), pp. 124-26.

missionaries and of certain 'missionary chaplains'. The dread of a general destruction of caste and forcible conversions to Christianity was not confined to the Sipahis. The most preposterous stories were current in the Bazaars."<sup>1</sup> Although John Kaye, the well-known historian of the period, seems to be hesitant in accepting this view it is difficult to ignore the evidence of an important person like Barlow, who was acting as Governor-General at the time; he "considered it necessary for the security of the Company's interests in Bengal to put a stop to the labours of the Serampore Missionaries, lest the natives should regard them as an interference with their religion."<sup>2</sup> Barlow had not taken this decision 'under panic', as has been suggested by some writers; he was certainly not unaware of the missionary activities in his own capital and the areas surrounding it.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the missionaries could not get any support in the Court of Directors also; evidently this was not due merely to panic. The supporters of the missionaries however, hit back with some force: Wilberforce who had failed to procure provisions for the encouragement of missionary activity in the Charter Act of 1793 succeeded in his efforts in 1815. The new Act laid down that "it is the duty of this country to promote the interest and happiness of the native inhabitants of British dominions in India and such measures ought to be adopted as may tend to the introduction among them of useful knowledge, and of religious and moral, improvement". For the furtherance of these objects facilities were to be provided by the Governments "respecting the intercourse of Europeans with the interior of the country" and "persons desirous of going to and remaining in India for the

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1 Kaye, Sir John, and Malleison, Colonel, *History of the Indian Mutiny* (Langmans, Green, and Co., London, Reprinted, June, 1898), I, 180-81.

2 Marshman, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 144.

3 In 1801 Wellesley had appointed William Carey as professor of oriental languages at the Fort William College, Calcutta. Here he had vast opportunities of carrying on missionary work along with teaching and his literary activities.

In 1804 the Bible Society was founded with the object of publishing biblical literature: the Governor-General was among the first donors.

above purposes" were to be given permission to settle and work there. A further provision was made "for the maintenance and support of a church establishment"; the King was authorized "to erect, found, and constitute one bishopric for the whole of the British territories in the East Indies", and one archdeaconry in each presidency. The Company's Government was to pay "£ 5,000 per annum to the bishop and 2,000 to each of the archdeacons"<sup>1</sup>. The supporters of the Scottish Church took advantage of the discussions and put forward their own claims; the motion was lost and no provision could be made in the Act. The Court of Directors, however, decided by a resolution to appoint a Scottish chaplain in each presidency, his salary "far exceeding the emoluments of the great majority of ecclesiastical preferments in Scotland"<sup>2</sup>. During the first half of the nineteenth century the Government's interest in and patronage of missionary activities continued to grow and its policies in that respect became more definite. In 1806 there were only 21 chaplains in State service, while in 1854 their number was 142, and 3 bishops and 3 archdeacons headed the list.

The patronage of missionary activities by the Company's authorities had far-reaching effects. Even S. N. Sen, who does not agree with the view that the rising of 1857 was a national movement thinks that his "very efficiency as an educationist was a source of great anxiety to the orthodox Indian, as the missionary did not confine his efforts to the improvement of the student's mind alone but strove for what was to him of far greater importance- the reclamation of latter's soul . . . and according to his way of thinking conversion was the inevitable corollary of western education."<sup>3</sup> Besides the schools and colleges, the missionaries, supported by Christian officers, carried on their work in the jails, the bazars, the fairs of the Hindus and Muslims, in fact at any place where they could hope to get a willing or even an unwilling

1 Beveridge, H. *A Comprehensive History of India*, (London, 1872), III, 5-6.

2 Thornton, IV, 247n

3 Sen, S. N., *Eighteen Fifty-Seven* (Delhi, 1957), p. 91.

audience. A Bengali missionary, Gopinath Nandi referring to his work in the jail at Fathpur says : "Every Sabbath morning the Gospel was preached by me. The privilege was granted by our pious magistrate." Syed Ahmed Khan adds some more instances of official patronage.<sup>1</sup>

In the earlier stages the missionaries concentrated their efforts on the conversion of the Hindus, among whom the chances of success were far greater than the Muslims.<sup>2</sup> With the expansion of their activities, however, they came into contact with the Muslims also. The latter proved to be formidable opponents; "In Islam", Muir writes, "we have an active and powerful enemy."<sup>3</sup> The Muslims of the subcontinent, despite the political domination of a Christian power, had not yielded to the new forces, and a number of '*ulamā* and *mashā'ikh* had come forward and devoted themselves to guarding their faith against the onslaughts of the missionaries.<sup>4</sup>

#### Western education

Like Christian missionary efforts, western education also found its early response among the Hindus. This was not unnatural, because the pioneer work in the educational field was done by the missionaries. The first institution for higher education, the Hindu College, was opened in January, 1817, as a result of the combined efforts of David Hare, Chief Justice Hyde East, Rammohun Roy and some other Hindu leaders. Rammohun Roy remained in the background and did not attend the meeting

1 *Risālah Asbāb-i-Baḡhāwat-i-Hind*, (ed. Mahmud Husain, Karachi, n.d) p 15 seq., also see Kay and Malleison, I, 135.

2 In fact, Islam was still achieving greater successes than Christianity as far as conversions from Hinduism were concerned. Marshman's remarks in this connection are significant; "the natives of the country", he writes, "had been accustomed to religious discussions and conversions, and that during the seven years in which the Serampore Missionaries had been labouring in Bengal, the Hindoos who had become Mussulmans greatly outnumbered those who had embraced Christianity, and, without creating any alarm." Part II, 144.

3 Muir, Sir William *The Mohammedan Controversy* (Edinburgh, 1897), p. 2.

4 For their activities in the first half of the nineteenth century and religious disputations between the leaders of the Muslims and Christians, see next chapter.

which was held at East's house. This was followed by the Jainarain College at Banaras (1818) and the Agra College in 1823. It is to be noted, however, that "the aims of the missionaries were naturally directed to using education, not as an end in itself, but as a means of evangelization."<sup>1</sup> To achieve this object they acted in a manner which alienated the sympathies of the people, both Hindus and Muslims. The opening of mission schools, for instance, was unexceptionable, but, as has been pointed out by Syed Ahmed Khan, highly placed officers used to persuade the people to send their children to them. Here, they were given lessons in Christianity and answered questions put to them according to its teachings.<sup>2</sup> Syed Ahmed Khan truly observes that the poverty of the people and the patronage of the Government forced them to send their children to these schools. In the villages and small towns conditions were far worse; the native deputy-inspectors who visited these schools had earned the nickname of *kālā-pūdī*.<sup>3</sup>

However, in course of time some of the Muslim leaders began to realize that the question of acquiring western education was as important for them as for the Hindus. Accordingly, a reference was made to *Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz* who was the most distinguished scholar of the period, he was asked if there were any objections to studying English and going to institutions which imparted western education. He gave a *fatwā* declaring them to be lawful.<sup>4</sup> Even this verdict from the greatest living authority on Islamic learning did not create among the Muslims an enthusiasm for western education. Their own traditions of learning, even in this period of political decadence, were too strong to admit of

<sup>1</sup> James, H R., *Education and Statesmanship in India* (Longmans Green & Co., London, 1911), p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> "Who is your Saviour?" was an oft-repeated question. Their reply to this question is so obvious that Syed Ahmad Khan avoids repeating it and simply says that they answered according to the Christian belief and received prizes for it p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Risālah*, p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> *Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz, Fatāwā-i-'Azizī*, Delhi, 1322 A.H., p. 186

a hasty change. Delhi, Lucknow, Patna, Murhīdābad were still living centres of cultural and literary activity; besides them smaller towns were also making some contribution to the development of knowledge.

In the meantime the Company's Government had also become interested in educating the people. The Charter Act of 1813 provided for the allotment of a sum of not less than 1,00,000 annually for "the revival and improvement of literature, and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the science among the inhabitants of the British territories in India." But, even this amount was not utilized and was allowed to accumulate for ten years, except for small stipends to some scholars, although the Court of Directors, in its despatch of 3 June, 1814, had expressed the view that the objects of the provision of the Charter Act could be attained through the medium of "public colleges."<sup>1</sup> In 1823 the General Committee of Public Instruction was formed and H. H. Wilson, a great admirer and advocate of Hindu learning, was appointed its secretary; "the reports of the Committee begin regularly from the year 1831." The Committee was not in favour of introducing English in the Government colleges, but in 1827 the Directors sanctioned the opening of English classes in the existing institutions. In 1834 T.B. Macaulay<sup>2</sup> became the president of the Committee; he was a zealous supporter of English, and it was due to the force of his arguments, incorporated in a

1 It is significant that in the official despatch the Court of Directors had referred only to the education of the Hindus and Sanskrit learning; the Muslims were completely ignored.

See *A History of the Freedom Movement* (published by Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi), II, 198-99; also see James, p. 18.

2 Macaulay was not in too happy a condition when he came to India. Major Basu calls him a needy person and quotes passages from his letters to show his condition before his departure for India and the prospects of returning to England at the age of thirty-nine with a fortune of thirty thousand pounds. See Basu, Major B.D., *Rise of the Christian Power in India* (Second addition, Calcutta, 1931), p. 802.



Minute,<sup>1</sup> that Bentinck's Government took a decision in its favour in 1835.<sup>2</sup> It was a vital decision and had far-reaching effects; it did not only cut off the people of the subcontinent from their own cultural traditions but also minimized the chances of the development of local languages.

Far more important were the motives with which these changes were being introduced in the system of education. Macaulay himself betrays the true feelings of the "reformer"; in 1838 he wrote to his father: "It is my firm belief if our plans of education are followed up there will not be a single idolater among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence"<sup>3</sup> Thus Macaulay's high-sounding phrases as for instance, the "stupendous process" of reconstructing "a decomposed society"—had a hidden meaning also. The comments of the *Indian Daily News*, though made seventy-three years later (30 March, 1909), were not beside the mark. "Lord Macaulay's triumph", the paper said, "was really the

1 Macaulay condemns Arabic and Sanskrit and tries to prove the superiority of western sciences in a manner which shows his complete ignorance of oriental learning. "It will be hardly disputed," he says, "I suppose, that the department of literature in which the Eastern writers stand highest is poetry. And I certainly never met with any Orientalist who ventured to maintain that the Arabic and Sanskrit poetry could be compared to that of the great European nations" and again, "The question, now before us, is simply whether, when we can patronise sound philosophy and true history, we shall countenance at the public expense medical doctrines which would disgrace an English farrier, astronomy which would move laughter in girls at an English boarding-school, history abounding with kings thirty feet high and reigns 30,000 years long, and geography made up of seas of treacle and seas of butter. The languages of Western Europe civilized Russia. I cannot doubt that they will do for the Hindu what they have done for the Tartar."

Quoted in Boulgor, D.C., *Lord William Bentinck* (Rulers of India Series, Oxford, 1897) pp. 154-56.

2 The Resolution, dated 7 March, 1835 laid down, "His Lordship in Council is of opinion that the great object of the British Government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science among the natives of India, and that all the funds appropriated for the purposes of education, would be best employed on English education alone." Quoted in James, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

3 Basu p. 791; also see Thompson and Garratt, p. 319.

triumph of a deliberate intention to undermine the religious and social life of India . . . how behind his splendid pharases, there lay quite a different view.”<sup>1</sup> In the cloudy atmosphere created by the administrative and economic policies of the Company on the one hand and its efforts at educational and “moral” reform, on the other, even those changes which had no hidden motives behind them were liable to be misunderstood. The abolition of *sati*, the suppression of *thagi* and discouragement of child sacrifice were, for instance, good measures, but they could not be enforced without opposition from orthodox sections of the Hindus; the latter could hardly be expected to tolerate the recklessness of English educated students who “would fling beef-bones” into their houses.

### Social injustice

Besides his attempt at social reform Bentinck “had achieved fame by permitting Indians to drive to the Governor-General’s house in carriage.”<sup>2</sup> This, however, was an exception in the midst of countless cases of gross racial discrimination witnessed in the daily routine of official life as well as social gatherings and contacts. As early as 1819 Elphinstone had told Malcolm that “it has sometimes struck me that the fault of our younger politicians . . . is a contempt for the natives, and an inclination to carry everything with a high hand.”<sup>3</sup> Syed Ahmed Khan has rightly laid emphasis on this racial estrangement as one of the main causes of disaffection of the people; “our Government and the Hindustanis (the people) are two separate pieces of stone, one being white and the other dark in colour”. In social life there was nothing common between the ruling class and the people they governed; they belonged to different races, they followed different religions and had different social customs and practices; obviously it was difficult for them to be sincere in their loyalty to the foreign Government.<sup>4</sup> The officers of the Company

1 Quoted in Basu, p. 791.

2 Spear, T. G. P. *The Nabobs*, quoted in Thompson and Garratt, p. 306 n. 1.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 306.

4 Cf. *Risālah*, p. 33.

Metcalfe in his reply to the farewell address “signed by more than five hundred of the most intelligent and influential native gentlemen resident at the

treated the Hind-Fakistanis in a manner which was often marked by deliberate and studied insults. A Muslim officer, Hidāyat 'Alī, refers to the attitude of the British commanders in these words: "When any sepoy goes to see or speak to them at their Bungalows they get much displeased."<sup>1</sup> This deplorable feature of European society in India had struck some British statesmen; "Sir Henry Strachey in his report laid before Parliament, attributes many of the defects in our administration in Bengal to the immeasurable distance between us and the natives, and afterwards adds that there is scarcely a native in his district who would think of sitting down in the presence of an English gentleman."<sup>2</sup> However, those who were entrusted with the responsibility of administration did nothing to improve the situation, and the gulf between European officers and the people whom they governed became wider day by day. The feelings of the Muslims were particularly injured by this attitude of the foreigners for the simple reason that they were until lately the rulers of the land and also because they were not prepared to acknowledge the superiority of the West over their own traditions and ways of life. In short patriotism stood in the path of

capital" laments over the fact "that a difference in religion and customs should operate, as it does, in a great degree, to prevent the benefits of social intercourse between the native and European communities in India, and consequently to preclude that personal intimacy, and that knowledge of private character, which are the chief cements of mutual attachment." Quoted in Thompson and Garratt, 397

<sup>1</sup> Hidāyat 'Alī was the subahdar of Rattary's Sikh Regiment; his loyalty to the British was unquestioned. He submitted to the Government a memorandum entitled, *A few words relative to the late Mutiny of the Bengal Army and the Rebellion in the Bengal Presidency*. The Bengal Government published it in 1858. It has been reprinted in Gubbins's *Mutinies in Oudh* (3rd ed.) as an appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Elphinstone as quoted in Thompson and Garratt, p. 307.

<sup>3</sup> Syed Ahmad Khan gives some more reasons for disaffection being greater among the Muslims than other peoples in the subcontinent. "There is no doubt", he says, "that these things were resented by the Muslims more (than others), the reasons being quite clear. For centuries the Muslims have been living a life of respect in this land, they are temperamentally sensitive; they

loyalty and the Company's authorities were not prepared to win the support of the people by relaxing the rigidity of their imperialistic outlook. Forty years after the Great Revolution a British historian, referring to the attitude of the people, remarked: "it is important to bear in mind that it would have been unnatural for them to feel towards an alien Government like ours the loyalty that can only co-exist with patriotism".<sup>1</sup>

#### Annexations: Sind, Panjab and Awadh

In consequence of the thoughtless policy of Lord Auckland (1836-42) the Company was involved in a disastrous war with Afghanistan, in which the British lost heavily in men and material and much more in prestige. But even after this bitter experience it did not change its policy. Ellenborough's short tenure of office (1842-44) is marked by one of the grossest acts of imperialistic aggressions. Outram who had been sent by the Government to seize the territories of Sind on account of the "offences" of its Amirs was "unable entirely to coincide in your views"; he adds, "I question whether any class of the people of Sind, except the Hindoo traders . . . would prefer a change . . . It grieves me to say that my heart, and the judgement God has given us, unite in condemning the measures we are carrying out for his Lordship as most tyrannical—positive robbery. I consider, therefore that every life which may hereafter be lost in consequence will be a murder . . ."<sup>2</sup> His Lordship, however, had another officer who could carry out his policy much more successfully. Sir Charles Napier, "who had the advantage of total ignorance of any Indian language", declared a letter of the Amirs to be genuine, "which the best scholars in India said was probably a forgery." To what

are not ruled by avarice and have no greed for money; experience has shown that they can hardly tolerate things which other people do not bother about. Even if we accept that these national characteristics are not desirable, the Muslims are helpless; they are gifted with these qualities by nature and cannot change them." *Risālah*, p. 36.

1 Holmes, T. Rice, *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, (fifth edition, London, 1898), p. 558.

2 Quoted in Thompson and Garratt, p. 356.

extent the guilt of the Amirs of Sind was established is indicated by an entry in Napier's Diary: "We have no right to seize Sind, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be"<sup>1</sup> The annexation of Sind was condemned by several British statesmen but Ellenborough thought he had "added a province, fertile as Egypt." The Governor-General, however, ignored the fact that the people whom he was sent out to govern could not easily forget such "additions".

The case of the annexation of Panjab and the north-western regions by Dalhousie (1848-56) was different from that of Sind. The Government of the Amirs was, to use Outram's phraseology, "patriarchal," and "each chief certainly lives with, and for, his portion of the people"; the Sikh State, on the other hand, military in character, was manned by a minority, culturally inferior to the majority of the people whom it governed<sup>2</sup> For the Muslims the regime of Ranjit Singh was a veritable reign of terror; it was the Sikh tyranny that prompted Sayyid Ahmad Shahid to organize a *Jhal* Movement in the north-west. In the Panjab and north-western areas, therefore, the British rule was welcomed by the people; it was most certainly better than Sikh tyranny.

### Doctrine of Lapse

Dalhousie's axe also fell on several other parts of the subcontinent inflicting on the people wounds which could not be easily healed, "the Company were now in the full tide of their annexation-on-any-pretext fever."<sup>3</sup> For seizing Hindu States the Governor-General found an effective weapon, to which some

1 Sir W. Napier, *The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles Napier*, II, 218.

2 For the annexation of Sind "Napier received £ 70,000 prize money"; Outram refused to accept his share of £ 3,000.

3 "We must at the same time recognize," writes a modern biographer of Ranjit Singh, "that the Jats who formed the backbone of the Sikh Community were principally soldiers and became even more so as a result of the reforms of Guru Gobind Singh. Therefore, power, as Ranjit Singh... understood it, was not moral but military." Sinha, Narendra Krishna, *Ranjit Singh* (Third edition, Calcutta, 1951), p. 189.

3 Thompson and Garratt, p. 401.

historians have referred as "the doctrine of lapse." The adopted son of a Hindu Prince could not succeed to the throne of his adoptive father ; consequently if a ruler did not leave behind a son born to him the State was to lapse to the Company. Adoption being a recognized principle of Hindu Law, Dalhousie's "doctrine of lapse" was obviously devoid of justification. Much has been written on the injustice of this method of annexation as well as in defence of Dalhousie, and it is unnecessary here to discuss this question. By this device, however, Dalhousie took the States of Satara (1848), Jaitpur and Sambalpur (1849), Baghat (1850), Udaipur (1852), Jhansi (1853), and Nagpur (1854).

Besides "the doctrine of lapse," Dalhousie used other methods also to seize princely States or parts of their territories. In 1853 the Nizam had to part with the province of Berar for his "tardiness in paying for the Hyderabad contingent",<sup>1</sup> the territory was to be known as the Assigned Districts. Lord Curzon "amicably" incorporated it in British India in 1903 after a personal discussion with the Nizam, although "the Nizām did not share the Viceroy's view of the discussion and later complained that he had been intimidated. A revival of his claims called for the Reading declaration of 1926 whose uncompromising claim to complete sovereignty throughout India provided a convenient basis for the later action of the independent Indian government."<sup>2</sup> The annexation of Awadh has been discussed elsewhere in this book. Another step taken by Dalhousie to weaken the position of the Hind-Pakistan chiefs was the abolition of the titles of the Nawab of Carnatic and Raja of Tanjore and the pension of Nana Saḥib, the adopted son of the ex-Peshwa Baji Rao. The home authorities did not allow Dalhousie to deprive Bahādur Shāh of the Imperial title, but he succeeded in his manouvres to make the

1 According to the treaty, "the Nizam ceded in trust, districts yielding a gross revenue of fifty lacs of rupees, it being agreed that accounts should be annually rendered to the Nizam, and that any surplus revenue which might accrue should be paid to him." Atchison's *Treaties and Engagements* (Ed. 1876), V, p. 139.

2 Smith, pp. 755-56.

Emperor's heir-apparent "forgo the imperial name . . . . When heirs were lacking, Dalhousie abolished titles ; when they were plentiful he made abolition a condition of recognition of family headship against rival relatives."<sup>1</sup>

The accumulated effect of the policies of the Government and the activities of the missionaries was manifesting itself in a widespread discontent. Every action of the Government, by whatever intention it was motivated, added to the suspicions of the people.<sup>2</sup> Nothing is more dangerous for an alien Government than its vulnerability to the suspicions of the governed, and the misdirected policies of the British statesmen had made the Company's administrative system more than vulnerable.

<sup>1</sup> Spear in the revised text of *The Oxford History of India* (Third ed., 1958), p. 660

<sup>2</sup> The suspicions of the people about the policies of the Government had become so great that even useful measures such as the introduction of railways and postal communication were interpreted by some sections as encroachments on their religious practices and customs

## CHAPTER II

### REACTIONS

#### Shah Wali Allah's role as a reformer

It has already been mentioned that a vital cause of the disintegration of the Mughul Empire was the rise of the Marathas in the south and the Jats and the Sikhs in the north. The political leaders who were guilty of encouraging the forces of disruption, could not foresee the consequences of their short-sighted policies. For an intelligent mind, however, it was not difficult to read the signs of the coming disaster. It was also beyond doubt that the gradual decline of the Empire was affecting every phase of Muslim life. To save the Community from a total collapse drastic reform was necessary.

Shāh Wali Allāh who was the first great leader to realize the seriousness of the situation was born in 1703. The formative period of his life had synchronised with the early stages of the decline of the Mughul Empire. By 1719, when he started lecturing at the Madrasah-i-Rahimiyyah<sup>1</sup>, half a dozen Emperors had occupied the Peacock Throne; three of them had been murdered. Within the next five years two of the biggest semi-independent States—Awadh and Haydarābād—appeared on the map of the subcontinent; a reference to the unpatriotic policies of the influential Sayyid Brothers has already been made in the previous chapter. These and

<sup>1</sup> *Madrasah-i-Rahimiyyah*: It was founded by Shāh Wali Allāh's father, Shāh 'Abd al-Rahīm, who had earned fame as a scholar and *shaykh*. For some time he had worked with the 'ulamā who were entrusted with the task of preparing the monumental work on Islamic jurisprudence, the *Fatāwā-i-'Ālamgiri*. Though an eminent scholar Shāh 'Abd al-Rahīm's inclinations were towards Ṣūfism. He avoided the society of the wealthier classes, but he was not averse to giving necessary guidance to those who were anxious to serve the people. He, therefore, welcomed the nobles and officials who came to see him.



other symptoms of decline which were daily becoming more clear, and could not but have deeply affected the intelligent mind of *Shāh Wali Allāh*. The decline of the Empire, he knew, would not just mean the disintegration of a Government and its administrative machinery. The Mughul Emperor was much more than a Head of the State; he was the centre of gravity in the politico-social structure of Hind-Pakistan, and it is therefore not surprising that a general loosening of the administrative machinery had brought in its wake a gradual demoralization of the people.

*Shāh Wali Allāh* was the first popular leader of the Muslims to realize the need of reform but perhaps he was too young, and the scope of his activities was so limited that he could not take any substantial steps in that direction before going to *haji*. At Makkah he had his historic dream,<sup>1</sup> which settled his views and strengthened his determination. Now there was no doubt in his mind as to what his mission was: "I felt, that the revelation of these spiritual secrets to me is intended not only for the perfection and education of my own self but also for the guidance and betterment of all the people"<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, on his return from the *Hijāz* he prepared a comprehensive programme of reform and decided to train his pupils to implement it. He was fully conscious of the fact that considerable time would be required for a revolutionary change in the socio-political order. First and foremost, however, was the need to save the Empire from imminent collapse under Maratha pressure. *Shāh Wali Allāh* made the Muslim chiefs realize the magnitude of the danger and convinced them of the urgent need of making a combined effort to check it; their decisive victory in the Third battle of Panipat in 1761 was, in fact, the reward of his efforts.<sup>3</sup> He died in the following year, but not before he had trained a number of pupils to carry on his work; besides, some political leaders also were influenced by his teachings;

1 The story of the dream is narrated in detail in his *Fuyūd al-Haramayn* (Deoband, n.d.), pp. 88-89.

2 *Ham'ūr*, p. 15; also quoted in *A History of the Freedom Movement* (Karachi, 1937), Vol. I, p. 518.

3 For details see *HFM*, I, Chap. IX.

Najīb al-Dawlah who survived him by nearly ten years spent this period in serving the Government, trying his best to check the forces of disruption.<sup>1</sup>

Shāh Wali Allāh was absolutely clear about the scope of his reform movement. The work of the Prophet, he maintained, was to be continued by two sections of people: the rulers and statesmen had to administer the State in accordance with the Law, while the shaykhs and 'ulamā were to provide spiritual and intellectual guidance to the Muslims.<sup>2</sup> In the first half of the eighteenth century most of the leaders of these sections were men of a poor calibre, and needed reform. Shāh Wali Allāh's anxiety to improve their condition is manifest in his writings.

#### Mirza Mazhar Jan Janan's work

Shāh Wali Allāh was not alone among the religious leaders of the period who had realized the need of reform. Mirzā Mazhar Jān Jānān, his friend and contemporary, had a number of disciples among the Ruhilah chiefs.<sup>3</sup> He lived in Delhi but he occasionally visited parts of Rohilkhand, particularly Sambhal,<sup>4</sup> Moradabad,<sup>5</sup> Shahjahanpur,<sup>6</sup> and Agra,<sup>7</sup> He refers to his intimate relations with Hāfiz Rahmat Klān<sup>8</sup> in one of his letters. Besides providing his admirers and disciples with guidance

1 For Shāh Wali Allāh's letters to Najīb al-Dawlah, see Shāh Wali Allāh Dihlawī ki Siyāsī Maktūbāt (ed. by K. A. Nizami, Aligarh)

2 Cf. Fuyūḍ al-Ibrar, p. 88.

3 For references to some of them see his letters, which have been compiled by Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad, Murādābādī and published along with some letters of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qādir Gilānī, Shaykh Shahāb al-Dīn Suhrāwardī, Shāh Wali Allāh, Shāh Ghulām 'Alī and Qādī Thānā Allāh, Pānipatī, under the title Kalimāt-i-Tayyibāt (Mujtabai Press, Delhi, 1390 A.H.) / 1907

4 He says that for several years he had been visiting these places annually. See, Kalimāt, p. 41.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 52

8 *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 49.

in religious and spiritual matters he was anxious to reform the Muslim people, particularly those who occupied a prominent position in society or were connected with administration. He commanded tremendous influence over the people in the capital and some of the top-most leaders in Rohilkhand; the *Wazir*, 'Imād al-Mulk, also, had great regard for him and was in close contact with him.

The reformers were bound to come into clash with the selfish politicians who, barring a few exceptions, placed their own interests above those of the Empire and the people. They took a bold stand and not only refused to yield to authority but openly condemned the unpatriotic activities of selfish leaders, regardless of their position. This is amply borne out by the attitude of Mirza Jān Jānān towards 'Imād al-Mulk. In a letter he speaks of his relations with the Nawab and says that he would be prepared to advise him but only on the lines which, he thought, "would be useful for the people", although, he adds, "the words of the wise and noble persons carry no weight with him (The Nawab)".<sup>1</sup> Mirzā Jān Jānān's anxiety to preserve the position and prestige of Islām is indicated by his advice to Mawlawī Thānā Allāh of Sambhal who had probably written to him about a Maratha raid on Rohilkhand. The Mawlawī is advised to pray ceaselessly for the victory of the Muslims; "the claim of Islām is superior to all other things".

Mirzā Jān Jānān was assassinated, it has been suspected, at the instance of Najaf Khān in 1780.<sup>2</sup> His efforts however did not go

<sup>1</sup> *Kalimat* pp. 61-62

<sup>2</sup> Najaf Khān held supreme power at the Mughul Court for nearly eleven years (1771-8). He had won Clive's favour in his early years. One of the conditions of the Treaty of Allahabad (1765 A.C.) was that Shāh 'Ālam would pay two lakhs annually to Najaf Khān. Though intelligent and shrewd Najaf Khān was not very patriotic in his policies. In the last years of his life he had become a slave of dissipation. As a result of excesses he became consumptive and died at the early age of forty-five in 1782. See Sarkar, J. N., *The Fall of the Mughal Empire* (second ed., Calcutta, 1950) Vol. III, pp. 136-63.

unrewarded, because the Ruhilahs among whom he had worked profited by his guidance and became a stout and patriotic people. Their defeat at the hands of the combined forces of Shujā' al-Dawlah and Warren Hastings in 1774 had brought their rule to an end, but in spite of this catastrophe they maintained their traditions of patriotism and bravery till the last moment. In 1857 the ablest and bravest of the Revolutionary commanders was a Ruhilah chief; and it was also on the soil of Rohilkhand that some of the toughest actions of the War were fought.

#### Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz declares the subcontinent a dar-al-harb

Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 1823), the eldest son of Shāh Walī Allāh carried on the work of his father for more than six decades. During this period political conditions in the subcontinent underwent great changes. The Marathas had ultimately succeeded in establishing their influence over the Emperor and his court; in 1784 Shāh 'Ālam appointed Sindhia, the Maratha chief of Gwalior, as his regent. In the early years of the nineteenth century the Sikhs led by Ranjit Singh had extended their power over the Panjab, the north-western regions and part of upper Sind. Far more important than this ascendancy of the Sikhs was British entry in Delhi in 1803; the Emperor had willingly come under their protection. This passing of the imperial stewardship from Sindhia to the Company proved to be a change for the worse, as far as the sovereignty of the Mughul Emperor was concerned. From the outset the aim of the Company was to reduce the Emperor to the position of a dignified stipendiary. It was under these circumstances that Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz boldly declared the subcontinent to be a *dār-al-harb*, which made it incumbent on the Muslims to overthrow the rule of the foreigner. In recording his reasons for delivering this important *fatwā* he says: 'In this city the *Imām al-Muslimīn* has no authority, and the orders of the Christian chiefs are enforced without any hitch...  
... (in fact) the authority of the Christians is established over the entire territory from this city (Delhi) to Calcutta. Of course, here and there, as for instance in *Ḥaydarābād* (Deccan), Rampur and

Lucknow, they (the Christians) have not enforced their orders because of their own considerations and also because of the loyalty of their rulers.”<sup>1</sup> The date of the *fatwā* has not been mentioned anywhere, but it was probably issued soon after the passing of Delhi under British control in 1803.<sup>2</sup> It was indeed an exceptionally bold and significant declaration, and, as such, an important mile-stone on the long road of the struggle for freedom which culminated in the Revolution of 1857.

### Religious disputations and controversial literature

A reference has been made to the activities of Christian missionaries in the previous chapter. With the expansion of British dominion they had become more active and gradually assumed an aggressive attitude towards Islām and Hinduism. This challenge of the missionaries was promptly accepted by the *‘ulamā* and the *shaykhs*. *Shāh ‘Abd al-Azīz* was the first prominent scholar to resist their attacks on Islām. Besides his *fatwā* already referred to, there are some interesting cases on record to show what type of charges he had to answer. Sometimes a mere retort served his purpose. A missionary, for example, is stated to have expressed his desire before Metcalfe for a discussion with *Shāh ‘Abd al-Azīz*. Metcalfe told him that he was a very learned man and it would be difficult to defeat him in a discussion. But the missionary insisted on meeting him; Metcalfe took him to the *Shāh*. The missionary said to him that he wanted to ask a question, but, he added, the answer was to be based on reason rather than citing of authorities. *Shāh ‘Abd al-Azīz* agreed. “You claim”, said the missionary, “that Prophet Muḥammad<sup>ﷺ</sup> is the friend of God

1 *Fatwa-i ‘Azīzi*, (Delhi), pp 16, 17, 185.

2 In a letter addressed to Mawlawī ‘Abd al-Raḥmān of Rampur, *Shāh ‘Abd al-Azīz* says that he had an intention of migrating from Delhi, which was a *dār-al ḥarb*, to Rampur but, he adds, “on hearing about the misbeliefs of the leading people of that place (Rampur) I became hesitant, and now I am obliged to stay on in this *dār-al ḥarb*.” As Mawlawī ‘Abd al-Raḥmān died in 1224 H (1809) this letter must have been written between 1803 and 1809. For the letter see Ḥāfiz Aḥmad ‘Alī Khān, *Shawq, Tadḥkirah-i Kāmilān-i Rāmpūr* (Delhi, 1929) pp 204-05.

(*Habīb-Allāh*). Why could he not then persuade Allāh to save his grandson, Ḥusayn, from being assassinated by his enemies?" *Shāh* 'Abd al-'Azīz promptly replied: "Yes, the Prophet<sup>c</sup> did approach God, and complained to Him that He had not saved Ḥusayn; but God's reply was that when Ḥusayn was being assassinated He was recalling to His mind the crucification of His only Son'. Evidently the Prophet<sup>c</sup> could say nothing, because after all his grandson could not be as dear to God as 'His own Son' was. How could he save Ḥusayn from being murdered when He had not saved 'His own Son' from crucification." The missionary felt ashamed at his silly question.<sup>1</sup>

Besides preaching Christianity the missionaries had started disseminating religious literature of a highly controversial and offensive nature. In this connection Doctor Pfander's<sup>2</sup> writings particularly his *Mizān-al-Haqq* (Balance of truth, as between Christianity and Islām) deserve to be specifically mentioned because they gave a new turn<sup>3</sup> to the controversy and "created a great sensation."<sup>4</sup> Some works had appeared even earlier

1 *Ṣābirī*, p. 225; Qāḍī Muḥammad Baṣḥūr al-Dīn, *Tadhkirah-i-'Azīzyāh* (Mujtabai Press, Meerut, 1934), pp. 16-17

2 Carl G. Pfander was born in 1803 in Germany. At the early age of twenty-two he was attached to a German mission at Fort *Shushī* on the confines of Georgia. In 1838 he came to the subcontinent to join the Church Missionary Society; three years later he was sent to Agra

*Mizān al-Haqq* was the Persian translation of his treatise written in German. The Persian text was published at *Shushī* in 1835; the Urdu rendering was lithographed at Mirzapur in 1843. Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

3 Mawlāwī 'Abbās 'Alī of Jajmaw had written a voluminous book *Ṣawlat al-Daygham*, in 1248 H.; its abridged edition was published in 1258 H. This was not written with reference to any particular work; it contained a general discussion on controversial issues.

Imdād Ṣābirī has mentioned the manuscript of *Jawāb-i-Muḥammadī* by Ikrām al-Dīn; it is in reality a treatise by a Christian missionary of Madras, who had tried to answer some questions from a Muslim scholar, Ni'mat 'Alī of Ā'zamgārh. See Ṣābirī, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-27, also see Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

4 The conversion of Ram Chandra, a teacher in the Delhi College, in July 1852, "caused great sensation." See *Khutbāt Gārsān Datsī* (Urdu ed., Aurangabad, 1935), p. 19.

than his arrival in Agra. However, Pfander continued his activities in the neighbourhood of the Mughul capital. An important work which may be mentioned was Mawlānā 'Alī Ḥasan's *Istīfṣār*, covering 806 large octavo pages. He was highly respected for his ability and piety; even his opponents had a great regard for him.<sup>1</sup>

The most prominent figures on this front—religious disputations—were Mawlawī Raḥmat Allāh<sup>2</sup> and Doctor Wazīr Khān<sup>3</sup>.

1 Mawlawī 'Alī Ḥasan belonged to Muḥān and was "a man of very superior abilities—an officer of some standing in the Sudder Dewany Adalat, N.W.P." Muir *op cit.*, pp. 35, 36, 89.

For a short biographical sketch see Sābirī, pp. 239-42.

2 Mawlawī Raḥmat Allāh and Wazīr Khān later became prominent leaders of the Revolutionary movement. The former was "accused" by the British Government for having taken part in the capture of Shāmli by the Revolutionaries. After the War of Independence he went underground and travelled in disguise. He could not be arrested but his property was confiscated. It has been related on the authority of Mawlanā Raghīd Ahmad Gangūhī that Raḥmat Allāh went to a *mudḥab* in Thānah Bhawan, he said. "Go away, nothing will happen to you." Subsequently he migrated to Makkah and reached there after suffering great hardships in the course of his journey. In the meantime his vanquished opponent, Pfander, had visited Istanbul and misled Sulṭān 'Abd al-'Azīz by telling him that in Hind-Pakistan he had scored a victory for Christianity over Islam in a disputation with a Mawlawī. The Sulṭān asked the Shārif of Makkah to inquire from Hind-Pakistanis visiting Ḥijāz about this disputation. The Shārif who was in contact with Raḥmat Allāh sent him to Istanbul where he was received by the Sulṭan and honoured with a *khil'at* and the *Tamīdh al-Majidi*. At the instance of the Sulṭān he wrote an account of his disputation with Pfander in Arabic and published it under the title, *Izhār al-Huq* in 1280 H. It was soon translated into Turkish and later into English, French and German.

On his return to Makkah Mawlawī Raḥmat Allāh decided to establish a *madrasah*. He had to face difficulties, chiefly created by the British consulate at Jeddah, nevertheless he did not give up his efforts, and ultimately with the help of a handsome donation from a lady, Ṣawlat al-Nisā Begam of Calcutta, he was able to establish the institution. It was named after her as *Madrasah-i-Ṣawlatiyah* and is now in a flourishing condition. Raḥmat Allāh died on 12 *Jumādā* I, 1310 H (1891 A.D.). See Sābirī, pp. 227-38.

3 Doctor Wazīr Khān took an active part in the Revolutionary War. With a contingent of the Revolutionary forces he went to Delhi and joined the

The former, a descendant of the well-known *sūfi-shaykh*, Maḥdūm, Jalāl al-Dīn, was born in 1233/1817 in a small village, Kayrānah, in the Muzaffarnagar district (India). After completing his studies Raḥmat Allāh devoted himself exclusively to the task of counteracting the anti-Islamic propaganda of the missionaries. He made a thorough study of Christianity and wrote a book entitled, *Izālat al-Awhām*; on its margin was published the *Istifsār* of 'Alī Ḥasan of Muḥān.

Doctor Wazīr Khān, Officer-in-Charge of the Government dispensary at Agra, belonged to a family which originally came from Patna. In 1832 he got a stipend for medical studies in England. Here he spent his leisure hours in learning Greek and collecting literature on Christianity. He had thus equipped himself with necessary information for religious disputations with Christian missionaries. He helped Mawlawī Raḥmat Allāh in his historic disputation with Pfander, held on 10 and 11 April in Katrah, 'Abd al-Maṣīh, Agra.

The proceedings of the *munāẓirah* were printed in 1270/1854 in the form of a book entitled *al-Baḥāth al-Sharīf fī Ithbāt al-Naskh wa al-Tahrīf*.<sup>1</sup> It was compiled by Wazīr al-Dīn b. Sharaf al-Dīn and contains the letters exchanged between Mawlawī Raḥmat Allāh and Pfander. But what gives this publication particular significance is the fact that it was printed at the instance of Prince Fakhr al-Dīn, the Mughul heir-apparent, at his own press, Fakhr al-Maṭābī, Delhi, and was distributed in different parts of the subcontinent under his orders.<sup>2</sup> This indicates that the Prince

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besieged army. On the fall of the capital he went to Awadh and fought under Aḥmad Allāh Shāh.

1 Besides Wazīr al-Dīn's account the volume contains another version of the *munāẓirah* by Maḥmūd Jān; in the appendix there is an old *fatwā* which has the seals of several 'ulamā in regard to the fact that the New Testament could not form part of the *Injil*. An Urdu version by Amin al-Dīn b. Farid al-Dīn was also published in the same press and is included in the volume.

2 Cf. Ṣābirī, p. 233.



was in close contact with the *'ulānā* and other leaders who later played a vital role in the Revolution, and that the Palace circles were not unaware of their movements. Fakh̄r al-Din died suddenly in July, 1856.

Agra seems to have been the centre of the preliminary activities and secret consultations of the leaders of the Revolution. Delhi was unsuitable for this purpose; because of the presence of British officials they would have found it difficult to keep their movements strictly secret. Besides Wazīr Kh̄ān, who was perhaps the central figure of the Agra group, Mawlawī Fayḍ Ahmad and several other prominent leaders were also present there. It might have been for this reason that Ahmad Allāh Sh̄āh also set up his headquarters at Agra. In any case, there seems to be little doubt about the mutual contacts of the various groups of Revolutionary leaders during the years preceding the upheaval of 1857.

Sh̄āh Wali Allāh's work was continued by his sons and later by his pupils, some of whom played a leading role in the Revolutionary Movement and the War of Independence.<sup>1</sup> Sh̄āh 'Abd al-Gh̄am migrated from the subcontinent soon after the fall of Delhi in September 1857. His brother, Sh̄āh Abū Sa'īd, a signatory of the famous *fatwā* of *ṭhāt* also accompanied him to Makkah. A number of Sh̄āh 'Abd al-Gh̄am's pupils were also among the active promoters of the Revolutionary Movement; some of them took part in the War of Independence.<sup>2</sup>

The *'ulumā* and the *shaykhs* were not the only sections of the people who had decided to put up a fight against British

1 The names of Sadr al-Dīn Azurdah (Delhi), Mawlawī 'Alīm 'Alī (Moradabad), Muftī Inayat Ahmad Kulūrawī (Bareilly), Mawlawī 'Abd al-Jalīl (Aligarh) from among the pupils of Sh̄āh Muhammad Ishāq, a grandson and pupil of Sh̄āh 'Abd al-'Azīz, deserve to be specifically mentioned.

2 Among the pupils of Sh̄āh 'Abd al-Gh̄am, Mawlānā Muḥammad Maẓhar, Nanawtāh, founder of the *Madrasah-i-Maẓhar al-'Ulūm* (Sahāranpur), Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim (Deorand), Mawlānā Rashīd Ahmad Gangūhī and Mawlānā Muḥammad Munir fought in the Battle of Shāmli under the leadership of their pir, Hājī Imdād Allāh Sh̄āh. See 'Ashiq Ilāhī, *Tadhkirat al-Rashīd* (Delhi, second ed., 1959), I, pp. 71-72.

imperialism. They became active only after 1814 when the Company abandoned its policy of neutrality in religious matters. On the political front, however, the struggle for freedom had started much earlier.

### Tipu fights for freedom

Sirāj al-Dawlah of Bengal was the first victim of British expansionism. He had decided to resist its growth, but his end came much too soon; within two years of his accession to the *musnad* he met his tragic end at Plassey, in consequence of a conspiracy engineered by Clive. Despite his short career, however, Sirāj deserves to be counted among the front-rank fighters for freedom.

Tipu Sulṭān (1750-1799)<sup>1</sup> was the first prominent leader of Hind-Pakistan to offer a stout resistance to British imperialism and take active steps to liberate the people of the subcontinent from the yoke of foreign domination. He alone among the Princes and statesmen of the period realized the consequences of the Company's expansionist policy. He seems to have studied the situation carefully before taking a decision. In the Introduction of the *Fatḥ al-Mujāhidīn*,<sup>2</sup> which is really an official record of his policies and reforms, a clear, though brief, reference has been made to the disintegration and growing weakness of the Timūrid (Mughul) sovereignty after 1757. "The Christian merchants", says its author, "who possessed factories on the sea-coast of Hind, while concealing their real aims under the pretence of commerce, exploiting some of the shallow-minded foolish men

1 Tipū's parents had visited the tomb of Tipū Mastān Awliya in Arcot to pray for the safety of their expected child. When the child was born he was called Tipū after his name.

2 Soon after his accession, Tipū ordered one of his generals, Zayn al-Ābidīn, to prepare a book on the significance of *jihād* and his military reforms. He carried out the orders of the Sulṭān and wrote a book called, *Fatḥ al-Mujāhidīn*. The object of the compilation was that "this noble science and graceful art . . . may gain currency and the Muslims with its aid might become victorious and triumphant over the enemies of the religion of the best of men." See *Fatḥ al-Mujāhidīn* (Persian text edited by Muḥmūd Husain, Karachi, 1950), p. 9. The English translation of some chapters was published in the issues of the *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*.

who were ready to barter their religion for worldly riches, conquered through their instrumentality kingdoms and subdued countries,.....Things were carried to such lengths that the rapacious and cruel hands of the unbelievers of Europe became extended over the wealth and belongings of the Muslims, and the Muslims taken captive were sold in the cities of China and Ethiopia”<sup>1</sup>

Tipu was convinced that the first problem of the people of the subcontinent was the expulsion of the British power. To achieve this object, he thought, no sacrifice was too great. He was anxious to make the Marathas and the Nizam realize that the British were their common enemy. Unfortunately neither of them was able to appreciate the significance of his advice; they allied themselves with the British and thus made it impossible for him to carry out his liberation plan<sup>2</sup>. Tipu, however, did not give it up and turned to foreign powers for help. In 1785 he sent an embassy to Turkey; it was also entrusted with a mission to Louis XVI of France<sup>3</sup>. Neither of the two powers, however, agreed to enter into a defensive and offensive alliance with Mysore. Louis received the Sultān's embassy with marked distinction but found himself unable to enter into a formal alliance on account of the recently signed Treaty of Versailles (1783). The French proposals for a commercial treaty on the other hand, were of no advantage to the Sultān who rejected them<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *J.P.H.S.*, II, 12

<sup>2</sup> 44 Cf. *HFM* I, p. 441 et seq. also see Mohibbul Hasan Khān, *History of Tipu Sultān* (Calcutta 1951), pp. 108, 378.

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed account of these embassies see Mohibbul Hasan Khān, Chaps. VII and VIII.

<sup>4</sup> In 1798 Tipu, anxious to enlist French soldiers in his army, asked two Muslim merchants, Shaykh Ibrāhīm and Husayn ‘Adī, who were about to visit the Isle of France, to help him in the matter. The Governor of the Island, Malartic, assisted the merchants by making an announcement that Frenchmen could take service under Tipu's Government. This announcement was publicized by the Company's Government as an official proclamation. For details see Mohibbul Hasan, *op. cit.*, chap. XVIII.

The Sultān of Turkey, too, expressed his inability to enter into an alliance with Tipū ; he needed England's help against an Austrian attack launched in August, 1787. Nevertheless, Tipū's ambassadors were warmly received at Istanbul ; the Caliph-Sultan agreed to confer the title of *Pādshāh*<sup>1</sup> on Tipū and allow him to coin money and have the *khushbah* recited in his name ; but he could not enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Mysore.<sup>2</sup> Tipū's emissaries to Irān and Afghanistan and the Imām of Muscat also failed to bring him any help ; even so, he decided to continue his struggle against the British to the last moment. He would rather die a martyr than rule as the puppet of a foreign power. In the last Mysore War when the fall of Seringapatam became imminent he was advised by a French officer to escape to Chitaldrug and save his life. He refused to accept the advice and died fighting like a hero (1799).<sup>3</sup>

#### "Disturbances" at Vellore and Hyderabad

Tipū's sacrifices were not made in vain ; seven years after his death the Hind-Pakistani sepoys rose in revolt against British officers.

The Vellore Mutiny of 1806 "had its primary cause in the deep-rooted hatred of Mahometans and Hindoos to the rule of a

1 Soon after his accession to the throne Tipū had sent a *wakil* to the Emperor with a request for a *sanad*. But he failed to secure this because of the machinations of Major Browne, the Company's representative at the Imperial court. After 1787 *Shāh 'Ālam* became a puppet in the hands of Sindhia. To acknowledge the sovereignty of the Emperor, Tipū thought, would mean the recognition of the Maratha supremacy. He, therefore, decided to get a confirmation of his title to the throne from the Caliph himself. See, *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, VII, No. 315 ; also see, Mohibbul Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

2 Kirmānī, Mir Husayn Ali, *Nishān-i-Haydarī* (Bombay, 1890), p. 328 ; Mohibbul Hasan, pp. 137-38. For Urdu versions of the letters exchanged between the Sultāns of Turkey and Mysore see Mahmud, Mahmud *Khān Salānat-i-Khudādād* (Lahore, 1947). pp. 542-54.

3 *Kirmanī, op. cit.*, pp. 388-89. For detailed discussions of some aspects of Tipū's fight for freedom see relevant articles in the quarterly, *Baṣā'ir* (Tipū Sultān *Shahid* number), Karachi 1964

Christian nation. It is this hatred . . . that makes every outbreak of the natives against European war of extermination."<sup>1</sup>

A few years later the Company had to face trouble even at Hyderabad although its ruler was staunchly loyal. The Nizam's sons were the leaders of the "disturbances". The situation became so critical that "courtiers were not wanting to advise the Nizam that he could not do better than free himself at once from the British yoke, by overwhelming the troops at the residency before the reinforcements could arrive, but, he (the Nizam) "listened to better advice . . ."<sup>2</sup>

#### A popular rising at Bareilly

The first popular rising of some magnitude occurred in Rohilkhand, where the people had neither forgotten "the inequitous bargain by which Warren Hastings sold them to the Nabob of Oudh," nor the process by which "after having pocketed the price" the Company, a quarter of a century later, had managed to "seize the territories, and thus obtain possession both of price and subject." The immediate cause was the imposition of house-tax by the local government. The citizens of Bareilly refused to pay the cess, on which the British magistrate decided to use force. This added to popular indignation, the people offered open resistance under the leadership of Mufti Muhammad I'wad, "whose sanctity was held in the highest reputation throughout Rohilkhand". In the struggle that ensued some lives were lost but the people did not yield; the green flag of Islām, hoisted on the shrine in which the *mufti* had taken refuge, announced to the faithful that their religion was in danger, and in addition to those in Bareilly itself, crowds of fanatics began to surge from the neighbouring

1 The rising at Vellore was not merely a "mutiny" of the sepoys; it had its contacts with the people. We know that the members of Tipū's family were considered to have been implicated in it, they were removed from Vellore. More over a flag which once belonged to Tipū and bore his arms (a central sun with tiger stripes on a green field), was even brought out and hoisted on the flagstaff amid the acclamations of the multitude. *Beveridge, op. cit.*, II, 812, 814.

2 *Ibid.*, III, 28-29

towns.<sup>1</sup> The officials had, in the meantime, obtained reinforcements, and were able to suppress the agitation, though not before many of them had been killed and wounded.<sup>2</sup>

### The Jihad Movement of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid

Within fifteen years of the rising at <sup>Kan</sup> Bareilly (1815) an extensive <sup>جہاد</sup> *jihād* movement was launched by a pupil of Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz; it culminated in a campaign against the Sikhs in the north-west. Born in 1786 in a distinguished family of scholars and *shaykhs* in Rai-Bareli, Sayyid Ahmad was interested from his childhood in sports rather than studies. While still young he had to leave his home and go out into the world in search of a living. He went to Lucknow and stayed there for nearly three months but with no prospects of success.<sup>3</sup> From here he proceeded to Delhi, joined the circle of the disciple-pupils of Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz, and stayed with him for nearly two years (1807-09). Subsequently he joined the army of the Ruhilah leader, Amir Khān, who later became the founder of the princely State of Tonk. The Sayyid remained in his army for several years, and received his training

1 Beveridge, III, 3.

2 "The insurgents, first resisted and then pursued, fled, leaving behind them about 400 dead, and a great number of wounded and prisoners." *Ibid.*, III, 32.

3 A contemporary of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid relates an interesting incident on the authority of Hakīm Mughīth al-Dīn of Saharanpur, who was a disciple of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid. He stated that one of the latter's ancestors had once prayed: "Oh God! do not give worldly riches to my descendants to such an extent that they forget Thee." This prayer, the Sayyid had told the Hakīm, had been accepted by God and the family had thereafter, always lived in poverty. Being hard pressed by the needs of the family the Sayyid is stated to have visited the tomb of his ancestor and there gone into meditation. It appeared to him that a portion of the body of his ancestor came out of the grave and raising the hands towards the *qiblah* offered prayers. Since then he was never in difficulties as far as the maintenance of the family was concerned. See, Ḥusayn Muḥammad, '*Anwār al-Ārifin* (Bareilly, 1290 H.) p. 519.

as a soldier. In 1817 we find him again in Delhi, now a mature leader. Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz put his nephew, Shāh Muḥammad Ismā'il, and his son-in-law, Mawlawī 'Abd al-Ḥayy, in his charge. With these two lieutenants the Sayyid toured the districts of Rohilkhand and parts of Awadh preaching *jihād* which, he said, was essential for the Muslims if they wanted their prestige to be restored to its original position in the subcontinent. He preached his ideas with remarkable success in the northern provinces, particularly in the regions of Awadh and Rohilkhand. In 1821 he left for *ḥajj*. On his way to Calcutta, from where he was to take a boat for Arabia, he broke journey at a number of places including the cities of Allahabad, Banaras, Ghazipur, Patna, Monghyr, Bhagalpur and Murshidabad. In Calcutta so many people enlisted themselves in the circle of his disciples that it became impossible for all of them to touch his hands for *bay'at*; he had to extend his turban for the purpose. On his return from Arabia in 1824 the Sayyid decided to launch a movement for *jihād*. Although fully alive to the need of liberating the people from the yoke of foreign rule,<sup>1</sup> he decided to give his immediate attention to Sikh tyranny in the Panjab, for Ranjit Singh was the strongest ally of the Company in the north. The romantic story of the sacrifices of the Sayyid and his *mujāhidh* in the north-western regions culminating in his death in the Battle of Balakot (1831) need not be retold here. It may be noted however, that in spite of its apparent collapse Sayyid Aḥmad's Jihad Movement created a religio-political consciousness among the Muslims. His appeal was based on religion, but for the Muslims religion and politics have always been inseparable.

<sup>1</sup> In a letter to Nawab Sulaymān lāh he writes that "during the last few years fate has been so unkind to the Government and Empire (of the Muḥmuls) in India that the accursed Christians and the mischievous polytheists have started oppressing people . . . This state of affairs fills my heart with sorrow . . . My heart is filled with shame at this religious degradation and my head contains but one thought, how to organize *jihād*" Quoted in Nadawī, Sayyid Abu al Hasan, *Sirat-i-Sayyid Ahmad Shuhid* (Lucknow, 1935).

### Reform movements in Bengal

In the eastern-most regions of the subcontinent Hājī Shari'at Allāh, (1781-1840)<sup>1</sup> a contemporary of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid, launched a vigorous reform campaign, which has come to be known as the Fara'idī Movement. He laid great emphasis on social and religious reform, but he also impressed upon the minds of his followers that the land in which they lived was *dār-al-ḥarb*, which by implication meant that it was incumbent upon them to free it from the yoke of alien rule. His son, Muḥammad Muḥsin, popularly known as Dādū Miyān, continued the work of his father. He divided the region into circles and appointed his workers to each of them; he was soon able to extend his influence over the peasants and craftsmen, particularly in the districts of Bakarganj, Dacca, Faridpur and Pabna. The Government's policy of economic exploitation and social injustice had made the condition of the peasants miserable.<sup>2</sup> No wonder, the followers of Dādū Miyān defied the Company's authorities; they refused to seek justice at British courts; instead they had their cases decided by their leader whose orders were carried to the remotest parts of the villages. The indigo planters and zamindars who had immensely benefitted from the Permanent Settlement evidently could not bear to see the new movement flourish. They started harassing Dādū Miyān by bringing false suits against him; ultimately they succeeded, and he was imprisoned.

#### Titu Mir

Another reform movement of the period which contributed to the growth of consciousness amongst the Muslims of Bengal

1 For a detailed account of the life of Hājī Shari'at Allāh and his movement see Khan, Mu'in al-Din Ahmad, *History of the Fara'idī Movement*, Karachi, 1965.

2 About the conditions prevailing under British rule during the period, 1765-93, Henry Beveridge writes: "This probably was the most unhappy period in the modern history of Bengal. There were abuses under the Hindu rulers, and also under the Mahomedan governors, but we suspect that the thirty years before the Permanent Settlement were more acute in their misery than any which had gone before." *District of Bakarganj, its History and Statistics* (London, 1876), p. 376, quoted in *J.P.H.S.*, VII, 25.



was led by Mir Naṣīr 'Alī, popularly known as Titā Mir. He is stated to have received his training under Sayyid Aḥmad Shāhid; another *shaykh* who is said to have influenced him was Miskin Shāh.<sup>1</sup> Titā Mir's followers being mostly peasants, the zamindars began to oppose the reforms introduced by him and resorted to oppressive measures such as the imposition of a "beard tax." In 1831 the people of the village of Sarfarāzpur refused to pay the tax, on which the zamindar attacked them; "several houses were plundered and a mosque was burnt." They went to the court of law, but the case was decided in favour of the zamindar; their efforts to lodge an appeal also ended in failure. They were thus forced to take the law in their hands; in the clash that followed a Hindu zamindar was killed. The slogan of the excited villagers was "the period of British rule had expired". Further clashes followed, the supporters of Titā Mir exhibited great courage but were ultimately overwhelmed by military forces that had been requisitioned by the civil authorities.<sup>2</sup> The leader of the movement and a large number of his followers died fighting like heroes; many of those who could manage to escape were arrested and thrown into prison; Ghulām Ma'ṣūm Titā Mir's first lieutenant, was sentenced to death.

<sup>1</sup> For different opinions on this issue see *H.F.M.*, I, 549-50.  
<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 551-55.

## CHAPTER III

### THE PATRIOTS ORGANIZE A MOVEMENT

#### Sayyid Ahmad Allah Shah

The greatest leader of the Revolution, who inspired the Muslims with the spirit of *jihād* and led them in battle till the last moment of his life, was a *ṣūfī-shaykh* from the south. Sayyid Ahmad 'Alī Khān<sup>1</sup> *alias* Diyā al-Dīn, better known as Ahmad Allāh Shāh, was born in a rich and influential family at Chinapatan near Madras in the second decade of the nineteenth century<sup>2</sup>. An exceptionally intelligent child, Ahmad completed the course of his studies, at an early age, attaining proficiency in *ḥadīth* and *tafsīr* as well as in Arabic, Persian and indigenous literatures<sup>3</sup>. Subsequently he seems to have learnt English also, which fact is

1 It is a great pity that we have very meagre information about the life and activities of this valiant fighter in the cause of freedom. One of his disciples, Faṭḥ Muḥammad *Tā'ib* wrote a versified account of his life only three years after his death; the *maṭḥnawī* bears the title, *Tawārīkh-i-Aḥmadi*, which yields the date of its composition (1280 H.). Though a printed book it is now rare. I have secured a photostat copy from the India Office Library. *Tā'ib* is very particular about the authenticity of facts; he has, therefore, been able to record very few details. However, he has made broad references to some important incidents of his *pir's* life. Besides this *maṭḥnawī* there are references to the activities of the Shāh in the works of English writers who call him a "Maulawi". We have retained the epithet, "Shāh". *Tā'ib* mentions his name as Sayyid Ahmad 'Alī Khān *alias* Diyā al-Dīn bearing the title of *Dilāwar Jang*. See p. 28.

2 The exact date of Ahmad-Allāh Shāh's birth is not known but according to the statement of Doctor Wazīr Khān he was about forty years old at the time of the Revolution *F.S.U.P.*, II, 148.

3 *Tā'ib*, p. 29.

mentioned by Hutchinson who also remarks that he was "possessed of considerable acumen and boldness<sup>1</sup>. After completing his studies he received practical training in the art of war. In the sixteenth year of his life he is stated to have proceeded to Hyderabad (Deccan). A proposal for his marriage in the ruling family does not seem to have materialized<sup>2</sup>, but he became a known figure because of his participation in a battle against an invader. Ahmad Allāh Shāh was wounded in the *melee*, but he managed to escape<sup>3</sup>. Some courtiers of the Nizam became jealous of the Shāh's influence on him and his growing popularity among the people; they even went to the extent of planning his murder<sup>4</sup>. Quite different was the attitude of the British statesmen; Ahmad Allāh Shāh's father was requested to allow him to visit England and meet the leading people of that country. Soon he got an opportunity of going to England where he was received in audience by the British Sovereign, and had occasion to meet some of the notables of the country<sup>5</sup>. The only interesting incident which his biographer relates about Ahmad Allāh Shāh's stay in Britain is that he expressed a desire and was allowed to exhibit his skill in the use of arms. On his return journey, it can be surmized, he must have visited other European countries also. It is certain that he stopped at Makkah and Madinah in Arabia, and then passing through other countries he came to Iran. The King wanted to take him into his service but he declined the

1 Captain G. Hutchinson, *Narratives of the Mutinies in Oude* (Calcutta, 1860). See pp. 33-37 for some information about the Shāh's activities and his arrest in Fyzabad.

2 Tā'ib says that he was betrothed to some princess in the ruling family of Hyderabad, the marriage however could not take place for reasons not known to him.

3 It is difficult to say who the invader was as we can form no idea of the date. It may be added that in Hyderabad Ahmad Allāh Shāh was the guest of the Nizam. Cf. Tā'ib, p. 32.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

offer and returned to the subcontinent;<sup>1</sup> he now decided to lead the life of a *darwish*<sup>2</sup> and proceeded to Delhi in search of a guide. He met some of the leading *shaykhs* of the time, who advised him to go to Jaipur; ultimately he became a disciple of Sayyid Furqān 'Alī Shāh"<sup>3</sup> at Sanbhar. The Sayyid had a great affection for him and treated him like a son; he changed his name from Aḥmad 'Alī to Aḥmad Allāh Shāh, invested him with his *khlāfat* and allowed him to tour the subcontinent. Accordingly, he visited a number of places where he frequently addressed large gatherings. Soon he became a known figure among the *darwishes*. When he reached Gwalior he is said to have fallen into a state of indescribable uneasiness, and decided to return to his parents. But, in a vision he was asked to go back to Gwalior where he would find his true guide, and he promptly acted upon this advice<sup>4</sup>.

In Gwalior he got himself enrolled as a disciple of Mihrāb Shāh Qalandar<sup>5</sup> a *shaykh* of the Qādiriyyah *silṣilah*, and stayed with him for four years and a half. Under him he received a thorough training in sufistic teachings and practice; often his *pir* would address the young disciple as *Wall-Allāh*.<sup>6</sup> A strong believer in *jihād*, Mihrab Shāh invested Aḥmad Allāh Shāh

1 *Tā'ib* says that it was about this time that his beard began to appear, p. 36:

عیان خط ہوا روئے دلخواہ پر      زمرد جڑے تحتہٗ ماہ پر  
شگفتہ گل نوحوانی ہوا      عیان عالم کامرانی ہوا

Translation: The beard became visible on the face which is likened by the heart; the *zammurruds* (emeralds) were set on the face of the moon. The lower of the youth opened; the world of success became apparent.

2 *Tā'ib*, p. 37.

3 Some writers have given the name of the spiritual guide of Aḥmad Allāh Shāh as Qurbān 'Alī which is incorrect.

4 *Tā'ib*, pp. 42-49.

5 Mihrāb Shāh, was a *shaykh* of the Qādiriyyah *silṣilah*.

6 Like most *qāfi-shaykhs* Aḥmad Allāh Shāh was fond of *samā'* (sufistic music) and had his differences with the orthodox '*ulamā* on the issue Cf. *Tā'ib*, p. 54.

with *khilāfat* and bound him in devotion to *jihād*<sup>1</sup>. He was then allowed to leave Gwalior and proceed on his mission. He came to Agra where he soon became popular as a *shaykh*; however, some persons became jealous of his increasing influence and reported to the local authorities that Ahmad Allāh Shāh was a prince in the guise of a *dervish* and that he was preparing the people for a war against the Government. He was called before a European officer, but instead of betraying any fear he addressed him in rather strong words. The officer was so deeply impressed by the Shāh that he not only allowed him to move about freely but also punished the reporters by ordering their *madrasah* to be closed<sup>2</sup>. The Shāh soon decided to return to Gwalior and rejoin his *pir*. Mihrāb Shāh was happy to receive his disciple but after a short time he again directed him to go on a tour and prepare himself for war.

The biographer of the Shāh has not given any details of his tours, but we find some references in the works of British authors. "To return to the Mouvie", writes Hutchinson, "this man after passing through a vast number of cities and stations under our rule, in all parts of India, and establishing his disciples therein, reached Fyzabad in February 1857. Subsequent investigations elicited that everywhere he had preached a *jihād*, or religious war against the *kufirs*, or infidels, as the Europeans were politely designated. From some places he had been summarily ejected, but in others evaded expulsion, meeting with no real check until he

1. Ta'rib (p. 51) says.

لِأَنَّهُ مِنْ بَہَرِ اسْتِحْضَانِ حَبَاد کہ کھینچے نصاریٰ پہ بیع عباد

Translation He then tested him (in his faith) in *jihād*, so that he might draw the sword of hostility against the Christians.

2. Ta'rib's story of the Shāh's interview with the British officer is interesting. The Shāh, according to his biographer, entered the room and sat on a table, although he was expected to remain standing. This annoyed the officer but before he could give vent to his wrath the table broke into two parts so suddenly that the officer was overtaken by fear and apologized to the visitor. See p. 52

came to Fyzabad".<sup>1</sup> It appears that after his second departure from Gwalior he made an extensive tour of the subcontinent. It would be reasonable to put it in 1856; "among them was one named Ahmad Allāh Shāh, a person looking like a *darwish* . . . who had come to Awadh from the side of Madras in the beginning of the (British) Government's rule and arrived first in Lucknow; from there he proceeded to Fyzabad."<sup>2</sup> As the annexation of Awadh had taken place in February, 1856, the Shāh must have arrived in Lucknow early in the year. He must have spent nearly a year in Lucknow for it was not before February, 1857, that we find him moving to Fyzabad. Before his arrival in Lucknow he had toured extensively; "Of the ascertained facts," writes Malle-son, "respecting his actions this at least has been proved, that very soon after the annexation of Awadh he travelled over the North-west Provinces on a mission which was a mystery to the European authorities; that he stayed some time at Agra; that he

1 Also see Kaye and Malle-son, v, 292. Hutchinson's statements that "everywhere he had preached a *jihād*" is corroborated by *Ta'ib* (p. 53) in the following line:

نصاری سے جو حکم پیکار تھا ہر ایک شخص سے اس کا اظہار تھا

Translation: As he had been ordered (by his *pir*) to fight the Chris- tians, he preached it (*jihād*) to everyone.

2 Lakhnawī, Khwājah Muḥammad Baṣṣir *Tadhkirah-i-Ghadr mawṣūm ba Ṣaḥīfah-i-Wāld Qadr wa Ā'inah-i-Ḥayrat-numā*, Newal Kishore Press, Lucknow, p. 37.

The statement that "he had come to Awadh from the side of Madras suggests that the Shāh had visited the south during his propaganda tour. In this connection it would be interesting to note that in January 1857 "an incendiary, written in Hindostani, was placarded at Madras"; it called "all true believers to rise against the English infidels and drive them from India. It declared . . . that there was but one way of resisting their encroach- ments—a holy war! He who fell in such a war would be venerated as a martyr. He that held back would be execrated as infidel and a heretic." Majumdar's guess seems to be correct when he says that "it is highly probable that this was a handwork of the Meulawi or his party." See Majumdar, R. C. *The Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt of 1857* (Calcutta, 1957), p. 169.

visited Delhi, Mirath, Patna and Calcutta ; . . . ”<sup>1</sup>. This is not an exhaustive list of places visited by him. About six months before the outbreak of the Revolution we find him at Aligarh where he had enrolled a large number of disciples. In an eye-witness account by Hakim Muhammad Akram Fā’iz we notice references to his activities, specially his *samā’ mahfils* (gatherings) and his casual remarks, almost in a prophetic strain, about a great revolt against the British rule within six months. The reference to six months is rather significant ; it shows that the *Shāh* had in his mind a clear and definite plan of the Revolution. After his return from Calcutta, it seems, other persons continued the work there. On the authority of the *Gulshā-i-Nawba’iār*, Calcutta, the *Sadiqul Akhbar* of Delhi published the news that “some *Mullas* of Agra and other places distributed pamphlets inducing Mussalmans to wage religious war against the English”.<sup>2</sup>

The people of Awadh, Ahmad Allāh *Shāh* knew, would play a vital role in the coming Revolution. They had been severely hit by the annexation of the kingdom, moreover, a large number of sepoys in the Bengal Army came from that area. It is not surprising therefore that he made Lucknow the main centre of his activities,<sup>3</sup> preaching *jihād* to the Muslims and preparing the Hindu sepoys for a war against the Government.<sup>4</sup> The efforts of the *Shāh* and other organizers of the Movement seem to have roused the enthusiasm of the people ; we have a contemporary

1 Malletson, Colonel G B., *The Indian Mutiny of 1857*, (London, 1891), pp 17-18

2 *Mutiny papers*, 1857, p 393

3 Husaynī says: ‘Ahmad Allāh *Shāh* had been living in the Ghasiari Mandi for some years and was known as Naqqārah *Shāh*. *Qayṣar al-Tawārīkh* (Lucknow, 1896), II, 203

4 *Tā’ib* does not give details of the *Shāh*’s activities in Lucknow, but he makes an interesting reference to them in the following line:

ہزاروں تلگے وہاں آتے تھے دم گنت کو سدھو جاتے تھے

Translation Thousands of Telingahs (sepoys) used to come there ; they discussed with him and went satisfied. See p. 19.

account of the manner in which *jihād* was preached by religious leaders from the pulpits of the mosques.<sup>1</sup>

Having finished his work in Lucknow, Aḥmad Allāh Shāh arrived in Fyzabad in February 1857<sup>2</sup>. He had preached *jihād* only for two or three days in Fyzabad when, according to Captain Hutchinson, who happened to be present there, a "Chuprasse informed the magistrate of the really dangerous tendency of this man's doings, and accordingly the officer in charge of the city issued the necessary orders for his arrest. The principal terms demanded from this Maulwi were that he and his armed followers, numbering about seven, should give up their arms, which should be kept in safe custody so long as they remained in the city, and returned to them on their departure; further, that all this preaching, this distribution of money, so conducive to the disturbance of peace, should be entirely put an end to. A deliberate refusal was given to every attempt at coercion, either on the part of the magistrate and city officer or their native officials". The authorities put a guard on the Shāh's party for the night, and "early the next morning an infantry company . . . attacked them *vi et armis* . . . these fanatics fought fiercely. The young European officer . . . escaping a blow received a slight cut on the head; several sepoys received severe cuts . . .". Ultimately, the Shāh and two of his companions surrendered on receiving a promise of fair trial. They were placed under guard in the cantonment as "he seemed too dangerous a character to keep in the city gaol".<sup>3</sup> The surgeon of

1 *Zafarnāmah Waqāi' Ghadr*. For this contemporary and informative but anonymous work see Ethe, *Cat. of India Office Library*, vol. I, p. 165, No. 431.

2 According to Dr. Wazir Khān the Shāh had gone to Fyzabad "to revenge the death of the Moulvie Ameer Ali," *F.S.U.P.* II, 147.

3 The account of the Shāh's arrest was published in the leading papers of the subcontinent. The *Mofussulite* carried the story in its issue dated Tuesday, 3 March, 1857. It differs from Hutchinson's account in some details. It mentions the Shāh as a "fanatic Faqueer . . . who had established himself in a *serai* . . . and addressing the mob informed them that his mission was the destruction of the Feringhees . . ."



the Fyzabad jail, Najaf 'Alī, used to provide food for the Shāh and seems to have joined the circle of his followers, for, when the rising took place in Fyzabad, he went to his superior officer, Surgeon Collison, and said : "that now the Company's reign was over he had changed masters and was then the Moulvec's servant".<sup>1</sup>

In the course of his preachings in Fyzabad the Shāh used to tell the people about the glorious martyrdom of Mawlawī Amīr 'Alī and his companions on the Hanūmangharhi issue in the last days of Wājid 'Alī Shāh's reign. It has also been stated that 'he and his followers had been visiting the tombs of the men killed in the religious quarrel just before the annexation'<sup>2</sup>.

Besides addressing private gatherings Aḥmad Allāh Shāh also worked in the army. Colonel Malleeson thinks that during his visit to Calcutta he had come to know of the symptoms of disaffection among the sepoys; "It is probable that... the Maulawi, constantly in communication with the sipahis stationed in the vicinity of that city, discovered the instrument which should act with certain effect on their already excited natures. It happened that, shortly before, the Government of India had authorised the introduction in the ranks of the native army of a new cartridge, the exterior of which was smeared with fat".<sup>3</sup> It may be mentioned that Malleeson was posted in Calcutta at this time.<sup>4</sup>

1 Surgeon Collin's letter to Captain Thurburn, dated "Durrighad, 22nd September, 1858". See Proceedings of the trial of "Najaf Ally, Native Doctor," quoted in *FSUP*, I, 386-87.

2 *FSUP*, I, 381-83.

3 Malleeson, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

4 He was the "chief of the Commissariat Department at Kanpur... in January 1846". Two months later he was transferred to the Military Audit Department in Calcutta; he kept "a careful record of the several occurrences, all apparently of minor import..." In 1880 he completed Sir John Kaye's history and after its publication, "I again visited India, and renewed my enquiries among those of my native friends best qualified to arrive at a sound opinion as to the real origin of the mutiny". See Malleeson, pp. vi-vii.

Aḥmad Allāh Shāh's personality and his devotion to the cause of freedom made a deep impression on his contemporaries including some British officers also. According to Malleon, Thomas Seaton, "who enjoyed during the suppression of the revolt, the best means of judging him;" considered the Shāh to be "a man of great abilities, of undaunted courage, of stern determination, and by far the best soldier among the rebels".<sup>1</sup> Malleon also had a high opinion of his character and capacity. "If a patriot", he writes, "is a man who plots and fights for the independence, wrongfully destroyed, of his native country, then most certainly the Maulawi was a true patriot".<sup>2</sup>

### Mawlawi Sarfaraz 'Alī

Another religious leader who actively worked for the Revolution was Mawlawi Sarfarāz 'Alī of Gorakhpur. An eminent scholar and a powerful orator, Sarfarāz 'Alī used to deliver *mā'z*<sup>3</sup> in the vicinity of his home town. One of his disciples, Shāh Ghulām Imām, a resident of Shahjahanpur, requested him to visit that town, where he started giving sermons to the people as well as the soldiers in the regimental lines of the cantonment. It is difficult to say when he came to Shahjahanpur, but this is certain that he was there when the Revolution broke out.<sup>4</sup> This is corroborated by the compiler of the District Gazetteer; "for several days", he writes, "they (sepoys) had been subjected to the corrupting influence of a *maulawi* from Gorakhpur named Sarfarāz 'Alī, who was afterwards appointed chief of the *Ghāzis* at Delhi."<sup>5</sup> Sarfarāz 'Alī's activities were not confined to his own province; early in 1857 we find him in Delhi, secretly working for the Move-

1 Malleon, p. 17.

2 Quoted in Kaye and Malleon, iv, p. 381.

3 i.e. religious sermons.

4 Khalil, Miyan Shāhib al-Dīn *Tārīkh-i-Shāhjahānpur* (Lucknow, 1931).

5 Neville, H. R., *District Gazetteers of United Provinces of Agra and Oudh* : (Allahabad, 1910), p. 141.

ment. He wanted to meet a Risaldar, (unfortunately) not named in the letter addressed to him, at the 'urs<sup>1</sup> gathering of Khwājah Bāqī bi-Allāh<sup>2</sup>, where his meeting with an army officer would raise no suspicion. Formally, he calls him there to earn the blessing of the *shaykh*'s soul by visiting his tomb and attending his 'urs; but he betrays his real motive when he adds that "through one step two purposes would be served".<sup>3</sup>

#### Mawlawi Liyaqat 'Ali

Mawlawi Liyāqat 'Alī, like Sarfarāz 'Alī, was also one of the active preachers of *jihād*. Born in a peasant family in a small village, not far from Allahabad, he lived and studied with his uncle, Dā'im 'Alī, who was a Risaldar in the Company's Army. Later, he himself joined the army and spent three years in Ambala and Ferozepur. Here too he would preach Islam to his fellow soldiers and several Sikhs are stated to have accepted Islām at his hands; perhaps it was for this reason that he resigned from the army. He toured extensively in northern Hind-Pakistan, ultimately settling down in Allahabad.<sup>4</sup> When giving lessons to

1 'Urs, lit. wedding entertainment; in Šūfistic phraseology it means annual gatherings to celebrate the death of a *shaykh*.

2 For a detailed account of his life see *Zubdat al-Maḳāmāt* (Lucknow, 1307 H.)

3 This important letter was made available to the writer by M. Ayub Qadri, who has secured it from a descendant of Ḥakim Sa'id Allāh of Aonia, a close friend of Mawlawi Sarfarāz 'Alī.

4 *Kaye's Mutiny Papers* (India Office Library, 721 A: Vol. I, p. 159) contain a copy of the notification which said that "whereas... Mouviee Lyakut Ullee of the Mouze Mowgoun... a base-born recreant and miscreant with other base-born and miscreant mussulmans assembled and offered up prayers in this musjid and publicly uttered rebellious and seditious harangues against the British Government... the following proclamation is issued: That by reason of this rebellion and sedition no recreant Mussulman be hence-forth permitted to resort to this musjid but it be for the future converted into Barracks for European soldiers of the British Government." It is dated, Allahabad, the 18th June 1857

his pupils and preaching Islam he laid emphasis on the importance of *jihād*. Soon he became associated with the "Secret Council" of the organizers of the Revolution and was assigned the duty of conveying to the people of the various places the date and signs fixed for its outbreak.<sup>1</sup> He went to villages, towns and cities and met a number of persons of different classes; on the outbreak of the Revolution he was put in charge of Allahabad.<sup>2</sup> It may be added that he was tried by the Government in 1872. With remarkable courage "the prisoner Lyakut Allie confesses that he did commit the offences charged against him, that is that he was a leader of the revolt and rebelled and waged war against the Queen, and the Government of the East India Company in the month of June 1857". The Judge found him guilty because of this "confession" and directed "that the said Lyakut Allie shall be transported for life."<sup>3</sup>

#### 'Azim Allah Khan and Nana Sahib

Nānā Ṣāhib is regarded by some writers as one of the most eminent leaders of the Revolution; it is true that after joining the Movement he remained firm and active till the last moment. Nānā Sahib "appeared to me not a man of ability, nor a fool. He was selfish; . . . He seemed to be far from a bigot in the matters of religion".<sup>4</sup> Mowbray Thomson adds that he was

1 Malleon refers to the "Executive Council" and its policy in these words: "The Executive Council of this conspiracy had arranged, in the beginning of 1857, to act upon the sipahis by means of the greased cartridges, upon the inhabitants of the rural districts by the dissemination of the chappatis. This dissemination was intended as a warning that the rising was imminent. It was further decided that the rising of the *sipahis* should be simultaneous, and more than once the actual day was fixed." Cf. Malleon, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

2 For an account of the life of Mawlawī Liyāqat 'Alī, before the Revolution, and his activities after its collapse till his death. See *Al-Jamiat*, Delhi, 2 September, 1957. The article contains some useful information, particularly about his work in the post-1857 years.

3 Government vs. Liyakut 'Alli, dated 24 July, 1872, quoted in *F.S.U.P.* IV, 643.

4 John Lang (who had enjoyed Nānā's hospitality), quoted in Sen, p. 123.

"exceedingly corpulent . . . clean shaven on both head and face. He does not speak a word of English".<sup>1</sup> Nānā had inherited the accumulated wealth of his adoptive father, the deposed Peshwa Baji Rao, and lived in a regal style. Nevertheless, he was anxious that the latter's pension which had been stopped by the Government on his death should be restored in his favour. He decided "to send an agent to England to prosecute his claims".<sup>2</sup> 'Azīm Allāh Khān who was selected for this purpose could not do anything with regard to Nānā's claim for the pension as decision had already been taken before his arrival in England in 1853, but on his return from Europe he was able to persuade his master to join the Revolution.

'Azīm Allāh Khān was the son of a poor Pathan who had migrated to Kānpur from the north-west in search of livelihood and had become a cook in an English family. The boy 'Azīm Allāh was put in a school by his father at the instance of his master. After completing his studies he became a teacher in the same school. In course of time "he acquired a thorough acquaintance with the English and French languages," and it was 'Azīm Allāh's proficiency in English which brought him into the service of Nānā Sahib.

<sup>1</sup> Thomson, Captain Mowbray, *The Story of Cawnpore* (London, 1859), p. 46. For other accounts slightly differing in details see Sen., p. 126, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Kaye and Malletson, I, 79.

According to some authorities 'Azīm Allāh himself had suggested to the Nānā that he should be sent to England; he "was confident that, if he could visit England, he would be able to have the decrees of Lord Dalhousie against his master reversed . . ." See statement of Muhammad 'Alī, who accompanied 'Azīm Allāh Khān as a member of his suite, in Forbes-Mitchell, Sargeant William, *Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny, 1857-59* (London, 1897), pp 185-86.

The story of Muhammad 'Alī *alias* Jamie Green is highly interesting. He came of a respectable family of Rohilkhand and was educated at the Bareilly College. From here he went to Roorkee to study Engineering, and "passed out the senior student of my year". But in spite of this credit he was given

during his stay in England 'Azim Allāh Khān apparently "devoted his energies to the pursuit of pleasure," and "made his way into good society."<sup>1</sup> On the basis of "a number of letters" found in the room occupied by 'Azim-Allāh Khān, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts came to the conclusion that he "was received into best English society, everywhere treated as a royal prince, and became engaged to a young girl who agreed to follow him to India to be married . . . an elderly dame called him her dear eastern son."<sup>2</sup> A "gay, charming, person" whom "the (European) ladies voted . . . charming," was by no means voluptuous, nor his interest in the high social circles of London was motivated by his fondness for handsome women. It appears that he was in correspondence with some Europeans; besides "the numerous letters from his English fiancée" two came from a Frenchman, Lafont, "relating to some business with the French settlement of Chandernagore, with which he had been entrusted by Azim Allāh Khān."<sup>3</sup> Under this assignment Lafont left Kanpur on 1 April, 1857; he posted a letter from Banāras on the 4th. He had planned to reach Chandarnagar on 7 April and

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a subordinate job in the Company's service, which he soon resigned. Subsequently he became Secretary to the Prime Minister of Nepal who wanted a well educated person to accompany him on his visit to England. After his return there he served in "different native courts" until he was selected by 'Azim Allāh Khān to join his suite; thus he went on a second visit to England. On the outbreak of the Revolution he joined the Bareilly Brigade and went with it to Delhi. Here he worked as the Engineer-in-Chief of the Revolutionary forces. On the fall of Delhi he came to Lucknow with the army of General Hāshim Khān and worked there also as Chief Engineer of the Revolutionary forces. Ultimately he was caught spying in the guise of a vendor and hanged; "in passing under a tree on the side of the Cawnpore and Kanow road, I looked up and was horrified to see my late prisoner and his companion hanging stark and stiffened corpses! I could hardly repress a tear as he passed."

Kaye and Malleeson, I, p. 78.

Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, *Forty-one years in India* (London, 1897), p. 27.

*Ibid.*, I, 427-28.

meet "our Consul-General ;" he also speaks of his intended visit to Calcutta where "I will not stay ..... longer than necessary to arrange everything and to arrange it well." He also adds a note asking 'Azim Allāh "to write to me at Calcutta because I would be there every day because by rail I make the journey in twenty minutes " In the second letter dated 9 April he informs 'Azim Allāh Khān that "I have arranged everything. I would bring a letter and it would be satisfactory if I give the letter on the 14th and on the 15th I depart for Cawnpore."<sup>1</sup> Lafont's statements need no comments, and it would be difficult to disagree with Roberts that probably "*Les principales choses*, to which Lafont hopes to bring satisfactory answers were invitations to the disaffected and disloyal in Calcutta and perhaps the French settlers at Chandernagore, to assist in the effort about to be made to throw off the British yoke."<sup>2</sup>

During the three years that 'Azim Allāh had spent in Europe he had visited Paris, Constantinople (twice) and the Crimea,<sup>3</sup> he was so much excited by "the news of the defeat of June 18th" which reached him in Malta, that he changed his programme of proceeding to Calcutta and resolved to go to Constantinople and thence to Balaklava and see "those great Roostums, the Russians, who have beaten French and English together."<sup>4</sup> Of the several letters in 'Azim Allāh Khān's own

1 *Ibid* , I, 428. The letters were written in French.

2 *Ibid* , p 429

3 In Constantinople he "met certain real or pretended Russian agents, who made large promises of material support if Azeemolla could stir up a rebellion in India. It was then that I and Azeemolla formed the resolution of attempting to overthrow the Company's Government, and *shookr khoda* ! we have succeeded in doing it . . ." Statement of Muhammad 'Ali quoted in Forbes-Mitchell, p 186

For some details of 'Azim Allāh Khān's visit to the Crimean front see Russel, William Howard, *My Diary in India, in the year 1858-59* (London, 1860), I, pp. 165-58.

4 *Ibid*

hand which he could not despatch, two were addressed to 'Umar Pāshā,<sup>1</sup> a distinguished Turkish general in the Crimean War. Of his meeting with the Iranian Prime Minister "Furookh Khan," there is a reference in the statement of Wazīr Khān.<sup>2</sup>

It appears that after his return from Europe, 'Azīm Allāh took active steps to materialize his schemes. He knew that the efforts of prominent *sūfīs* and *'ulamā* to preach *jihād* to the Muslims would bear little fruit without the active cooperation of the Hindus. He, therefore, decided to use Nānā's position as the adopted son of the last Peshwa and the discontinuance of his pension as levers for the working of his propaganda machinery. Besides sending messages on behalf of the Nānā to some Hindu chiefs 'Azīm Allāh Khān arranged a "mysterious tour", and the "worthy couple, on the pretence of a pilgrimage to the hills at Simla—a Hindoo and Musulman joined in a holy excursion—visited the military stations all along the main trunk-road, and went as far as the Umballah."<sup>3</sup>

1 Roberts, I, 431. Also see Lord Eversley, *The Turkish Empire* (Lahore, 1957—second impression). pp. 309, 320, 323.

2 Foreign Political Proceedings, 30th December, 1899, No. 312 as quoted in *F.S.U.P.*, II, 149.

3 Russel, I pp.107-08; also see Kaye and Malleeson, I, 422.

Sen (p.129) does not accept the view that the Nānā 'accompanied 'Azīm Allāh on this tour and thinks "Russel does scant justice to the intelligence and good sense of the Anglo-Indian officialdom without whose leave Nana could not proceed a mile from his palace and even the griffin knew that Kalpi and Lucknow had no sanctity in Hindu eyes. The official records throw no light on his tour; programme, but when Martineau met Azimullah at Ambala in January 1857 Nana was not with him." Sen has criticised Russel but he does not even mention the great historian Sir John Kaye who rightly asks; "How was he (Lord Canning) to know how was any Englishman, shut up all day long in his house, and having no more living intercourse with the people than if they were clay figures, to know what was passing beneath the surface of native society?" Evidently Nānā and 'Azīm Allāh Khān were clever enough to keep their movements "beneath the surface of native Society." Kaye adds that "it was remembered afterwards that, in the early part of this year, one man, was displaying in his movemenets,



### The Emissaries

On the basis of the meagre information now available, some idea can be formed of the methods used by the organizers of the Movement. Besides religious sermons and the preaching of *jihād*, emissaries were sent in the guise of *faqirs* and *sanyāsīs*. "It is probable" writes Cave-Browne, "that the correspondence of the leaders in the rebellion was not entrusted to the post, but conveyed by private hands, such as *faqirs* and pretended beggars, who were really disguised traitors and emissaries of treason."<sup>1</sup> If an exceptionally large number of men had been employed as emissaries their identity would have been exposed; postal communication was therefore resorted to; this proved to be a great mistake. It is rather surprising that the organizers did not realize the danger involved in it. In the beginning they wrote messages in cipher; later even this precaution was given up.<sup>2</sup> Naturally the Government became suspicious, and "all letters addressed to sepoys were opened at the principal stations. Thousands of other vernacular letters were also inspected, and at many stations the Magistrate became the Post-Master. The number of

an unwonted activity, which created surprise, but scarcely aroused suspicion. This man was Nana Sahib . . ." Kaye and Mallett I, 421-22.

On one occasion he thought he had "aroused suspicion," and therefore he had to leave Lucknow rather abruptly. Vide Gubbins, Martin Richards, *An account of the Mutinies in Oudh* (London, 1858). p. 3.

1 Cave-Browne, Rev. J. *The Punjab and Delhi in 1857* (London, 1861) I, p. 6n. Also see *Punjab Mutiny Report* (Lahore, 1859), p. 87. For letters from Patna and Thanesar addressed to Nāik Karīm Allāh and other soldiers of the 64th N I see *FSUP* I, 353, also see *Selections from the History of India* (Urdu version published under the authority of the Government of India, Calcutta, (1898). p. 197

2 "The secret correspondence" writes Lieutenant General Innes "by which the conspiracy was fostered was ascertained to have been at first mainly Mahomedan very cautiously worded and written in Cipher. Later, when it spread among the sepoys, it was more diffuse easier of detection, being in ordinary language, with the allusions crudely veiled". Innes, Lieut-Gen. J.J. McLeod, *The Sepoy Revolt* (London 1897), p. 55

sedition letters thus discovered was alarmingly great. The treason was generally couched in figurative and enigmatic phrases." These letters made it clear that "the sepoys and others really did believe that we intended to destroy their caste by various devices, that the members of Mohamedan fanaticism had begun to glow,..."<sup>1</sup>

### **Chapatīs and lotus flowers**

In view of the low percentage of literacy the leaders of the Revolution adopted a singularly remarkable device of approaching the masses in the villages and men of the army. The circulation of *chapātīs*, now a well-known fact, was organized so efficiently that no one has been able to discover its origin or its author. Malle-son asserts with some confidence that Aḥmad Allāh Shah had devised this interesting scheme.<sup>2</sup> Their distribution seems to have started in 1856,<sup>3</sup> but it was early in the following year that they attracted the attention of the Company's officers. Captain Ternan, who was posted at Narsinhpur, about sixty miles from Saugor, was informed by his Kotwal in January, 1857, that they were being circulated in the area; the Kotwal had also brought a few *chapātīs* for his inspection. Ternan saw "in those small unleavened cakes... the fiery cross sent through

1 Chik, N.A., *Annals of the Indian Rebellion, 1857-58* (Calcutta, 1859-60; p. I.

The sepoys were convinced that efforts were being made by the Government to convert them. In *The Times* (London) a letter was published on 5 August, 1857 saying that this was proved by papers laid before the Parliament. The writer then speaks of a report saying that the sepoys believed that Christian missionaries had presented an '*urzee*' (petition) to Queen Victoria. They complained "that although for 60 years a Christian Government has ruled this country (India) yet not one man has since been made Christian... When the Queen read the *urzee* she was greatly pleased and said, 'This is very good thought, and by this means we shall have every sepoy made a Christian.'" For a cutting see *Kaye's Papers*, Vol. 726.

2 Malle-son, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Evidently the object of circulating the *chapātīs* was to notify to the people that they were to remain prepared for a revolution.

3 See Majumdar, R. C., *The Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt*, (Calcutta, 1957) p. 208.

the land to unsettle the minds of the great mass of the people." He immediately sent a report to Major Erskine, Commissioner of Saugor, but the latter considered the views of Ternan to be absurd and ridiculed them. However, "subsequent events made it abundantly evident that Erskine was wrong and Ternan was right."<sup>1</sup> The circulation of the mysterious *chapātis* soon became alarmingly widespread and the Government had to take notice of it.<sup>2</sup>

Interestingly enough, even the *chawkidārs*, through whom they were distributed did not know the secret of their circulation; on the contrary, ironical though it might appear, they believed that they had been circulating the *chapātis* under orders of the Government.<sup>3</sup>

A similar device was used for the men of the army; here the lotus flower was circulated instead of the *chapātis*.<sup>4</sup> Evidently the Revolutionaries had to be pretty cautious as far as the Army units were concerned. The lotus flower was given to the chief Hind-Pakistānī officer, and he was expected to prepare the sepoys under him for the Revolution<sup>5</sup>. On the eve of the outbreak of the Revolution

1 Kaye and Malleson, V, 62-63.

2 *The Mofussalite*, Agra, dated 27 February, 1857, published the news that an official report was made to the Government of the North-Western Provinces. It also published a letter of the Magistrate of Gurgaon, to the Commissioner of Delhi, dated 19 February, 1857, which said that the *chawkidārs* of the villages in Muttra had received the *chapātis* and spoke of the process of their movement in these words: "A chokeydar upon receiving one of these cakes has had five or six more prepared, and thus they have passed from village to village; so quickly has the order been executed that village after village has been served with the notice."

3 The Magistrate had reported that "an idea has been industriously circulated that Government has given the order." *The Mofussalite*, 27 February, 1857.

4 See *Risālah*, *op cit*, p. 3, Sen, pp. 398-400; also Majumdar, *The Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt*, p. 207 ff.

5 Referring to the *chapātis* and "another symbol of conspiracy," Sir Colin Campbell says: "A man appeared with a lotus flower and handed it to the chief of the regiment. He handed it on, and when it came to the last soldier of a regiment he suddenly disappeared and took it on to the next

meetings were held openly ; "burning arrows," writes Sir John Kaye, "were shot into the thatched roofs of officers' bungalows . . . These intending fires were soon followed by nocturnal meetings. Men met each other with ruffled faces, and discussed, in excited language, the intolerable outrage which the British Government had deliberately committed upon them . . . All that is clearly known is that the meetings were held, that the letters were sent ; and cantonment after cantonment fermented with the story of the greased cartridges."<sup>1</sup>

### 31 May fixed as the date for a general rising

The Revolutionary leaders had planned a simultaneous rising of the sepoys at all important stations ; this was to be followed by a general revolt resulting in the overthrow of the British Government. According to Malleson, more than once the actual day was fixed, "but providentially something always happened to prevent the explosion on that day."<sup>2</sup>

station. There was not, it appears, a single regiment, not a detachment, not a station in Bengal, through which the lotus flower was not thus circulated ; . . . The conspiracy, of which these were the symbols, seems to have been precipitated in a remarkable manner." Campbell, Sir Colin, *Narrative of the Indian Revolt from its outbreak to the capture of Lucknow* (London), p. 4.

1 Kaye and Malleson, I. 365-66.

2 Malleson. *op. cit.*, p. 33.

Another contemporary writer, also an eye-witness, supports Malleson. He says : "The following facts will prove that, though the exact locality of the first outbreak was not arranged, though the train took light unexpectedly, a mutiny of the army, and a Mussulman rebellion were planned and fully expected." He also quotes an interesting conversation between Nawwāb Ahmad Allāh Khān Tahsildār of Naginah and a Police Inspector, Francois Sisten, who was posted at Sitapur but had come on leave to meet his relatives and friends. Both happened to meet in an ante-room of the house of Edwardes, Joint Magistrate of Saharanpur. The Nawab took Sisten to be a Muslim, because he was in "native clothes" and inquired from him where he was employed. On receiving Sisten's reply that he was posted as a Police Officer in Sitapur the Nawab asked him ; "What news from Oudh ? how does the work progress, brother ?" The Nawab continued in the same strain and concluded by saying : "Depend upon it, we will succeed this time, the direction of the business is in

For instance it has been stated that 10 March was fixed for a rising of the sepoys in Calcutta, but this seems to be improbable.<sup>1</sup> However, it is almost certain that the organizers of the Movement had fixed the last day of May 1857 for a simultaneous rising of the sepoys. After the collapse of the Revolution, Cracroft Wilson was appointed Special Commissioner and assigned the task of preparing a report about persons who deserved a reward for their loyalty to the Government or were to be punished for their participation in the Movement. "Carefully collating oral information with facts as they occurred", he writes, "I am convinced that Sunday, 31st of May 1857, was the day fixed for mutiny to commence throughout the Bengal army; that there were committees of about three members in each regiment which conducted the duties, if I may so speak, of the mutiny, that the Sipahis as a body knew nothing of the plans arranged; and the only compact entered into by regiments, as a body, was that their particular regiments would do as the other regiments did. The committee conducted the correspondence and arranged the plan of operations, viz., that on the 31st of May parties should be told off to murder all European functionaries, most of whom would be engaged in church; seize the treasure, which would then be augmented by the first instalment of the rubbie harvest; and release the prisoners . . . The regiments in Delhi and its immediate vicinity were instructed to seize the magazine and fortifications".<sup>2</sup> The anniversary of Plassey, 23 June, has also been suggested<sup>3</sup> but this would have been unwise, as by that time the

able hands." See Dunlop, Robert Henry Wallace, *Service and Adventure with the Khakee Rissalah, or Meerut Volunteer Horse during the Mutinies of 1857-58* (London, 1858), pp. 151-54.

<sup>1</sup> Kaye and Mallsen, I, 388.

<sup>2</sup> J. C. Wilson's *Muradabad Narrative* (official) Dec. 24 1858, quoted in Kaye and Mallsen II 81-82.

<sup>3</sup> "This twenty third of June 1757, was the date of the great rout that placed Bengal beneath the sway of the foreigner. In 1857 the ringleaders of the mutiny had fixed on the dawning of that day as the signal for the general rebellion over the entire north of India." Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

monsoon, would have set in, and made the movement of armies difficult ; moreover, the newly-set up Government of the Revolutionaries would have lost the *rabi*<sup>1</sup> harvest.

### **Premature outbreak of the Revolution**

The sudden and premature rising of the sepoys at Meerut on 10 May, 1857, upset the plans of the Revolutionary leaders ; it was perhaps one of the main causes of their failure. The statement of a contemporary writer shows that the immediate cause of the outburst was an altercation between the British soldiers and the sepoys in the course of their religious discussions. "One day in the month of fasting of the said year of *hijrah* .. .. ." he writes, "the Indian soldiers, the *sawārs* and the *telingahs*, started discussions on religious topics ; the discussions developed into a quarrel ; the parties took to using arms and individuals began to fight . . . As the sepoys were larger in number they had the upper hand . . they became proud and audacious enough to fight and shed blood of their officers."<sup>1</sup>

### **Was the Revolution a National Movement ?**

The manner and scale on which the Revolutionary Movement was organized leave no doubt that its aim was to liberate the people from the shackles of British imperialism.<sup>2</sup> The Princes and the landlords had reconciled themselves to foreign rule which they thought could alone safeguard their interests. The Revolutionary leaders, therefore, wisely addressed themselves to the peasantry through the distribution of *chapātīs* by the village *chawkidārs* and the working classes in the towns and cities through local religious leaders and *faqirs*.

1 Lukhnawī, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

2 The Movement had been organized on all Hind-Pakistan basis : Agra and Lucknow in the north, Calcutta, in the east and Peshawar in the west were most certainly active centres of the activities of its leaders and emissaries. In the central and southern subcontinent also their agents had been carrying on work.

The anonymous author of the *Zafar-nāmah Waqāi' Ghadr* who was a *Muḥāfiẓ Daftār* in the Residency before the annexation of Awadh and subsequently worked as *Nā'ib Mir Munshī* of the Chief Commissioner describes in detail the activities of the Revolutionaries in Lucknow and mentions facts to which "he was either an eye-witness or which he had heard with his own ears." Referring to the sermons of "*Barey Ḥaḍrat Ṣāhib*" on Fridays and "*Chotey Ḥaḍratji*" after every congregational prayer, he says that "they lectured on the *Tafsir Muḍīḥ al-Qur'ān* . . . and preached *jihād* to the butchers, vegetable-sellers, weavers, cotton dealers, tailors, saddle-makers, tobacco-nists, bakers, cobblers, shoe-makers along with other craftsmen and traders and prepared them for mischief and disruption (*ṣharr wa fasād*)". Besides the working classes and traders the Revolutionary leaders contacted the disgruntled Princes and chiefs, and succeeded in enlisting the support of quite a few of them. Nānā Rao, the Begum of Awadh, the Rānī of Jhānsī and Kunwar Singh of Jagdishpur joined the Movement because they or their families had suffered grievously at the hands of the British Government.<sup>2</sup> However, after joining the Movement they not only remained firm in their adherence to the cause of the Revolution but soon became its front rank leaders. The reputation of Nānā Rao and his confedante, 'Azīm Allāh Khān, has undoubtedly been stained by their massacre of defenceless Europeans, but the names of the two women leaders of the Revolution will ever remain alive in the pages of our history.

The organizers of the Movement knew that they could not achieve their purpose without a bloody revolution; it was, therefore absolutely necessary to "tamper with" the sepoys who formed

1 I. O. MS ff 31-32

For the author's references to himself see ff. 54-55. Also see Etche, I, 165.

2 It may be noted that the case of Bahādur Shāh and the Mughul Princes is different. Later when he was tried by the British Government an attempt was made by his prosecutors to prove that he was the chief organizer of the Revolution and had been in touch with Persia. But the available evidence on this point is not conclusive although it is certain that the people generally believed

the bulk of the Company's army. The sepoys too had their own grievances,<sup>1</sup> most of which were quite genuine ; but they were not planning to have them redressed by overthrowing the Company's administrative machinery. The patriots, however, were quick to take advantage of the discontent among the sepoys ; for this purpose they started an organized propaganda against the introduction of the Enfield rifle with its greased cartridge, emphasizing the point that the Government had thereby hurt the sentiments and

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that Persian forces were on their way to the subcontinent. Nor can there be any doubt about the influence of the patriots on the Muḡhul Princes, and despite their weaknesses they took an active part in the Revolution. Incompetent as they were, soon after seizing power they started behaving like spoiled children and did more harm than good to the cause of the Movement. 'Allāmāh Faḡl Ḥaqq, who was an eye-witness to their misdeeds, has condemned them in strong words ; he says : "His (Bahādur Shāh's) sons and grandsons . . . were stupid, dishonest and coward. They hated honest and wise persons. They had never witnessed a battle nor had they any experience of the blows of swords and lances. They selected men from the gutter for association and consultation. These inexperienced fellows drowned themselves in the ocean of luxuries and extravagance and submerged themselves in the flood of debauchery." See *J.P.H.S.*, V, Part I. p. 31.

1 The most serious of the grievances of the sepoys was in regard to the danger to their religion, particularly because of the conduct of some officers who abused their position and tried to convert them to Christianity. Colonel Wheeler's case had become almost a popular scandal. The *Englishman* wrote : "Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler is quite unfit for his post, because he distributes tracts." The *London Times*' comment was more definite ; Wheeler "had no right to be missionary and colonel too." His activities were considered to be a contributory cause of the "Mutiny." The same paper said : Who can tell, then, how much mischief this one man's forward and impertinent zeal has done, and how much it may have contributed to the whole outbreak." When asked to explain, the Colonel made a frank admission : "I have been," he said, "in the habit of speaking to the natives of all classes, sepoys and others . . ." Continuing his arguments he added, "I have done this from a conviction that every converted Christian is expected, or rather commanded by the scriptures to make know the glad tidings of salvation to his lost fellow creatures . . ." For further details and relevant documents, *FSUP.*, I, 287-302.



feelings of the sepoys. When the ground was prepared a pledge was taken through the circulation of the lotus flower.<sup>1</sup> In the villages too the idea of a revolution was spreading fast. As early as January 1857, "the peasants of Bengal were repeating to each other a sentence apparently devoid of meaning 'sub lal hogahi', everything is to become red." It was interpreted by some as a reference to the extension of British rule over the entire subcontinent, "when the scarlet coats of our soldiers would be seen at Hyderabad and Khatmandoo, in Cashmere and Travancore; while others hinted that there was something thicker than water, and of a deeper crimson than a British uniform."<sup>2</sup>

By the spring of 1857 the Revolution fever had reached a climax; even small boys playing in the streets had begun to raise anti-British slogans.<sup>3</sup> The Imperial Palace at Delhi was guarded by a British officer, but there is no doubt that whisperings about the coming Revolution and a Persian invasion from the north-west often found their way into the apartments of the Red Fort.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, there was hardly any place, public or private, where *jihād* and the Revolution were not talked about. The author of the *Zafar Nāmah Waqā'i' Ghadr* narrates some very interesting incidents in this connection. A *darwish*, for instance, came to the cemetery at *Tilah Shāh Muḥammad* and addressed the dead bodies buried there in these words: "All of you should move from here and occupy the graves of the Europeans who have fled away; apparently

1 Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

2 Trevelyan, pp. 72-73

3 Cf. *Zafar Nāmah Waqā'i' Ghadr*, ff 15-16

4 In the trial of Bahādur Shāh the Judge-Advocate General tried to make out a case of a "Muhammadan conspiracy" in which the old Emperor was involved; in his (Emperor's) personal apartments "the subject of the conversation night and day was the early arrival of the Persians." All that the Advocate has said may not be true, but most of the facts mentioned by him to prove the existence of a "conspiracy" were supported by documentary evidence. See Kaye and Mollison, V, 319

he behaved like a mad man in order to avoid causing suspicion. Another person appeared at the tank of Husaynābād, and taking a sheet of cloth from the shoulder of a beggar he tore it into pieces and threw them at the people, saying: "Give the biggest piece to the Emperor of Delhi and the smaller ones to Nānā Rao Nawab of Farrukhābād and Sayyid Ahmad Allāh Shāh; the fourth one was to be burnt in the shop of a *bhang*-seller because I have burnt the share of the ruler of Awadh". Other mad-looking *majdhūbs*<sup>1</sup> could be seen roaming about in public places, crying strange type of slogans.<sup>2</sup>

The British Government and European officers who had to face the Revolution naturally regarded it to be a 'mutiny' of the sepoys. The heavy losses suffered by them had made them so bitter that they contemptuously referred to the Revolutionaries as *badma'āshes* (scoundrels) and traitors. The war had left bitter memories, and the post-1857 period was therefore marked by a spirit of unrestrained retaliation. The entire structure of life, particularly in areas which had been directly affected by the upheaval, was shaken to its foundations. Under these abnormal circumstances few persons could have had opportunities of making an objective study of the Revolution. Those who genuinely agreed with the views of the British officers or considered it expedient to express their agreement with them had of course no difficulty in writing and publishing their works on this ticklish theme. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Mawlawi Zakā Allāh and Ghalib may be mentioned, by way of illustration. In fact, nearly all the books written on this subject, including the memoirs and reminiscences of those who were eye-witnesses of the events, took one and the same view. From contemporary works this view found its way into school and college text-books. For decades therefore the 'mutiny' theory held the ground, almost unchallenged; the other side of the picture

1 *Majdhūb*: i.e. a *darwish*, attracted by Divine grace, and apparently behaving in a rather unusual manner.

2 See *Zafā nāmah*, ff. 27-31.

remained completely hidden.<sup>1</sup> Now that an objective study of this important chapter of our history can be made in a freer atmosphere it is not difficult to examine it in its proper perspective.

The activities of the patriots who organized the Movement and other Revolutionary leaders leave no doubt as to the nature and origin of the Movement. Even some of the British historians relying on contemporary records have found in it elements of a national struggle for freedom. Charles Ball, one of the earliest authorities on the subject, definitely asserts, that the Meerut sepoys appealed to the men of the 54th posted at Delhi "to join in the movement that was intended to put an end to the 'Raj of the Feringhee' and to restore to India the independent rule of its native princes." The men of the 54th were ready to receive this appeal and "required no solicitation to fraternize with the rebels ; and, as if by one impulse, they withdrew from the European officers .....<sup>2</sup> Another great writer who is unable to reconcile himself to the idea that it was just a 'mutiny' of the sepoys is Colonel Malleon. He is rather emphatic on the point that the war was the result of a pre-meditated "conspiracy" which "had its ramifications all over India," and which had among its prime movers the Mawlawi.<sup>3</sup> J. B. Norton, who wrote a short treatise on the "Rebellion" has critically examined its causes and nature. He warns his countrymen in these words : "Do not let the fatal mistake in our diagnosis be committed of fancying, that this outbreak is merely the local exhibiton of discontent on the part of a few disaffected regiments. It will be found to extend from one end of Bengal to the other, and probably to embrace all classes, civil as well as military. It leaps from one distant point to another almost simultaneously. Thus the same post brings intelligence of risings at Sattarah, at Nagpore, at Jhansi.

<sup>1</sup> Savarkar wrote his *The war of Independence* in 1909, but it was proscribed. See its Introduction in the 1947 edition.

<sup>2</sup> Ball, I, 73

<sup>3</sup> Kaye and Malleon, V, 292

Its origin is partly, if not principally, political. The answer of the sepoys to their officers at Neemuch may show us that . . . within three little months 50,000 soldiers have turned rebels! ”<sup>1</sup> Later events proved beyond doubt that Norton’s conclusions, though recorded soon after the outbreak were correct. We find similar comments recorded by other writers who were in a position to make a critical study of the various aspects of the problem.<sup>2</sup>

We have abundant circumstantial evidence which proves that it was a National Revolution. There are veiled references to it even in contemporary literature and incontestible documentary proof in official records, particularly those relating to the trials of the Revolutionary leaders. The publication of ‘Allamah Faḍl-i-Haqq’s *The Story of the War*<sup>3</sup> has made a valuable addition to contemporary literature on the subject. He was a distinguished scholar, and soon after the outbreak of the Revolution he had become an adviser to Bahādur Shāh. On the fall of Delhi he came to Awadh and worked as a counsellor of

1 Norton, John Bruce, *The Rebellion in India: How to prevent another* (London, 1857), p. 14.

2 As an illustration the views of two French writers —Fonvielle and Legault —given in their joint work *Liinsurrection de l’Indie* may be quoted; they write: “Is it correct to say that the Indians are not interested in this and the revolt of the sepoys is only a military mutiny without an echo from the people of India? Is it correct to say that this revolution could not have been foreseen, and that there were no forbodings of it and that England — just, beneficent and paternal—was relying on the goodness of her administration but she only met with ungratefulness? No: all this is a fallacy and must be given up; let no one be deceived by this empty phraseology . . . Discontent has invaded all classes of the Indian population; they are going to make common cause with the sepoys. And . . . it must be admitted that there exist in their favour numerous and considerably extenuating circumstances.” Quoted in Husain, Mahdi, *Bahadur Shāh II* (Delhi, 1958), p. 1.

3 Originally written in Arabic it was secured and remained in secret custody of one of his pupils and passed by the latter to his own pupil. After independence (1947) it was published at the instance of Mawlana Abul Kalam under the title, *Baḡhī Hindustān*. An English translation by the present writer was published on the basis of Urdu version in the *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Vol. V, part I.

the Begum Hadrat Mahal. Subsequently he was tried and transported for life. It was during his period of imprisonment at the Andamans that he wrote a short account of the Revolution on torn pieces of paper and used clothes.

Besides recorded evidence throwing light on the nature of the Movement we may briefly refer to some of its striking features whose significance has not been properly assessed. The fact that the "Mutiny" was confined to the Bengal Army has been over-emphasised. In fact, vast areas in different parts of the subcontinent were affected by it. Though the leaders could not organise a popular revolt openly yet symptoms of uneasiness were noticed even in places which were at a great distance from the main centres of the Movement. "A Native, well acquainted with the spirit and feelings of his countrymen" told Norton at Bangalore that but for the presence of British forces "there would not be a European alive in the station within a week." At Triplicane, the same writer adds, "fear only is said to keep the Mussulmen down - their brethren in Poona have publicly offered up prayers for the success of the Native arms at Delhi and Meerut . . . ." After mentioning other places which had become scenes of outbreaks he continues his comments : "It is impossible to limit the cause of outbreak to the offended religious prejudices of any particular caste . . . . The rebellion is wide-spread and contagious. It shows signs of combination. It draws all religions to a common centre."<sup>1</sup> That the Revolution spread like wild fire from a common centre is a strong evidence of the fact that it was the result of an organized Movement having for its object the expulsion of British rule.

It is not without significance that Bahādur Shāh was accepted as the leader of the Revolution by all sections of the people despite the fact that he was old and helpless, his only title to fame being his poetical talent ; nor had he any means of exercising his authority

<sup>1</sup> Norton, *op cit.*, p. 18-

outside the walls of his Palace. It was a well-known fact that he could not be a good leader of a violent Revolution, and yet every body accepted his authority. There were several local leaders who could assume independent positions but none ever thought of it even after Bahādur Shāh's surrender. They received no help from Delhi, but they continued to remain loyal to the Centre. The rulers of Awadh had assumed the status of kingship and abandoned their allegiance to the Mughul Throne, but during the Revolution the son of Wājid Ali Shāh, was only a *Wālī* and not a king. Similarly Nānā Rao declared himself to be Peshwa but he never thought of quarrelling with the Centre. Even those who realized that Bahādur Shāh was not a competent leader did not waver in their loyalty to him. Loyalty to the Emperor had become, in fact, loyalty to the cause. After the fall of Delhi the local leaders continued the war within their respective jurisdictions.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps equally significant is the fact that after overthrowing the authority of the British Government the Revolutionary leaders set up their own machinery of administration. This is not the usual procedure followed by the mutinying soldiers who simply overthrow the lawful authority and create chaos. But the "mutineers" of 1857 took great pains to maintain the machinery of law and order and tried to create conditions in which people could live in peace and happiness. It may further be noted that in most cases the Hind-Pakistānī officers, serving under the Company's Government

1 The Revolutionary leaders were so particular about allegiance to the Centre that of the four conditions to which Hadrat Maḥal was made to agree at the time of Birjis Qadr's coronation, the first was with regard to the recognition of Bahādur Shāh's sovereignty. It ran thus: "That orders from Delhi were to be obeyed and that whatever orders were received should be final." See *Trial Proceedings*, Government vs Raja Jai Lal Singh, Statement of Mir Wājid 'Alī Dārūghah, quoted in *F. S. U. P.* II, 85.

In a proclamation issued by Birjis Qadr to the people of Awadh and Rohilkhand he is mentioned as "Walee of Oudh". Copies of the Proclamation were found in Khān Bahādur Khān's secretariat at Bareilly. Its English translation was later published in *The Delhi Gazette*, 16 June, 1858. For a cutting see *Kaye's Papers*, vol 727 (I.O.)

were retained by the Revolutionaries ; thousands of Government servants, from the village *chawkidārs* to the highest functionaries in the districts, changed their loyalty overnight and accepted the Revolutionary regime.<sup>1</sup> It would be unfair to say that all of them were 'badmashes' and 'mutineers.' In fact an over-all survey of the Revolution leaves the impression that nearly all sections of the population were represented among the Revolutionaries. Of course the Rulers of the States and the landlords, of whom only a few participated in the struggle, supported the British cause.<sup>2</sup>

To conclude, there is sufficient evidence—recorded and circumstantial—to show that the great upheaval of 1857 was a National Revolution organized by patriotic leaders to liberate the subcontinent from the shackles of foreign rule. That they failed in achieving their objective does not in the least vitiate the character and purpose of the Movement. Indeed, it was the opening chapter of the long struggle of the Hind-Pakistānis to regain their lost freedom which they obtained in 1947.

1 In Meerut district, for instance, only one out of ten Tahsildars chose to remain faithful to the British.

2 Some writers have held the view that the followers of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid did not associate themselves with the Revolution. This is not correct ; many of their leaders actively participated in their individual capacity if not as members of a particular community.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION

#### The greased cartridge

The efforts of the Revolutionary leaders to prepare their countrymen and the Company's army for a war soon bore fruit. As has been mentioned the introduction of the Enfield Rifle, in which a greased cartridge had to be used, provided the sepoy with a genuine cause of grievance<sup>1</sup>; for the leaders of the Movement it proved to be an effective instrument of propaganda. The new rifle had been introduced at the close of 1856 and the cantonments of Dum Dum, Ambala and Sialkot were selected as depots for instruction in its use. How swiftly had the news spread that the Government had introduced the greased cartridge to spoil the faith and the caste of the Hind-Pakistānī sepoy is indicated by an interesting incident which occurred in January, 1857. A low caste lascar asked a Brahmin for a drink of water from his *lota*. The Brahmin refused to give the water because he did not know to what caste the fellow belonged. "You will soon lose your caste," retorted the lascar, "as ere long you will have to bite the cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows." This incident was mentioned by General Hearsey, Commander, Presidency Division, in one of the two letters which he had forwarded to the Government of India on January 24, 1857; he had recommended "that the officer commanding the Rifle Depot might be authorized to obtain from the bazar whatever ingredients might be necessary, which the sepoy might be allowed to make up for themselves." The Government accepted

<sup>1</sup> It is to be noted that "recent researches . . . prove that the lubricating mixture was actually composed of the objectionable ingredients, cow's fat and lard . . .," See Roberts, I, 431.



this suggestion but before any action could be taken the symptoms of the Revolution became clear. "A few days after the story of the greased cartridges first transpired at Damdamah", writes Kaye, "the telegraph station at Barrackpur was burnt down. Then, night after night, followed other fires."<sup>1</sup> In the wake of these fires came the nocturnal meetings of the sepoy, and the excitement began to spread. By the beginning of February, it appears, reports about the new cartridge had reached Barhampur, a military station near Murshidabad.<sup>2</sup> They were confirmed by the two detachments of the 34th Regiment, which came there on 18 and 25 February respectively. On the evening of the day following the arrival of the second detachment, the men of the 19th refused to receive the percussion caps for a parade which was to be held next morning saying, "there was a doubt how the cartridges were prepared." Colonel Mitchell, the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, went to the lines, called the Hind-Pakistani officers and explained to them that the cartridges to be served to their men had been made a year earlier, adding that those who disobeyed the orders of the officers would be severely punished. Late in the night sounds of the beating of drums and shouts were heard. The Colonel rushed to the scene and took necessary steps to quell the rising. But he was advised by his officers to withdraw his men because in that case they hoped the disturbers also would return to the lines. Mitchell acted accordingly and withdrew. On the following morning the entire Regiment fell in for the parade without any sign of insubordination.<sup>3</sup>

1 Kaye and Malleson, I, 365

2 "What is this story everybody is talking about, that Government intends making the native army use cows and pigs' fat with the ammunition for their new rifles?" This question was put by a havildar to Colonel Mitchell commanding the 19th Regiment Native Infantry early in February. Forrest, G. W. *Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers of the Government of India* (Calcutta, 1893), I, 39-41

3 Colonel Mitchell was later censured for his action in not insisting on the laying down of the arms by the "mutineers." See *State Papers*, I, Appendix A., p. XVII. Minute by the Governor-General

The Government however decided to punish them severely ; their Regiment was to be disbanded. As it was feared that punishment could not be executed but in the presence of a European Regiment, a steamer, *Bentinck*, was sent to Rangoon to bring Her Majesty's 84th Regiment. Soon after this another incident occurred in Calcutta. Two sepoys of a detachment, of 2nd of Native Infantry, on guard at Fort William, were courtmartialled and sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years for conveying a false rumour to the Subahdar commanding the Mint Guard (34th N.I.)<sup>1</sup>. This was a significant incident, and General Hearsey, Officer Commanding Barrackpur, thought that he should address his brigade. His suggestion was approved by the Governor-General, but he told him to remain careful and guarded in his words. "I am afraid," wrote Canning, "that, however brief your observations on that regiment (and they should, I think, be very brief), you will find it a nice matter to steer between exciting undue alarm and raising hopes which may be disappointed."<sup>2</sup> Fully realizing the delicate nature of his task, Hearsey issued orders for a general parade on the morning of 17 March. He began his address by warning the sepoys of "the evil-minded and designing men who were leading them astray" and "making them instruments of their schemes of sedition." He explained to them that the glazed surface of the paper in the cartridges was due to the starch used in its composition and that the fine quality paper used by Hind-Pakistāni Princes was very similar to it. To prove his statement he took out a letter from his bag, which he had received from Gulāb Singh of Kashmir, gave it to the officers and told them to show it to their men. Far more delicate was the question of the punishment of the

1 They had told the Subahdar that they had been sent to him by the Havildar-Major. "The Governor-General", they said, "is going to Barrackpore to take the magazine and there will be fighting there. The Calcutta militia are coming into the fort ; you bring your guard and join them " The meaning of the message was clear. Forrest, G. W., *A History of the Indian Mutiny*, (Edinburgh and London, 1904-12), I, 16.

2 Canning to Hearsey, March 14, 1857. MS. correspondence as quoted in Kaye and Malleison, I, p. 391.

19th. Hearsey, however, could not avoid it and had to mention that it would be disbanded; "I inform you of this beforehand", he said, "because your enemies are trying to make you believe that European troops with Cavalry and Artillery will be sent here suddenly to attack you; these and such lies are fabricated and rumoured amongst you to cause trouble." In conclusion he assured his men that their religious prejudices would be safe and any one who attempted to interfere with them would be punished.<sup>1</sup>

#### **Barrackpur incident : Mangal Pande executed**

The 19th left Barhāmpur on 20 March but before it reached its destination a serious incident in the lines of the 34th added to the excitement of the sepoys at Barrackpur. On the afternoon of 29 March, a young sepoy, named Mangal Pande, put on his accoutrements and posted himself in front of the Quarter-guard. Heavily drugged with *bhang* he had lost control of himself and fired at a European Sergeant-Major. He missed the aim, but the Hind-Pakistāni officers and men who were on duty did not move an inch to help the European officer. When the incident was referred to Lieutenant Baugh, the Adjutant of the Regiment, he rushed to the spot immediately, but he had hardly tightened the rein of his horse when Mangal Pande, hidden behind the station gun, fired at him. He missed the Lieutenant but wounded his horse, which threw the rider to the ground. Baugh immediately fired with his pistol, but like his adversary he also missed the aim. Both now engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, the Lieutenant being assisted by the Sergeant-Major. Mangal was now desperate and would have despatched both of them if another sepoy, Shaykh Paltū, had not seized him and averted his blows. Baugh and his companion managed to escape; Paltū had come in time to save them. The matter was reported to the General by a sepoy. Hearsey accompanied by his two sons reached the parade ground of the 34th and rushed to the spot where Mangal Pande was

<sup>1</sup> Kaye and Mallsen, I 393.

pacing up and down with a loaded musket in his hand. The General's defiance of all danger and Mangal's failure to get any support from his comrades convinced him that the game was up; he turned his musket upon himself, and discharged it with the pressure of his foot. He fell on the ground but the wound was not fatal; he was given medical aid and thus survived his attempt to kill himself.

On the morning of 31 March the 29th N.I. marched into Barrackpur. General Hearsey addressed a few words to them before ordering the decision about their disbandment to be read. They were asked first to pile arms and then take off their belts; this done they were ordered to march. At a short distance they were halted and paid their dues. They were also told that the Government had not disgraced them by stripping them of their uniforms and had decided to pay their passage home as a reward for their good conduct during their march from Barhāmpur. Canning explains the mildness of the decision in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief in these words: "Heavy as has been their crime—none heavier—it is not a mean or abject one; such as refusing to march to a post of danger; and the substance of their punishment is severe enough without being made to gall and rankle."<sup>1</sup> That the disbandment passed off without any incident was a source of satisfaction to the Governor-General who had specially sent a messenger to bring him a prompt report. The Government could now punish Mangal Pande. He was court-martialled and sentenced to death on 6 April; two days later he was hanged in the presence of all the troops at Barrackpur. On 10 April the Jamadar of the Guard was also court-martialled for inciting his fellow-sepoys not to help their European officer. He was also sentenced to be hanged. For some technical difficulties, however, his execution was delayed and could not be carried out before 21 April. The Government did not stop here; it decided to inflict exemplary punishments on the offenders. The next

1 *MS Correspondence*, quoted in Kaye and Mallsen, I, 401.

Regiment to suffer the blow was the 34th, to which Mangal Pande belonged. A special Court of Enquiry was appointed to go into the case and a decision was taken to the effect that excepting the officers and sepoy's not present at Barrackpur the Regiment should be disbanded. Thus the three Companies stationed at Chittagong were exempted from the general order of disbandment which was carried out on 6 May.

#### **Ambala : General Anson's address**

Before the execution of this sentence disturbing reports had come from the headquarters of the Army. Ambala, one of the depots of instruction, was apparently calm and the Commander-in-Chief believed that the sepoy's stationed there were not in any way dissatisfied. In the third week of March, however, a Subahdar taunted two non-commissioned officers of the 36th Regiment, which formed the escort of the Commander-in-Chief, with having become Christians.<sup>1</sup> They reported the story to their instructor, Lieutenant Martineau. He made inquiries among the men of the depot and officially communicated his reactions to the Assistant Adjutant-General. The Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, promptly decided to inspect the depot on 23 March. After the inspection parade he addressed the Hind-Pakistāni officers; Martineau translated his speech, sentence by sentence. He explained to the sepoy's that their suspicions about the intention of the Government "to subvert their religion and to subject them to the loss of caste," were baseless, and expressed regret that there had been cases of the sepoy's having refused to accept the assurances of their officers to the effect that cartridges with objectionable material would not be supplied to them. The need of obedience to Government was emphasized; it was their first duty. They were also told that the Government knew "how to deal with such instances of insubordination, and the Commander-in-Chief does not hesitate to say that they would be visited with the severest punishment." The same day General Anson wrote to Colonel Young: "There has been such

<sup>1</sup> Obviously for touching the cartridges.

an uneasy feeling in the depot here that I thought it right, after I had inspected it this morning, to address the Native officers and detachments on parade. It is a difficult and delicate subject to handle, but I trust that the course I have taken will produce some good!."

General Anson was anxious to know the effect of his address and had ordered Martineau to send an immediate report about it. The latter accordingly wrote to the Assistant Adjutant-General that the Hind-Pakistānī officers had expressed to him "their sense of the high honour done them by his Excellency, who condescended himself today to personally address them, for the purpose of quieting both their minds and those of their comrades in the army at large on the subject of rifle cartridges". The officer had however informed Lieutenant Martineau of the true position, for, he adds, "they know that the rumour is false, but they equally know, that for one man in Hindostan who disbelieves it, ten thousand believe it, and that it is universally credited, not only in their regiment, but in their villages and their homes . . . Their devotion to the service, and submission to the military authority, will inflict on them the direct and most terrible punishment they can undergo in this world." To the Commander-in-Chief's reference that they had been "selected for this duty on account of their superior intelligence," their spokesmen clearly said that "their being selected as men of intelligence and fidelity thus becomes to them the most fatal curse. They will obey the orders of their military superiors and socially perish through their instinct of obedience." It is to be noted that the sepoys at the Rifle Depot in Ambala had not been served with the greased cartridges. They were allowed to use their own grease, but objections were now raised to the paper used for the cartridge. The Governor-General admits in a letter addressed to General Anson that "the Government was in some degree in the wrong" in the matter of the

1 Young, Colonel, Kieth, *Delhi, 1857* (London and Edinburgh, 1902), p. 2.

2 Kaye and Mallsen, I, 409 n. Martineau's letter to the Assistant-Adjutant General is quoted in Cave-Browne, I, 45.

greased cartridge, but that no legitimate objections could be made with regard to the paper. The Governor-General's letter was still on its way when fires similar to those which had preceded the trouble at Barrackpur became frequent at Ambala. They caused anxiety and Courts of Enquiry to investigate the causes of fires were set up, but no information could be elicited because no one was willing to give evidence. The Commander-in-Chief was sorely puzzled and wrote to the Governor-General: "Strange that the incendiaries should never be detected. Every one is on the alert there; but still no clue to trace the offenders"<sup>1</sup> The fires at Ambala had begun in the last week of March and continued to the beginning of May.

The growing symptoms of excitement could also be read in incidents at other places, such as the refusal of the 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry to accept the new cartridges. It was however at Meerut, one of the largest of military stations in British India and the headquarters of the Bengal Artillery, that events moved to a crisis. Meerut seems to have been an important centre of the secret activities of the Revolutionary leaders. Besides the "fires" we have recorded evidence of the agents of the Revolutionaries visiting the place probably to give final touches to their propaganda campaign. "The emissary of evil," writes Sir John Kaye, "who in some shape or

<sup>1</sup> Kaye and Malletson, I, 413

To find out the offenders a reward of Rs 1000/- was notified but no clue could be found. It was however generally believed that the sepoys did it, and that it was under deliberate planning. The Joint Magistrate of the cantonment of Ambala writes to the Commissioner, Cis-Sutlej States, under 4 May, 1857: "and were it the act of only one or two or even a few persons the well-disposed sepoys would at once have come forward and forthwith informed; but there is an organized leagued conspiracy existing, I feel confident, and though all and every individual composing a regiment may not form part of the combination, still I am of opinion that such a league in each corps is known to exist, and such being upheld by the majority, or rather connived at, therefore it is that no single man dares to come forward and expose it." It is difficult not to agree with the arguments given above. See *Mutiny Records: Correspondence* (Lahore, 1911), VII, part I, pp 11.

other, was stalking across the country, was at Mirath in the guise of a wandering Fakir, or religious mendicant, riding on an elephant, with many followers. That he was greatly disturbing the minds of men was certain ; so the Police authorities ordered him to depart. He moved ; but it was believed that he went no farther than the Lines of the Native regiments”<sup>1</sup> Commissioner Willam’s Narrative refers to him as “one of the many emissaries who were moving about the country appeared at Mirath in April . . . ;” he was asked to leave the place and apparently he complied with the orders of his externment, “but, it is said, he stayed some time in the Lines of the 20th Native Infantry.”<sup>2</sup> The Faqir’s visit had not remained a secret, because references were made to it even in the press.<sup>3</sup>

#### **The storm bursts, 10 May**

The outbreak of the revolution at Meerut on 10 May was precipitated by the indiscreet actions of the officers stationed there. They knew that the sepoys had been worked up and yet they dealt with them as if there was nothing unusual in what had been happening at places where Regiments of the Bengal Army were stationed. Even the Officer Commanding the 3rd Regiment of the Native Cavalry, Colonel Smyth, had ample opportunities of feeling the pulse of the army. Earlier in the year he had visited the fair at Hardwar where the revolt of the 19th was freely discussed.<sup>4</sup> There is evidence on record to show that discussions on religious topics were sometimes held between the British

1 Kaye and Malleison, I, 415.

2 *Meerut Narrative* (Unpublished Records) quoted in Kaye and Malleison, I, 415-16 n.

3 *The Delhi Gazette* referred to his visit in its issue dated 7 May 1857 in following words : “A letter from Meerut mentions that a fakeer—painted yellow, and in sufficiently good circumstances to ride an elephant when he takes his airing—has taken up his abode near the Soorajkoond. He is said to have come from Philloor or Putteeala, and we imagine the authorities will have their eyes on him.”

4 Cf. Kaye and Malleison, II, 32.



soldieres and the Hindu and Muslim sepoys of the Army. In fact one contemporary writer makes a definite statement that the sudden outburst of the Army at Meerut was the sequel of a heated religion discussion. "One day in the fasting month of the said year of *hijrah* corresponding to the month of May of the Christian year," writes Khwājah Bashir Lakhnawī, "the Indian soldiers, the *sawārs* and the *jelīngahs*, started discussions on religious topics ; these soon developed into a quarrel ; the parties rushed to arms and individuals began to fight." This is an important statement and explains the premature and precipitate outbreak of the Revolution.<sup>1</sup>

Later, Smyth, during his visit to the hill station of Mussoorie, is stated to have heard about the progress of events at Ambala. He informed the Commander-in-Chief about the dangerous state of the Army.<sup>2</sup> It is, therefore, surprising that he did not foresee any danger in calling his Regiment to parade ; on the contrary, he thought that he would allay the excitement by telling them that in future they would not have to bite the cartridges.<sup>3</sup> The orders of the parade were given on 23 April for the following morning ; only ninety skirmishers from different troops were to attend. Smyth was informed by the Havildar-Major that the men of the 1st Troop would not receive the cartridges. Captain H. C. Craigie, Commander of a Troop, wrote to the Adjutant : "Go at once to Smyth and tell him that the men of my troop have requested in a body that the skirmishing tomorrow morning may be countermanded ... and that the regiment will become *budnam* if they fire any cartridges . This is a most serious matter and we may have the whole regiment in mutiny in half an hour if this be not attended to."<sup>4</sup>

1 La'ishnawī, p. 21.

2 Kaye and Malletson, II, 33

3 It is interesting to note that Colonel Smyth, when later criticized for his action, stated that he had done it deliberately. By precipitating the outbreak of the revolt, he thought, he had upset the plans of the Revolutionaries for a simultaneous rising throughout the subcontinent. Cf. Kaye and Malletson, II, 81.

4 State Papers, I, 228.

Smyth was, however, determined to see his orders carried out.<sup>1</sup> The parade was held and the Colonel explained the reasons for ordering it to the ninety men who were called, but when the cartridges were served, they were refused by all except five<sup>2</sup>; "they would get a bad name," was their excuse. The Colonel made another appeal, saying: "You see the havildar-major has used one;" but the sepoys remained adamant and "I ordered the Adjutant to dismiss the men." Colonel Smyth's action was not liked by General Hewitt, the seventy year old Commander of the Meerut Division of the Army. He thought that slight discretion on his part could have easily averted the open mutiny of the Regiment. However, now that the Regiment had "committed an offence" he ordered an enquiry into the matter.<sup>3</sup> Among the witnesses who were the oldest troopers of the Regiment one at least, Mawlā Bakhsh, had the "insolence of manner"<sup>4</sup> to assert that "I have doubts about the cartridges. They may look exactly like the old ones, but how do I know that pig's fat has not been

1 It could not have been a mere accident that fires in Meerut commenced on the night preceding the parade. Nor was it without significance that one of the first buildings set on fire was the house of a *sipahi*, Brijmohan (the son of a pig-keeper), who was a great favourite of Colonel Smyth. He had been dismissed from the Infantry for theft but had managed to get himself enlisted in the Cavalry under a different name. He had used the cartridge on the same day (23 April) and had thus earned the abomination of the sepoys. Cf. Kaye and Malleeson, II, 34-35.

2 For their names, see *State Papers*, I, 228.

3 *Ibid.*, I, 230. The Court was comprised of the following officers:

*President*: Subahdar-Major Thakur Awustee (N. I.)

*Members*: Subahdar-Gunga Deen Doobey (N. I.)

Subahdar-Ram Churn (Light Cavalry)

Subahdar-Gunnesh Singh (N. I.)

Subahdar Goolab Khan (Light Cavalry)

Subahdar Buxees Sing (N. I.)

Jamadar Fyze Khan (Light Cavalry).

4 Kaye and Malleeson, II, 34.

smearcd over them ?”<sup>1</sup> The Court, however, did not pay much heed to this statment and gave their opinion that adequate cause could not be assigned for the disobedience of the Regiment. This report went to the Judge Advocate-General who recommended that all those who had refused to take the cartridges should be courtmartialled. The Commander-in-Chief accepted this recommendation and necessary orders were issued for a court martial.<sup>2</sup> The tribunal met on 6 May and finished its work within three days. All the eighty-five men were found guilty by fourteen out of fifteen members of the Court and sentenced to imprisonment and hard labour for ten years. The whole trial was, to quote Kaye’s expression, “a grim formality.” “Every man,” he writes, “felt that his condemnation was certain, and sullenly abided the issue.” They did not put forward a defence ; in fact, they were heading towards a Revolution.

When in due course the proceedings of the court martial came to General Hewitt he found no justification for showing any mercy to the majority of the prisoners, because “there has been no acknowledgement of error — no expression of regret—no pleading for mercy.” He was, however, struck by the young age of some of them and remitted their sentence by one-half, because they had not been more than five years in the service. The sentence of all the prisoners was carried into effect on the morning of 9 May.<sup>3</sup>

The entire forces stationed at Meerut were to attend the parade to be held on the ground of the 60th Rifles, the 3rd Cavalry having been ordered to attend unmounted. The officers suspected trouble and had, therefore, dispersed the European troops and the Artillery in such a way that the sepoy could be instantaneously shot on the slightest show of insubordination. The eighty-five men condemned by the court martial were now brought under

1 *Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.* See *State Papers*, I, 236.

2 The tribunal was comprised of 15 Indian officers of whom six were Muslims and nine were Hindus. Among the accused it may be noted forty-nine were Muslims and thirty-six were Hindus Cf. Kay and Malleon, II, 35.

3 Cf. Forest, G. W., *A History of the Indian Mutiny* (London, 1904), I, 33

guard ; they were in their regimental uniforms. The sentence was then read aloud ; uniforms were taken off their backs ; and the smiths were ordered to hammer the fetters on their ankles. "As each culprit was marched forward," says General Roberts, "he called on his comrades to rescue him, but no response came from the ranks."<sup>1</sup> Evidently a response from the sepoys in the face of the precautionary arrangements would have been an act of folly. After the parade the prisoners were marched down the lines and escorted to the jail, apparently to the satisfaction of the authorities on the spot.<sup>2</sup> The folly of the course followed by the officers was however so apparent that the procedure was approved neither by the Commander-in-Chief nor by the Governor-General. Canning wrote : "The rivetting of the men's fetters on parade, occupying, as it did, several hours, in the presence of many who were already ill-deposed, and many who believed in the cartridge fable must have stung the brigade to the quick." After referring to the remarks of the Governor-General, a modern English historian writes : "No act of folly could have led to results more fatal. The native troopers, maddened by the spectacle, at once prepared for revolt from the English rule, and in order to rescue their comrades resolved to dare the worst extremity."<sup>3</sup>

One obvious result of this demonstrational method of punishment was that rumours of all sorts became strife both in the cantonment and the town. It was already in the air that two thousand fetters were ready for the Hind-Pakistānī soldiers ; now a rumour spread that European soldiers would suddenly attack and destroy the sepoy Regiments and that the morning parade was only the beginning and an experimental measure for a bigger and

1 Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, *Forty-one years in Indiā*, (London, 1897), I, 81.

2 The same evening General Hewitt reported to the Commander-in-Chief that "the majority of the prisoners seemd to feel acutely the degradation." but "the remainder of the Native troops are behaving steady and soldierlike." *State Papers*. I, 247.

3 Forrest, I, 34.

a more decisive action. News also found its way to the dinner table of the Commissioner that "the walls had been placarded with a Muhammadan proclamation calling upon the people to rise against the English."<sup>1</sup> The feeling of self-complacency had however completely overwhelmed the authorities and none of them took these reports seriously: they were all dismissed with "indignant belief". This gave the sepoys time to make a hasty plan.<sup>2</sup> Sunday had to be utilized: it was only on that day that a surprise attack could be made on the Europeans when most of them would be in their churches. In spite of the utmost efforts of the sepoys to keep their plans secret the morning of the fateful Sunday (10 May) presented signs which, though they went unnoticed at the moment were undoubtedly a pointer to the events that were to follow a few hours later. The Hind-Pakistāni servants of the European barracks and their officers absented themselves from duty; though a significant circumstance, it was considered to be just accidental. In the sepoys' barracks, on the other hand, unwanted activity could be noticed; men of all types were coming from the neighbouring villages and were trying to arm themselves as best as they could. The morning services having passed off quietly, the European population was lulled into lounging through the heats of the summer midday. As the sun went

1 Kaye and Malleison, II, 39.

2 The European and Hind-Pakistāni quarters in the cantonment of Meerut were separate, between them lay a space covered by gardens, trees and also some shops. The distance between the European and Indian barracks was enough to keep the nocturnal activities of one quarter hidden from the residents of the other. The barracks of the sepoys were to the south of the European quarters, and at a short distance to the south of the former lay the town. Thus, contact between the sepoys and the town was not only easy but could also remain a secret as far as the European soldiers were concerned. When the storm burst the people of the town "were armed and ready for the onslaught before the sepoys commenced the attack; plainly showing how perfectly they were aware of what was to happen." Roberts, I, 85.

A contemporary Hindu writer tells us that the sepoys had meetings and consultations among themselves and also with the people of the city. He writes: "The friends of the accused spent the whole night of the 9th and morning of

down the chaplains began to prepare themselves for the evening service. The wife of one of them was warned by a devoted nurse that there was danger and precautions were necessary ; "O, madam," said the poor woman, "do'n't go to the church this afternoon." These words were uttered just at the moment when the chaplain was ready to enter his carriage which was at the door. "Hearing this singular request," says he, "addressed to my wife I naturally enough enquired, 'why should not madam go to church, this evening ?' The servant replied, 'Because there will be a fight.' I asked, 'Who will fight ?' The woman answered, 'The sepoys.' Of course, I could not give any credence to such a statement."<sup>1</sup> The reaction of Mrs. Rotton was different. She was frightened and unnerved by the warning ; "to quiet my wife's fear, I consented to both the children accompanying us in the carriage, together with this faithful servant, who was to take charge of them in the church compound while divine service was being solemnized."<sup>2</sup> The chaplain soon found that the maid-servant's warning was not baseless ; the "sounds of musketry and pillars of smoke ascending into the air" convinced him that "mischief had already commenced".

The sepoys did not know that in view of the increasing heat of the season the evening church parade had been fixed half-an-hour later than on the previous Sunday. This, according to some authorities, saved the Europeans from total destruction in Meerut. It has been argued that if the sepoys had waited till the 60th Rifles were gathered into the church nothing could have prevented them from overpowering the crowded soldiers<sup>3</sup>. It was about half past six

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the 10th in consulting the sepoys of the 11th and 20th Regiments and also men of the bazaar as to what were the best ways and means of freeing the prisoners." Pundit Kanhayya Lal *Maḥārbaḥ-i-Ā'zam* (Newal Kishore Press, Lucknow, 1916), p. 43.

1 Rotton, John Edward Wharton, *The Chaplain's Narrative of the Siege of Delhi* (London, 1858), p. 3.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Cf. Forrest, I, 35n.

that the sepoys of "the 20th Regiment of N. I. turned out with arms"<sup>1</sup> The 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry rushed to the jail, broke into the cells and liberated the eighty-five men, who had been imprisoned after the court martial, along with the other prisoners numbering about 1200.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the Infantry Regiments had become active. Some of their officers rushed to the lines and tried to persuade their men to desist from the course they had taken. Colonel Finnis, a good soldier and a popular officer, was addressing his men and imploring them to be faithful, when a young recruit of the 20th fired at him and wounded his horse; another shot hit him and then followed a volley; the Colonel fell dead, 'riddled . . . with bullets.'<sup>3</sup> This was the signal for a general rising of the sepoys, which soon spread over almost the whole of the cantonment area. With the coming darkness of the night they started putting the houses to fire. The situation worsened because the riff-raffs from the town and the neighbouring villages started plundering the people. The worst offenders, to quote S. N. Sen's words, "came from the slums of the city . . . The city police readily joined hands with them. The officiating Kotwal, Dhanna Singh, was a Gujar and his men came mostly from that lawless tribe. At this crisis he had no control over them and their passion for plunder got better of their good sense. The unsuspecting wayfarers were ruthlessly robbed and murdered and Indian citizens suffered at their hands equally with the Europeans. The house of Babu Birbal was burnt down and

1 General Hewitt's report to the Adjutant-General, dated 11 May. See *State Papers* I, 249.

2 *Ibid* Also see Ball I, 57

Kaye does not accept this view. "The troopers of the 3rd Cavalry," he writes, "at that time had no other work in hand but the rescue of their comrades. The other prisoners in the goal were not released, the buildings were not fired and the European goaler and his family were left unmolested." Kaye and Malleeson, II, 43.

3 Gough, General Sir H., *Old Memories* (Edinburg, 1897), p. 39; also see Kaye and Malleeson, II, 44.

the wine shop of Kailash Chandra Gosh, a Bengali, was attacked.”<sup>1</sup> This, however, is only a part of the picture. There are cases on record to show that the horrors of the night were interspersed by signal deeds of individual mercy and sympathy. The graphic and often exaggerated accounts of the incidents of this night present an overdrawn and misleading picture of the outbreak of the “mutiny” at Meerut. The stories related by some of the contemporary writers and the views of later historians formed on their basis leave an impression that the sepoys had become madcaps and were out for total destruction. Gough, for instance, refers to the activities of the sepoys as those of “absolutely a maddened crowd of fiends and devils”...<sup>2</sup> Sir John Kaye calls it a “night of horror such as History has rarely recorded;”<sup>3</sup> Forrest records that “half mad with excitement and aided by the scum of the city, the sepoy began the work of pillage and murder.”<sup>4</sup> Instances of similar comments could be easily multiplied but hard facts of history do not present such a dark picture as these writers would like us to imagine. The casualties were by no means considerable,<sup>5</sup> and for plundering the main responsibility rests on the Gujars and other riff-raffs of the city and the neighbouring villages.

1 Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

2 Gough, General Sir H., *Old Memories* (Edinburgh, 1897), pp. 27-28.

3 Kaye and Malletson II, 51.

4 Forrest, I, 36

Sen also holds the same view; “. . . there is no clear account of further events except that there was a mad orgy of arson, pillage and murder in which no distinction of age or sex was made.” Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

5 According to Field-Marshal Roberts “besides Colonel Finnis, seven officers, three officers’ wives, two children, and every stray European man, woman and child in the outskirts of the cantonments were massacred.” Roberts, I, 85.

The number of stray cases could not have been large because once it was known that the sepoys had revolted the Europeans must have rushed back to their houses or other places of safety. Rev. T. C. Smyth, a protestant chaplain posted at Meerut, says: Mr. Rotton and I have buried thirty-one of the murdered, but there are others whose bodies have not as yet been brought in.” See Ball, I, 65.



The aim of the sepoys was to overthrow the administrative machinery, rather than murder or plunder the people; "they did not attack their own officers, but warned them to get away, telling them the Company's 'raj' was at an end."<sup>1</sup> This is fully borne out by the conduct of the sepoys, although they were in a state of excitement. They set fire to the officers' bungalows and Government buildings, on which they could lay their hands, and cut the electric wire,<sup>2</sup> with a view to paralyze the administration, which, of course was the object of the Revolution.<sup>3</sup> It would be difficult to ignore the fact that soon after the commencement of the rising the cry was raised. "Quick, brother, quick : Delhi, Delhi!"<sup>4</sup> The 3rd Light Cavalry was soon on the ride and "scarcely drawing rein on the way, were pricking on, in hot haste, all through the moonlight night for Delhi." Behind them toiled on the footmen of the Infantry Regiments. Their march to Delhi was not systematic; small parties seem to have been on the road throughout the night. A Hindu businessman of Delhi, who was on his way to Meerut, saw a party of the *sawars* near the Hindan river soon after midnight and met another, four miles further on the road.<sup>5</sup> Early

1 Cf Roberts, I, 84.

We have on record a number of incidents which indicate the temper of the Revolutionaries. It is beyond doubt that they were out not for the total destruction of European life but for a violent Revolution. The wife of an officer of the 3rd Cavalry, in a letter, dated 14 May, writes: "Eliza and I were driving to the church, when we saw rioters pouring into the road, armed with clubs and swords. They warned us back, and we reached home safely." Quoted in Bill, I, 60.

2 General Hewitt's Report (para. 4) in *State Papers*, I, 250.

3 The view expressed by some writers that the sepoys had been overwhelmed by the fear that the European soldiers would destroy them has been accepted by Sen. He writes: "Fear had driven the sepoys wild but the worst outrages were not committed by them." See p. 60. Far more correct, however, is Kaye's remark: "It is hard to believe that on that Sabbath evening a single Native soldier had discharged his piece without a belief, in his inmost heart, that he was going straight to martyrdom. See Kaye, II, 57.

4 Forrest, I, 36.

5 Sen, p. 64

in the morning the advance parties were before the Mughul capital of Delhi, and by 8 o'clock they were knocking at the gate of the Red Fort.<sup>1</sup>

### **Indecision of the European officers**

An important issue connected with the outbreak of the revolt at Meerut is the inaction of the Europeans and their failure to go in pursuit of the Revolutionaries on their march to Delhi. The number of European forces stationed at Meerut was by no means inconsiderable; their officers have consequently been censured for cowardice and indecision. It would be unfair, however, not to consider the circumstances under which they worked. The sepoys were thoroughly acquainted with the military system of the Company and the weaknesses of their officers. They had made their plans, keeping these factors in view, and it was for this reason that their tactics proved to be so effective in paralyzing the efforts of the European officers. Colonel Smyth, Commander of the 3rd Light Cavalry, proved unequal to the task. He did not immediately rush to his Lines on hearing about the rise of his men; on the contrary, he went to the Commissioner's house, then to the General's and lastly to the Brigadier's and thus "he went everywhere but to his Regiment." To have avoided going to the Lines was undoubtedly an act of cowardice, but Smyth probably had guessed what later history proved that he would have surely met the same fate as Colonel Finnis when talking to his men.<sup>2</sup> However, Smyth passed the night at the headquarters of the Division under the safety of field-guns and rifles.

Brigadier Wilson, Commander of the station, behaved in a different manner. The moment he heard of the outbreak he took his horse and galloped to the parade ground of the Rifles, issuing

1 *Memoirs of Hakim Ahsanullah Khan* (ed. S. Moinul Haq, Karachi, 1958), p. 1.

2 The example of Captain Carnegie and his subaltern, Clarke, has been quoted as an argument against Smyth. Carnegie was able to keep his troops under control and had made an attempt to rescue the prisoners in the jail.

orders at the same time that the Artillery and the Carabineers were to join him there. He ordered the Rifles who had assembled to go to the church to arm themselves and reassemble. When they got ready for action he sent one Company to the Collector's court to save the Treasury and another to protect the barracks. In the meantime the Artillery also arrived.<sup>1</sup> Leading them and the remaining Companies of the Rifles he marched down upon the Lines of the Native Infantry in search of the "mutineers". But there was not a single person in the Lines; they had dispersed, "in what direction we had no means of ascertaining, it being quite dark at the time, the moon not rising until nearly nine o'clock" Wilson continues: "I requested the Major-General Hewitt's orders as to what he would further wish done. At the same time I gave my opinion that from the hubbub and noise proceeding from the Sadr and city, the sepoys had moved round in the direction of the European portion of the cantonment (this was my firm conviction at the time), and recommended that the brigade should march back for its protection, it being so weakly guarded." General Hewitt accepted the recommendation and the brigade was marched back. What puzzled, almost bewildered, the European officers was the fact that on their march back past the Sadr Bazar and the blazing bungalows "no armed men were seen." Wilson adds that only a few unarmed plunderers were found there, "the rest having vanished on the approach of the brigade."<sup>2</sup> Not being aware of the plans of the Revolutionaries and prejudiced by the idea that they had done all that under a mortal fear of being annihilated by the Europeans, it is no wonder that it did not occur to Hewitt, Willson or any other officer on the spot that the sepoys could have gone to Delhi. A junior officer offered to go after them with a squadron of his troops and some Horse Artillery. The

<sup>1</sup> The Carabineers had lost the way and could join Wilson only when he was returning from the N. I. Lines.

<sup>2</sup> Wilson's explanation submitted to the Headquarters dated 18 October, 1857. See *State Papers*, I, 260-62;

offer was not accepted, because, Rotton truly points out, "our military authorities were paralysed. No one knew what was best to do, and nothing was accordingly done."<sup>1</sup>

By their premature rising, however, the sepoys at Meerut had anticipated the course of the Revolution. They did not realize that they had done great harm to their cause, but in marching to Delhi they adopted the only right course under the circumstances.

<sup>1</sup> Rotton, p. 7.

## CHAPTER V

### DELHI : 11 MAY

#### The Meerut sepoys proceed to Delhi

The sepoys at Meerut seem to have decided to go to Delhi after some discussion.<sup>1</sup> It was the capital of the Mughul Emperor who still occupied the throne and claimed *de jure* sovereignty over vast territories. True, Bahādur Shāh was no more than a monarch in name, depending upon a *prti-kash* (lit. a present) from the Company ; but his ancestors had governed the people of the subcontinent with great success and had made a remarkable contribution to its civilisation. The Mughul throne had become almost a sacred institution, and its occupant an object of universal respect. The eighty-two year old Emperor, Bahādur Shāh, was greatly handicapped by the circumstances in which he was passing his days. Nevertheless, it was inconceivable that if the subcontinent was to be ruled by a Hind-Pakistāni he could be a person other than the occupant of the Mughul throne. For more than a century the Mughul Emperors had been puppets in the hands of ambitious ministers or powerful vassals yet, it had never occurred to any of them to bring the Timurid dynasty to an end. Even the British authorities had considered it unwise to close the chapter of the *de jure* sovereignty of the Emperor. The public crier still prefaced the proclamation of the Company's orders with the words : "People belong to God, the Empire belongs to the Emperor, and the order is from the Company Bahādur."<sup>2</sup> To an Englishman the

1 "Some suggested that they could set off in a body for Rohilkhand ; others preferred the imperial city, only forty miles away." Sen, p. 63.

The suggestion of Rohilkhand as a possible destination indicates that the Meerut sepoys knew that it was one of the strongholds of the Movement.

2 Zakā Allah Khān Bahadur ḡhams al-'Ulāmā Muḥammad, *Tārīkh-i-'Urūj-i-'Ahd-i-Sulṭanat-i-Inglishiyah-i-Hind* (Delhi, 1904), p. 662.

contents of the public crier's proclamations may have appeared meaningless, but the Hind-Pakistānis fully understood its significance ; the Empire *did belong* to the Emperor, no matter who governed it on his behalf or even against his will. The Meerut sepoys knew that after the overthrow of the Company's authority a new Government would have to be set up and nowhere could this be done more conveniently than in the historic palace of Shāhjahān. Other considerations also went in favour of Delhi ; it was a fortified city with a wall, and a ditch surrounding it and had considerable stores of munition, and lastly, the number of European soldiers there was negligible. Comparatively speaking, Delhi was a centrally situated town, and since the establishment of Muslim rule in upper Hind-Pakistān early in the thirteenth century it had been the seat of the Government except for some short intervals. This had given it a sanctity in the eyes of the people ; besides, for centuries it had been the chief centre of the cultural, political, and economic life of the Muslims.<sup>1</sup>

Delhi had changed its site and topography, as also its name, under the various dynasties of Muslim rulers. The town which became the centre of the Revolution of 1857 was known as Shāhjahān-ābād after its builder, Emperor Shāhjahān. It lay, like its predecessors, on the right bank of the Jamuna : the other three sides were surrounded by stone and brick wall and a wide ditch nearly twenty-four feet deep. The wall was pierced by a number of Gates ; among these the Kashmir Gate in the north, the Kabul and Lahore Gates in the west and the Delhi Gate in the south were important ; on the eastern side a little to the south of the Red Fort was the Rājghāt Gate. To the north of the Fort, and not

<sup>1</sup> In medieval Persian literature, Delhi is often mentioned as *ḥaḍrat*, an honorific title used for persons commanding respect. See, for instance, al-Kirmani, Muḥammad Mubarak al-'Alawi, *Siyar al-Awliya* (Delhi, 1302 H ) p. 581.

In later works there are numerous references to the high status of Delhi as a centre of cultural activities. Some of these may be seen in *Fughān-i-Dihli* (ed. by Kawkab, T. H., Lahore, 1954).

far from it was the Calcutta Gate which commanded the passage to the bridge of boats. The Gates were built of stone and had quarters for city guards. The Kashmir Gate was the main exit of the city towards the north, and as such the nearest entrance to it from the side of the famous Ridge and the British cantonments. Naturally therefore, it became the most important scene of fighting between the Revolutionaries and their British besiegers.<sup>1</sup>

Within the town the Red Fort (*Lāl Qil'ah*) the residence of the Emperor, was undoubtedly the main centre of activity. After fifty long and dreary years of negotiation between the Emperor and the Company on the question of the former's status and privileges, the jurisdiction of the descendant of 'Ālamgir had shrunk to the area covered by this fortress. Shāh 'Ālam II and after him, his two successors always maintained that the *de jure* sovereignty vested in the Emperor and that the Company was governing the Empire on his behalf. The British statesmen had, however, continuously followed the policy of gradually clipping the privileges of the Emperor; ultimately they had reduced him to a mere figure-head.<sup>2</sup>

### The sepoys enter the city

Broken by age, worries and frustration, Bahādur Shāh tried to console his injured heart by spending most of his time in prayers and writing poetry. No doubt, he was interested in Sufisim and had actually started enlisting disciples<sup>3</sup>, but it would be wrong to

1 'The Cishniere Gate had been renewed not many years before the outbreak by Colonel Edward Smith of the Engineers.' Metcalfe, Charles Theophilus *Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi* (London, 1898), p. 23.

2 See chapter I, for negotiations.

3 The famous poet Shāhib refers to this in the following lines:

شبیلی از سر دهد آوار عشق شاه ما بر محبت گوید راز عشق  
شاهی و درویشی ایرجا باهم است بادشاه عمد قطب عالم است

(Tr. Shibil talks of (divine) love from the pulpit; our Emperor speaks on the secrets of love from the Throne)

Here kingship and mendicancy are united together; the Ruler of the day is the *qutb* of world.)

conclude that he had no interest in safeguarding the prestige of the Empire or restoring it to its former position. In the course of his efforts to retain his sovereignty his feeling had been deeply injured by the attitude of the British authorities. It was, therefore, obvious that he would always welcome an opportunity of throwing off the yoke of their control. This opportunity came to him on the morning of 11 May, 1857; after his morning prayers he was engaged in his *wazifa*<sup>1</sup> (devotions) in the *Muthim nan Burj* when he was suddenly disturbed by the shouts of the troopers<sup>2</sup>. The *sawārs*, now clamouring for admittance, were an advanced party of the 3rd Light Cavalry; "scarcely drawing rein on the way" they had managed to cover in the night the forty odd miles that separated Meerut from Delhi. In the early hours of the day they crossed the Jamunā by the bridge of boats, having set fire to the toll house which lay on the left bank of the river.<sup>2</sup> As the door of the passage leading down the riverside was closed, the troopers addressed the Emperor from below the walls of the Fort. In reply to enquiries made by Ḥakīm Aḥsan Allāh Khān and others who had been directed by the Emperor to meet the troopers they related the circumstances under which they had risen and appealed to the Emperor, crying, "Help O King! We pray for assistance in our fight for the faith"<sup>3</sup>.

Bahādur Shāh who was completely taken by surprise<sup>4</sup> told the troopers, that he was a mere *faqīr*, passing his days in retirement, and had neither money nor forces to assist them. In the meantime

1 *Za'ir Dih'awī, Dāstān-i-Ḥīdr*, (Lahore, 1955) p. 70.

2 For some interesting details see *The Trial of Muhammad Bahādur Shāh* (ed. by H. L. O. Garrett, Lahore 1932).

3 Holmes, p. 105.

Mubārak Shāh who was kotwal of Delhi during the Revolution, says that the Emperor offered to do "his utmost to get their crime pardoned". In reply the *sawārs* said: "... we have already commenced a *jihad* and have come to Delhi considering you the Mahomed in King. You will see what will happen" I. O. MS. of R. M. Edward's English translation of Mubārak Shāh's narrative of the seige of Delhi, ff. 7-8.

4 Evidently he had no knowledge of the premature outbreak at Meerut.



the Commandant of the Palace, Captain Douglas, having arrived at the scene, the Emperor came to the *Dīwān-i-ʿĀm* and asked him to do something. Douglas offered to go downstairs and speak to the *sawārs*, but Hakim Ahsan Allāh stopped him and said: "You have no armed soldiers with you. They have firearms. You oughtn't go near them"<sup>1</sup>. Douglas then went to the balcony and asked the *sawārs* not to annoy the Emperor. Baffled in their attempt to enter the Fort at this point they went to the Calcutta Gate which was also closed. They next tried the Rajghāt Gate, where the doors were opened to receive them.<sup>2</sup> Referring to the first batch of the Revolutionaries who entered the city, Sayyid Mubārak Shāh says that they were the seven troopers of the 3rd Cavalry who had burnt the toll house before crossing the river. "As they rode on," adds Kaye, "with the cry of '*Din, Din*', they were followed by an excited Muhammadan rabble"<sup>3</sup>. They marched along the road which passed below the *Sunahrī Masjid*<sup>4</sup>.

1 *Memoirs*, p. 1.

2 Who opened the Rajghāt Gate to let the Revolutionaries in is a mystery. Kaye, without quoting his authority, says, it "was opened to them by the Muhammadans of Thauba Bazaar." Kaye and Malletson, II, 58.

Zahir holds the Hindus to be responsible for it; they were returning from their morning bath in the Jamunā and finding it closed they asked the guards to open it. When the guards refused to comply with their demand they broke the lock and entered the Gate by force. Zakā Allāh says that a 'disloyal' *najib* did it. He also speaks of a rumour that a mysterious person dressed in green came to the Gate, opened it and disappeared. Mubārak Shāh corroborates Zakā Allāh's version that the Gate was opened by a *najib*. Zakā Allāh, p. 410; Zahir Dihlawī, p. 86, Mubārak Shāh, f. 6.

3 Kaye and Malletson, II, 58.

4 *Sunahrī Masjid*. There were at least three mosques in Delhi known by this name. The one mentioned here is situated at a distance of about one hundred yards from the Fort. It was built by Jāwid Khān in the time of Emperor Ahmad Shāh (1748-54). It was called 'Golden Mosque' because originally its three domes and towers were covered with gold plate. These domes were repaired by Bahādur Shāh in 1852. For a description of the mosque see Ahmad, *Bahār al Dīn Wāqīāt-i-Dār al-Iḥkūmat-i-Dihli*, Shamsī Press, Agra, 1919), II, 118-122.

and killed Doctor Chaman Lall, a Hindu convert to Christianity. This was perhaps the first act of violence, although Zahir says that a priest who lived in a house on that road was killed before the doctor.<sup>1</sup>

### Commissioner Fraser and some other Europeans killed

The reports of the arrival of troopers from Meerut had now spread all over the city ; the officers were alerted but they found themselves helpless. The Commissioner, Simon Fraser, on hearing the report of these occurrences, rushed towards the Fort to inform the Commandant and persuade the sipahi guards of the city to remain loyal.<sup>2</sup> Finding that Captain Douglas was with the Emperor, Fraser returned to the Calcutta Gate, leaving a message that the Commandant should follow him. Soon after Fraser's arrival there, other officers, too, came in and joined him ; Metcalfe came from the Magazine where he had gone to obtain a couple of guns for guarding the bridge ; subsequently Hutchinson and Douglas also arrived there. It was however, all too late now ; the troopers had crossed the bridge and held possession of the Gate.

Fraser was trying to argue with the troopers when one of them fired at him, but he missed the aim. Fraser seized the musket of a *najib*, who was nearby, shot dead the leaders of the party, entered the buggy and proceeded to the Lahore Gate of the Fort ; Douglas, who had also been with him, threw himself into the

1 Zahir Diblawi, p. 87.

2 Mu'in al-Din says that Hutchinson, Collector and Magistrate of Delhi, was informed by Baldeo Singh, Dārū ḥāh of the Jamunā Bridge that "he had just received information that there had been a fight between the European and native troops in Meerut, and that the latter were marching straight upon Delhi, . . . . The Collector directed him to return to his post and have the gate leading to the bridge, closed, while he himself rushed to the Commissioner's house, woke him up from his sleep and told him all that was happening. The *chaprasi* (peons) at the court told Mu'in al-Din that Fraser had received an urgent letter from Meerut on the previous night but as he was feeling drowsy he thrust it into his pocket and went to sleep." *T. N. N.*, pp. 41-42 ; also see, Cave-Browne, I, 61.

ditch.<sup>1</sup> Fraser managed to enter the window of the Gate and had it locked ; Douglas, having been severely wounded, was carried into the Palace by a few *chaprasis*, who had followed him, and was taken upstairs. Fraser, however, stayed<sup>2</sup> downstairs and tried in vain to make an appeal to the Revolutionaries to stop violence. As he was addressing the noisy crowd with a sword in his hand "a man named Mughul Beg, an orderly of the Palace Guards, rushed upon him and clove his cheek to the bone."<sup>3</sup> The excited crowd now forced their way upstairs into the apartments where Douglas and Hutchinson were killed along with their guests. Douglas had sent word to Hakim Ahsan Allāh Khān to come to his rescue. When the Hakim accompanied by Sharif al-Dawlah, *Wakil* of the Emperor, arrived at the spot he found the Commandant lying on a coach. The latter asked him "to get me quickly two *palkis* and some men from the king" for the ladies ; Fraser who was going downstairs asked for two guns. On Ahsan Allāh Khān's return to the *Diwān-i-Khāṣ* the *palkis* were sent to the Commandant and orders were given that the guns should also be sent. In the meantime, however, all Europeans in the apartments of Douglas had been killed.

1 Douglas had left the Fort after his interview with the Emperor and seems to have joined Fraser somewhere outside it. Mubārak Shāh does not mention his leaving the Fort, but he says that from the *Diwān-i-Khāṣ* he went to his quarters (within the Fort) where Fraser had already arrived. (f 10) Cave-Browne, however, definitely says that the Commandant went to the Calcutta Gate where the officers met, Hutchinson also having arrived there. See Vol. I, p. 61.

2 According to Hakim Ahsan Allāh he went upstairs and later came down to address the crowd. *Memoirs*, p. 2.

3 Kaye and Malletson, II, 60. Kaye relies for this version on the statements made by two witnesses, Bakhtāwar Singh and Kishan Singh, at the trial of Mughul Beg in 1862. Mubārak Shāh is positive that "an Afghān Khas-bardar of the King named Khaliq-Dad Khan struck him with his *talwar* wounding him severely on the face . . ." (f 9). At the trial of Bahādur Shāh it was also mentioned that the first blow was struck by a seal-engraver, named Hāji ; Jivan Lal mentions two names, Mughul Beg and Kartik Beg. *T. N. N.* p. 80 ; *Trial*, p. 238.

The sepoys, now nearly fifty in number, forced their way to the *Diwān-i-Khās* and loudly proclaimed their arrival in these words : "We have come to fight for our religion and to pay our respect to his Majesty." The Emperor came out and pleaded his helplessness ; "I have neither troops, magazine or treasury, I am not in a condition to join any one." They said : "only give us your countenance (*hamār i sar par hāth rakhūji*), we will provide every thing." Bahādur Shāh left the place quietly ; the *sawārs* now retired to the *Mahtāb Bāgh*,<sup>1</sup> which became the rendezvous of the Revolutionary soldiers.

### The sepoys seize control of the town

Outside the Fort conditions had become worse. Some batches of the sepoys had marched into the Daryāganj quarter and set fire to the houses of the Europeans and Indian Christians. The machinery of Government broke down and the riff-raffs of the city started a campaign of loot. The shops in the bazaars were hurriedly closed by their owners and the city was soon in a state of anarchy. It is to be noted, however, that the sepoys, at least an overwhelming majority of them, were fully conscious of the fact that loot and plunder on a large scale would defeat the very purpose of the Revolution. Zahir reproduces an interesting dialogue between the 'rebel *sawars*' and some of the Emperor's servants. The former asked the latter to make necessary arrangements for the supply of provisions. When it was pointed out to them that no arrangements could be made as long as the city was in a state of confusion the sepoys offered to stop arson and loot. Accordingly four leading citizens accompanied by the *sawārs* and the servants of the Emperor went to the Kotwali and asked the public crier to proclaim throughout the city that His Majesty had

1 To this version of Hakīm Ahsan Allāh may be added the incident related by Zahir that the *sawārs* were infuriated at the sight of the cloth which had been brought for the coffin of the English officers. They changed hot words with the Hakīm and Maḥbūb 'Alī Khān, the chief eunuch. Zahir, p. 101 ; *Memoirs*, pp. 2-3

issued orders that plundering must be stopped at once and that any one found guilty would be treated and punished as a criminal.<sup>1</sup> The result was that in no time the shops were reopened and the people resumed their normal activities in the *bazaars*. Ḥakīm Ahsan Allāh sent Zahir Dihlawī and Risaldar Maẓhar Allāh Beg to go round the main quarters of the city and see if conditions had improved. "Both of us" writes Zahir, "rode through the *bazaar* right up to the *Faṭḥpurī Masjid* and found that conditions in the town were gradually becoming normal and some shops had already reopened and were under guard ; people were buying and selling things and the sepoy paid for what they took from the shop-keepers."<sup>2</sup>

By forenoon several Regiments of Infantry besides the troops of the 3rd Cavalry had arrived from Meerut and joined their comrades : the sepoy of the 38th N. I. who were on duty in the city had already come over to their side. Having killed the European officers and some newly-converted Christians, on whom they could lay their hands, they now fell upon the Delhi Bank which was situated in the heart of the city close to the *Chāndni Chawk*. Its manager, Beresford, his wife and their five children, had taken refuge on the roof of an outbuilding and closed its staircase. The Revolutionaries, however, scaled the walls in the rear of the

1 The proclamation began with the words : "People belong to God, the Empire belongs to the Emperor, the order is from the Emperor" This is significant because it gives an indication of the mind of the Revolutionaries : the Company's authority to govern on behalf of the Emperor had come to an end. Cf. Zahir, pp. 101-103.

2 *Ibid*

The Revolutionaries, particularly the troopers of the 3rd Cavalry, scrupulously avoided plunder ; "the Cavalry mutineers from Meerut, as they marched through the streets of Delhi, refused to plunder . . .". Norton, J. B., *The Rebellion in India* (London, 1857), p. 14

The Hindu Gujar of the neighbouring villages, on the other hand, had rushed into the city and started a campaign of loot ; they were joined by the riff raffs of the town. See, Bill, I, 74 ; Mu'in al-Dīn definitely states that bands of Gujar had come from the villages of Wazīrābād and Chandraṛāwā ; "Metcalfe House was plundered by the Zemindar of Chandraṛāwā." *T.N.N.*, p. 54.

building and overpowered their victims ; the Bank was thoroughly plundered. Zakā Allāh says that bags of money were carried away even by pious-looking men,<sup>1</sup> which, however were later seized by the Revolutionary forces. The next public building to suffer was the *Delhi Gazette Press*. The startling news that the Meerut "mutineers" were on their way to Delhi had been published in what they called *Delhi Gazette Extras* ; by noon the printers who had announced the crisis succumbed to it. Besides other property the sepoys seized the type of the Press, which could easily be turned into bullets. The Church was also attacked but, significantly enough, it was not damaged or plundered ; only the bells were torn off and the monumental slabs removed from the walls.

### Delhi Cantonment

The military authorities in the cantonment had received information about the arrival of the Revolutionaries fairly early.<sup>2</sup> Without losing time they took action but their efforts, like those of the civilian officers also met with failure. Unlike Meerut, there were no European troops at Delhi. The cantonment was situated near the village of Rajpur beyond the Ridge. Here at the early sunrise parade the proceedings of the court martial of Iswari Pande had been read to the troops—the 38th, the 54th and the 74th Regiments. This had aroused a murmur of disapprobation, but the European officers did not think it worth taking any notice. Nor had any serious attention been paid to the fact that the Indian officers of the Regiments in Delhi, who had sat on the court martial at Meerut, could have brought with them information and reports of the

1 Zakā Allāh, p. 414.

2 Captain Tytler of the 38th N. I. giving evidence at the trial of the Emperor said : "On the morning of the 11th May, I think about 9 o'clock one of my servants rushed into the room and said Lieutenant Holland had sent over to say that troops were marching on Delhi." *Trial*, p. 168.

Kaye confirms this in these words : " . . . . . before the work of the toilet was at an end our people were startled by the tidings that the Native Cavalry from Mirath were forcing their way into the city." Kaye, and Malleeson, Vol. II, p. 63.

disaffection which was fast spreading among the sepoys. It was, however, certain that on the previous evening a carriage had arrived in the Delhi cantonment ; it had brought sepoys, but they were not in their regimental uniforms. This carriage had passed by the house of Captain Tytler of the 38th N. I. He had sent his servant to see if the Subahdar-Major of the Regiment, who had gone to Meerut to sit on the court, was in the carriage. The servant had reported ; "there are a great number of natives in the carriage from Meerut, but none belonging to our regiment . . . ." <sup>1</sup> Jat Mal, a news writer, said in his evidence at the trial of the Emperor that the arrival of the soldiery from Meerut was expected in the palace. "1 letters came in from Meerut on Sunday, bringing intelligence that 82 soldiers had been imprisoned, and that a serious disturbance was to take place in consequence. Owing to this the guards at the gate of the Palace made no secret of their intentions, but spoke openly of what they expected to occur, which was that some of the troops after mutinying at Meerut would come over to Delhi" <sup>2</sup>

Perpahs it is to the bearers of these letters that the author of the *Red Pamphlet* refers when he says : "There can be no doubt that on that afternoon they matured their plans for a rise ; messengers were despatched to Delhi to inform the regiments there of the projected move, and to warn them to be ready to receive them on the 11th or 12th." <sup>3</sup> It is rather surprising that most of the historians have not laid emphasis on this aspect of the problem. The conduct and behaviour of the men in the Regiments posed in Delhi and their fraternization with the sepoys who had come from Meerut clearly indicates that they did not only know what was going to happen in the cantonment on that evening, but were also

1 *Trial*, p. 168

2 *Ibid.*, p. 123

3 Malleison, Colonel G. B., *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army by one who served under Sir Charles Napier*, commonly known as the *Red Pamphlet* (London, 1858), p. 16.

prepared for active participation in the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> The English historian, Sir John Kaye is right when he says : "What was said or done in the Lines on that evening and during the ensuing night can only be conjectured. But the following morning found every regiment ripe for revolt."<sup>2</sup>

The 54th commanded by Colonel Ripley was the first Regiment to be ordered out for service and move in the direction of the Kashmir Gate. Two of its Companies were left behind with Captain De Teisseir to bring the two guns which were to go with the Regiment to the city. Not far from the Kashmir Gate was the Main-guard where some men of the 38th were on duty under Captain Wallace. By the time that the 54th reached the Main-guard the Revolutionaries had also arrived there and won over the men of the 38th. The latter not only refused to carry out Wallace's orders to fire upon the "mutineers", but insulted him by sneering at him. Ripley now ordered his men of the 54th to fire upon the Revolutionary troopers of the 3rd Cavalry, who had assumed a threatening attitude. They did fire but only in the air ; while the Revolutionaries succeeded in killing six officers. Ripley is, however, stated to have declared that he was bayoneted by his own men.<sup>3</sup> De Teisseir's two guns arrived at the scene, but only

1 Mubarak Shāh describes the meeting of the Hind-Pakistānī Regiments in these words : "About this time the three Native Infantry Regiments which had been stationed at Delhi, viz. the 74th, the 54th and 38th, were marched down the Kashmere gate with the object of expelling the Meerut Mutineers from the city. When the 54th had gone a short distance within the walls some of the 3rd cavalry appeared and on seeing the regiment their leader rode out in advance and raising his sword above his head reversed it with the point downwards, calling out : 'Brother, are you with those of the true faith', on which the 54th halted to a man ; from this it would appear that matters had been previously arranged and that parties were acting on a preconcerted plan . . . . . The three native infantry regiments now made common cause with the cavalry mutineers and accompanied them into the heart of the city." Mubarak Shāh, ff. 11-13.

2 Kaye and Malleon, II, 63.

3 Colonel Ripley was left on the road by the Revolutionary troopers under the impression that he had died. He was, however, picked up by Major Pater-



when the tragedy was over : the Revolutionary troopers had by now retired into the city with the sepoy's of the Infantry Regiments. The guns were, however, posted at the Main-guard.

Meanwhile Major Paterson who was now at the Main-guard directed Wallace to rush to the cantonment and bring more succour. The 74th commanded by Major Abbot was accordingly ordered to march down to the Main-guard where it soon arrived with another two guns. Here they anxiously waited for help which, they still thought, would soon arrive. When "the agony of waiting for help became insupportable"<sup>1</sup> a volunteer offered to ride to Meerut. He had not gone far when he was shot dead by men of the 38th. Doctor Batson of the 74th now started, disguised as a Hind-Pakistāni, for the same destination ; he, too, was fired upon but escaped, only to be robbed by the villagers <sup>2</sup>

#### **Jail prisoners released**

When the Infantry Regiments accompanied by the troopers from Meerut were marching into the city some of them left the main body, went to the jail and asked the guards to open the gates. In the beginning the *najib* guards "made a show of resistance and fired a few harmless shots but very soon opened the jail, released all prisoners and removed their fetters."<sup>3</sup> A party of the convicts working on the roads was taken to the police station for being kept in custody. They were released by "two Mahommedan son, on his way to the Main guard, who had him put in a conveyance and sent to the cantonments. See, Ball, Vol. I. p. 73 ; also see, Rotton, p. 9.

<sup>1</sup> Holmes, p. 107.

<sup>2</sup> Cave Browne, I, 69-71.

<sup>3</sup> Mubarak Shāh, f. 14. Jiwan Lal's account differs from this version. According to him Thakur Lal, the jailor, resisted till about 5 o'clock in the evening. This is not probable and cannot be accepted against the statement of Mubarak Shāh who was at the time moving about in the city. Jiwan Lal's remark that Thakur Das was a man of great bravery and loyalty may be correct, but obviously a single individual could not have resisted the troopers for long. Sen has accepted Jiwan Lal's version. See, *T.N.N.*, p. 84 ; Sen, pp. 73-74 ; Zakā Allāh, p. 422.

Sowars", who rode up to them and called out : "Are you all here for your religion or against it ?" The Kotwal said : "We are all for our religion". As these words were uttered by their custodian the convicts rushed to an iron-smith's shop nearby and helped each other in removing their fetters.<sup>1</sup>

The Treasury Officer, Collins, having been killed, another civilian, Galloway, Assistant Magistrate and Collector, now stood on guard at its door. Finding that the sepoys of the guard were on the point of revolt he rushed to the Main-guard for assistance. but he was told by the officers there that it was not possible for them to give him any help ; he was however allowed to stay there, because it was comparatively safer. Galloway returned to his post where he was soon attacked and shot by a sepoy of his own guard. The Treasury was plundered<sup>2</sup> by the Sepoys, but they surrendered its contents to the Emperor.<sup>3</sup>

### The Magazine exploded

In the afternoon of the fateful day the most important incident was the explosion of the Magazine, not far from the Emperor's Palace. It contained vast stores of ammunition and a fairly large staff under the command of Lieutenant George Willoughby. Early in the morning Theophilus Metcalfe had come to the Magazine to obtain two guns for shelling the bridge and stopping the Revolutionaries from entering the city ; but, for want of conveyance, the guns could not be moved in time and the troopers from Meerut had safely crossed the river. Willoughby had, however, become alert and made preparations for defence, because he knew that the Revolutionaries would demand its possession. The outer gates

1 Mu'in al-Dīn adds here that "two men mounted on camels and dressed in green with red turbans rode by a trot, calling out, "Hear, ye people, the drum of religion is sounded." Whence they had come or whither they went, my informant knew not, but the excited and terrified crowds in the streets believed that they were heavenly messengers." *T N. N.*, p. 48.

2 Mubārak Shāh, f. 16

3 Zakā Allāh, p. 422.

were barricaded and guns placed inside them ; at the same time "a train was laid from the powder store to a tree standing in the yard of the Magazine", where Conductor Scully was posted. He was to fire the train on receiving a signal in case the defence failed, so that, "if the enemy broke into the stronghold, they should find death, not plunder within"<sup>1</sup> The fears of Willoughby were not imaginary, nor his arrangements for defence made too soon ; he had not to remain in suspense for long. A demand for surrender made on behalf of the Emperor was not acceded to, and the building had to be besieged. Captain Forrest, one of the European survivors of the siege, later stated at the trial of Bahādur Shāh that the Emperor's message had been brought by "a well-dressed Mussulman" between 9 and 10 A. M. Soon after, an officer in the Emperor's service arrived on the scene and "placed guards of about 12 men at each gate of the Magazine " After some time the Hind-Pakistan "Subahdar of our guard again expressed a wish to see either Lieutenant Willoughby or myself, we accordingly went to him He told us that a messenger had come from the King to say that if we did not immediately open the gates, then he would have scaling ladders sent down to scale the walls "<sup>2</sup>

Willoughby and his companions did not comply with this demand. The Revolutionaries, therefore, set the scaling ladders in position, and this was followed by a fight which demonstrated how determined the parties were to stick to their respective causes and to what extent the individuals participating in the struggle were prepared to go in making sacrifices for them. The Revolutionaries knew that in scaling the walls they would be playing with their lives. Yet, full of enthusiasm as they had been, they were prepared to defy all possible dangers. Under an incessant shower of bullets they continued climbing up the walls. "As the enemy streamed over the walls," writes Kaye, "round after round

<sup>1</sup> Holmes, p. 109.

<sup>2</sup> *Trial*, p 125 ; Cave-Brown adds that the guard sent by the Emperor was under a son and a grandson of the Emperor. See Vol. I, pp. 77-78.

of murderous grapeshot from our guns, delivered with all the coolness and steadiness of a practice-parade, riddled the advancing multitudes ; but still they poured on . . ."<sup>1</sup>

The tiny garrison of the Magazine had drawn its courage and strength from the hope of receiving succour from Meerut ; this, however, failed them. When, therefore, further defence became impossible, Willoughby took the fatal step. He went over to the river bastion for the last look towards Meerut ; no help was coming. He gave the signal ; and the train was fired by Scully. In a moment the Magazine exploded, producing a thunderous noise and killing a number of Revolutionaries and four out of the nine Englishmen. "I then went on", writes Mu'in al-Din "to the Magazine". The wall facing the river was blown down, and some of the inmates escaped that way. When the smoke had blown away, I entered the place ; six wounded Europeans were found after the explosion, I had them sent away to the Palace, saving them from immediate slaughter. It was towards evening . . . Several Europeans from Dariagunge had taken refuge there . . . All natives were turned out of the place . . . Only twenty-five sepoys were killed by the explosion, but a mob of 400 onlookers perished."<sup>2</sup>

Lavish praises have been showered on the defenders of the Magazine by Western writers, and there can be no doubt that they richly deserve this appreciation of their splendid sacrifice. But what surprises the reader is that not a word has been written about the dauntless courage and equally splendid sacrifices of those who defying sure death climbed the walls of the Magazine, and laid down their lives for the sake of a cause. Indeed, if we compare the conduct of the defenders with those who were attacking we would find that the latter exhibited greater courage. For the defenders there was no alternative ; if they had not taken the suicidal step which they took they would have been overpowered.

1 Kaye and Mallsen, II, 68.

2 T.N.N., p. 52.

On the contrary the Revolutionaries could have saved much loss of life on their side by just prolonging the siege, ultimately the defenders would have either surrendered or destroyed themselves. But to the safer course of continuing the siege they preferred the hazardous one of scaling the walls under showers of bullets; evidently their casualties were far heavier than those of the defenders.<sup>1</sup> There is evidence to prove that the Revolutionaries knew what steps the British defenders were going to take to deprive their opponents of the valuable contents of the Magazine.<sup>2</sup>

#### **British officers leave the Cantonment**

The explosion naturally created great excitement in the city. In the cantonment it startled into action the officers who were still waiting for succour from Meerut; it broke the last link between the Europeans and the Hind-Pakistāni soldiers serving under them. The sepoys in the cantonment had not yet risen in open revolt, but it could be easily noticed 'that they were festering with the bitterness of national hatred, and eager to strike.'<sup>3</sup> It had become imperative for the British authorities to take all possible measures to protect the lives of the officers and their families. Earlier in the day some of them and a number of fugitives from the city and the Civil Lines, including women and children, had been put in the Flag-Staff Tower. Two guns were set in front of the building to defend it against any possible attack.

As the declining hours of the day were rolling by the chances of getting succour from Meerut were becoming more remote. The Main-guard, the last rallying point in the city, was evacuated after

1 Of the nine defenders, five could escape alive; they were Lieutenants Forrest and Raynor, Conductors Buckley and Shaw, and Sergeant Stewart. Willoughby survived the attack on the Magazine, but was murdered on his way to Meerut. See Holmes, p. 109; also Cave-Browne, vol. I, p. 79.

2 " . . . One man in particular, Kurreem Bukhsh, a *durwan*", wrote Lieutenant Forrest in his report dated May 27, "appeared to keep up a constant communication with the enemy outside, and keep them informed of our situation." *State Papers*, Vol. I, p. 274.

3 Kaye and Mallsen, II, 69.

the story of the explosion had become known. At the Flag-Staff Tower, too, the situation was every moment growing uneasy. An attempt was made by an officer, Captain Tytler of the 38th, to march his men and take unawares a party of the Revolutionaries who were reported to be enjoying siesta under the shade of trees along the canal bank near the Lahore Gate. The sepoys' refusal to carry out the Captain's order of firing at their *bhai-bands* unnerved most of the officers. Another incident soon followed. Captain De Teissier's guns had been recalled from the Main-guard and were moving towards the cantonment; they were seized by a picket of the 38th which had been placed at the gorge of Sadr Bazaar. Having seen this from the Flag-Staff Tower, De Teissier galloped down the hill and called out to his men to return. He was met by a volley of shots from the sepoys of the 38th and, although he escaped uninjured, the incident demoralised the officers at the cantonment. One of them "suggested that we should get away while we could. At first the brigadier would not hear of such a thing . . . but the question was agitated and the idea of retreat gradually became familiar to men's mind."<sup>1</sup> Ultimately a decision was taken by the Brigadier; all took to flight, as best as they could, some hoping to reach Meerut, others took the road to Karnal. It is surprising that neither the sepoys who were still present in the cantonment nor those who had taken possession of the city and the Palace thought it necessary to check their flight. Nevertheless, the sepoys were careful enough to guard the powder-magazine, and they successfully defied the efforts of the fleeing enemy to blow it up.<sup>2</sup> The stores of this magazine passed into the possession of the Revolutionary Government on 12 or 13 May.<sup>3</sup>

1 Le Bas in Fraser's Magazine, February 1858, as quoted in Cave-Browne, I, 84

2 It may be noted that this was the main powder-magazine and was situated about two miles from the city walls on the banks of the river to the rear of the cantonments. It was much bigger than the *Expense Magazine* in the city and contained more than one thousand barrels of powder against about fifty, which were blown up in the latter. Cf. Cave-Browne, Vol. I, pp 69-70n.

3 Statement of Jat Mal at the trial of the Emperor. See *Trial*, p. 120.

The flight of the British officers and their families left the Revolutionaries in complete possession of Delhi. Late in the night the resumption of power by Emperor Bahādur Shāh was proclaimed by a salute of 21 guns.<sup>1</sup> Obviously the first step for them now was to instal a regular machinery of government under the Emperor.

1 *Trial*, pp. 120, 146, also see Zakā Allāh (p. 662) who adds that the name of the Company disappeared from public proclamation (*dhandūrah*) from May 12.

Mu'in al-Din was told that the salute was fired to welcome the arrival of a fresh Regiment from Meerut *T.N.N.*, p. 53.

Chunni Lal, editor of *Delhi News*, confirms this in his statement. Ball has given the substance of the eye-witness account of a Hind-Pakistānī; it says "About ten at night, two *pultuns* (troops of artillery) arrived from Meerut and entered the city and fired a royal salute of twenty-one guns." Ball, I, 101.

## CHAPTER VI

### BAHADUR SHAH LEADS THE REVOLUTION

On assuming power the eighty-four year old Emperor Bahādur Shāh became the leader of the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> A hundred and fifty years earlier one of his illustrious ancestors had led his armies at the age of ninety to the field of battle and fought against the forces of disruption ; but 'Ālamgīr's courage and firmness were exceptional. After his death the Mughul Court had degenerated into an arena of conflict between selfish politicians and factious groups, and this was undoubtedly the main cause of the decline of the Empire. The process of degeneration was rather fast, and by the time when Bahādur Shāh ascended the throne in 1837, the sovereignty of the Mughuls had been reduced to a mere shadow of its past glory. As a Prince he had received good education and training, but the Company's Government had created conditions in which the Emperor was expected to live only as an idler. Other members of the Imperial family too had been encouraged to live a life of inactivity and dissipation.<sup>2</sup> The Mughul Emperor had thus been rendered politically ineffective ; in fact, the Company was only waiting for the death of Bahādur Shāh to bring to an end the "legal fiction" of the *de jure* sovereignty of a prince of Tīmūr's house.

1 Bahādur Shāh was born in 1189 H. (1775 A. C.). In 1857 when the Revolution broke out he had completed 84 lunar years of his life.

2 Mawlānā Faḍl i Ḥaqq refers to the Princes who were appointed officers in the Revolutionary Army in these words : "They [the Princes] hated honest and wise persons. They had never witnessed a battle, nor had they any experience of the blows of swords and lances. They selected men from the gutter for their society and consultation. These inexperienced and extravagant fellows drowned themselves in the ocean of luxuries and extravagance and submerged themselves in the flood of debauchery. They were poverty-stricken and (suddenly) they became opulent ; when they became opulent they took to a life of dissipation." "The Story of the War of Independence" in *J.P.H.S.*, Vol. V, part I.



None of the British officers holding the reins of government in India in the middle of the nineteenth century expected any serious trouble from the Red Fort, which, they thought, would soon be reduced to the position of a mere historical monument. Within its four walls lived a few hundred members of the Imperial family generally called *salāṭīns*, who were believed to be harmless and innocent souls having no interest in politics. To make their helplessness doubly sure a British Commandant 'guarded' the main (Lahore) Gate of the Fort. After the annexation of the Panjab (1849) the strategic importance of Delhi had almost ceased to exist, and until the dawn of 11 May not one of the European officers posted there had any reasons to fear that the rays of the morning sun would bring in their wake the darkest episode in the history of British imperialism.

#### The Revolutionary Government

The *Qil'ah-i-Mu'al'ā*, the Sublime Fort, had been for over two centuries the symbol of the greatness and sovereignty of the rulers of Hind-Pakistan, as well as the high traditions of its cultural life. Now, it was to play a significant role in the Revolution which aimed at restoring the freedom of the people under the leadership of the Emperor. "On this morning," writes Jiwan Lal in his diary under 12 May, "the whole body of native officers of the regiments that had arrived yesterday, concerted together and demanded an audience of the King. It was granted; the native officers presented *nazars* (tribute money) and described themselves as faithful soldiers awaiting his orders."<sup>1</sup> The Emperor called the leading citizens to his Court for consultation. The first step taken by them was to arrange for the supply of provisions for the soldiers. Subsequently a draft constitution vesting supreme control in a "Court of Administration", that is, *Jalsah-i-Intizām-i-Fawji wa*

<sup>1</sup> T.N.N., pp. 84-85.

On the authority of a Hind-Pakistani eyewitness Ball says: "The next day (12 May), about three in the after-noon, the empire was proclaimed under the king of Delhi, and the imperial flag hoisted at the Kotwali (chief police station)" See Vol. I, p. 101; also see p. 458.



Emperor Bahādur Shāh Zafar  
(From C. Ball's *History of the Indian Mutiny*)



Zinat Mahal, wife of the Emperor  
(From C. Ball's *History of the Indian Mutiny*)

*Mukht*, was approved and enforced.<sup>1</sup> The *Jalsah* (Court) was to consist of ten members, six military officers and four others ; the former were to be elected by and represented the different wings of the army, the infantry, cavalry and artillery. The procedure of the election of four non-military members is not mentioned. The Court had powers to elect its own President who had an extra vote. In view of the impending war the Court's decisions were to be approved by the Commander-in-Chief. If the latter did not agree with its decisions he could return them for reconsideration by the Court. If the Court insisted on its advice the matter was referred to the Emperor whose orders were final. The constitution of the Court leaves no doubt that its authors were anxious to make it an effective body. The military officers were in a majority, but they came by election. All decisions were taken by a majority vote. The original constitution seems to have been amended from time to time in view of the changing conditions and new developments in the situation. Turāb 'Alī,<sup>2</sup> a British spy, writes in his report under 1 September, 1857 : "The members of the Court or Military Council are as follows :

Ghous Mohumud	...	...	General, Neemuch.
Heera Singh	...	...	Brigadier, Neemuch.
Bukht Khan	...	...	General, Bareilly.
Mohumud Shuffee	...	...	Resaldar, 8th Irregulars
Hyat Mohumud	...	...	Resaldar, 14th Irregulars
Qadir Buksh	...	...	Soobedar, 72nd Regiment. Native Infantry
Hurdutt	...	...	Soobedar, 9th Regiment Native Infantry
Names unknown	...	...	{ Soobedar, Hurriana Battalion Soobedar, 11th Native Infantry Soobedar, 54th Native Infantry

1 For a photographic sketch of the original document in Urdu, called *Dastūr al-'Amal*, see Sen (facing p. 74) ; also see *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 36, Nos. 539-41.

2 Turāb 'Alī was an active spy of the British ; he was once arrested by the Revolutionaries, but let off on the recommendation of the Princes. Zakā Allāh, p. 664.

The Kote (Court) also comprises five sepoys from every Regiment and Moulvie Fuzul Huq is also a member."<sup>1</sup> Besides the 'Court' the Emperor also had a smaller "Privy Council" of persons in whom he had implicit confidence. "The King's Council", says Mubārak Shāh, "was composed of Bukht Khan and Surfuraz Ali, and in a lesser degree of Fuzul Huq, but though the King wished it, the last was not permitted to be present in the Council."<sup>2</sup>

The new Government was confronted with tremendous problems, as it had been set up in the midst of a cataclysm. In less than twelve hours of the outbreak of the Revolution the administration of the city had broken down; the unruly elements of the population had seized the opportunity of creating confusion and started a campaign of loot, forcing peaceful citizens to stay in their houses; shops were closed, bazaars became empty and the city wore a deserted look. Besides reinstating the machinery of civil administration and restoring order in the capital the Emperor and his Court had another mighty problem to solve. they had to take immediate steps to provide means for the maintenance of an army. It is difficult to estimate the actual strength of the forces that had thronged into the city on the first day of the Revolution. We can, however, form some idea of their numbers, because Hakim Ahsan-Allāh says that "by evening 300 irregular cavalry (*Turk-Sawārs*) and three regiments from cantonment and two from Meerut had taken up their quarters in the Fort, the Malpert Regiment in Salimgarh, and the rest in the Diwan Khas, the Diwan Am, the Stables and Naqqar Khanah."<sup>3</sup> In a state of excitement, it appears, the Regiments posted in Delhi had rushed to the Palace, not caring even to guard the stores of provisions and keep them in tact. The contents of the Treasury, according to one contemporary authority,<sup>4</sup> had come into the possession of the Revolutionary Government, but the money thus obtained

<sup>1</sup> *Secret Letters*, No. 191, 7 September, 1857; also see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part II, 8-9.

<sup>2</sup> Mubārak, f. 97.

<sup>3</sup> *Memoirs*, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Zakā-Allāh, p. 422

does not seem to have been much, because the inadequacy of funds hampered its work, even in the earliest stages.

The second day of the Revolution at Delhi, must have been a long day for the aged Emperor. Jiwan Lal's entries under this date give us an idea of the steps taken by the new Government to restore normal life in the city on the one hand, and prepare itself for a decisive struggle against foreign rule on the other.

### **Kotwals of Delhi**

On 15 May a number of officers were appointed on the recommendation of Mawlawī 'Abd al-Qādir Khān.<sup>1</sup> Mu'in al-Dīn Ḥasan Khān became the Kotwal of the city. It was soon discovered that he was incompetent and had been guilty of plundering the people; Mirza Mughul who had recommended his appointment was ultimately compelled to ask for his removal. The Emperor dismissed him and "further ordered that after investigation his property should be restored to any of the citizens who had been plundered and that the Kotwal should be punished."<sup>2</sup> He handed over charge to Mir Nawāb who was also removed for incompetence.<sup>3</sup> Since Ḥakīm Aḥsan-Allāh Khān does not mention that Mu'in al-Dīn was succeeded by Mir Nawāb it may be concluded that his appointment was a stop-gap arrangement, and that he held the office only for a short period. Mu'in al-Dīn

1 *T.N.N.*, p. 91.

2 Chunnī Lal's *Diary* says that he was appointed "to the Governorship of Delhi" on 12 May. He is supported by Ḥakīm Aḥsan-Allāh Khān. See, *Trial*, p. 176; *Memoirs*, p. 4.

Mu'in al Dīn himself refers to his removal in these words: "A man called Mir Nawab had taken charge of the Kotwali with my consent and my connivance." It is obvious that he wants to conceal the incident of his dismissal for bribery. To justify his version he would like us to believe that after his dismissal "my position was better than that of the Kotwal . . ." The real fact, however, was that he was not only removed from office but was later on ordered by the Emperor to give up the property that he had plundered. *T. N. N.*, pp. 57-58, 140.

3 Mubārak Shāh places Mir Nawāb before Mu'in al-Dīn; but this seems to be incorrect. Mir Nawāb came after and not before Mu'in al-Dīn.

belonged to the police service of the Company and had been promoted from the position of an Inspector in charge of a suburban *thānah* to the Kotwalship of Delhi, which was a very important post. He, however, disappointed the Emperor and his advisers. The next choice, therefore, fell on a public figure. Qāḍī Fayḍ-Allāh, to quote his successor in office, "was a Rais of the city"<sup>1</sup> He was recommended by Khwājah Wahīd al-Dīn,<sup>2</sup> who also belonged to a distinguished family of Delhi. Fayḍ Allāh, however, proved no better than his predecessor; cases of bribery were reported against him, and he was asked to explain his conduct. He sent the explanation along with his resignation. Mirzā Muḡhul accepted the resignation and appointed Mubārak Shāh<sup>3</sup> in his place. Khudā Bakhsh Khān was made his deputy.

The frequent changes of Kotwals in Delhi were not without significance. Under the Muḡhuls the Kotwal enjoyed very extensive powers. He was a Magistrate and a police officer combined,<sup>4</sup> and, therefore, to a large extent, the efficiency of the administration of a city depended on the ability and character of its Kotwal. The overthrow of the Company's machinery of administration by the Revolutionaries had naturally let loose the forces of disorder. Only a strong, honest and experienced man could control the situation. Sayyid Mubārak Shāh's official papers, including reports made by him to the Emperor, the Commander-in-Chief and other authorities, and orders and instructions issued to him, leave no doubt as to the importance of the position.

1 Mubārak, c. 32. Aḡsan-Allāh (*Memoirs*, p. 13) mentions his appointment under 28 May. But in the *Press-list of Mutiny Papers* we find a document dated 21 May which shows that he was Kotwal then. See p. 223, Bundle, 109.

2 Khwājah Wahīd al-Dīn was the son of Khwājah Farīd al-Dīn and the maternal uncle of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. See Ḥālī, *Mawlānā, Hayāt-i-Jāwīd* (Agra, 1903), Part I, chap. I.

3 He says that Fayḍ Allāh Khān was removed from office for reasons of health. Perhaps this was only an excuse for justifying his resignation. See *Memoirs*, p. 15; Mubārak, p. 76.

4 There is recorded evidence to show that Mubārak Shāh decided cases. See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 209, No. 252.

he held. On 13 September, 1857, he fell ill and applied for four days' leave suggesting that the "*Naib-Kotwal* will act in his place,"<sup>1</sup> This means that throughout the period of the siege of Delhi, Mubārak was the *Kotwal* of the Imperial capital. Besides performing his normal police duties he was also expected to supply provisions to the army as well as the soldiers who went out of the city to fight the enemy<sup>2</sup>, bullock carts and carriages for transporting military equipment and elephants,<sup>3</sup> as well as artisans and coolies<sup>4</sup>; there were other duties also which he had to discharge. Mubārak was against forced labour: when it came to his notice that "4 carts were forcibly employed in carrying rations", he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief "to pay their hire",<sup>5</sup> and this is not the only recorded case of his recommendations to the officers to pay the wages and other dues of the poor labourers. It seems the *Kotwal* was also in charge of the prisoners of war; on 11 July, 1857, he reports to the Commander-in-Chief "the arrest of 5 British soldiers."<sup>6</sup> The fact that there are more than 1200 documents addressed to the *Kotwal* in the collection of papers seized by the British authorities on the fall of Delhi is a further proof of the importance of this office. They also indicate the varied nature of the *Kotwal's* duties and responsibilities.<sup>7</sup> He had assistants called *Nāib Kotwāls*.<sup>8</sup> It may be added that there was a separate *Kotwal* for the Red Fort; Nawāb Yār Khān held this post on 24 August<sup>9</sup>.

1 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, 1857 (Calcutta, 1921), p. 215, No. 393; on 1 June Bhao Singh was a *Naib-Kotwal*, *Ibid.*, p. 232, No. 131.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 205, No. 144.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 208, No. 236.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 203, No. 69.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 210, No. 296.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 205, No. 136; also see p. 229, No. 91.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 216-51.

8 Bhao Singh is mentioned in a document dated 1 June and Shaykh Muḥammad Amir in another dated 9 June, *Ibid.*, p. 232, No. 31 and p. 243, No. 22; also see p. 265, No. 166; p. 288, No. 6.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 271, No. 41.



**Bahadur Shah's efforts to restore peace and order**

The Emperor and his advisers fully realized the need and importance of restoring order and maintaining peace. In contemporary accounts there are numerous references to the Emperor's anxiety to provide security of life and property to his people. "The King directed Mirza Moghal", writes Chunnī Lal, the news-writer, under 12 May, "to take a company of infantry, and adopt steps to prevent the plunder in the city. Mirza Moghal accordingly went to the principal police stations, seated on an elephant, and had proclamation made that every individual convicted of plunder would be punished with the loss of nose and ears, and all shop-keepers not opening their shops, and refusing to supply the soldiers, would be fined and imprisoned."<sup>1</sup>

Hakīm Ahsan-Allāh refers to several incidents of plundering, which were reported to the Emperor. On each occasion the Emperor took prompt steps to redress the grievances of the people; even an ordinary employee of the post office could easily obtain relief.<sup>2</sup> In suburbs of the city also conditions had become unsettled; the Government took immediate steps to restore order with the help of the leading persons of the localities concerned. As early as 18 May the police officer of a station in the suburbs sent a report "to the King—shelter of the worlds", saying, "that the orders of the royal missive have been fully explained to all the Thakurs, Chawdaries, Kanungoes, and Patwaries of this township

1 *Trial*, pp 176-77.

An idea of Chunnī Lal's hostility towards the Emperor can be formed by his statement made at the trial. When asked by whose orders the Europeans were murdered in the Fort, he said: "It was done by the King's order; who else could have given such an order?" Kaye and Mallsen, Vol. V, 332. See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, (p. 106) for an order of the Emperor to the Kotwal "to report on the riot committed by the *Tilangas*."

2 Kanhayya Lal was "a servant in the post-office". When it was reported to the Emperor that his house was being plundered he ordered Mirza Muḥḥul "to go at once himself or send one of the Princes to put a stop to plundering." *Atfemairs*, p. 15

of Najaf Garh, and the best arrangements have been established. . . . As regards Nagli Kakrowala, Dachao-Kallan, and other adjacent Villages, your Slave has to represent, that, unrestrained by the dread of consequences, and bent on all sorts of excesses, the inhabitants have commenced plundering travellers. Two petitions regarding the conduct of these lawless disturbers of the peace have already been submitted, and I am now in hopes that some Royal Prince of reputation and capacity, may be deputed, with a sufficient force of Cavalry, Infantry and Ghazees, to settle the portion of the country, constituting your petitioner's jurisdiction, your Slave will then point out these lawless Villagers, and will be able for the future to preserve order, and prevent crime." The English rendering of the 'autograph order by the King, 'in pencil', reads thus : ' Mirza Moghal will quickly send a Regiment of Infantry, with its officers to Najaf Garh.'<sup>1</sup>

The Emperor's anxiety to establish order and make the life and property of the people safe is indicated by a strict personal control over administration and prompt disposal of cases brought before him. On reports being received that the enemy troops were likely to march against the Old Fort some Regiments of sepoys were sent to offer resistance. The troops of the enemy did not come ; the sepoys, however, started molesting the people. Mirzā Mughul was directed on 17 June to stop this ; and for not carrying out these orders promptly he was given a severe warning. "It is surprising," said the Emperor's order of 18 June, "that, up to the present time, no arrangement should have been made, and that you should not have given effect to the prohibition, by sending out some cavalry. It is the business of the army to protect, and not to desolate and plunder. The officers of the army will, therefore, immediately restrain their men from the commission of these

1 Found in the papers and documents filed in the trial of the Emperor. See *Trial*, pp. 7-8.

The reference to *Ghāzīs* is interesting : it shows that within a week of the outbreak of the Revolution volunteers had joined the Revolutionary forces in adequate numbers.

improprieties. . . . You will immediately take steps to arrange this matter, and will allow no neglect to occur, in reference to it." The orders were further reinforced by a postscript, in the Emperor's own handwriting, saying, "Make arrangements quickly".<sup>1</sup> Almost a week later Mirzā Mughul and his brother and colleague, Mirzā Khayr Sultān, received another strict warning when they reported a case of plunder by four or five men who had disguised themselves as sepoy of the Revolutionary Army.<sup>2</sup>

Sometimes, even high functionaries of the State went beyond the limits of their powers in demanding contributions from wealthy merchants of the city. Jugal Kishore and Sheo Prashad had paid Rs 1,200- as their share of subscriptions. On further demands being made they launched a complaint against "some troops". The Emperor immediately ordered a guard to be stationed at the house of the petitioners. Mirzā Mughul is also reported to have exceeded his powers in issuing orders regarding disbursement of money to the forces. In reply to a warning verbally communicated to him the Prince had to explain his conduct thus: "Your slave affirms, with the solemnity of an oath, that no orders are ever issued, but such as Your Majesty has been previously made acquainted with or if any are issued, the physician, at least, is always informed of them."<sup>3</sup> Cases of reports made to the Emperor about the civil and military officers who harrassed the people or indulged in extortion, or of plunder by the soldiers and the professional robbers can be added; almost on every occasion Bahādur Shāh took prompt action to protect the life and property of his subjects. Occasionally the Court also issued orders to the officers not to plunder the people.

The soldiers of the Revolutionary Army and occasionally even their officers are mentioned as having taken part in plunder. The victims of these attacks however were only wealthy citizens who

<sup>1</sup> *Trial.*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Mirzā Muḥḥul's petition dated 11 July, 1857 *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

refused to cooperate with the Government or were suspected of being in active sympathy with the British and working for them. "Information was received", Jiwan Lal tells us, "that a man armed with a written authority from the English to raise money had been for some days in the house of Alap Pershad, Agent of the former Nawab of Jajjar, and was on his way to Muttra, travelling in a bullock cart. When he reached the Delhi Gate the guards searched the man and found the paper in question; they then confiscated his cart and severely beat the man. After this some 400 of the soldiers went to Alap Pershad's house and charged him with concealing Europeans, and on this pretence they searched and plundered his house. and those of seven other persons, and carried off property to the value of 50,000 rupees. As soon as General Muhammad Bakht Khan heard of this he sent off several hundred men to stop the outrage, but these soldiers would not interfere with the plunderers."<sup>1</sup> It is possible that not every body suspected was guilty, but such instances show that the Emperor and his Government were both anxious to stop plunder and keep the excited people under control.<sup>2</sup> In special cases orders were issued that the premises of individuals were to be guarded. An order was issued, for instance, by Shaykh Muhammad Amir, the *Nāib Kotwāl* to the Thanahdar of Daribah "to appoint guards at the houses of Jai Lal and Kanhiya Lal, jewellers." In the order 'Kanhiya Lal' was written by mistake: the correct name was Ghasimal.<sup>3</sup> The order was, of course, carried out.

As the Revolution spread over parts of the subcontinent and the Company's machinery of administration deteriorated or broke

1 *T.N.N.*, p. 166.

2 Of the other definitely known cases that of Munshi Mohan Lal (Āghā Hasan Jān, after accepting Islām) and Nāzir Gobind Saran are mentioned by Ghulām Husayn, author of *Nuṣrat-nāmah* (Urdu translation published by Khwājah Hasan Nizāmī under the title, *Dillī ki Sazā*, second edition, Delhi, 1946), pp. 14-15.

3 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 230, No. 75 and 76.

down, and lawlessness and highway robbery became common. In the region surrounding Delhi peace was maintained by the Central Government, but in territories which lay at a distance from the capital this responsibility fell upon the local leaders. Reports about the insecurity of roads and highway robberies were frequently received by the Centre; the new Government lost no time in making suitable arrangements and authorizing reliable persons to safeguard the lives and property of the people.<sup>1</sup> Nāhir Singh of Ballabgarh, for instance, sent a letter suggesting measures for the protection of the region near his *jāgīr*.<sup>2</sup> For the safety of the roads in Bulandshahr the newly appointed Subahdar, Nawāb Walidād Khān, is recorded to have set apart a company of 100 soldiers besides appointing new Tahsildars and Thanahdars.<sup>3</sup> It is to be noted, however, that of the chiefs and zamindars who were entrusted with the task of maintaining law and order some at least failed to cooperate with the Revolutionary Government. Mubārak refers to Thakur Tūlā Rām's misconduct; the latter had submitted "Arzies" to the Government tendering his allegiance. "A petition was read in open Durbar," writes Jiwan Lal, "from Rao Tulla Ram, noble of Rewari, to the effect that he was sending his brother with a confidential communication to the King, and begged he might be heard and a favourable answer sent."<sup>4</sup> Under an earlier date he tells us that Tūlā Rām had taken a large force with him to collect revenue. But he had failed to do so and had to come to Delhi to obtain necessary authority for using force in the collection of revenue.<sup>5</sup> On his return to Rewari, however, he seems to have changed his

1 Some of the petitions received by the Emperor and his orders and directions relating to arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security in the countryside have been published along with the proceedings of the Emperor's trial.

2 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 12.

3 *Sazd*, p. 24.

4 *T.N.N.*, p. 163.

5 *Ibid*, p. 159. He was expected to send Rs. 5,000/- in return for the *sanad* and Rs. 10,000/- as *bharif* revenue. Cf. *Memoirs*, p. 25; also see *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 9, No. 34.

views and misused his power and position. The chief of Farrukhnagar "complained that he was to be attacked by Rāṣ Tullā Rām, of Rewari." This was not all; the latter had turned a traitor. In a letter which was intercepted and read before the Emperor he had written to Ghulām Muḥammad Khān, Revenue Collector of Kot Qasim: "Are you intoxicated that you think the English are going away from Hindustan? They will most assuredly return and will destroy you."<sup>1</sup> Subsequently we find that the Emperor had to despatch some officers to punish him for these undesirable activities.<sup>2</sup>

To stop looting and restore normal conditions, however, the Emperor was prepared to take any steps that, he thought, would be effective. He was advised to march through the main streets of the city in a procession and personally order the people to shed their fears and resume their normal work. Accordingly he mounted an elephant and passed through the streets; this restored confidence among the people and some of the shops were opened. He also issued orders that some Regiments should be posted at the principal Gates of the town,<sup>3</sup> and later in the day once again he went out in a procession in response to the appeals of the citizens; he again called upon the shopkeepers to resume business.<sup>4</sup>

It is to be noted that the shops of the main bazaar only were closed. Even Zakā-Allāh, an eye-witness, though openly hostile to

1 T.N.N., p. 174.

The correspondence of Tūlā Rām is preserved in *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 10.

2 T.N.N. p. 195; also see *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 11.

3 According to Mubārak Shāh "four hundred sepoys and two guns were stationed at each Gate. Large parties of cavalry were kept inside the palace, a troop being at the main Gate, and another by the Diwan Khas, six horse artillery guns fully equipped were in front of the Diwan Am", p. 33.

4 Charles Ball says that the Emperor when marching in procession passed by the *Jāmi Masjid*, "where the standard of the prophet was unfurled, and the empire of Hindostan was proclaimed amidst the exclamations of the soldiers and the people." See Vol I, p. 458.

the cause of the Revolutionaries, admits that "if a single house was plundered rumours would spread that the entire *maḥallah* had been plundered ; . . . in short not one per cent of the rumours about the plunder of the city were true ; there were hundreds of *maḥallahs* in which not a *casri* worth of property was plundered.<sup>1</sup> The exaggerated accounts of some writers create the impression that the city was completely in the grip of rapine and plunder. This is wholly untrue ; looting there was, but not on a very large scale, and certainly not in the entire city. Stray cases seem to have occurred, but rumours of wholesale plunder made wealthy shopkeepers panicky. They closed their shops and began to make complaints that their lives and property were unsafe and they needed immediate protection. Of the soldiers who created disturbances in the city the majority were the Infantry men known as the *ṭilangās*. They attacked the houses of persons who were suspected of harbouring Europeans, spying for the British or sending provisions to their camp at the Ridge. Zakā-Allāh quotes the instances of Budi Chand, Mohan Lal, Qāḍi Pannū, Nawāb Hāmid 'Alī Khān, Turāb 'Alī, Hakīm Aḥsan-Allāh, and Ajit Singh, the uncle of the Raja of Patiala.<sup>2</sup>

A marked improvement in conditions was brought about by General Muḥammad Bakht Khān. He arrived in Delhi at the head of the Bareilly Brigade on 2 July, the same day he was put in charge of the Army. Next day "he was also instructed to arrange for the civil administration, the police and revenue departments." An order was issued whereby the royal princes were relieved from all further duties connected with the army."<sup>3</sup> Bakht Khān lost no time in taking strong measures to stop looting. He told the Emperor that "if any of the Princes attempted to plunder the city, he would cut off their noses and ears." The Emperor gave him full authority adding : "Do whatever seems good unto you."<sup>4</sup> The Muslim volunteers who had joined the War as *Mujāhidīs* were also deadly

1 Zakā Allāh, pp. 665-666.

2 *Ibid.*

3 *T.N.N.*, p. 137.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35

against molesting the people. When Mawlānā Muḥammad Ishāq of Tonk who had been appointed Commander of a detachment of the Revolutionary forces found that Mirzā Muḡhul paid no heed to his protest against looting by the sepoys he resigned from his post. The Prince appealed to him to withdraw his resignation, because the Mawlānā was a competent person. But he refused to accede to his request, saying that he would not withdraw his resignation if looting was not stopped. He continued, however, to fight as an ordinary soldier in the Revolutionary Army.<sup>1</sup>

1 Mawlānā Muḥammad Ishāq : He was born in Tonk and received his early education under his uncle who was a Commander in the army of Tonk State, and was held in great regard by the Ruler. Muḥammad Ishāq was trained by him in the art of war and the use of the sword and spear ; he was a good rider. His mother was greatly interested in Sayyid Aḥmad Shāhid's Movement, and Muḥammad Ishāq was influenced by her ideas. He joined the Revolution of 1857 immediately after its outbreak. He came to Delhi and was given the charge of a detachment of forces under Mirzā Muḡhul. On the fall of Delhi he returned to Tonk and was arrested before he could enter the town, but not without offering resistance. He was tried at Ajmer and sentenced to death. But the Nawāb of Tonk, who had a great regard for him and addressed him as *Mabūdūm-zādah* went to Ajmer and persuaded the Commissioner to pardon him. The Mawlānā could not reconcile himself to the idea of living in the subcontinent as a British subject and migrated to Afghanistan. For further details see Aḥar Sahswānī's article in *Al-Jamī'at*, 3 December, 1956.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Under the new Government the Princes had become the officers of the Army. This was rather unfortunate, for it adversely affected the course of the war in the Delhi centre. Some of these Princes had no doubt joined the Revolution at the very outset and were anxious to assume its leadership which, they thought, had devolved upon them by virtue of their position. They were, however, thoroughly incompetent, having no experience of fighting or administration, Prince Firūz Shāh, the maternal grandson of Hāhī Bakhsh<sup>1</sup>, being an illustrious exception. Bahādur Shāh knew that the Princes were incompetent; moreover, he had been warned by Ahsan-Allāh Khān and Queen Zinat Maḥal that it would be unwise to appoint the Princes to military commands. He, therefore, hesitated to take this drastic step and told the Princes that, inexperienced as they were, they would not be able to discharge their duties with efficiency. Subsequently, however, the Emperor was confronted with and had to yield to a demand from the military officers<sup>2</sup>

#### Military organization

Mirzā Mughul was appointed Commander-in-Chief on Wednesday, 13 May, in the *Darbār*<sup>3</sup> Zinat Maḥal, always anxious to

1 See Muir, Sir William, *Records of the Intelligence Department* (Edinburgh, 1902), I, p. 411.

2 Khwājah Wahid al-Dīn a cousin of Syed Ahmed Khān, also put his pressure on the Emperor to appoint the Princes as commanders. His argument was that "the troops who have killed their officers will misbehave to you" if their wishes were ignored. See *Memoirs*, p. 6.

3 *Memoirs*, p. 4; Kaye and Malletson, *op cit*, Vol. V. 328; also see Chunni Lal's statement in *Trial*, p. 146. Zakā-allāh (p. 679) gives 18 May as the date of the appointment of the Princes.

advance the claims of her son, Prince Jawān Bakht, now persuaded the Emperor to appoint him Prime Minister.<sup>1</sup> The Princes were absolutely incapable of leadership, and soon became a positive source of disruption and demoralization of the Army. (Mirzā Abū Bakr who was the Supreme Commander of the Cavalry was present at the important Battle of the Hindan on 30 May, 1857. As soon as fighting commenced and the two sides started firing their heavy guns, the Prince became panicky and left the field of battle.) Mirzā Mughul had extensive powers, as Commander-in-Chief which he exercised rather unscrupulously. (He did not cooperate with General Bakht Khān, the most capable and devoted of the military leaders of the Revolution, and placed obstacles in his path. In fact, throughout the period of the siege of Delhi we find Mirzā Mughul disagreeing with him on questions of details as well as matters pertaining to the over-all strategy of the War. The Emperor invariably accepted the advice of Bakht Khān but the officers who were patronized by Mirzā Mughul often refused to carry out his orders.) Sometimes the Prince submitted petitions to the Emperor, which were full of complaints against Bakht Khān. The fighting forces were thus divided into two camps. This disunity was the main cause of the reverses suffered by the Revolutionaries, particularly in the later stages of the War. A reference to these differences is found in the report of the spy, (Fath Muhammad, dated 1 September 1857. He writes - "The state of affairs at Delhi is as follows : The Nusseerabad and Neemuch Brigades are supporters of Mirza Moghul, and the Bareilly Brigade is devoted to the King. The officers of the Bareilly force and Mirza are bitter enemies.")<sup>2</sup> Mirzā Mughul's brother Khidr Sultān, was mainly responsible for the defeat of the Revolutionaries in the Battles of the Hindan and Badli kī Sarāī. (About his conduct in the Battle of the Hindan, Sayyid Mubārak Shāh writes : "Mirza Khizar Sooltan not liking

1 T.N.N., p. 97 ; *Trial*, p. 185 ; *Memols*, p. 7.

2 Zakā-Allāh, p. 679-80.

3 See *Trial*, pp. 87-89, also *Secret Letters*, No. 191, dated 7 September, 1857.

the turn matters were taking got out of his buggy and mounted his horse... turned to Meer Nawab and said, 'What is to be done now?' to which the latter replied, 'Come along Your Highness—look the English are advancing... On hearing these words Mirzā turned his horse's head and the mutineers seeing him retiring—first by twos or threes but soon in one mass—fled panic-stricken from the field... Their rebel troops threw their arms in their flight and in sore straits and inconceivable confusion reached Jamna, ... rushed into the river and perished." Similarly at Badli kī Sarāī "on the pretence of bringing up magazine stores" he "was the first to fly". On the day following the Battle of Badli kī Sarāī (8 June) the historic siege of Delhi by the British forces commenced. The Revolutionaries had therefore to organise their administration in the face of an ever increasing pressure of the siege

#### **Military administration**

It is difficult to present a detailed picture of the military administration of Bahādur Shāh on the basis of the extremely limited source material that has come down to us.<sup>2</sup> In some contemporary documents, however, there are a few stray references to steps taken by the Revolutionary Government from time to time in connection with the organization of the defence of Delhi. A careful examination of this fragmentary information reveals the fact that the Emperor and his advisers were anxious to build up a system of military administration. (The Commander-in-Chief had the overall charge of the Army, and, there being no separate ministry for defence, his powers were extensive. An appeal against his orders could, however, always be made to the Emperor, but no officers of the Government could interfere in his work.) Ḥakim

1 Mubārak, ff 54 55, 60

2 Most of the contemporary writers on the Revolution were Europeans who did not bother about the working of the Revolutionary Government. Among the few Hind Pakistāni writers none had the courage to discuss matters which, they thought, would displease the British Government. They condemned every aspect of the Revolution and censured every act of the new Government.

Aḥsan-Allāh writes : "The officials all begged that all orders regarding the army might be issued through the General of the army, and that no officer of the Government (*Ahlkar i Bādshāhi*) should be allowed to interfere. The King agreed."<sup>1</sup>

### The War Council

One of the important steps taken by the new Government was to appoint a *Majlis* (Committee) of leading citizens for securing provisions for the Army and the population ; Maḥbāb 'Alī Khān and Mir Nawāb were made directly responsible for this. On the same day (12 May) Munshī Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥasan was directed "to take charge of supplying provisions." The Emperor's orders to this effect were issued on 12 May and on the following day a statement of the "account of expenses for supplying provisions," was prepared.<sup>2</sup> This arrangement seems to have been purely temporary ; after the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief he became responsible for the supply of the provisions.<sup>3</sup> Of course the immediate officers of the various Regiments were directly responsible for securing supplies ; the Secretariat of the Commander-in-Chief supervised the work of the department and sanctioned payment of the bills. As the number of forces increased with the arrival of contingents from different parts of the Empire the need of appointing a War Council had become necessary. A meeting of this Council was held on 28 July which Bakht Khān was unable to attend, because he was too busy with the collection of supplies.<sup>4</sup> The War Council was an active body issuing instructions and advising the officers with regard to the details of the movements of the Regiments and offering resistance to the attacks of the enemy.<sup>5</sup>

For obvious reasons the new Government retained in most cases the main principles and nomenclature of the Company's

1 *Memoirs*, p. 7.

2 Zakā-Allāh, p. 579 ; *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 358.

3 There are a number of references to documents regarding the supplies of provisions being submitted to the Commander-in-Chief. See, for instance, *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 204.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Army administration. The majority of the officers in the Revolutionary forces were men who had served under the Company. It was, therefore, convenient to adopt its methods and terminology in the new system. However, most of the officers being new to the posts to which they were now appointed the Government thought it necessary to issue orders about their specific duties and responsibilities. Some documents containing orders, "governing the conduct of the sepoys" and "defining the duties of the Colonel of a regiment" and "rules for the maintenance of discipline" have come down to us.<sup>1</sup> In the earlier stages of the Revolution, the Emperor had appointed only a few Commanders from among his sons and grandsons, but with the arrival of contingents of troops from different places the number of officers must have become fairly large. It is, however, beyond doubt that promotions on a large scale were given to the officers who were actively associated with defence of the Capital. Several officers with military ranks of the British Army have been mentioned. (Bakht Khān's appointment as General soon after his arrival in Delhi is recorded by Jiwan Lal;<sup>2</sup> he was also given the charge of the general administration of the city, particularly for purposes of defence. The Emperor's autograph order for a seal to be prepared for Bakht Khān calls him "the adviser of the State, the respected of the country, our own special slave, Muhammad Bakht Khan, Lord Governor Bahadur, Controller of all matters, military and civil."<sup>3</sup>) He was generally addressed as General Bahādur and was sometimes called

1 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 179, No. 59, 60 and 62.

2 Bakht Khān was made a Brigadier by Khān Bahādur Khān in Bareilly; he became a General in Delhi; See Najm al-Ghani; *Akhbār al-Sandīd*, II, 553, also *Intelligence Records*, I, 148.

Similarly Sudhanī (Sirdār) Singh, Ghawth Muhammad and Hīrā Singh, Commanders of the Nimach forces, are called Generals. *Intelligence Records*, II, 6; *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, pp. 24 (No. 215), 363 (No. 190); *Memoirs*, p. 18. Other instances can be added.

3 *T.A.N.*, p. 134.

4 *Trial* p. 34.

'Commander-in-Chief of the Army'.<sup>1</sup> Jiwan Lal's statement that he was appointed Commander-in-Chief and Mirzā Mughul demoted to the rank of Adjutant-General on 2 July cannot be true, because only a week later (9 July) the latter submitted a petition which was attested by him "with the official seal of the Commander-in-Chief ;"<sup>2</sup> on the same date Bakht Khān sends an acknowledgment of the receipt of orders from the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>3</sup> There are clear indications in the Emperor's orders as well as other documents which were seized from the Red Fort that Bakht Khān enjoyed his confidence and exercised wide powers in military affairs. When Mirzā Mughul made a formal complaint against Bakht Khān's "interference" the Emperor paid no attention and passed no orders on the "petition".<sup>4</sup> The procedure of the appointment of officers is not recorded in detail ; however, it is evident that higher posts in the Revolutionary Army were filled by election. (The officers of the Regiments elected their Commander from among themselves and the Commander-in-Chief, probably after the approval of the Court or the War Council, issued orders of his appointment<sup>5</sup>) Shaykh Shabrāti, for instance, was elected *Šūbahdār* by the officers of the Cavalry and Infantry Regiments ; they reported this to the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>6</sup> Officers were expected to maintain registers of men working under them ; these were submitted to the Court.<sup>7</sup>

Besides the officers of the Regiments and Brigades there were separate Commanders who had the charge of the various branches of the Army. Prince Abū Bakr is mentioned by Ḥakīm Aḥsan-Allāh as the "Commandant of the whole cavalry."<sup>8</sup> "Each Cavalry Regiment is now split up," says the report of a spy, "into small

1 *Trial*, p. 95.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 87.

3 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 20.

4 *Trial*, p. 89.

5 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 34, No. 506.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 29, No. 380.

7 *Ibid.* p. 36, Nos. 546-47.

8 *Memoirs*, p. 7.

'Thokes' or federacies, comprising those who are resident of a particular tract of country. For instance, the Hansi fellows form one 'Thoke', the Kalanoor men another 'Thoke' and so on through the whole body."<sup>1</sup> The upkeep of the horses of the Artillery was in the charge of Captain Mu'in al-Dawlah Haydar Khān;<sup>2</sup> Rājah 'Ali is mentioned as Artillery Inspector. Each Regiment, it seems, had a separate Paymaster who was under an Officer-in-charge; Colonel Mirzā Suhrāb Jang was the Commander of the 11th Regiment and Sayyid Umrāo 'Ali acted as its Paymaster.<sup>3</sup>

### Finance

The most difficult problem of the new Government was finance. The number of forces arriving in Delhi was daily increasing, and only a few of them brought enough money for their expenses.<sup>4</sup> Bahādur Shāh had no funds at his disposal, and he had told the Revolutionaries at the very outset that he did not have any money; but the sepoys had assured him that they would collect the necessary funds.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps neither the Emperor nor the leaders of the sepoys had a clear idea of the magnitude of this problem. The defence of the Capital had to be organized on a much larger scale and for a much longer period than they had imagined. With the continuous arrival of reinforcements of British troops the pressure of the siege became heavier every day; the prospects of an early conclusion of the war appeared to be meagre.<sup>6</sup> The morale of some sections of the sepoys was shaken, and they started plundering. Bahādur Shāh's difficulties were considerably aggravated by the irresponsible conduct of the Princes and some officers

<sup>1</sup> *Secret Letters*, No. 191.

<sup>2</sup> Muharak, f. 63; *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, pp. 37-38, also see *Memoirs*, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 166, No. 2. Hākim Ahsan-Allāh writes Suhrab i Hindi instead of Suhrab Jang. *Memoirs*, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Bahkt Khān is said to have brought with him four lakhs of rupees and distributed advance pay to his soldiers for six months. Zakā-Allāh, p. 678.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 691.

<sup>6</sup> For reinforcements arriving in the British camp see Young, Colonel K., *Delhi, 1857* (London, 1902), pp. 51, 78, 80, 87, 93, 119, 170, 266, 268, *et. seq.*

who had adopted questionable methods of collecting funds for the Government as well as for themselves.<sup>1</sup> The leading merchants of the city who were subjected to extortion by Mirzā Mughul, submitted a petition to the Emperor.<sup>2</sup> The Emperor remedied the situation by directing that the "Court" alone was authorized to collect funds. Orders to this effect were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Kotwal was directed "not to realize money as it is the court only which can do that"; on the same day Khudā Bakhsh, Naib-Kotwal, informed Colonel Muḥammad Khidr Sulṭān that the "Commander-in-Chief has ordered that none but the court is authorized to realize money."<sup>3</sup> It would, however, be wrong to conclude, that the Princes and other State servants alone were at fault; the wealthier sections of the people were also responsible for creating situations in which the normal machinery of the Government could not work smoothly; they did not rise to the occasion and failed to fully cooperate with the Revolutionaries. Since they refused to pay their contributions stringent measures had to be taken against them.<sup>4</sup> Sometimes the Commander-in-Chief called the bankers to advise him about the methods of collection.<sup>5</sup> According to Zakā-Allāh the Government could not collect more than four or five lakhs of rupees from the *sāhūkārs* and other rich citizens.<sup>6</sup> Besides collecting donations the Government took loans from money-lenders; regular bonds were executed and interest was paid on these loans.<sup>7</sup> The contents of some of the treasuries in the towns and districts captured by the Revolutionaries were also brought to Delhi.

1 For instance Fayḍ-Allāh Kotwal was removed from office for accepting bribes. *Memoirs*, p. 15.

2 See *Trial*, pp. 70, 71-72

3 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 324 Nos. 59-68, ; see *Memoirs*, pp. 26, 27. Also see Gauri Shānkar's Report in *Secret Letters*, No. 191,

4 *Memoirs*, p. 26

5 *Press list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 102, Nos. 59-60.

6 Zakā-Allāh, p. 678. He mentions the names of a few persons who were made to pay money to the Government.

7 *Trial*, p. 69.



Besides these collections and loans the Government asked some of the chiefs and landlords of the adjacent districts to send their contributions to the Imperial Exchequer.<sup>1</sup> It is not known to what extent these orders were complied with ; the response was probably not satisfactory. Even in the second month of the Revolution the Government found it difficult to disburse the pay of its servants. (According to Ahsan-Allāh Khān a sum of 120,000 rupees was required for this purpose in the month of June ;<sup>2</sup> subsequently, the expenditure must have risen considerably. A requisition from the Commander-in-Chief shows that he needed Rs. 16,000 "to pay the army, their wages for 4 days."<sup>3</sup>)

For the wounded soldiers the Government maintained a hospital. It was under the Commander-in-Chief and the doctors employed there had to send daily and weekly reports.<sup>4</sup> Besides the staff employed in this hospital, the various Regiments had physicians and surgeons attached to them. Doctor Muḥammad Jān was attached to the Volunteer Regiment, and Doctor Sultān to the 11th Infantry Regiment.<sup>5</sup> Medical aid seems to have been organized in a satisfactory manner ; even Zakā-Allāh who has presented an extremely distorted picture of the short-lived Revolutionary regime, has not criticized it ; he has just ignored it.

Despite the paucity of funds at his disposal to meet the ever-mounting expenditure of the administration and the War and numerous difficulties in collecting Government revenue and taxes, the Emperor did not allow his officers to take anything from the

1 A list is given in Zakā-Allāh, p. 690

2 *Memoirs*, p. 13.

3 The Emperor wanted that the men of the Cavalry and Infantry Regiments should be paid Rs. 9, and 7 respectively. The Cavalry men protested against this and demanded Rs. 30 p. m. Maḥbūb 'Alī Khān ultimately agreed at Rs. 20 p. m. See Zakā-Allāh, pp. 677-78, *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 401.

4 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 369.

5 In the *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, we also have references to Doctor Mir Muḥammad Khān (p. 65), Ḥawājī Bakḥḡh (p. 271) 'Abd-Allāh, Ṣabūr Khān and Imām Bakḥḡh (p. 369). Muḥammad Khān and 'Ayn al-Dīn are mentioned as surgeons (pp. 171, 197). Also see *Trial*, p. 25.

people without paying for it. A number of documents in the collection of papers seized from the Fort prove that prompt payments were made for things purchased or work done on wages. Though confined to a besieged city which was being defended by forces comprised of heterogeneous elements and different units belonging to different places, the new Government tried its best to maintain normal conditions of life. The soldiers were not allowed to misbehave, and a strict control was kept over the police officers. Mu'in al-Din Hasan Khān, the first Kotwal of Delhi, was dismissed because of his harshness and excesses;<sup>1</sup> he was made to disgorge his ill-gotten wealth<sup>2</sup> (That the people of the city lived a normal life and could afford to indulge in pastimes like the flying of kites and pigeons, and the display of fire-works is indicated by Bakht Khān's orders to the Kotwal that these practices were to be stopped, because they disturbed the Army in its activities.<sup>3</sup> The Kotwal sought instructions of the Commander-in-Chief on 30 August; two days later the *Naib-Kotwal* issued instructions to the *Thanahdars* "to circulate the order of the Commander-in-Chief not to fly pigeons, kites or discharge fire-works."<sup>4</sup>

### Revenue Administration

In matters pertaining to revenue administration the Government was confronted with the problem of securing the services of experienced officers in adequate numbers. Most of the men belonging to this branch of administration were posted in districts and worked under the local Governments. (On the collapse of the Company's authority in the Provinces and districts, power was seized by the local leaders of the Revolutionaries. In a number of cases these leaders were confirmed in their offices by Imperial *farmāns* or *sanads*) even those who could not get confirmatory orders from the Emperor considered themselves to have been

1 Zakā-Allāh, p. 688.

2 T.N.N., p. 140.

3 Press-list of Mutiny Papers, p. 274, No. 92.

4 Ibid., p. 292, No. 194.

working under the Revolutionary Government. (Among the well-known local Chiefs who received *sanads* of appointment were Khān Bahādur Khān (Bareilly),<sup>1</sup> Birjīs Qadr (Lucknow)<sup>2</sup>, Maḥmud Khān (Bijnore),<sup>3</sup> Walidād Khān (Mālāgarh),<sup>4</sup> and Liyāqat 'Ali (Allahabad).<sup>5</sup>)

In the Capital itself the Emperor seems to have kept the Revenue department under his own supervision,<sup>6</sup> but most of the appointments were made by Bakht Khān and the Princes.<sup>7</sup> (The Emperor ordered Muhammad 'Ali Beg to establish the Revenue Secretariat (Khāṣṣah Sharīfah and Hudūr Tahṣīl) in the house of James Skinner.) Obviously there were separate officers for the collection of revenue in the Crown Lands. (The Emperor sometimes wrote to big zamindars of the Crown Lands to send their quota the revenue of their lands.) Only two days after assuming power he wrote to Skinner who was in his country house at Bulāspūr (Bulandshahr): "immediately on receiving this order he is to transmit to us whatever revenue he may have collected on account of this harvest and that in future also he is to send us harvest by harvest the proceeds of the Tuppa of Ruboopoora which is included among

1 *Trial*, p. 278.

2 Ḥusaynī, II, pp. 225, 448.

3 Khan Syed Ahmed, *Sarkashī Zil'a Bijnawr*, (ed. S. Moinul Haq, Karachi, p. 177), pp. 42-43.

4 *Intelligence Records*, II, p. 16.

5 *Zakā-Allāh*, p. 689.

6 Faṭḥ Muhammad, a British spy, says in his report: "The King reserves the affairs of the country and the Revenue which he will administer himself" *Secret Letters*, Letter No. 191.

7 *Zakā-Allāh*, p. 689. In the *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 286, there is an application from Muhammad Khyr al-Dīn, requesting the Commander-in-Chief to appoint him Tahsildar in the District of Balagarh.

8 *Press list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 12, No. 13: p. 113, No. 8; p. 400, No. 22; also see *Trial*, p. 10.

Mirzā Muḥammad 'Ali Beg was in the beginning appointed Tahsildar of Mithrauli, *T N N.*, 101.

the Royal lands (Tuyool). Dated 19 Ramazan (14th May 1857) 21st year.”<sup>1</sup>

The Minister concerned was directed to issue circulars to the Provincial Governments about the appointment of a Tahsildar to whom they were “to give facilities in the discharge of his duties.”<sup>2</sup> Mawlawi Fayḍ Aḥmad, an officer attached to the Revenue Board at Agra, had joined the Revolution, and had come to Delhi with the Nimach Brigade. He was appointed *Sarishṭahdār*, and to quote Hakim Aḥsan-Allāh, “all the office work was made over to him ;” all the Thanahdars and Kotwals were directed to send their applications to him and obey his orders, and “the Maulawi should bring important cases before the King ; . . . he should write daily an abstract of the *thunah* reports, and bring it before the King.”<sup>3</sup> Zakā-Allāh adds that he was given some judicial work along with Mirzā Muḡhul and *Khidr Sultān* ; perhaps cases of the Army men were decided by this Court,<sup>4</sup> where the Mawlawī represented the Emperor. Subsequently, however, Fayḍ Aḥmad was attached to Revenue administration ; he is mentioned as visiting Aligarh and Bulandshahr to collect revenue of those districts (The collection of revenue was among the duties of the local Chiefs and zamindars, but they used to withhold Government dues, and the Emperor was sometimes forced to send his officers to realize them) Mawlawī Fayḍ Aḥmad was accompanied by Ḥusayn Bakhsh ; they were specifically directed to realize Government revenues from Gulab Singh (Kacher), Zahr ‘Alī Khān

1 *Secret Letters*, Letter No 212 of 3.11.1857, No. 164, Bahādur Shāh’s order to Skinner was seized with other documents by Captain Briggs when the Palace fell to the British. Its translation was sent by the officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to Edmunstone, Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with a covering letter dated 6th October, 1857. It may be noted that the order of the Emperor mentions James Skinner who had died in 1841. Actually R.W. Skinner occupied the house at Bilāspur. See Kaye and Malleison, VI, 135.

2 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 180, No. 2.

3 *Memoirs*, p. 16 ; also Mubārak, f. 109.

4 Zakā-Allāh, p. 688.

(Dharampūr) and Muḥammad Dāwūd Khān of Bhikampūr.<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to form an idea of the villages that paid the revenue to the Emperor ; however, about the end of September, 1857, Muir was told by Clifford who was in Ghaziuddin-Nagar that "several of the Goojur villages have already paid it to the late King ; . . ." <sup>2</sup> Ghulām Fakhr al-Dīn Khān, the Tahsildar of Kot Qasim, had been able to collect revenue to the tune of 3000 rupees ; 'Abd al-Haqq was despatched to Gurgaon for the same purpose.<sup>3</sup> Occasionally the Emperor inspected the accounts himself ; on 23 July orders were issued to the Revenue Collector of Kot Qasim to submit his accounts for inspection by the Emperor.<sup>4</sup>

Besides land revenue the Government collected other taxes also. Sugar, for instance, was taxed at the rate of annas eight per maund ; evidently, this was sales tax. Octroi duties on this commodity as well as salt were withdrawn.<sup>5</sup> On 23 August the *Mukhtār al-Saltānat* directed the Kotwal "to realize the rent from a dancing girl by distraining her property"; four days later, he asked the same officer "to realize the canal rents from Ghulam Nabi Khan."<sup>6</sup>

### Mint

In spite of their best efforts to secure donations, borrow money<sup>7</sup> and realize revenue and other taxes, the Revolutionary Government, it is easy to understand, could not collect

1 Zakā Allāh, p. 691. He gives a list of other zamindars also who were expected to send contributions, See p. 690.

2 *Intelligence Records*, I, 129.

3 Zakā-Allāh, p. 697.

4 *T. N. N.*, p. 164.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 149-152

6 *Press list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 270, No. 20 ; p. 272, No. 43. The office of the *Mukhtār al-Saltānat* was at the time held by Ṣamṣām al-Dawlah Aḥmad Qulī Khān, the father of Queen Zinat Mahal and a grandson of Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī's Wazīr, Shāh Wali Khān. See *Memoirs*, p. 14.

7 The Government took loans from bankers and other rich persons and paid regular interest.

The Muslims "could not be called upon to supply funds" (in the form of

enough money to meet the expenses of the war and the reconstruction of a broken machinery of administration. The system of paper currency did not exist and enormous quantities of metal were needed to coin money. As early as 23 May, 1857, orders were issued that "the old coins should be withdrawn from circulation, and new coinage introduced."<sup>1</sup> On 6 August the Commander-in-Chief sought the Emperor's permission to establish a mint in Delhi; this was sanctioned.<sup>2</sup> However, the price of gold had considerably risen and this must have affected the prices of other metals also. It was not possible, therefore, to coin money on a large scale. By September the financial position of the Government had deteriorated to such an extent that "gold and silver articles belonging to the palace have been sent to the King's mint for coinage."<sup>3</sup> To add to the difficulties of the Government, anti-social elements had become active, and the Commander-in-Chief had to issue a proclamation to the people "warning them against counterfeiting coins."<sup>4</sup> Besides Delhi, Bahādur Shāh's coins were minted at other places also, as, for instance, at Lucknow. Gold mohurs minted at Lucknow were brought to the Emperor and presented as *nadh*r by 'Abbās Mirzā, the envoy of the Wālī of Awadh. The legend on these coins indicated that the Wālī of Awadh acknowledged the suzerainty of Bahādur Shāh.<sup>5</sup> This is a loans) because they would not take interest. However, they had to give donations in cash and also in the form of provisions for the *Mujahids* :

T. N. N., p. 99 ; *Trial*, p. 72.

1 T N N, p. 101.

2 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 14, No. 45 ; p. 407, No. 246, 247.

3 *Press-list of Mutiny Paper*, p. 8, No. 11 ; Gauri Shankar spy reports on 12 September : "A mint has been established and the silver of the King's howdas, sticks of office, and utensils are sent to the mint to be coined into rupees for the use of the army." The mint was set up in Katrah Maghrū. See *Mutiny Records*, VII Pt. II. 34 ; 56.

4 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 36, No. 543.

5 The legend on these gold mohurs was :

به زر زد سکه نصرت طرازی سراج الدین بهادر شاه غازی

The victorious coin was struck in gold : Sirāj al-Dīn Bahādur Shāh Ghāzi. T. N. N., p. 69 ; for gold mohurs minted in Delhi see T. N. N., p. 96.

fact of great constitutional significance. The East India Company had encouraged the Nawābs of Awadh to assume the status of a King and thus become rivals to the Mughul Emperor.<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionary leaders of Awadh reverted to the old constitutional position of their Chief *vis-a-vis* the Central Government and acknowledged the suzerainty of Bahādur Shāh.

### Civil appointments

On 14 May the Emperor called Mufti Ṣadr al-Dīn and asked him to work as "City Magistrate, to try all cases, and decide them with impartiality and justice. The Moulvie excused himself on the plea of bad health"<sup>2</sup> But subsequently he seems to have accepted office under the new Government; on June 5, the Emperor appointed Mumtāz al-Dawlah Muḥammad Taqī Khān as *Ṣadr Amin* under Maulawi Mohd. Sadru'd-Dīn.<sup>3</sup> From the meagre and fragmentary references in contemporary records it appears that separate courts were set up for civil and military cases. Mawlawi Fayḍ Ahmad who had arrived in Delhi on 26 July<sup>4</sup> was "at once appointed Chief Criminal Judge by the King"; he was of advanced age but "retained his courage to the last and constantly exposed himself."<sup>5</sup> Mawlawi Ghulām Ahmad is also mentioned as an "officer-in-charge of the criminal court."<sup>6</sup> On 6 July Muhammad Quli Khān was appointed "Magistrate over the city with full powers"<sup>7</sup> In a circular issued by the Kotwal, Fayḍ Ahmad Khān is mentioned as *Munṣif*.<sup>8</sup> The Judiciary, it appears,

1 See p. 12 (chapter I).

2 T. N. N., p. 90.

3 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 374, No. 1.

4 Young, p. 150.

5 Mubarak, f. 111. Besides this he had the charge of the Emperor's Secretariat. See *Memoirs*, note on p. 16. Fayḍ Ahmad was born in 1223 H. and was therefore in his fiftieth year at the time of the Revolution. See 'Alī, Raḥmān, *Tadhkirah i 'Ulamā i Hind* (Lucknow, 1914), p. 165.

6 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 291, No. 168.

7 T. N. N., p. 141.

8 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 292.

could not be organized as elaborately as other departments were done. There is recorded evidence to show that even minor cases of theft were brought before the Emperor and that he took action on them, issuing necessary orders.

Bahādur Shāh and other Revolutionary leaders at Delhi were confronted with problems which were completely new to them. Few of them had any experience of administration, and much less of running it during a period of war. They seemed to have counted on two factors : that the Company's officers and forces would soon be overpowered and wiped out and that the Hind-Pakistāni officers in the Company's service would respond to their appeals. In both cases their expectations were only half fulfilled. However, in spite of the unexpected and long course which the Revolution took and the protracted war that they had to fight the Revolutionaries succeeded in setting up a fairly efficient machinery of administration. Delhi had been completely cut off from the Panjab, and yet the Government was able to keep the economic situation under full control ; almost normal levels of prices were maintained except in the case of gold for which the demand had grown. "Some of the *Telangahs* had so much money (in rupees) that they could not carry it ; they would go about in the city purchasing gold. Because of their purchases the rate of gold has risen from 16 and 17 rupees to 27 and 28 per tolah . . . There used to be crowds of them at the shops of the gold-smiths, asking the latter to convert their gold into bangles or rings for their legs. Some of the *Telangahs* had as many as five rings on each of their thighs."<sup>1</sup> The demand for gold being confined to a very limited section of the people, the Government was able to keep the prices of other articles within reasonable levels. Ghee, for instance, could be purchased at one rupee for three seers.<sup>2</sup> The rate of sulphur, according to payment made under the orders of the Commandant of the Artillery to a grocer, works out to be

1 *T. N. N.*, p. 100 ; *Zakā-Allāh*, p. 677 ;

2 *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 253, No. 34. An idea of the prices of other articles may be formed by a list in the petition of a man named Aḥsān



less than three annas for a seer.<sup>1</sup> It was on account of the comparative cheapness of prices that the pay of a footman could be fixed at Rs. 5/- and that of a Cavalry trooper at Rs. 30/- per month.<sup>2</sup>

With a hastily-reconstructed machinery of administration and an Army comprised of heterogeneous elements—regular units of the Company's Bengal Army, *Ghāzis*, and Regiments belonging to Princely States besides retainers of minor Chiefs—the Revolutionaries, defended Delhi against a well-equipped and well-trained British force for four long months. They were defeated in the end but only after leaving behind a brilliant record of heroic deeds and sacrifices.

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al-Haqq whose property had been plundered. He claimed the prices of the articles looted at the following rates :

Cotton carpet, 5 yards long, valued at	7 Rs
Copper saucer with cover	" " 2 Rs.
Prayer carpet	" " 2 Rs.
Banaras Scarf	" " 7 Rs
a house	" " 200 Rs.
a pair of bullocks	" " 100 Rs.
a sword	" " 15 Rs.

See *Trial*, p. 18.

1 Haydar Husayn Khan asks Jawala Nath "to credit Rs. 109 and 6 annas to the account of Lala Dina Nath. Grocer, from whom 14 maunds and 23 seers of sulphur have been secured for the magazine." *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p 357 No. 51.

2 *T. N. N.*, p. 92.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE DEFENCE OF DELHI (I)

#### **The British forces move towards Delhi**

The Revolutionary Government was hardly twenty days in the saddle when they had to fight their first battle against the British on the banks of the Hindan, a tributary of the Jamunā. In the long and eventful history of Hind-Pakistan never was a Government forced into a major war in such a state of unpreparedness as that of the eighty-two year old Bahādur Shāh. The organizers of the Movement had planned a violent Revolution, but they had never calculated that it would mean a long war. The Army and the people, they thought, had been thoroughly worked upon; the former was ready to strike at a moment's notice, while the latter would support it. The wealthy classes could not be relied upon, but their number was small, and it was obvious that the Revolutionaries would not show much regard to the hoarders of wealth. The original programme of the Revolutionaries was that on a particular day the sepoys, in their respective stations, would simultaneously overwhelm the European officers and men of the Company's Army; this would be followed by a general rising of the people under the local leaders; the machinery of administration would thus be paralyzed, and a new Government established. The premature rising of the sepoys at Meerut had, however, upset their arrangements. No doubt they were able to capture Delhi, but before the reports of the outbreak could reach other important centres of the Movement, the British forces were already in motion.

Before the Telegraph Office at Delhi was captured by the Revolutionaries a short but highly alarming message had been

flashed to<sup>1</sup> Ambala ; from there the news was communicated to "all stations". The same day General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's Army, who was recouping his health in Simla, received a report of what had happened in Delhi. No time was lost in preparing for a march on the Capital. He sent immediate orders to Kasauli, Dagshai and Sabathu that the Regiments stationed there were to move down forthwith ; instructions were also sent to Ferozepur and Jullundur for precautionary measures and to Phillaur for the preparation of a siege train. Having "pressed forward the urgent measures", Anson left Simla on 14 May reaching Ambala the next morning. It took him three more days to despatch the first detachment to Delhi<sup>2</sup>.

Anson has been criticized by some writers for not acting with as much promptitude as the occasion demanded ; he was hesitant to risk an attack on the Imperial Capital. In reply to a letter from John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, in which the latter had emphasized the urgency of recovering Delhi, the Commander-in-Chief referred to the inadequacy of troops and equipment at his disposal, and then said : "It becomes now a matter for your consideration whether it would be prudent to risk the small European force we have here in an enterprise upon Delhi. I think not."<sup>3</sup> Lawrence was not convinced by Anson's arguments. Canning also held the same view ; Anson was therefore overruled and had to proceed to Delhi. As he was to begin his march he sent Hodson, escorted by a

1 The telegram sent from  
"The following just received  
lows are being burnt down by  
morning. We are off : don't re-  
went out this morning and has not  
were killed." *Mutiny Records*, VII,

2 Cf Forrest, I, 34

3 Smith, R. Bosworth, *Life of Lord*  
see Kaye and Malletson, II, 112-13.

Meerut with a message for General Hewitt.<sup>1</sup> The latter had, however, already despatched a messenger to Ambala. The two envoys met on the road between Karnal and Meerut ; "so unexpected was this meeting that at first each party took the other for 'moofsids', as we used in those days to designate the rebels ; but we soon discovered our mistake."<sup>2</sup>

### **The Sikhs support the British**

Douglas Forsyth, Deputy Commissioner of Ambala, was a friend of the Maharaja of Patiala. He met the Sikh Chief and asked him : "Are you for us or against us?" The prompt reply of the Maharaja was : "As long as I live, I am yours." It may be noted here that the attitude of the Sikh States towards the Movement was important ; if they had not preferred to cooperate and help the British, the course of the Revolution would have been entirely different. Delhi could not have been recaptured by the British if the line of communications had not been kept open in the Panjab, and this "important service" was rendered by the Phulkian Chiefs. The Revolutionary Government of Delhi had early realized the strategic importance of the territories of the Sikh States, particularly of Patiala. As early as 15 May, 1857, the Emperor had sent a *farmān* to the Maharaja of Patiala. This was followed by several others, because Delhi was fully aware of the help which the British were receiving from these Chiefs.<sup>3</sup>

The cooperation of Patiala, Jhind and other Sikh States having been secured and necessary information received from Meerut, Anson decided to proceed to Delhi. The Commander-in-Chief's plan was to assemble his army at Karnal where he arrived

1 Hodson, George H., *Twelve Years of a Soldier's life in India* (London, 1859), p. 187.

2 Mackenzie, Colonel A. R. D., *Mutiny Memoirs* (Pioneer Press, Allahabad, second edition, 1891), p. 54.

3 Forrest, I, 59 ; Roberts, *op. cit.*, I, 104. Some valuable documents of this correspondence may be seen in the Records Office of the West Pakistan Government, Lahore. *Press-list of Mutiny Papers, Punjab Secretariat* (Lahore, 1925), p. 30.

on the morning of 25 May. He hoped to enter Bāghpat on 5 June and wait there for the arrival of General Hewitt. In Karnal, however, he was stricken with cholera and died early in the morning on 27 May.<sup>1</sup> Major General Sir Henry Barnard who succeeded Anson issued an order that villages which had ill-treated the European fugitives from Delhi were to be utterly destroyed.<sup>2</sup> The Field Force left Karnal on 30 May, reaching 'Alipūr ten miles from Delhi, on 5 June ; here it waited for the arrival of the siege train.<sup>3</sup>

### **The Battle of the Hindan, 30-31 May**

The Meerut troops commanded by Brigadier Wilson had already left their cantonments for Delhi on the night of 27 May ; three days later they encamped near Ghaziuddin-nagar on the banks of the Hindan. The officers of the Revolutionary forces at Delhi decided to give them a battle before they crossed the Jamuna. Mubārak Shāh tells us that the troops wanted the Emperor to accompany them to the battle field, but the old monarch said that he was too weak to join them. Mirzā Khidr Sulṭān and Mirzā Abū Bakr were, therefore, ordered to lead the Army, which consisted of "three regiments, four horse artillery guns, one gun of a bullock battery and four hundred cavalry."<sup>4</sup> Against this the British Column was comprized of "two squadrons of the Carabineers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, Scott's light field battery, Tombs' troop of horse artillery, two 18-pounder guns, all manned by Europeans, with some native sappers and irregular horse."<sup>5</sup> The Revolu-

1 It is rather interesting to note that the "Native troops" thought that General Anson was commissioned to convert them. See Young, p. 21 n.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

3 The siege train was equipped at Phillaur and consisted of "eight eighteen-pounders, four eight-inch howitzers, twelve five-and-a-half inch mortars, and four eight-inch mortars " Kaye and Malleson, II, 141 n.

4 Folio, 53.

5 Forrest, I, 66. The Revolutionaries had a numerical superiority, but the figures given by some Western writers are highly exaggerated. Cave-Browne, for instance, says, "some 700 Europeans . . . drove ten times their own number." Vol. I, p. 313.

tionaries, though numerically superior, were handicapped by the fact that they had arrived from Delhi the same day and had no time to rest ; the British having reached the site early in the morning and not expecting "the presence of an enemy nearer to us than Delhi", passed their day "in conversation and in sleep."<sup>1</sup>

The Revolutionaries were tired, but their presence having been discovered they could not postpone fighting for long (They began by opening fire from their heavy guns, which had been placed on a small ridge on the right bank and not far from the rivulet. The British guns replied, and at the same time their rifle-men moving forward along the causeway came to close quarters with the Revolutionaries. When the battle was in full rage Mirzā Khidr Sulṭān came out of his carriage (*buggi*), mounted his horse and turned his head.<sup>2</sup> As the Revolutionaries were retreating a gallant sepoy of the 11th Regiment discharged his musket into an ammunition waggon, which cost him his life, but the explosion killed Captain Andrews with some of his followers, who were trying to capture it. "It taught us", comments Sir John Kaye, "that among the mutineers were some brave and desperate men, who were ready to court instant death for the sake of the national cause."<sup>3</sup>)

(On the following morning (31 May, 1857) the officers of the Revolutionary forces again left Delhi for another engagement. The battle was really an artillery duel which lasted for about two hours. Brigadier Wilson ordered a general advance ; the sepoys found its pressure too heavy,) "but although they felt that they could not hold their ground and continue the battle, they did not fly, shattered and broken, as on the preceding day. Having discharged into our advancing columns a tremendous shower of grapeshot, they limbered up their guns before the smoke had dispersed, and fell back in orderly array."<sup>4</sup> On both sides casualties

1 Rotton, pp. 23, 24.

2 See *supra*, pp. 141-2.

3 Kaye and Malleon, Vol. II, p. 138.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 139-40.

were rather heavy (the retreat of the Revolutionaries, however, raised the morale of the Meerut Brigade. It was joined by the Sirmur Battalion of the Gurkhas on 1 June; three days later orders were received for a march towards 'Alipūr. On 7 June Brigadier Wilson's force joined General Barnard early in the morning.) Their arrival put the entire camp into high spirits. Keith Young wrote in a letter, dated 7 June, that (no one doubts for an instant the ultimate result of the contest and ere this reaches you all confidently expect that Delhi will be in our possession, and with very little loss on our side) . . .<sup>1</sup> He was, however, soon disillusioned.

#### **The Battle of Badli ki Sarai, 8 June**

(By the end of the first week of June the British army was in a position to march on Delhi, the siege train having arrived on the 6th. Two days later was fought the Battle of Badli-ki-Sarāi. On hearing that the Meerut Brigade was moving towards 'Alipūr the Revolutionaries had decided to send a small force of Infantry, supported by five hundred horse, four heavy guns and two troops of Horse Artillery to stop the advancing British army.) They did not send a large force because they had been misled by a British spy who "disguised as a Moulvee came into Delhi and informed the soubadars and other Native officers that four hundred of the 4th Ir. Cav. then with the British would during the fight come over and join them that they must not interfere with them in any way as they were friends and easily recognizable being dressed in green Tunics and turbans and that he had been sent secretly with the information."<sup>2</sup> As the Revolutionaries were negotiating with the 4th Irregular Cavalry they were taken in by the spy and the "Rebel army marched that night taking the Moulvee with them and arrived at 'Badlee' . . . Mirza Khizhar Sooltan was distinguished by a very brilliant hand-piece which glistened, sparkled in the sun"<sup>3</sup> (They took their position in and around a *sarāi* which was

1 Young, p. 44.

2 Mubārak, ff. 58-59.

3 *Ibid.*, 1. 59.

situated a little to the right of the Grand Trunk Road from Delhi ; the ground on either side of the road was swampy, and a mile to the Western Jamna Canal, almost parallel to it for several miles. Brigadier Grant crossed the Canal and proceeding along its right bank took a position, from where he could cover the rear of the Revolutionary force ; the main column marched down the road, and to its left was the third contingent commanded by Brigadier Graves.)

(The day was just dawning when the British opened fire ; the Revolutionaries replied with firmness. "The fire of the enemy's heavy battery, aided by several light guns", says Lieutenant Norman, second Adjutant-General of the Army, "began to tell seriously, the bullock drivers of our heavy guns ran away with the cattle, and one of the waggons blew up ; our men fell fast, and the staff offering a tempting mark, two officers (Colonel Chester and Captain Russel) were killed, and several horses of the staff lost in the course of one or two minutes."<sup>2</sup> This upset the British Commander who ordered the Infantry to make a charge ; it was followed up by flanking attacks and the appearance of Graves and Grant on the right and left of the camp of the Revolutionaries.) Their officers, Mubārak Shāh tells us, "saw the four hundred Horse as described by the Moulvee and fully satisfied, allowed them to advance unmolested."<sup>3</sup> They soon realized, however, that they had been deceived by the "moulvee"; the 3rd Cavalry advanced to meet them ;

1 "The total force to be engaged in the main attack was in round numbers 170 cavalry and 1,900 infantry, with fourteen guns. That employed in the flank attack about 350 cavalry and ten guns." Norman's Narrative, *State Papers*, I, 435.

2 *Ibid.*

Cave-Browne admits that "the heavy guns of the enemy... were playing with deadly effect on the advancing column." See Vol. I, p 321. Rotton confirms this; "The practice of their artillery was excellent ; they had the range to a nicety, and their fire was rapid, and scarcely unbroken for a moment. There can be no question it was telling with deadly effect on our advance column." See p. 40.

3 Mubārak, f. 60.



both sides lost "some 200 men" in the contest, but (Mirzā Abū Bakr had fled from the field "on the pretence of bringing up magazine stores" This action of the Commander of the Revolutionaries disheartened them and "the infantry commenced retreating followed by the remaining artillery and 3rd Cavalry." The cowardice of the Prince had demoralized the Revolutionary forces; they withdrew after suffering heavy losses.) For the British, too, "it was no easy victory. Here, as on the Hindan, the rebels fought well; . . . they worked the guns with fatal accuracy"<sup>1</sup>

Despite heavy losses in the field of battle and excessive heat, Barnard decided to follow up his victory by an advance on Delhi; he feared the Revolutionaries would reassemble and occupy another strong position if they were not pursued (Half a mile below the *sarāi* near Āzādpur the road split into two branches, one leading to the city of Delhi and the other to the cantonments. The British forces were divided into two sections; Barnard led one of them on the cantonment road, the other marched towards the city under Wilson. The Sirmur Battalion of the Gurkhas was extended between the two columns. The Revolutionaries had taken position on the Ridge and posted three guns at the Flag Staff Tower. From here they opened fire, and with accuracy, on Barnard's Column, hitting the marchers right up to the bridge over a canal nearby. Barnard, however, managed to cross over to the parade ground and then proceed through the deserted houses of the officers and the sepoys in the cantonment area. When he was within a few hundred yards of the Flag Staff Tower, his men wheeled up to its right and started firing; they were supported by the Gurkhas. Wilson's Column too was not allowed to proceed unhampered;<sup>2</sup> it met with opposition at the Sabzi-Mandi. Ulti-

1 Cave-Browne, I, 321

2 On hearing of the reverse at Badli ki Sarāi the Revolutionary Government sent troops of Irregulars to reinforce its Army. They "went four *cos* beyond the Ridge," but they had no guns with them and were forced to make a retreat; their Commander, Risālahdār Mubārak Khān, was slightly injured. See Mubārak, f. 62.

mately it succeeded in mounting the Ridge at the southern end.) The losses of the Revolutionaries were no doubt heavier than those of the British,<sup>1</sup> but far more disheartening for them was the fact that the enemy now held the road to the Panjab and the north-west.<sup>2</sup> Delhi was thus cut off from one of the strategically most vital regions of the subcontinent. As the Revolutionaries had no navy and could not capture or exercise control over the sea ports, their only means of communications were the land routes that passed through the Panjab ; these were now held by their enemy.

### The Siege begins

The British forces encamped below the Ridge in the parade ground, and "seldom has a finer position been occupied by a British Army"<sup>3</sup> In the rear of their camp ran the Najafgarh Jhil Canal which, though ordinarily dry during the summer months, was full of pure and wholesome water because of plentiful rains in 1856 "It is scarcely possible" remarked Colonel Baird Smith, "to over-estimate the value of such a provision both to the health and comfort of the troops, for without it the river, two miles distant, or the wells in Cantonment, all brackish and bad, must have been the sole sources of water supply for man and beast . . . the Jhil canal was not merely a good defensible line for military operations, but a precious addition to the comfort and salubrity of the camp."<sup>4</sup>

In front of the camp was the famous Ridge which extended from the Jamunā for about two miles and was roughly speaking

1 Some writers have put the losses of the Revolutionaries at a thousand ; perhaps Kaye is nearer the truth, when he says that "the loss of the enemy is computed at three hundred and fifty men." See Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 145.

2 The authorities of the Revolutionary Government were convinced that the main cause of their defeat was the treachery of the "moulvi" who had acted as a British spy; he had been kept as a closely guarded prisoner, and now that his guilt was proved, he was put to death. Mubarak, f. 62.

3 Kaye and Malleon, II, 386.

4 MS. Memoir quoted in Kaye and Malleon, II, pp. 387-88 n.

sixty feet higher than the level of the city. Along the Ridge stood four buildings at some intervals—The Flag Staff Tower, an old mosque, an observatory, and, near the extreme south-western edge, a Maratha chief's country residence, known as Hindu Rao's House. In all these buildings pickets were established. To the right of his camp, Barnard threw a heavy battery near the end of the Ridge. Not far from it was the Sabzi-Mandi, a suburb of Delhi, which could provide a cover to the Revolutionary forces if they chose, as they frequently did, to attack the British camp from that side. Further down and facing the surrounding wall of Shāhjahān's Capital stood the *'Idgāh* and then came the suburbs of Kiṣhanganj and Pahāripūr. In the wide space between the Ridge and the city there were a number of buildings and gardens; Metcalfe House and Ludlow Castle were important for both parties. Delhi's main strength was its surrounding wall, nearly seven miles in circumference, with a ditch below its base. To the east of the town flows the Jamunā, and a bridge of boats connected the Capital with the regions across the river. The city wall was pierced by several Gates where strong guards had been posted with guns at "commanding points". The area surrounding the Kashmir Gate became the chief battle-ground of the siege because it faced the British camp.

### Early skirmishes

The Revolutionaries had by now realized that they would have to fight a full-fledged war, and that first stage was the defence of Delhi; this was a hard task because the entire resources of the Sikh States besides their own forces in the Panjab and the north-west were at the disposal of the British. (The Revolutionary officers decided to take the offensive, and on the afternoon of 9 June they came out of the Lahore Gate and attacked Hindu Rao's House where the British had established their main picket. Unfortunately for the Revolutionaries their enemy had been greatly reinforced the same morning by the arrival of the Guides consisting of three troops of Cavalry and six Companies of In-

fantry. They were immediately sent to support the picket. A contested action followed resulting in the withdrawal of the Revolutionaries,) who probably had no information about the arrival of British reinforcements. In the action the British lost Battye, Commandant of the Guides Cavalry.

(On the following day the Revolutionaries again marched out of the Ajmer Gate ; Major Reid, commanding the Gurkhas, met them. The Revolutionaries did not fire at their countrymen and cried out : "We expect the Gurkhas to join us ; we won't fire". Promptly came the taunting reply : "Oh yes, we are now coming to join you." They were allowed to come within twenty paces of the Revolutionaries ; from here "they gave a well-directed volley, killing between twenty and thirty, and followed them up until fired on by the batteries of the Ajmer Gate.)"<sup>1</sup> Jiwan Lal in his account of the fighting on this date says that the Revolutionaries were commanded by Samad Khān and that "about 100 English were killed."<sup>2</sup> The next day (11 June) another attempt was made by the Revolutionaries to capture Hindu Rao's House, but the Gurkhas resisted their advance and forced them to withdraw. For three days successively they attacked the right flank of the enemy, but they did not achieve much success ; they were, however, not deterred by discouraging factors. (Early in the morning of the 12th they launched an attack on the left flank of the enemy. Taking advantage of the undulating ground and successfully using the trees as a cover they got on to the Ridge and surprised the Flag-Staff picket. "In consequence of this", Rotton says, "the enemy advanced a little too near the guns without being observed ; . . . The rebels evinced more than ordinary daring, coming up in spite of the steady resistance made against them by the picquet : . . ."<sup>3</sup>

The bullets of the Revolutionaries, some of whom marched right up to the lines hit the men in the British camp ;

1 *State Papers*, I, p. 294; Zakā-Allāh, p. 580.

2 *T.N.N.*, pp. 118-19.

3 Rotton, p. 68.

three of them were killed). Captain Knox of the 75th Foot tried to resist their advance, but he was shot dead by a sepoy; a number of men belonging to the same Regiment also fell with him. After a determined fight lasting for nearly two hours and a half the Revolutionaries were obliged to withdraw, but "they had inflicted some severe losses on our side."<sup>2</sup> (An officer engaged in the struggle "found the Flag Staff full of our wounded men, and numbers lying round the open face in front. I am told, that out of the few who held the position, no less than forty-five men and two officers were killed and wounded—nearly all of the 75th and Europeans). . ."<sup>3</sup>

#### Attack on the Metcalfe House

The losses in the last engagement alerted the British Commander, and to lessen the possibility of a recurrence of surprise attacks it was decided to occupy the Metcalfe House, "that estate, on which the late Sir Theophilus Metcalfe had so lavishly displayed his taste."<sup>4</sup> The building originally stood in a large garden covering about 1000 acres. It had been plundered and burnt by the Gujars under the zamindar of Chandraul, but its walls still provided a good site for a battery, which the Revolutionaries had established. Its strategic importance was fully realized by the British, and the possibility of wresting it from the Revolutionaries was discussed on 11 June; but it was thought that "with so weak a force, the risk would be too great." Nevertheless, in consequence of the retreat of the Revolutionaries on 12 June it fell into British hands and a strong picket was established.

The combats of the first five days had been very encouraging from the point of view of the besiegers, but it was after much hesitation that the General agreed "to take Delhi" by a *coup de main*. A plan was made to blow up two Gates of the city and then

1 Zakā-Allāh, p. 581.

2 Rotton, p. 68.

3 Ball, I, 463.

4 Cave-Browne, I, 331.

force an entry before dawn on 13 June. But at the last moment, Barnard abandoned the plan because, it has been stated, he was told by one of his officers : "You may certainly take the city by surprise, but whether you are strong enough to hold it is another matter."<sup>1</sup>

### Role of the spies

It was now obvious that the siege of Delhi would be a long affair ; steps were therefore taken by the British Commander to strengthen his position. Besides new batteries and pickets, a very efficient and extensive system of espionage was established under Hodson. He contacted an acquaintance, Mawlawi Rajab 'Ali, who had served as the confidential *Mir Munshi* of Henry Lawrence. The *mawlawi* agreed to offer his services, and "with a fidelity and zeal which it is impossible to over-estimate in that crisis, did this man, rigid Mohammedan though he was, daily forward from the very heart of the city—in a quill, a chupattee, a sole of a shoe, the fold of a turban, or the matted hair of a Sikh—anywhere or anyhow, so as to escape detection—a slip of paper containing the news of all that was passing in the city which it behoved us to know ; and so great was his tact that not a shadow of a suspicion rested upon him.) Like the two ends of an electric wire were Rujjub Ali in the city and Hodson in camp ; through them passed daily the most authentic intelligence of the rebel plans and movements."<sup>2</sup> Besides Rajab 'Ali there were other spies who sent information to the British camp ; Chunna Mal was richly rewarded

1 Forrest, I, 86-87 ; Cave-Browne, I, 335-36. Hodson, one of the officers who were asked to draw the plan of assault, writes under 13 June : "I am very vexed, though the General is most kind and considerate in trying to soothe my disappointment—too kind, indeed, or he would not so readily have pardoned those whose fault it is that we are still outside Delhi." See Hodson, p 204.

Keith Young thought otherwise. "Most fortunate, I think", he wrote in his diary, "that we did not attack, for failure would have been death—and success was not a quite certain ; . . ." See p. 9.

2 Cave-Browne, I, 339-40.

for espionage after the re-establishment of British rule.<sup>1</sup> Gauri Shankar<sup>2</sup> was another spy; some of his letters were recovered from the Red Fort when it fell to the British; women were also engaged.<sup>3</sup> In some cases even the officers of the Revolutionary Government were in the pay of the enemy.<sup>4</sup> Subsequently the intelligence service was further strengthened and organized by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, and William Muir was put in charge of it.<sup>5</sup>

The Revolutionaries also had their spies but their system did not work as efficiently as that of the British. It is difficult to over-emphasize the advantage of successful espionage during the entire course of the War of Independence, and there can be no doubt that one of the main causes of British successes in Delhi was that they received detailed and correct information of the resources and activities of its defenders, while the Revolutionaries in most cases built their plans on the basis of faulty information. "The fact was", Mubārak Shāh remarks, "that the Rebel Army possessed no really trustworthy information as to the number and position of the British troops—nor had they a [?] spy on whose words they could rely."<sup>6</sup> From the outset the Hindus of Delhi, particularly the wealthier among them, were lukewarm in their support of the Revolution. In a letter, dated 14 June, Keith Young wrote that "news of a reliable nature came in yesterday to Greathed to the effect that the Hindoos were becoming quite disgusted, finding they were being made complete dupes by the Mahomedans who wish to make a religious war of it."<sup>7</sup> Nor was the attitude of the Hindu Princes of the neighbouring States encouraging. To

1 Nizāmī, Khwajah Hasan. *Delhi ki Sazā*, pp. 49-50.

2 See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, pp. 3-8.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 177, No. 73.

4 *T N N*, pp. 63, 67, 112 and 114.

5 For details of the working of this system see Muir, Sir William, *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 16, *et seq.*

6 Mubārak ff 67-68.

7 Young, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

the Emperor's letters inviting them to join the Revolution, the Raja of Gwalior said ; "When you are really King I will come to your assistance", The Raja of Dholpur wanted to put the messenger to death, and the ruler of Bharatpur said : "He was always disloyal to Delhi, and would remain so." These facts were reported to the British camp by a spy on 15 June.<sup>1</sup>

Another handicap was that they had very few good military leaders. (The Indian officers who served in the Company's army were not promoted to higher commands ; they were good soldiers and fought with courage and determination, but they had no experience of directing operations in a major war. Now, under the Revolutionary Government they were raised over-night to the highest positions and entrusted with responsibilities which they were unable to discharge.) Worse was the case of the *Mujāhids* or volunteers who joined the War as a sacred cause ; they had never received a systematic training in fighting, nor did the Revolutionary officers get an opportunity of teaching them the methods of war.

Nevertheless, in spite of these and some other handicaps the Revolutionaries fought a long war, lasting more than four months, to defend the Capital of their new Government. Of the large number of actions, ranging from mere skirmishes to full scale battles, that were fought during the course of this siege, brief references may be made to the most important ones.

### **The British capture 'Idgah, 17 June**

On 17 June the Revolutionaries were seen constructing a battery on a knoll near the 'Idgāh. If this had been completed it would have become easy for them to enfilade the British position on the Ridge. Two Columns were therefore immediately sent by the British to seize the unfinished battery ;<sup>2</sup> the Revolutionaries retreated but

1 Young, p. 63.

2 For an account of this action by Major Reid who led the 2nd Column, see *State Papers*, I, 300-01.



not without offering resistance. Evidently they were not prepared for a major attack by the enemy.

### **The Revolutionaries score a victory, 19 June**

Two days later (on the afternoon of 19 June, the Revolutionaries came out from the Lahore Gate ; they seemed to threaten the enemy position on the Ridge, but a large number of them had managed to march through the gardens and suburbs and reach the rear of the British camp.) As the English had received through their spies full information about the plan of the Revolutionaries, they were not unprepared for the attack (Brigadier Grant came out with twelve guns and a Cavalry force to meet them. The guns of the Revolutionaries poured forth quick and well-directed fire and their infantry "shot down our artillerymen and horses". As darkness grew the pressure of the attack became heavier and "they very nearly succeeded in turning our flank." At about half past eight o'clock the British were obliged to return to their camp after losing three officers and seventeen men.) Among the seven wounded officers was Brigadier Grant. His horse was shot in the action and he could not have escaped alive if a Muslim *sawār*, Rūpar *Kh*in, had not dragged him out of the crowd.<sup>1</sup> (The Revolutionaries had scored their first victory, and "much disquieted by the day's operations were the besiegers." They had attacked the weakest, though a vital, point of the British camp. If they had taken full advantage of their victory and established themselves at this point of vantage "our communications would be cut off with the Panjab : our small force would be invested ; and without supplies and reinforcements, it would be impossible . . . to hold our own.")

1 Brigadier Grant to Major J. Waterfield, 22 June, 1857, *State Papers*, I, 303.

2 *Forrest*, I, 92

According to Rotton "melancholy impression on most men's minds in camp" was due to "the enemy's significant mode of intimating to us the plan he intended to pursue in future. . . his eyes were open to the advantage he might gain over us, if he only harassed us in the rear." See p. 92.

An idea of the significance of this victory for the Revolutionaries can be formed from the reaction it had on a staunch ally of the British like the Maharaja of Patiala.<sup>1</sup> Edward Hare, referring to "the many chances against us which we escaped", relates the story of Barne's meeting with the Patiala Chief after the latter had received a letter from Bahādur Shāh who had mentioned the victory of 19 June and told the Raja that if he "did not instantly desert us and join him, he would be destroyed also" In his reply to a question from the perturbed Maharaja about the possibility of the survival of British Government, Commissioner Barnes tried to convince him that, "we are in a difficulty just now; but we have ship loads of troops coming from England who will soon crush the mutinous sepoys." The Maharaja remained loyal to the British and was profusely rewarded by them after the collapse of the Revolution. Later, it was discovered that the Maharaja had been playing a game of duplicity. "A letter, too", Hare adds, "from the Raja was found promising to join the King"<sup>2</sup>

(The retreat of the Revolutionary forces, despite the favourable results of the day's fighting, had become inevitable because of the treachery of Aḥsan-Allāh Khān. Mubārak Shāh says that the Revolutionaries had run short of ammunition, and the Ḥakīm "purposely delayed sending further supplies. The result was that the Naseerabad troops were forced to retire and re-entered the city. Had they received it, they would very probably have advanced their batteries and fighting with still greater ferocity, have cut their way into the British lines."<sup>3</sup> However, a great opportunity was lost. The march of the Naṣirābād troops for an attack on the enemy had raised great hopes in the minds of the people; their officers had received the Emperor's blessings before leaving

1 Sir John Kaye's comments on the battle are significant: "Night fell upon a drawn battle, of which no one could count the issues, and as our officers met together in their mess tents, with not very cheerful countenances, they saw the camp fires of the enemy blazing up in their rear. We had sustained some severe losses." Kaye and Malleeson, Vol. II, p. 415.

2 Hare, Edward, *Memoirs* (London, 1900), pp. 109-11.

3 Mubārak, f. 74.

the city, but, they had been unfortunate in one respect (their officers had quarrelled with those of other Regiments; consequently they did not receive cooperation from other troops). Even without this cooperation they had fought well, and could have achieved their object if they had received the necessary supplies of ammunition.

### **The Battle of 23 June**

It was reported by the British spies that the next attack would be launched by the Revolutionaries on the centenary of the Battle of Plassey (June 23). (For some time the idea had become popular that British Raj would come to an end on that date, and the Revolutionary leaders had taken full advantage of this : the civilian and the soldier alike believed that 23 June would be a grand day in the history of the struggle. Their hopes must have risen considerably and the superstitious belief about 23 June almost confirmed by the arrival of three Regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry from Jullundur and Phillaur on the 21st.<sup>2</sup> The plan of the attack was the same as that of the 19th ; the newly arrived troops from Jullundur were to play the role which the Naṣirābād Brigade had played on the previous occasion ; however, they met with no better luck. The British, having learnt of their plans from the spies, demolished the bridges on the Najafgarh drain by which the Revolutionaries intended to cross with their guns, this was done on the night of 22 June. The troops of the Revolutionaries, unaware of this demolition of bridges, could not proceed much further than Sabzī-

1 *T.N.N.*, p. 124. It is of some interest to note that besides the treachery of Ahsan Allāh Khān a split between the Naṣirābād troops and other Regiments also contributed to the failure of the Revolutionaries. Cave-Browne reports this incident in these words : (Had simultaneous attack been made in front, the result would probably have been still more serious. Such was their original plan, but there was split between the old and new mutineers. The newly arrived Nussarabad men taunted the older portion of the rebel force with cowardice for not having long before cleared the ridge ; so now they were left to fight alone, the other brigades refusing to attack the batteries while they were pressing on the rear.) See Vol. I, pp. 346-47.

2 Cave Browne, I, 349; *T.N.N.*, p. 125.

Mandi. Nevertheless they attacked the position held by Major Reid who wrote that "no men could have fought better," and "at one time I thought I must have lost the day." It was at this time that reinforcements under Major Olpherts arrived and added considerably to the strength and morale of British forces. The Revolutionaries continued the fight but were ultimately forced to make a retreat.)

The British had won a victory, but the price paid for it was heavy. Commenting on this battle, Sir John Kaye ruefully remarks that "it was one of those victories of which a few more repetitions would have turned our position into a graveyard, on which the enemy might have quietly encamped"<sup>2</sup> Keith Young corroborates these remarks by an entry in his diary on 23 June: "Fighting all day almost on our right to try and take some guns of the enemy; we lost many men, and all faces very long about it. Not much generalship, I fear."<sup>3</sup> (However, the Sabzi-Mandi was gained and an advanced battery was set up at the Sammy House; this gave the British control over the Grand Trunk Road. The losses of the Revolutionaries were undoubtedly heavy. They had lost Sabzi-Mandi, a place of considerable strategic importance, and their casualties, particularly among the Jullundur troops, were pretty large.) More than this, (the prophecies about the collapse of British power on the centenary of Plassey had not come out true. According to the reports received in the British camp on the morning of 24 June from their spies in Delhi, the Revolutionaries were "most disheartened at the result of their attack.") Evidently these reports were

1 Keith Young definitely says that "they were met by Olpherts' force and soon driven back." See p. 78. He also mentions "so many casualties yesterday", p. 80.

Hodson is more frank when he tells us that "the fight of the 23rd was a much more severe one than was reported... and our loss was the heaviest we have yet had to deplore since we got here on the 8th." See Hodson, p. 221.

2 Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 418.

3 Young, p. 79.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 80.

not free from exaggeration. The Revolutionaries had done so much that they could not launch an attack on the rear of the British camp to cut off their line of communication with the Panjab, from where incessant supplies and reinforcements were pouring in, but they had failed to achieve their objective. The strength of the Delhi Field Force had now reached 6,600; the new Adjutant General of the Army, General Chamberlain, arrived on 24 June. "It is to be hoped he will be able to instil a little more energy and decision into our councils."<sup>1</sup>

Both parties had suffered heavy losses in the battle of 23 June; each was now convinced of the stiff determination and great potentialities of the other. The last week of June was a period of lull in the War; nevertheless, it was important because the belligerents were busy taking important decisions and making preparations for a decisive struggle. The besieged were receiving reinforcements and again considering the possibility of a *coup de main*; the Revolutionaries were waiting for the arrival of the Bareilly Brigade under Bakht Khān. An important step taken by them was to adopt measures to counteract the advantages which the enemy hoped to secure by setting up an advanced picket in Sabzi-Mandi. "The mutineers," records Mubārak "on seeing this adopted the same course and sent two guns to the Teleewara supported by an infantry regiment and constructed batteries on right and left with an entire regiment of each."<sup>2</sup>

### Petty skirmishes

The Revolutionaries were however not inactive; not a day would pass without the British troops having to come out to meet a rear or a threatened attack. On 27th June early in the morning the Revolutionaries advanced against the British picket at the Metcalf House. This was followed by another against the pickets in the Sabzi-Mandi area. Though not a major battle, the action lasted

<sup>1</sup> Young, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> FF 75-76

the whole day ;<sup>1</sup> nor was it insignificant. Hodson who took part in the contest speaks of it in these words : "We were turned out before I had hardly turned in, by another attack of the rebels. This time a faint one, . . . For a short time, however, the cannonade was very heavy, and I have seldom been under a hotter fire than for about three quarters of an hour at our most advanced battery, covered every moment with showers or rather clouds of dust, stones, and splinters ; but we kept close and no one was hurt "<sup>2</sup>

The clash of 27 June brings the story of the War to the end of the first round. Its results were by no means decisive ; both parties had, however, learnt some lessons from the actions that had been fought. They now decided to wait for reinforcements and improve their respective positions. During the last week of June the British forces were considerably strengthened by fresh arrivals from the various stations ; arrangements were also made to send the sick and the wounded to Ambala.<sup>3</sup> In the Revolutionary camp reports had been received that Bakht Khān's (Bareilly) Brigade which was soon to attain great distinction in the War was quite near. As early as 24 June the Brigade had reached Garhmukteshar and was preparing to cross the Ganges on their way to Delhi.<sup>4</sup> The Revolutionary Government was anxiously waiting for their arrival. The second day of July found them in Capital.<sup>5</sup>

1 *T.N.N.*, p. 128.

2 Hodson, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-20.

3 For details of reinforcements see Norman's Narrative, in *State Papers*, I, 448.

4 Young, pp. 81-82.

5 *T.N.N.*, pp 133-34; also see Young, p. 100.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE DEFENCE OF DELHI (II)

#### Bakht Khan and the Bareilly Brigade leave for Delhi, 13 June

(Muhammad Bakhsh,<sup>1</sup> more famous as General Bakht Khān, raised the *Green Standard* at Bareilly on the morning of 31 May.) An Artillery officer in the Company's Army, he joined the struggle for freedom at an early stage and in course of time became one of the most eminent leaders of the Movement. His sincerity and devotion, his perseverance and sense of discipline and, above all, his love for *jihād* and readiness to sacrifice even his life in the sacred cause make of him a hero indeed.

The Revolutionaries of Bareilly took a prompt decision about going to Delhi in response to an appeal from the Capital.<sup>3</sup> They had, however, to wait for a few days because the Revolutionaries

1 We have no authentic information about the origin and early life of Bakht Khān. It is, however, beyond doubt that he was a Ruhilah and belonged to a Pathan family of Sulṭānpūr. It is difficult to accept Jivan Lal's version that "the General pointed that he was the descendant of the same family as the king of Delhi, and asked the king to satisfy himself that this was true" *T. N. N.*, p. 134. Zakā Allāh also mentions this but in a derisive manner, which shows that he did not believe it to be a fact. See p. 681.

Bakht Khān had joined the Company's service and risen to the position of an Artillery Subahdar. He had fought for the British in the First Afghan War and was with General Sale at Jalālābād. After this War he was posted at Neemuch and subsequently at Bareilly where he joined the Revolution. Mubārak Shāh mentions an interview of the Kotwal with Bakht Khān. He charged the Kotwal with having served the British. In reply the Kotwal said: "Your Excellency was a Subadar receiving Rs. 80/- a month and have been 40 or 45 years a servant of the British". Mubārak, f. 86. Also see Kaye and Malletson, III, 203, n. Ricketts, quoted by Metcalfe in *T. N. N.*, p. 133 N.

2 Kanhayya Lal, p. 290.

3 Kanhayya Lal reproduces the translation of a letter which was intercepted

from Shahjahanpur and some other places wanted to join them. Bakht Khān, in the meanwhile, helped Khān Bāhādūr Khān a descendant of the famous Ruhilah chief, Hāfiẓ Rahmat Khān in establishing his authority in Rohilkhand and setting up a machinery of Government. But on hearing that Nawāb Yūsuf 'Alī Khān, the Ruler of Rampur, who was loyal to the British, had seized Moradabad, Bakht Khān decided to leave Bareilly without delay. Mawlawī Sarfarāz 'Alī who later became known as the *Amir ul-Mujāhidīn* accompanied him and was the spiritual leader of the Army; Resūldar Muhammad Shāfi<sup>1</sup> was also with him. The Revolutionaries requested Yūsuf 'Alī to join the War of Independence or at least allow his forces to do so. He did neither, but to placate the Revolutionaries he gave them a few thousand rupees and some provisions as his contribution. On 13 June the Bareilly Brigade, as these forces were called, left for Moradabad.<sup>2</sup> After staying there for four days and placing the town in the hands of the local Revolutionary leaders, Bakht Khān resumed his march on 17 June. At Garhmuktesar the Brigade took four days to cross the Ganges because the bridge had been destroyed by the British;<sup>3</sup> on the last day of the month it reached the left bank of the Jamunā. A messenger had already been sent to inform the authorities at Delhi of the Brigade's programme of entering the Capital. Bakht Khān carried with him the keys of the Bareilly jail, perhaps as an evidence of their loyalty.<sup>4</sup> The bridge on the Jamunā needed some repairs which were promptly carried out under the orders of the Emperor. Bahādūr Shāh was so keenly interested in the arrival of the Brigade that he "examined the Bareilly forces across the river through a telescope, and remarked upon the elephants and Cavalry,"

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at Singhapur. It contained a message from Delhi in these words: 'If you are coming to our help then you should take your meals there and wash your hands here.' *Ibid*, p. 292.

1 He played an important role in the defence of Delhi.

2 Najm al-Ghanī, *Tārīkh-i Awadh*, (Lucknow, 1919). p. 552.

3 See *Kaye's Papers*, Home Miscellany, I. O., vol. 727, p. 758.

4 Mubārak, f. 78.



When it entered Delhi, the Brigade was comprised of four Regiments of Infantry, one of Cavalry, horse battery and two post guns,<sup>1</sup> besides three to four thousand *Ghāzls*.<sup>2</sup> An attempt had been made by the British to blow up the bridge. A barrel was filled up with gun-powder and floated down the river; it was so timed as to explode and destroy the bridge when the Brigade would be crossing it. The boatmen, however, saw the barrel and brought it to Prince *Khidr Sultān* who gave five rupees to each of them as a reward.<sup>3</sup>

(On entering the city early in the morning of 2 July, the Brigade was received by Nawāb Ahmad Qulī *Khān* on behalf of the Emperor. It was allowed to encamp outside the Delhi Gate in the plain near the Jail.) The new-comers were so full of enthusiasm for *jihād* that they wanted to attack and capture the Ridge immediately after crossing the river, even before being presented to the Emperor. This however was not practicable.

#### **Bakht Khan appointed Commander-in-Chief**

*Bakht Khān* was granted an interview by the Emperor the same day. He offered his services as Commander-in-Chief and promised to enforce discipline which, the Emperor had complained, was fast deteriorating. Bahādur *Shāh* was deeply touched by *Bakht Khān*'s offer and grasped his hands in token of friendship. *Bakht Khān* returned to the troops and announced his appointment; the officers swore allegiance to him. Later the Emperor called him to private audience, and a proclamation was issued that

1 Forrest, I, ff. 96-97; also see Kedar Nath's *Journal* in *Memoirs*, p. 46

2 Mubarak, f. 79.

3 *Ibid.*, f. 83.

4 It is rather interesting to note that *Bakht Khān* had brought with him a European sergeant who had accepted Islam and was given the name of 'Abd-Allāh besides 'two or three Christians, halfcastes of the poorest class. Mr. John Powell, son of Mr. Powell of Shahjahanpore was also with them but under surveillance." Mubarak, ff. 84-85. This is confirmed by Forbes-Mitchell, pp. 281-82. Zakā-Allāh, perhaps on the authority of Jiwan Lal, mentions two European sergeants who were introduced to the Emperor by *Bakht Khān* as expert gunners. See, p. 681; also see T. N. N., p. 137.

all officers were to receive instructions from Bakht Khān. Mirzā Muḡhul was appointed Adjutant-General.<sup>1</sup>

The new Commander-in-Chief lost no time in making necessary arrangements for an offensive; he inspected the magazine and stores and held a levee of the leading citizens of Delhi. At about 8 o'clock in the night he went to the Emperor and had a long consultation; Queen Zinat Maḡal, Aḡsan Allāh Khān and Aḡmad Qulī Khān were also present.<sup>2</sup> Mubārak Shāh's account is slightly differs in details. He says that Bakht Khān was appointed Commander-in-Chief in this second meeting in the night and at that time he had Muḡammad Shafī with him Bakht Khān had told the Emperor that if he would appoint him Commander-in-Chief, "I will on my part appoint Mahomed Shufee General and Imdad Ali Captain and your Highness will confirm them in these posts." The Emperor had agreed. Soon after this, Mawlawī Sarfarāz 'Alī also came in; he offered himself to be appointed *Wazīr*: "Your Highness, I see no one here deserving of being taken into your confidence and council. If you consider it expedient nominate me as '*Wazīr*'. After that you will have no anxiety or trouble."<sup>3</sup> Bahādur Shāh,

1 Zakā-Allāh and Zāhir Dihlawī speak of Bakht Khān's rude behaviour. Ḥakīm Aḡsan-Allāh is also not too happy with him. He complains that "contrary to etiquette he did not make his obeisance at the *Red Purdah*, nor did his companions, . . . when he came near the King's Chair in the *Diwan Khās*, he salaamed as though to an equal, and merely taking his sword from his side, presented it to the King." *Memoirs*, p. 16; Zahir, pp. 140-141; Zakā-Allāh p. 681.

2 T. N. N., p. 134.

The appointment of Bakht Khān to the supreme command of the forces was not accepted by the Princes, particularly Mirzā Muḡhul, without reservation. From the outset therefore the relations of Bakht Khān and Mirzā Muḡhul became strained, and throughout the defence of Delhi the Princes and their supporters tried to sabotage Bakht Khān's efforts.

Aḡsan-Allāh Khān gives a garbled version of Bakht Khān's interview with the Emperor. He says, for instance, that the General did not offer *nadhīr*; this is contradicted by Mubārak Shāh. See *Memoirs*, p. 16; Mubārak, f. 85.

3 Mubārak, f. 90; *Memoirs*, pp. 16, 17.

who had offered him a seat in the council "because he was a high moulvee", put off the matter saying : "We shall see." In any case Mawlawi Sarfarāz 'Alī with Bakht Khān and Mawlawi Faql i Haqq formed the "King's Council."<sup>1</sup>

In the British camp the arrival of reinforcements again raised the question of a *coup de main*. A scheme was drawn up, according to which two Columns would force entry through Kabul and Kashmir Gates and a third would scale the walls. On 3 July, however, reports were received that Bakht Khān intended to launch an attack on the British positions, and at the last moment the project of the assault had to be abandoned. The Chief Engineer regretted this decision, but there were others who thought that it was not an unwise step.<sup>2</sup>

#### Attack on Alipur, 3 July

(On the afternoon of 3 July the Revolutionaries marched out of the city and advanced towards 'Alipūr; here they met and drove away Younghusband who commanded a party of the 5th Panjab Cavalry.<sup>3</sup> Their object was to intercept the 200 carts of provisions, coming from Patiala,<sup>4</sup> but they could capture and bring to the city only two.<sup>5</sup> On their return march to Delhi they were attacked early in the morning (4 July) by a British force. Major Coke who

1 Mubārak f. 96.

2 *State Papers*, I, 448-49.

3 Young, p. 106 and note.

Referring to this defeat, Major-General Reeds wrote to John Lawrence : Younghusband . . . put his sowars into and about a serai there and waited till the enemy came up . . . the consequence was that although he killed six of the insurgents he lost two of his men and all their luggage . . . having of course to retire when the guns opened. *Kave's Papers*, Vol. 726, pp. 337-38.

4 *T N N*, p. 137

5 *Ibid*, p. 138.

Keith Young wrote to his wife on 5 July : "it is supposed that the enemy went to Aleepore in the expectation of finding the 17th Irregulars there with treasure, . . . but Lieutenant Hockin . . . had been warned from here to halt at Lussowlie, which he did, . . ." See p. 106.

led this attack says : "after a few rounds from their guns, they carried them off in the direction of the city before we could get up to them." While Coke's men were resting under the trees on the bank of the canal the Revolutionaries again attacked them. In the end they retreated but not as a defeated party. } "Major Coke was ... severely criticized for the comparative failure of the action."<sup>1</sup>

If Coke had failed to achieve his object, the Revolutionaries had not succeeded either. It appears that internal differences were again the main cause of their failure. It was for this reason that on the following day Mawlawī Sarfarāz 'Alī and Munshī Khayrāt 'Alī begged the Emperor to confer the title of Governor on Bakht Khān, "for the whole army would not obey him till this title was conferred..." The Emperor agreed and orders were issued "to the effect that the Khān alone was to command and that the Prince had nothing to say to the army."<sup>2</sup> This arrangement could not work successfully because the Princes were not prepared to recognize any authority other than their own. } Mirza Mogul and Mirza Khizhar Sooltan who had for some time regarded the empire as virtually their own", writes Mubārak Shāh, "and ever since the arrival of the Bareilly Brigade had considered themselves masters of Hindostan, were greatly displeased at Bukht Khan and Moulvee Sarfaraz Ali having thus interviewed the King... They conspired with the officers of the regiments which had been first in Delhi . . Throughout the period of the defence of the Capital the Princes followed a policy of undermining Bakht Khān's authority and placing obstacles in his way ; these dissensions proved suicidal to the national cause.<sup>3</sup> The Emperor knew that the Princes were incompetent and unworthy of the responsibilities of leadership. He, therefore, supported Bakht Khān and his colleagues.<sup>4</sup> It was

1 Forrest, I, 100.

2 *Memoirs*, p. 18.

3 See *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 378, where Mirza Muḥḥul is mentioned as C-in-C.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 411.

very late, indeed too late, when Mirza Mughul realized the need of cooperating with Bakht Khān !<sup>1</sup>

On 5 July, Sir Henry Barnard died and was succeeded by General Reed. He ordered the bridges on the Najafgarh Jhil Canal to be blown up except one which was retained for the use of his own forces. This Canal running almost parallel to the main road was like a natural ditch guarding the British camp. An aqueduct from which the people of Delhi got their supply of water was also destroyed. "Another piece of engineering work," writes Cave-Browne, "was achieved about the same time. One of the greatest monuments of a bygone Mohammedan period is a gigantic aqueduct, by which water was brought a distance of many miles into the heart of the city. It crosses the canal by a bridge known as the *Pool-Chuddur*; by which horsemen were enabled to pass to our rear. This was also blown up, and a double end thereby gained; the passage of the horsemen obstructed and the water cut off from the city; . . ."<sup>2</sup> The destruction of the bridges was considered necessary because the attack on 'Alipūr had given an indication of the changed strategy of the defenders. Instead of attacking the pickets and batteries of the enemy they now seemed to have decided upon attacking the rear of the enemy and cutting off his supply

**The Revolutionaries score a victory, 9 July**

(The task of launching these attacks was entrusted to Risālah-dār Muḥammad Shafī' and Imdād 'Alī of the Bareilly Brigade.<sup>3</sup> On the morning of 9 July at about ten o'clock these officers moved out of the city and proceeded to attack the advanced pickets on the right of the British Camp. Here a battery of three 18-pounders was set on a mound not far from the camp; below the mound on the low ground was a picket of two horse Artillery guns and further to the right another had been set up with the 9th

1 *Ibid*, p. 353, No. 73 (a).

2 Vol II, p. 14

3 Mubārak, ff. 100-01.

Irregulars at a *faqir's* enclosure.) Muḥammad Shafī' attacked this position ; he had taken good care to lessen the chances of attracting the enemy's attention, "their dress being the same as that of the 9th Irregulars, from which corps the *fakir's* picquet was taken."<sup>1</sup>

In this action several hand-to-hand encounters were fought ; among these Imdād 'Alī's combat with Lieutenant Hills is interesting. Hills himself gives an account of the incident : "I went, however, at the fellow, and cut him on the shoulder ; but some 'kupra' (cloth) on it apparently turned the blow. He managed to seize the hilt of my sword, and twisted it out of my hand ; and then we had a hand-to-hand fight, I punching his head with my fists, and he trying to cut me, but I was too close to him. Somehow or other I fell, and then was the time, fortunately for me, that Tombs came up and shot the fellow."<sup>2</sup> This was not the end of the combat ; Imdād 'Alī had not been killed by Tombs, he had only shammed dead. Imdād 'Alī's men started looting, which created confusion, and he could not achieve the object of his attack. On returning to his camp he told his men : "if the sowars had not commenced looting the heights were as good as won but what could be done when troops will not obey orders ?"<sup>3</sup> Besides

1 Norman's Narrative in *State Papers*, I, 452

2 Hill's account was published in the *Times*; it has been reproduced by Cave-Browne, II, pp. 18-20.

It may be noted that Hill is not correct in saying that the man whom Tombs killed by "cutting him on the left wrist" was not the same whose attack had made him "somehow or other" fall. Sir John Kaye has discussed this point in detail; he is supported by Mubārak ḡhāh. See Kaye and Malleison, II, pp. 436-37, n.

3 Mubārak, f. 101. Imdād 'Alī's remarks were not empty words of boast. In the beginning the Revolutionaries had fared exceptionally well. Keith Young's comments on this affair are : "I am sorry to say that it is an undoubted fact that the picket of the Carabineers and the 9th Irregular Cavalry disgracefully fled, though they were called upon by Tombs to charge the enemy—which they were quite strong enough to do, . . . they all ran helter-skelter into camp, some of them getting thrown from their horses." See p. 123. The British losses in this action were "very great—two hundred and twenty-three killed and wounded." See p. 119.

Muhammad Ḥafī' 's attack on the rear of the enemy, a sharp canon duel continued all through the morning on the sight of the British camp. A number of Revolutionary sepoys who were posted in Sabzi-Mandī "kept up a galling fire on our picquets." The battle lasted till sunset.<sup>1</sup> Bakht Khān sent an official report of the victory to the Emperor<sup>2</sup>

#### **Attack on Sammy House · British retreat, 14 July**

After a lull of four days a party of the Revolutionaries marched out from the Lahore Gate, moved towards Kishenganj and thence advanced upon the picket in Sabzi-Mandī. The British had considerably strengthened this flank and were ready to meet the charge. They decided to fight a defensive action, and this position was maintained till about 4 o'clock when a Column was formed under Brigadier Showers. It consisted of six horse artillery guns besides other detachments from different units. Brigadier Chamberlain accompanied it. It was subsequently joined by Major Reid also. The Revolutionaries began a slow retreat letting the enemy follow them "until they came within musketry-range of the city walls. Here they began to fall fast, and a retreat was ordered."<sup>3</sup> On the retreat of the British forces the Revolutionaries rallied in numbers and punished the enemy severely for his pursuing them in so indiscreet a manner. Hodson who had joined the Column resisted their charge, but when he tried to capture the two guns left by his opponents, "suddenly two rescals rushed forward with lighted

1 Jivan Lal says that Bakht Khān had himself led the attack and "charged with cavalry into the English lines cutting down a great number of officers and men." See *T.N.V.*, p. 145. This cannot be accepted against Mubarak Ḥāh's definite assertion that "Mahomed Shafee and Imdad Ali with about 150 Sowars managed to get up to the British batteries and surprised the Europeans who were scattered about off duty, drinking tea." This is corroborated by Roberts who says, "Stilman and Hills were break-fasting together, when a sowar from the Native officer's party rode up and reported that a body of the enemy's cavalry were in sight." Roberts, I, 187

2 *Press list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 20, No. 64.

3 Cave Browne, II, pp. 24-25.

portfires in their hands, fired the guns, loaded with grape, in our faces, and when the smoke cleared away, we found, to our infinite disgust and chagrin that they had limbered up the guns and were off at a gallop. We had then to effect our retreat to rejoin the column, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry, and many men and officers were hit in doing it."<sup>1</sup> Hodson learnt later that among the casualties of the day was his Adjutant-General, 'poor Chamberlain', whose left arm was broken below the shoulder. The scene of the hardest fighting of the day was an old temple, called by the Europeans, Sammy House. Three days after this battle, General Reed handed over command of the Delhi Field Force to Brigadier Wilson (17 July). The situation at the time of his taking over was by no means heartening. Two Commanders had been struck down by death and the Adjutant-General and Quarter-master-General lay wounded.

#### **British Commander disheartened**

It was now for more than five weeks that the British forces had been before Delhi, nominally as besiegers, but, in reality, as the besieged. They had been victorious in some actions and the lossess of the Revolutionaries had been heavy; but their casualties also were by no means negligible. The real cause of anxiety for them, however, was that the Revolutionaries were continuously arriving in Delhi from different places and their morale was rising. No one could say how long this state of affairs would last, and as early as the beginning of July "the thought of a retrograde movement had been fixing itself in the minds even of men who had been at one time eager for the bolder course, which had been described as the 'Gamster's Throw' ... The time for assaulting had passed and the question had arisen and had been freely discussed at Headquarters, whether, until we could appear before Delhi in greater strength, it would not, both on military and political grounds, be a wiser course to relax our hold, and employ our eager troops in

1 Hodson, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-35.



in other parts of the country.<sup>1</sup>" The situation was so serious that Wilson asked Engineer Baird Smith to give him his professional advice. Smith emphatically opposed the idea of withdrawal, which, he argued, would be construed by the people of the sub-continent as a sign of weakness and defeat. He told the General that they badly needed long-range guns, and that after the arrival of the siege train their success was sure.

#### **Attack on Sabzi Mandi, 16 July**

(On 16 July the defenders were strengthened by the arrival of troops from Jhansi, consisting of the 14th Irregular Cavalry and the 12th N I. A plan was made for an attack on the besiegers on the 18th.) Rajab 'Ali informed his masters on the 17th that the Revolutionaries would march on 'Alipūr and when the British forces would go to its rescue a rush would be made on their camp. Necessary precautions could, therefore, be taken by the British in time. Instead of marching on 'Alipūr (the Revolutionaries attacked the Sabzi-Mandi and the Ridge batteries. A Column was sent under Lieutenant Colonel Jones in the afternoon. About the end of the day the Revolutionaries withdrew; Jones did not commit the mistake of pursuing them. This was the last real contest in the Sabzi-Mandi area because the *sarāis*, old buildings and gardens which provided cover to the Revolutionaries were cleared away; besides this, Sammy House was considerably strengthened.)

#### **Metcalf House, 23 July**

The next charge of the Revolutionaries was directed against the left flank of the British camp. Early in the morning on 23 July they came out of the Kashmir Gate, marched towards

<sup>1</sup> Kave and Malleson II, 443-44.

Brigadier Wilson told Sir John Lawrence, in a letter dated 18 July, that the British forces had been attacked twice, adding in conclusion that "I candidly tell you that unless speedily reinforced this force will soon be so reduced by casualties and sickness that nothing will be left but a retreat to Kurnaul. The disasters attending such an unfortunate proceeding I cannot calculate." See *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part I, p. 231.

Ludlow Castle and captured it. From here they opened fire on the Metcalfe House picket; the enemy replied but owing to the cover of trees and walls his firing was not effective; a Column was then formed under the command of Brigadier Showers. The Revolutionaries followed their old tactics; they retreated allowing Showers to pursue them to a point dangerously near the city walls. Here he was subjected to fire of grape from the walls, and "the casualties of the day were very great" <sup>1</sup> Colonel Seaton, who was officiating as Adjutant-General, and Showers were both among the wounded. On the other side "the loss of the enemy was not heavy, and they carried off all their guns" <sup>2</sup> The last incident of the month was the attempt of the Revolutionaries to throw a bridge over the canal in order to take their guns for an attack on the rear of the British camp. They had come out for this purpose on 28 July and had completed the construction of a temporary bridge at Bussye. Their labour, however, was wasted because it was swept away by flood before they could use it. <sup>3</sup>

### **Bakht Khan's reforms**

July was an important month in the history of the Defence of Delhi. It was marked by the arrival of Bakht Khān, Mawlawī Sarfarāz 'Alī and their co-workers in the Movement. Sarfarāz 'Alī became the Chief Adviser of the Emperor; he had great influence over the *Mujāhidīn* and is referred to as the *Amīr al-Mujāhidīn* and *Imām al-Mujāhidīn*. <sup>4</sup> Their appointments had changed the entire pattern of the administration (reforms were introduced and steps taken to strengthen the fighting forces and control the situation in the city, which had been deteriorating as a result of the inefficiency of the Princes. On the day he took over charge, Bakht Khān allowed the shop-keepers to keep arms in their shops and asked the people not come out of their houses unarmed. He was

1 Rotton, p. 164. He was watching the battle from the Flag-Staff Tower.

2 Kaye and Malleson, II, 447.

3 Forrest, I, 111-12; Norman's Narrative in *State Papers*, I, 460.

4 Mubārak says, he was "a styled wazeer" See f. 112.

very strict in punishing the sepoys who were caught plundering ; their arms were to be seized and confiscated. He held a general levee and ordered the leading citizens to attend it ; evidently the object of this order was to seek their cooperation in improving the law and order situation<sup>1</sup> A couple of weeks later he ordered the withdrawal of octroi duty on sugar and salt, with a view to encourage its import into the city (15 July).<sup>2</sup>

( Perhaps the most drastic step taken by Bakht Khān was his order regarding the slaughtering of animals for meat. He was fully conscious of the need of maintaining unity between the Muslims and the Hindus. As a gesture of good-will towards the Hindus Bakht Khān issued an order on 9 July forbidding the slaughtering of cows for purposes of meat.<sup>3</sup> He went a step further. On the eve of *‘Id al-Adhā* the public crier announced by a beat of drum; ‘The people are the Lord’s the country is the King’s, the decree is that of Bakht Khān, chief of the army If any man high or low (shall) sacrifice a bullock or a goat he shall suffer death ’ Mubārak Shāh tells us that the order was obeyed most implicitly and ‘not even a kid was sacrificed on the Eid.’<sup>4</sup> There was a serious danger of communal clashes between the Hindus and Muslims. The spies and supporters of the British, who lived in the city, were trying to excite communal feelings, but the *‘Id* was celebrated on 1 August in perfect peace. The British authorities were sadly disappointed. ‘our hopes of a grand row in the city yesterday at the Eid Festival have not, apparently, been fulfilled . . . The King had issued strict orders against killing cows,

1 T.N.N., pp 135-36.

2 *Ibid*, p. 152.

3 Zakā Allāh is not happy with this order and says it was ‘against the wishes and religion’ of the Emperor. See p. 660.

4 Folio 117. This is confirmed by Muir who wrote a letter to General Havelock on 17 August. In a postscript he says that Bakht Khān told the Emperor to forbid cow-sacrifice, ‘at the same time laying before His Majesty reasons in support of the lawfulness of such a course ’ Muir, *Intelligence Records*, II, 125.

or even goats, in the city, and this, if acted upon, must have satisfied the Hindoos ; and instead of fighting amongst themselves they all joined together to make a vigorous attack to destroy us.) This was a wise step, and is a clear evidence of Bakht Khān's statesmanship. A slight and seemingly harmless incident could have been made a pretext for communal riots, and nothing would have been more harmful to the cause of the Revolution than a Hindu-Muslim clash.

Bakht Khān knew that the co-operation of the Ruling Princes was absolutely essential, particularly those whose territories lay in the Panjab and the North-West. He, therefore, requested the Emperor to despatch letters (*shuqqahs*) to the Rulers of some of these States. The Chiefs of Jammu, Patiala, Jaipur, Gwalior, and Tonk were among those to whom an appeal was addressed.<sup>2</sup> A century of foreign domination had, however, completely demoralized the Princes, and none of them had the courage of joining the War of Independence, the only noble exception being the Rani of Jhansi. In fact the Princes and the landlords were the main props of British rule in the subcontinent. Some of the zamindars however did join the Movement. Their activities were no doubt mostly confined to the areas under or

1 Keith Young's letter dated 2nd August, p. 171. According to Jiwan Lal this order was issued on 28th July, *T N N*, p. 170.

2 Mubārak says that the *shuqqahs* addressed to Jammu, Patiala and Jaipur fell into the hands of Hikīm Ahsan-Allāh who "tore them up and said he had forwarded them." See Folio 98.

It is interesting, however, that a letter of Gulāb Singh of Kashmir addressed to the Emperor was picked up by an officer from an interior apartment of the Imperial palace when it was captured by the British. Gulāb Singh had written : "This suppliant has been the servant of the Lahore Government and has eaten its salt and has now, under the auspices of Your Majesty, possessed himself of Lahore and placed (50) fifty of the principal (Sahibs) European officers in confinement at Jummoo ... Let Your Majesty be most graciously pleased to issue a purwana bearing the royal seal, ... and he will at once have Putiala razed to the ground. He waits Royal orders to present himself before Your Majesty and kiss the Royal feet." *Secret Letters*, no. 64, Enclosure 8 ; also see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, p. 125.

near their respective jurisdictions, but their recognition of the Emperor and the Revolutionary Government were a source of considerable strength to the cause of the Revolution. In some of the Princely States the people joined the Movement or were at least anxious to do so in spite of the fact that their Rulers were on the other side ; a number of *Mujahids*, for instance, came from Tonk. Under 19 July, Jiwan Lal writes that fifty artillery-men of the army of Jaipur presented themselves and complained of the Raja and his Pundit Adviser, although "Rawul Sheo Singh and the whole army was anxious to join the rebels, and, as soon as an opportunity occurred, intended to seize the Rajah and bring him into service of the King. . . Twenty troopers joined the rebels today from Gwalior"<sup>1</sup> Another contingent came from Jaipur under Nanney Khān Risaldar and was enlisted in the Cavalry on 30 July<sup>2</sup> The number of Gwalior forces was fairly large ; on 13 August 150 of their horsemen were posted as guards at the Kashmir and Lahore Gates<sup>3</sup>

#### **Bakht Khan's difficulties**

Bakht Khān's efforts to stabilize the administrative machinery of Government and strengthen his forces were to a large extent neutralized by the machinations of his opponents and the stupidity of the Princes and some of the officers of the Revolutionary Regiments. (The latter could not easily reconcile themselves to the idea that a mere 'Subadar' should be raised to the supreme command. Ṭālī Yār Khān and other officers of the Regiments approached the Emperor with a request that the Princes should hold the supreme authority.<sup>4</sup> These differences continued and became wider with the arrival

1. *T.N.N.*, p. 155, 160, 173.

2. *Press list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 80, No. 267.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 362

4. "Next day in the afternoon (illegible) Qanbar (?) and Tale Yar Khan, with other officers of the regiment gave in a very long petition to the King saying, Bakht Khan was an officer of artillery. You have conferred on him the title of Governor-General and proposed to place us all under his order. It is contrary to the rules of Government. He is not fit for such a trust. You have

of fresh troops from different places. Paradoxically, therefore, the larger the number of troops arriving in the Capital the greater were the difficulties of the Revolutionary leaders.) The author of the *Qayṣar al-Tawārīkh*, though hostile to the Revolution, is not wrong when he says that "if all the forces present in Delhi had possessed the true zeal of faith (*ḥarārat i dīn*) and fought the enemy under a unified command then something would have happened and nobody would have been surprised at it."<sup>1</sup> Bakht Khān faced the situation with remarkable patience and ability; he tried hard to crush the forces of disruption and insisted on maintaining unity and coordination among the heterogeneous elements in Army. This explains why he did not take exception to Mirzā Muḡhul's action in retaining the title of Commander-in-Chief, nor quarrelled with other officers on the question of his supremacy in command.

### Finance

From the outset the Revolutionary Government was confronted with the problem of finding money for the War; (as early as the first week of July it was reported to the Emperor that only 10,000 rupees were left in the Treasury.) The treasures brought by the sepoys were not sufficient for the ever-increasing expenditure of the War. Bakht Khān had with him several lakhs of rupees besides horses, elephants, guns, tents, carts and carriages,<sup>3</sup> and did not require any money for his own people who had already received six months' pay in advance, but arrangements had to be made for other Regiments also. (Their officers harassed the Emperor and rightly told him that they could not fight in a state of starvation.)

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dismissed your sons and appointed him. This does not please us" *Memoirs*, p. 18; also *T.N.N.*, p. 171.

1 Husayni, Vol II, p. 246

2 *Memoirs*, p. 19

3 According to an informer, Mir Muḡammad 'Alī, he had eleven lakhs of rupees. See *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. I, p. 190. Jiwan Lal puts it at four lakhs. *T.N.N.*, p. 135.

4 Mubārak, f. 104.

By the end of July conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that they had given four days notice for receiving their pay. "otherwise they must plunder the town and help themselves."<sup>1</sup> Plunder could not be tolerated under any conditions and therefore steps were taken to raise money by loans, subscriptions and collection of arrears of revenue.<sup>2</sup>

### Shortage of ammunition

Another problem was the shortage of ammunition. In the earlier days of the War gun powder and percussion caps were consumed indiscriminately. A number of sepoys wasted ammunition or destroyed it, burying it in the sand, because this provided them with a pretext to return to the city.<sup>3</sup> A factory was set up by Mirzā Mughul in Telewārah; it supplied thirty maunds of powder and about a quarter of maund of percussion caps.<sup>4</sup> For the growing requirements of the Army these arrangements were inadequate, but they give us an idea of the determination of the Government to fight out the War to a successful end.

### The Jihad Fatwa'

The second month of Bakht Khān's command thus commenced with serious handicaps; the situation demanded total effort and sacrifice on the part of the Revolutionaries. Bakht Khān introduced conscription for all able-bodied Muslims by proclaiming a *fatwā* which had been signed by a number of 'ulamā including Mawlānā Idrīs Haqq and Mufti Sadr al-Dīn.<sup>5</sup> The exact date and

1 Young, p. 160

2 On 12 July the Court submitted definite proposals for collecting funds. See *Press list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 404, Nos. 149-50

3 Mubarak f. 103

4 *Ibid.*

5 Mawlāwī 'Abd al-Qādir, Qādi Fayḍ-Allāh, Mawlānā Fayḍ Aḥmad, Doctor Wazīr Khān, Muḥammad Sa'īd-Allāh and Sayyid Mubārak Shāh were among other signatories. Sherwani, 'Abd al-Shahīd Khān *Bāghī Hindustān* (Bijnor, 1947), p. 156; Zakā-Allāh, p. 675; Razī al-Dīn, *Kanz al-Tārīkh* (Badayun, Nizami Press, 1907), pp. 351-52.

text of the *fatwā* are not known, but it appears from Zakā-Allāh's account that it was signed not long after Bakht Khān's arrival in Delhi. The promulgation of the *fatwā* attracted volunteers in large numbers and infused the Muslims with a new spirit; to their feelings of patriotism and love of independence was now added the zeal of religious duty.

### Nimach Brigade arrives in Delhi

(At the end of July the famous Nimach Brigade arrived. Its fame had reached the Capital much earlier and its victory at Agra in the beginning of the month had been celebrated as a great achievement. Bakht Khān had sent his greetings to the officer of the Brigade and congratulated them on behalf of the troops fighting in Delhi) this communication was in reply to a petition of the Brigade addressed to the Emperor. "Brethren!", he wrote, "Your King and all of us are night and day labouring for the annihilation of a small body of Christians, those infidels having from fear of their lives entrenched themselves on the top of a hill which is neither practicable for Cavalry nor assailable by the Artillery. God willing, in a short time the plain of Delhi will be cleared of the existence of these impure Nazarenes. But now, brethren! you should march expeditiously without halting and reach the presence of your (both secular and spiritual) King and unite with us in the extirpation of the

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It appears that before this *fatwā* another had been signed by a number of 'ulama of Delhi. It was in reply to a proclamation issued by the British authorities, addressed to the Muslims of Delhi and its neighbourhood. The object of the proclamation was to deceive the Muslims by telling them that the Hindus alone were guilty of rebelling against the British and the Muslims had nothing to do with it; it was also mentioned that only the fat of cows (and not the lard) was used in the cartridges. The Muslims, however, did not fall into the trap. A reply was promptly issued by the leading 'ulama in the form of a *fatwā* which made holy war against the British obligatory, because they had attacked the city with the aim of destroying the lives and property of the people. This *fatwā* was published in the *al-'Ibār al-'āfar*, Delhi. See *Nawā i Azādī* (Adabi Publishers, Bombay, 1957), p. 8; *Māh i Naw* monthly (Karachi), IX, No. 3, pp. 14-15,



infidels.”<sup>1</sup> This letter is dated 8 July; five days later “a regimental band played music expressive of good news (*muzda*) before the King in celebration of the victory”<sup>2</sup>

### Attack on Metcalfe House, 1-2 August

The arrival of new contingents of sepoys and *Mujāhids* and the coming of envoys from some of the Chiefs and leaders from different places, particularly from Rohilkhand, raised the morale of the Revolutionary forces and intensified their zeal for a decisive struggle. It was decided that after performing the prayers and ceremonies of *‘Īd al-Adhā* on 1 August a major attack would be launched.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly late in the afternoon on that day the Revolutionaries emerged from the gates of the city and commenced by attacking Metcalfe House, gradually spreading along the whole front. The battle continued throughout the night; the Revolutionaries kept on coming in batches and “not a man of ours advanced from under cover”. When the day broke fighting was still going on; it lasted till about noon time when the Revolutionaries decided

1 *Secret Letters*, No 64, Enc 1. Also see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, pp 115-16.

2 *T N N* p. 150.

3 It was customary for the teachers to give blessings to their pupils in the form of a short poem on the occasion of the *‘Īds*. This was generally known as *‘Īdi* (*‘Īd* greetings). Bahādur Shāh composed the following couplets on the occasion of the *‘Īd al-Adhā* (1st August, 1857). It contains a prayer for victory over his enemies, namely, Christians, Gurkhas, white soldiers and Gujars.

لشکر اعدا الہی آج سارا قتل ہو - گورکھا گورے سے تاگوہر نصاریٰ قتل ہو  
آج کادن عید قربان کا ہے ہی حائیں گے ہم - اے ظور نہ تیغ حب قاتل تمہارا قتل ہو

*Translation:-* O God, May the entire army of the enemy be killed today! from the Gurkhas and white soldiers, to Gujar and Christians.

We shall consider this day as the day of the *‘Īd* of sacrifice only if, O *Zafar*, your murderer is killed by a sword.” This appeared on the title page of *Sādiq al-Aḥbār*, Delhi, 12  *Dhī al-hijjah*, 1273 H, under the caption *Qita’h Tahniyat i ‘Īd i S’id farmūdah i Naḍrat Abū Zafar Muḥammad Sirāj al-Dīn Bahādur Shāh Badshāh i Shāzi*. Reproduced in *Nawā i Āzādī* (Adabi Publishers, Bombay, 1957), facing p. 6.

to withdraw, because they now saw no hope of success, and their losses had been heavy compared to those of the enemy.)

**Alipur, 3 August**

In another sector, however, the Revolutionaries had succeeded in their objective. The Revolutionary Government was not unaware of the movements of Nicholson's Movable Column.<sup>1</sup> To check the advance of the Column the Revolutionaries had rebuilt the bridge of Najafgarh canal, but this had been destroyed by the British. General Wilson informed Nicholson that the purpose of the reconstruction of the bridge by the Revolutionaries and concentration of their forces near it was to attack 'Alipūr and cut the British line of communication "I, therefore, earnestly beg you", Wilson had written, "to push forward with the utmost expedition in your power, both to drive these fellows from my rear, and to aid me in holding my position."<sup>2</sup> The reconstruction of the bridge had been completed on 2 August, and on the following day the Revolutionaries launched an attack on 'Alipur, but they had to withdraw because of the exceptionally heavy rains which made the movement of the soldiers impossible.<sup>3</sup>

**Explosion of the magazine factory, 7 August**

On 6 August the Nimach and Nasirabad forces under their respective commanders, Sindhara Singh and Badli Singh, made an ineffective attempt to attack the right flank of the British camp. This reverse was nothing compared to the calamity which befell the defenders on the following day. (After the explosion of the Magazine near the Kashmir Gate on 11 May, the Revolutionaries had set up a manufactory in Begam Samru's House<sup>4</sup>; it exploded on the morning of 7 August. According to a British spy the cause of

1 Nicholson had taken command of the Column on 22 June. See Kaye, *Lives of Indian Officers* (London, 1875), p. 359.

2 See Kaye and Malleison, II, p. 486.

3 Cave-Browne, II, p. 137.

4 For Samru's House see Baghīr al-Dīn, II, 209.

the explosion was "a spark from a hooqa."<sup>1</sup> but the Revolutionaries suspected that *Hakim Ahsan-Allāh Khān* was the author of this act of sabotage. The excited sepoys rushed to his house, plundered it and then set fire to it; they would have killed the *Hakim* if the Emperor had not intervened. Actually in this case *Ahsan-Allāh Khān* was outmanoeuvred by *Rajab 'Alī* who was more cunning and certainly more efficient in the nefarious art of spying.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless two days later he (*Rajab 'Alī*) also came under suspicion; a price was set on his head, and he "was obliged to escape for his life, after having been for three months the invaluable medium of all city news in the intelligence department so admirably conducted by Hodson."<sup>3</sup> From the British camp, however, where he was in charge of the office of the intelligence department *Rajab 'Alī* continued to perform his duties as a spy.<sup>4</sup>

#### Metcalf House again, 8 August

On 8 August the Revolutionaries marched out of the Kashmir Gate and established a battaery at Ludlow Castle; from here they

1 *Delhi News*, 8 August, 1857 quoted in Mahdi Husain, p. 245, n. 6

2 *Rajab 'Alī's* friend Hodson refers to his treachery in these words: "On the 7 (August) a powder manufactory was exploded and they suspended the minister, Hakeem Ahsanoolah, and searched his house; there they found a letter which had been sent him, concocted by Moulvie Rujub Alee, which confirmed their suspicions, so they plundered and burnt his house." See Hodson, p. 261

It may be mentioned that after the collapse of the Revolution, *Rajab 'Alī* was amply rewarded for his treachery by the British Government; he was given lands and the title of *Arifū Jāh* besides a cash reward of 10,000 rupees. In compliance with a request from the writer of *Tahqīqāt i Chishtī* he wrote an account of his life, this has been included in that book. See Chishī, Nūr Ahmad, *Tahqīqāt i Chishtī* (Lahore, 1324 H.), pp. 114-19; also see Jafri, R. A., *Bahādūr Shāh Zafur aur unkā 'thd* (Lahore, 1957), pp. 1247-54

3 Cave-Browne, II, 136-37; for details of the story of the explosion see *Memoirs*, p. 21. Zahir says that the women of *Ahsan-Allāh Khān's* family took shelter in his house, they were brought there by 'Aziz al-Dīn, a nephew of the *Hakim*. See pp. 143-44.

4 For his report dated 15 September see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, p. 48, also see Zaka-Allah, 647

could easily ply the Metcalfe House picket with shot and shell. For three days the British could not do anything to check them. Before sunrise on 12 August Brigadier Showers and Coke advanced silently towards the Revolutionaries who were completely taken by surprise. The British captured and brought with them four guns. Both sides suffered heavy losses in this affair) on the British side Showers and Coke were severely wounded and the number of casualties was large; "an officer was killed, eight wounded, and one hundred and nine men *hors de combat*."<sup>1</sup>

### **Hodson captures Rohtak**

Nicholson thus succeeded in bringing his Movable Column to the camp on 14 August; his arrival raised the strength as well as the morale of the British forces. The same day a body of the Revolutionaries, mainly Cavalry, came out with the intention of cutting off the enemy's communications with the Panjab. Hodson was sent against them. He pushed towards Kharkanda a small village near Rohtak, and fell upon a small party of the Revolutionaries led by Risaldar Bishārāt 'Alī. The village was surrounded and "the little party of mutineers was soon mastered and the ressalidar shot down by Hodson himself. . ."<sup>2</sup> From here Hodson rushed to Rohtak where he had a skirmish with men of the *Rānagarh* tribe, who were commanded by their leader, Bābur Khān. The action was not decisive; on the following day Bābur Khān again charged Hodson and pushed him back. A small battle was fought in the open in which the Revolutionaries suffered casualties; they retreated and evacuated Rohtak in the course of the night.

### **Battle of Najafgarh, 24 August**

In the last week of August the Revolutionaries planned an attack on the rear of the enemy. They were not unaware of the progress of

1 Forrest, I, 115; Cave-Browne, II, pp. 137-38.

2 Cave-Browne, II, 145.

Risaldar Bishārāt 'Alī belonged to 1st Irregular Cavalry and had been decorated with an Order of Merit. Hodson takes pride for massacring the leading persons of the village: "We polished off the Khurkhundah gentry in style, though they showed fight to a great extent. See Hodson, pp. 206-07.

the British siege train which was expected to reach Karnal on 25 or 26 August ;<sup>1</sup> they also realised the great danger which its arrival would mean for them. Besides this, the Emperor is stated to have told the officers of the leading Brigades in the Capital that they should do some thing "to stop this rain of shot and shell pouring into the Palace," the reference was to three shells which by accident had fallen in the Red Fort just at the moment when he was coming out of his apartments. On hearing these words from their Emperor the Commanders of the Nimach and Rohilkhand Brigades held a council and decided that a major offensive should be launched on the rear of the enemy's position on the side of Najafagarh. Accordingly on 24 August after prolonged discussions the Nimach and Nasirabad Brigades marched out with the intention of proceeding to Najafagarh ; Bakht Khān followed them ; he was to remain in the rear, in charge of the reserve. They advanced up to the bridge without meeting opposition, and were able to cross it after some repairs. They occupied the villages in the neighbourhood and took a strong position at an old *sarāi* where they posted four of their heavy guns. The British commander despatched Nicholson to attack the Revolutionaries.

Nicholson started at 4 A. M. in the morning and proceeded to a cross road. About five o'clock in the afternoon he crossed a *nālūh* and arrived in front of the position taken up by his opponents. He now attacked the *sarāi* and ultimately succeeded in capturing it. After this he changed front, swept down the line and pushed back the Revolutionaries. Mubārak adds that the Nimach troops were tired because they had no time to rest and their march was slow as they had to wade through water which was above their knees. Obviously they could not move fast enough to reach the *sarāi* in time to reinforce its defenders ; yet they "offered a desperate resistance, and a bloody hand-to-hand encounter." The village of Najafgarh, in the meantime, had been captured by Lumsden who had been assigned that task by Nicholson.

<sup>1</sup> Young, p. 30.

From here he crossed over along the rear of the line, with a view to strengthen the attack on the village of Nagli which had been occupied by the Revolutionaries. They latter offered a determined resistance and killed the British Commander with eleven of his men besides wounding twenty-six others. But after the capture of the *sai āī* a portion of the British troops was sent against this small band of defenders, while the rest were re-formed to attack the camp of the Revolutionaries and the bridge in their rear. The Revolutionaries soon realized that the fall of bridge would mean utter destruction of their forces; hence they decided to make a retreat. The village of Nagli was also left to the enemy;) "indeed, more properly speaking, it was not taken, but was evacuated by the enemy during the night."<sup>1</sup> The defeat at Najafgarh was the severest reverse which the Revolutionaries had suffered. Their losses, particularly among the men of the Nimach Brigade were very heavy, and, more than that, the blow to their morale was almost irreparable. "The prestige of the rebel army," remarks Mubārak, "had waxed materially previously to their defeat at Nujufgurb but after that it was completely and for ever lost."<sup>2</sup>

↳ Mubārak attributes the defeat of the Revolutionaries to the failure of the supply of provisions. Bakht Khān had sent a message to Mirzā Mughul that the forces had nothing to eat and were starving and that parched gram should be sent to the battle front immediately. The prince could make no effective arrangements for this.<sup>3</sup>) The Revolutionaries could not continue their attacks after this defeat; they were now forced to fight defensive actions.

1 Norman's Narrative in *State Papers*, I, 465; also Kaye, J. W., *op. cit.*, pp. 366-67.

2 Mubārak, f. 143.

3 *Ibid.*, f. 142.

## CHAPTER X

### THE FALL OF DELHI

(September 1857)

#### The situation deteriorates

After capturing Najafgarh the British officers began to reconsider the possibilities of an assault on the city. Only five days before the battle General Wilson had written a letter to the Chief Engineer of the Field Force, Colonel Baird Smith, dwelling upon the dangers and doubtful results of an assault without getting adequate reinforcements; he thought that wanted Havelock's men or some other troops should march on Delhi because "the force under my command is actually besieged by the mutineers". He had concluded his remarks with a warning: "As an Artillery officer, I have no hesitation in giving my opinion that the attack on Delhi, garrisoned and armed as it now is, is as arduous an undertaking as was the attack on Bharatpur in 1825-26." His officers however did not agree with this view; they were in favour of an immediate assault, and with the arrival of the siege train on the night of 3 September it became the common talk of the camp. Nicholson wrote on the 4th: "I think we have a right to hope for success, and I trust that ere another week passes our flag will be flying from the palace minarets"<sup>1</sup> Quite different was the state of affairs in the city: the demoralising effects of the defeat were becoming apparent. Mirzā Moghul and his junta persisted in their opposition to Bakht Khān; their relations had become so bitter that the British spy, Fath Muḥammad, said in his news-report of 1 September that "the Naseerabad and Neemuch Brigades are supporters of Mirza Moghul and the Bareilly Brigade is devoted to the King. The

<sup>1</sup> Kaye, J. W., *op cit.* p. 376.

officers of the Bareilly force and Mirza are bitter enemies. It is not at all improbable that the Bareilly troops will fall out and kill Mirzā Moghul." Personal jealousy and factious rivalries were not the only causes, of this bitterness "The Shahzadas," continues the spy, "manage to embezzle the collections made from the towns people. The Bareilly Brigade talk of returning to Bareilly."<sup>1</sup>

From the outset the Revolutionary Government was confronted with serious financial problems ; the funds at their disposal were scanty and inadequate. The conduct of the Princes added to its difficulties. On Bahādur Shāh's assumption of power they thought that fortune after all had begun to smile on them. For decades they had been living like prisoners with no prospects of the restoration of their lost glory and prestige. They could not have failed to realize that the Empire seemed to be dying fast, but with the outbreak of the Revolution they suddenly found themselves in the possession of power and dignity. Unfortunately, however, instead of utilizing this opportunity for the good of the people and the Empire they gave themselves up to a life of ease and dissipation, and began to behave in an irresponsible manner ; power corrupted them absolutely.<sup>2</sup> For nearly four months the Revolutionary Government had managed to keep the financial situation under control, but the demoralizing effects of the reverse at Najafgarh created circumstances which led to a crisis. On 31 August the Emperor was forced to proclaim that the Princes were unworthy of credit and directed "that no one should give money to them."<sup>3</sup>

1 *Secret Letters* (India Office Records). Letter No. 191.

2 As late as 9 September the Princes were embezzling State funds. Jiwan Lal writes : ' The King ordered the arrest of the Princes who had misappropriated money collected for the p-y of the sepoys ' Mubārak Shāh says that the Emperor had persuaded the wealthier citizens of Delhi to pay donations "From men," he says, "known to own upward of a lac a contribution of Rs. 25,000/- was demanded, but those assessed at this amount went to Mirza Moghul and giving him a present of five or six hundred rupees succeeded in having the call reduced to Rs 1500/ or even Rs 1000/ " Folio. 158.

3 See *Secret Letters*, Letter No. 191 (Gauri Shankar's report dated 1st September 1857).



Two days later he was surrounded by some officers of the sepoys, who demanded the pay of their Regiments. Bahādur Shāh was greatly annoyed, because he did not have enough money to meet their demands. "There was much talking and shouting, at last Selim Shah Rissaldar (on leave)", says Gauri Shankar, "expostulated with the soobahdars and got them quiet." Bahādur Shāh had only 40,000 rupees; this amount was not sufficient. He also offered them one hundred and one gold *mohurs* which he had received as *nadhr* on behalf of the Nawab of Bareilly, and ultimately 'the jewels of the zenana'. The courtiers were moved by this action of the Emperor and persuaded the officers to accept 40,000 as an instalment of their dues.<sup>1</sup> These reports of the spies were substantially correct. Thus they kept the British camp informed of the developments in the city<sup>2</sup>. An account of the setting of guns and other defence arrangements made by the Revolutionaries inside the city walls was sent to the British by Gauri Shankar on 12 September.

### British preparations for an assault

With this information in their hands it is not surprising that the British Command eventually agreed to launch an attack on the city. The preparations for the assault began with the digging of a trench to the left of the Sammy House and the setting up of a strong battery<sup>3</sup> at its end with the object of preventing sorties from the Lahore and Kabul Gates. These arrangements deceived

1 *Ibid* (Fath Muḥammad's report dated 2 September). Another spy, Turāb 'Alī confirms this incident. Also see *Mutiny Records* vol. VII, Pt. II, 15-17.

2 Colonel Keith wrote to his wife on 2 September: "There are several letters from the city, all telling the same story of divided Counsels internal dissensions, and troops running away". See Young, p. 258. For Gauri Shankar's report see, *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part II, pp 33-34. On 7 September Nicholson wrote "Poor Pandey has been in very low spirits since then (the battle of Nujafghurh) and, please God he'll be in still lower before the end of this week" Kaye, J. W. *op cit* pp. 376-77.

3 This battery was erected on the suggestion of Reid and was therefore, known as Reid's Battery

the Revolutionaries ; they made them think that they would be attacked from this side, whilst it had been decided that the main attack would be directed from the other flank.<sup>1</sup> By 6 September all the expected reinforcements had arrived, and on the evening of the following day the first battery was quietly installed about seven hundred yards from the Moree Gate. The work had to be completed in the night ; for some time it went on undisturbed, but the Revolutionaries soon heard the noise, and immediately came a shower of grape from the Moree Bastion, killing several workmen. If this firing had been continued the work would have had to be relinquished ; but the Revolutionaries stopped firing because they took the workmen to be parties of men cutting brushwood and thought they had been scared away. When the day broke, they saw the battery and again opened fire ; but it was too late now. The British on their part started firing at the Moree Bastion, and by afternoon reduced its masonry to a heap of ruins. This battery (No. 1) was commanded by Major Brind and came to be known after his name. On the left the besiegers were able to establish two batteries (No. 2 and 4) at the Qudsi h Bāgh which was only five hundred yards from the Kashmir Gate. These were completed in three days (8 to 11 September). About the same time another battery (No. 3) was set up at the Customs House, only a hundred and sixty yards from the Water Bastion.

#### **Fighting at Kashmir Gate**

The work of erecting the batteries had been conducted in great silence, and it was only after it had been completed that the Revolutionaries realized that the main attack was to be directed

1 According to the plan approved by the authorities the attack was to be made on the northern sector of the city extending from the Moree Gate to the Water Bastion near the Jamunā. It has been rightly pointed out that the defenders could have strengthened their position by pulling down the buildings and erecting a rampart, from which the attacking force could have been easily subjected to concentrated and heavy fire. It is difficult to explain why this step was not taken except by the fact that the Revolutionary leaders were busy quarrelling among themselves. Kaye and Malleeson, IV, 6 ; Roberts, *op. cit.*, I, 218-19.

from the northern sector. It was now too late to take any effective measures and no amount of effort and sacrifice could save; fifty-four guns and mortars "belched forth havoc on the doomed city."<sup>1</sup> However, when the enemy's firing commenced on the morning of 12 September, the defenders tried their best to counter the attack. They had not raised their guns on to the bastions; they were, therefore, forced to bring them out into the open to fire at the enemy's batteries. They also maintained steady firing of musketry from the walls of the city and inflicted losses on the besiegers,<sup>2</sup> but they could not stop him from breaking the screening walls near the Kashmir Gate and Water Bastion. The besiegers, to quote Mawlinī Fadlī Haqq, "showered continuously heavy balls throughout the day and night. The wall of the city was breached and cracked, and openings became apparent in the wall and the ramparts. The gate was demolished and sources (of defence) were cut short; the curtain rose. None from among the soldiers was able to stand or sit there, nor could anyone peep from or ascend over the wall. Anyone who tried to peep from its wall was shot and fell into the ditch."<sup>3</sup>

1 Smith, R B, *Life of Lord Lawrence*, 2 Vols (London, 1883) II, 115. Mubārak refers to these incidents in these words: "By this time the British battery at the Koolia Bigh had greatly damaged the city wall and smashed the muzzles of most of the mutineers' guns rendering them wholly unserviceable and killed nearly all the artillery men", Folio 154.

2 Between 7 and 14 September, 327 officers and men were killed and wounded. See Robberis, *op cit*, I, 221.

3 J. P. H. S., Vol V, p. 34.

The decision was taken at a Council of War held in a tent in the British Camp. This Council had met in perfect secrecy and had continued its deliberations till 4.30. It is, therefore, surprising that 'when we took the Cashmere Gate next morning, an order book, similar to the book then in use in the army, was found dated Palace, September 13, 5 P. M., giving the exact detail of the force that was to assault the Cashmere Gate, and sketching out generally and briefly the other points of attack of the other assaulting columns.' Wilberforce, R. G. *An Unrecorded Chapter of the Indian Mutiny* (London, 1894), p. 147.

The breaches having been examined by the British engineers and reported to be practicable, it was decided on 13 September that the assault should be made on the following day. It appears that the details of the plan of assault had become available to the officers of the Revolutionary Government. The British forces were now divided into four Columns and a Reserve. Nicholson was to lead the first Column, and he was also entrusted with the general direction of the assault. Brigadier Jones, Colonel Campbell and Major Reid were to command the second, third and fourth Columns respectively; Brigadier Longfield was in charge of the Reserve and had instructions to follow the first Column. In the meantime the reports of these measures and successful breaching of the wall had created a panic in the city; the sepoys had started "fast evacuating Delhi",<sup>1</sup> and the main brunt of the attack had fallen on the *Ghāzis* "Ultimately", to quote 'Allāmah Faḍl i Ḥaqq again "there remained only a small party of *Mujāhidīn* who passed the nights in hunger, but rushed to fight at dawn, and waged war against the enemy. They together with a company of the forces guarded the wall of the city and stopped the enemy's entry through breaches . . . ."<sup>2</sup> This statement is corroborated by facts mentioned in the news-letters of the spies. On the 12th, Gauri Shankar reported: "The citizens took part in yesterday's fight and Moulvee Nawazish Ali of Habree, in Thaneisur District, with 2,000 men, went out to battle."<sup>3</sup>

### The Assault

Early in the morning on 14 September the British forces began to move and advanced as far as Ludlow Castle, the rendezvous for

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In this connection it is interesting to note that the British spy, Faṭḥ Muḥammad reported on 11 September that "the Afghan Ghazees in the city go out and mix fearlessly with the Afghans in camp, and bring in all details, even to the names of officers killed and wounded, which are published in the "*Delhee News*." See *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 54.

1 Cf. Hodson, p. 287.

2 J. P. H. S., Vol. V, p. 33, *The Story*, 33.

3 *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part II, 33.

the three Columns on the left. After some time the 1st Column proceeded to Qudsiah Bāgh and the 2nd further on to the Customs House, while the 3rd moved out along the road. From the Qudsiah Bāgh the men of the 1st Column began to move towards the breach ; they met with a storm of bullets but continued their advance until they reached the ditch. The ladders were thrown and Nicholson was among the first to reach the breach. The Revolutionaries abandoned the site, and the besiegers entered the city and took positions in the Main-Guard. The small party who were entrusted with the task of blowing the Kashmir Gate also moved forward and, in spite of heavy fire from the wicket, they managed to lay the powder bags and blow up the Gate. In the meantime the 2nd Column had carried the breach near the Water Bastion. On entering the city the British soldiers ran down the road, past the ramparts, and succeeded in capturing Moree Bastion without much difficulty or loss, the obvious reason being that the Revolutionaries had not anticipated this line of advance.

#### **Major Reid's Column repulsed**

The fourth Column under Major Reid, however, had to face a different situation. Numerically the largest of the four Columns it was to serve as a *feint* to confirm the defenders in their expectations that the main attack would be made on that side.<sup>1</sup> The Column moved down the hill from behind the Gurkha stronghold at Hindu Rao's House, and came near the picket in the Sabzi-Mandi. Major Reid wanted to clear the Kishenganj Sarai, where the Revolutionaries had planted two batteries, and then make for the Lahore Gate. While he was preparing for this advance firing

<sup>1</sup> Mawlānā Fadl e Haqq corroborates this : " . the Christians deceived the defenders and played a trick. They sent a division of their forces in front of another gate, so that (their opponents) should think that the other gate was being attacked. The *Mujahids* and a section of the forces, therefore, busied themselves in fighting and resisting them ; They were thus deceived by this trick and device of the Christians" *J.P.H.S.*, Vol. V, p. 34 (*The Story of the War of Independence*).

was heard, and it was found that the Kashmir Contingent were engaged with the Revolutionaries. He rushed to their aid. The Revolutionaries opened fire from the bridge over the canal and also from the *sarāi* ; Major Reid was hit and fell wounded in the head. He was thus "compelled to resign his command. The whole plan was now disconcerted . . . the heavy guns from the rebel batteries swept the road with grape ; the Cashmere Contingent on the right, finding the enemy far more numerous than the expected, gave way, and could not again be brought up ; any further attempt was hopeless, and it only remained to draw off the rest of the column with as little loss as might be, which was effected by Captain Muter of the 60th Rifles, who succeeded to the command on Major Reid being wounded"<sup>1</sup>.

More disastrous was the fate of the other detachment of the Kashmir Contingent, which was ordered to occupy the Idgāh. Hardly had its men got to the Rohtak road, which led to that building, when the Revolutionaries attacked them. The Kashmiris were pushed back and their guns were seized by the Revolutionaries.<sup>2</sup> They wanted to follow up their success, and had begun to threaten this vital point of the British position, when Hope Grant's Cavalry Brigade, which had hitherto been covering the assaulting forces, came to the rescue

1 Cave-Brown, II 183-84. When Major Reid found himself disabled he resigned his command to Captain Lawrence ; in the meantime Captain Muter had actually assumed command of the Column "This caused considerable confusion ; Captain Lawrence, however succeeded in asserting his authority, he retired leisurely and in good order on the batteries behind Hindu Rao's House." Kaye and Mallison, VI, p. 30.

For Muter's reasons for withdrawal, see his official despatch to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, dated 17 September, in *State Papers*, I, 412.

2 Captain Dwyer who commanded the Contingent attributes the defeat to numerical superiority of the Revolutionaries. but Major Reid's successor, Lawrence, thinks : " blame may be attached to the Jummoo troops for the loss of their guns, .. " See official despatches of Lawrence and Dwyer in *State Papers*, I, pp. 410-411.

of the beaten Column. Grant's Brigade was also subjected to a sharp musketry firing from the houses and gardens of Kishenganj ; at this critical moment Tombs brought his Artillery to their support. The British suffered heavy casualties, but Hindu Rao's House was saved.

### **John Nicholson killed**

The repulse of the fourth Column had a disastrous effect on the men of the other three also, who, flushed by their successes at the Moree and Kabul Gates, were now rushing to the Lahore Gate to join their comrades, believing that they too must have also scored an easy victory. They had however covered only a short distance, when fire was opened upon them from the Burn Bastion which commanded the Lahore Gate. The 75th Regiment which was in front of these men was forced to fall back upon the Kabul Gate. Seeing his men thus repulsed by the Revolutionaries, Nicholson rushed forward with the intention of assaulting the bastion, but the Revolutionaries had in the meantime made hasty arrangements to offer resistance ; two guns were set up in a lane which had to be traversed before the bastion could be reached and some sharp-shooters were placed behind the windows of the houses as well as on their roofs. Nicholson was advised not to attack the dangerous spot and await intelligence before advancing further, but he did not pay any heed to their warning and ordered the 1st Fusiliers to advance. They were severely punished for this ill-advised action ; their leader Major Jacob fell mortally wounded, and soon men and officers were falling fast. "The men of the column" said one of Nicholson's friends to Sir John Kave, "had—in soldier's language—had their stomach full of fighting already, ..and they were not up to carrying out the programme. They reeled doggedly and slowly on. The sepoys in vast numbers disputed their advance. Under such circumstances it is of no use talking to soldiers, they won't do any more. But Nicholson tried, and as he stood before them entreating them to follow further, his single and stately figure became an easy mark. It would, indeed, have been a miracle had he

escaped ;”<sup>1</sup> and the Revolutionaries were obviously not in a mood to let such miracles happen ! A sepoy took aim at Nicholson, and he fell with a bullet in his chest and died on 22 September.

### Campbell's Column withdraws from before the Jami' Masjid

The third Column had stormed the Kashmir Gate and proceeded towards the Main-Guard ; from there they turned to the left, captured the Church and the Press and then came to Skinner's House. Here they met with resistance from a Regiment of the Nasirabad Brigade which held it ; ultimately the British succeeded in capturing the building. Leaving these positions with Captain Wilde of the fifth (Reserve) Column, Colonel Campbell,<sup>2</sup> Commander of the third Column, pushed on through the Begam Bâgh, entered the Chandni Chauk, took possession of the Kotwali, and with a detachment moved towards the *Jāmi' Masjid* where Muslims had assembled to offer prayers. When they found that the British soldiers were going to harm the innocent congregation, one of them came to the *minbar* and said : “now that the enemy is bent on damaging our mosque, I invite you all to lay down your life in the sacred cause. Those who are prepared to die should accompany me to the northern gate of the mosque.” Thousands of Muslims who had their swords with them recited the *takbīr*, *Allāh-u-Akbar*, and rushed out of the gate. The British opened fire ; two hundred of them were killed, but ultimately they succeeded in falling upon the enemy and forcing him to a hand-to-hand fight. Metcalfe who was at the head of the British soldiers could not stand this charge and withdrew.<sup>3</sup>

Campbell had by now received the disconcerting news of Nicholson's failure to take the Lahore Gate ; he was also informed that his men were falling fast in Chandni Chauk, where the *Ghāzīs*

1 The statement of a friend of Nicholson, as quoted in Kaye, pp. 378-79.

2 Colonel Campbell was guided by Theophilus Metcalfe who was acquainted with the city of Delhi.

3 Nizāmī, *Khawājah Hasan Dihli ki Jān-kani*. (Delhi, 1922), pp 33-34.



were offering a stiff resistance.<sup>1</sup> He was so disheartened by these reports and also because he had himself been wounded that he thought it wise to withdraw and not risk an assault on the Mosque. In his first official despatch, dated 16 September, Major-General Wilson tries to justify this retreat in these words: "The opposition, however, which he met from the great concentration of the enemy at the Jumma Musjid, and the houses in the neighbourhood, he himself, I regret to state, being wounded, satisfied him that his most prudent course was not to maintain so advanced a position, .. and he accordingly withdrew the head of his column and placed himself in communication with the Reserve." <sup>2</sup>

#### Street fighting in the city

14 September was a day of deadly strife. the losses of the assaulting forces were eleven hundred and four men, and sixty-six officers killed or wounded—roughly speaking, about two men in nine. Wilson was disheartened, and his first reaction was that the Columns should be withdrawn to the Ridge. Other officers however, thought otherwise. In reply to a question whether it would be possible for the Army to retain the ground that it had won, Baird Smith said rather emphatically: "We must do so." Wilson accepted the advice. On the following day, however, it was not possible to continue the offensive. The British soldiers had found numerous "bottles of beer, wine and brandy. in the deserted shops; and that night and the next morning so utter was the disorganization in the whole force, that any attempt at an advance would have been certain failure and defeat."<sup>3</sup> Wilson had, therefore, to wait till the morning of 16 September, when news was received that Kishenganj had been evacuated by the Revolutionaries in the night. The

1 'A large body of Ghazees,' reports Mubārak, "assembling from various points advanced on the Kotwalce on which the Europeans came down and engaged them but were so greatly outnumbered that they were obliged to fall back on their main body at the Kashmir Gate after sustaining considerable loss" See ff 165-66; also see Norman's Narrative in *State Papers*, I, 477.

2 *State Papers*, I, 372-73, Cave Brown, II, 180-81.

3 Cave-Browne, II, 187.

British occupied it immediately and found there five heavy guns left by their opponents. Another gain was the capture of the Magazine ; it was an important acquisition because it contained one hundred and seventy-one guns and howitzers and ammunition of every kind.<sup>1</sup> The fall of the Magazine was considered by the Revolutionaries to be a serious blow. Nevertheless, they did not lose courage and decided to make an all out effort to expel the besiegers. A deputation led by Mawlawī Sarfarāz ‘Alī and Fayḍ Ahmad went to the Emperor and requested him to lead the troops “assuring him that the entire army, the citizens of Delhi and the people of the surrounding country would all follow and die for him, and expel the English.” Bahādur Shāh agreed, and it was decided that he would come out at noon time and lead his men in person. Thousands of citizens, *Ghāzis* and sepoys gathered in front of the Palace, and the Emperor moved out of his apartments. But as soon as he came out of the gate of the Palace and the troops and citizens started their march in the direction of the Magazine Ḥakīm Aḥsan-Allah told him that it would be dangerous for him to proceed further, because he would be shot by European riflemen who were concealed in the houses near-by, adding that the English would not spare him if he led the army. Bahādur Shāh was unnerved by this warning and returned to the Palace, saying that he must go back to offer his prayers : the people and the troops also dispersed.<sup>2</sup>

#### **The Ghazis offer stubborn resistance : Greatheads Column repulsed**

The report that the Emperor had returned to his apartments disheartened the people—both the troops and the citizens. They could

1 The Magazine was defended by two Regiments of the Nasirabad Brigade known as the Dow and Macdonald Regiments. See Mubārak, f. 171.

It could be captured only when a battery was planted on the left of the College. See Cave-Browne, II, 188

2 Mubārak, f. 172-73 According to another authority the Emperor had come to Lāl Diggī and it was from there that he returned to the Palace on the advice of his officers. Nizāmī, *Dillī-ki-Sazā*, (Delhi, second edition, 1945), p. 42.

now see that the situation was becoming critical, and the troops that had come from outside Delhi began to leave ; many of its old citizens also decided to evacuate. The *Ghāsis* and those among the soldiers who were determined to fight to the end, as is indicated by their stiff resistance on the 17th continued the struggle. The only important building lost on this day was the Delhi Bank ; it was not won by the besiegers without hard fighting and some loss, but it brought them quite near the Imperial Palace. However, the *Ghāsis* remained firm in their opposition on the following day also. The attack of a British force on the Lahore Gate, led by Greathead and composed of detachments from the 8th, the 75th, and a Sikh Regiment supported by fifty men of the First Fusiliers, made earlier in the day had miserably failed. In his report of the day Wilson writes : "We are still in the same position in which we were yesterday. An attempt was made this morning to take the Lahore Gate, but failed from the refusal of the European soldiers to follow their officers .. The fact is, our men have a great dislike to street-fighting ; they do not see their enemy, and find their comrades falling from shots of the enemy who are on the tops of houses and behind cover, and get a panic, and will not advance This is very sad, and to me, very disheartening."<sup>1</sup>

### Fall of the Red Fort

The evening of the next day (19 September) however proved more auspicious for Wilson's men ; they captured the Burn Bastion on that night. Its fall weakened the defences of the Lahore Gate, which was seized by Brigadier Jones on the morning of the 20th, Jones was now ordered to send a detachment to take the *Jāmi' Masjid* and proceed with the remaining forces to the Ajmer Gate. Major Brind, who was given the command of the detachment which was to attack the *Masjid*, occupied it and wrote to the General, reporting his success and urging the need of capturing the Palace immediately. Wilson accordingly sent a Column to attack the Red Fort,

1 Kaye and Malletson, IV, 44.

which was also captured. Inside the Palace the British forces found only a small band of the *Ghhāzis* who fell upon them and sacrificed their lives in the cause of freedom. Wilson wanted "to blow up the several bastions and portions of the palace," but Lawrence would not agree to it, because, as he said in his reply to the General, "the occupation of the palace would do as much good politically as its destruction."<sup>1</sup>

**The heroic resistance offered by the Ghazis and other Revolutionaries**

The heroic resistance of the Revolutionaries in the last stage of the great Battle of Delhi is certainly one of the most remarkable though tragic chapters of the War, for, it was quite evident that no amount of sacrifice could save Delhi, once the British forces had entered it. Their slow progress and heavy losses during the first five days of the assault (14 to 18 September), however, leave no doubt as to the determination of the defenders; they had decided to fight to the end. The waverers and those among the sepoys who were not prepared to sacrifice their lives had started leaving the city immediately after the assault began. Rajab 'Ali's report of 15 September contains this information: "Today I heard that parties of the rebels were deserting by the Kootub road and towards Rewaree, and a few by other routes."<sup>2</sup> The flight of the sepoys had a very demoralizing effect on the population; it made the people panicky. On the afternoon of the 17th according to a report from the lookout at Hindu Rao's House, streams of people and animals were moving out of the Ajmer Gate. This large scale evacuation of panic-stricken citizens in its turn affected the morale of the defenders. Nevertheless, the Emperor and the leaders of the Revolution remained firm; they were determined to fight to the last man and had no intention of changing this decision until the afternoon of 19th<sup>3</sup>.

1 For Wilson's telegram to Lawrence, dated 21 September, and the latter's reply on the following day, see *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 74.

1 See *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 48

2 "On the 18th, it was reported by the spies that the King with his sons, the three royal Regiments, some other corps of native infantry, and troopers of the

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**Bahadur Shah ignores Bakht Khan's advice**

The fall of Burn Bastion the same evening, however, changed the situation. The Revolutionary leaders thought that it would be suicidal for their forces to stay on in Delhi, now that all the strategic points and positions capable of defence had been captured by the besiegers. Bakht Khān, anxious to save the forces from annihilation, requested Bahādur Shāh to accompany him to Rohilkhand where the position of the Revolutionaries was strong. There can be no doubt that if Bahādur Shāh had accepted Bakht Khān's request the course of the Revolutionary War would have been entirely changed. The loss of Delhi, Bakht Khān rightly argued, was not the end of the struggle; undoubtedly it was a great blow to the Revolutionary cause, but they could continue fighting in other theatres of War, "under the shadow of his name and presence," and the General was convinced that their chances of success were immense. Bahādur Shāh however failed to take a prompt decision; he hesitated and told Bakht Khān to see him next morning in Humāyūn's Tomb, whither he had decided to go for refuge. It may be added that Bakht Khān had been rather indiscreet in making his request to the Emperor in the presence of Ilāhī Bakhsh who was a traitor and had sold himself to the British. He listened to Bakht Khān's arguments without uttering a word, but, after his departure, he took the Emperor to his apartments and advised him not to accept the suggestion of the Ruhilah chief. He waxed eloquent on the hardships of War, particularly when the scene of fighting would be far from the Capital; moreover, he pointed out, success was not certain. On the contrary, if he dissociated himself from the Revolution, the British Government would certainly treat him with consideration. Bahādur Shāh yielded to his kinsman's persuasions and refused to go with Bakht Khān, when the latter came to Humāyūn's Tomb on the following morning to hear his

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light cavalry, had secured themselves in the palace, and were resolved to resist to the last man." Cf. Ball, I, 508

decision.<sup>1</sup> Bakht Khān and his followers, then "went their way, leaving behind the royal family and a numerous crowd of emascuated followers, the scum of the palace, men born never to rise above the calling of a flatterer or a scullion."<sup>2</sup>

### **Bahadur Shah's surrender**

Bahādur Shāh's refusal to comply with Bakht Khān's advice was a great blunder, for which he had to pay a heavy price. Having thus persuaded the Emperor to remain in Humāyūn's tomb, Ilāhī Bakhsh informed Rajab 'Alī who was his chief collaborator in the conspiracy. The latter communicated the news to Hodson who rushed to General Wilson and secured his permission to arrest Bahādur Shāh and bring him alive. Wilson wanted to treat the Emperor as a law-breaker, but Hodson insisted on being authorized to give a guarantee of his life, should he surrender, obviously in return for a handsome price.<sup>3</sup>

1 Hakīm Ahsan Allāh Khān gives a garbled account of Bahādur Shāh's escape. He writes, "Next day in the evening Bakht Khan and Kadir Bakhsh of the Sappers and Miners, came and said that the king must go by stealth to the Kutb and send his womankind too for their lives were in danger if they remained. They advised him to go by boat to Humayun's Tomb and thence to the Kutb by palanquien and that they would follow, that they would not have another such opportunity" He also adds that Bahādur Shāh made some excuses, but ultimately he agreed. See *Memoirs*, p 30.

This is incorrect; Bakht Khān was anxious to take the Emperor with him. He knew how important it was that the Emperor should continue to lead the Revolution. See Kaye and Malletson, IV, 50.

2 *Ibid*, p 51.

3 Hodson, one of the greediest and most unscrupulous of British officers, has been condemned for murdering the Mughul Princes and his impertinence towards the Emperor; in fact, his earlier career had not been cleaner either. He had become at one time "one of Henry Lawrence's disciples, and won for a time, his confidence and regard," but soon after he was found guilty of corruption and was dismissed. With the outbreak of the Revolution he found an opportunity of again getting into service and was given the charge of the Intelligence Department. For his corruption and other vices of character see Holmes, Appendix, N, pp. 591-617; Bosworth-Smith, I, 498-530.

This "explains the otherwise unaccountable persistancy with which,

Hodson reached Humāyūn's Tomb with fifty of his troopers on 22 September. Rajab 'Ali was sent as a messenger to the Emperor, while Hodson and his men remained concealed in the buildings near-by. Two hours later came the word that the Emperor was ready to surrender. Soon after this the Queen and her son, followed by Bahādur Shāh were before Hodson. The Emperor asked Hodson to confirm the pledge given by his messenger; Hodson complied with this last demand; "then, . . . betrayed by his own kinsmen, his city captured, his army defeated and dispersed, his hopes shattered, the last King of the house of Timour gave up his arms to an English subaltern, and was led captive to await his trial."<sup>1</sup> Bahādur Shāh was taken to the city and was kept under guard in a small building, known as Zinat Mahal and belonging to his wife. On entering Delhi he expressed a desire to see General Wilson, but the latter refused to show him this courtesy.

#### **Hodson murders the Princes**

Next morning having obtained permission from the General to capture the Princes; Hodson again came to Humāyūn's Tomb, he had one hundred horsemen with him and was accompanied by Rajab 'Ali and Ilāhi Bakhsh. Besides the three Princes, Mirzā Muḡhul, Khudr Sultān and Abū Bakr, there was a large crowd of the people in Humāyūn's Tomb; they were armed and capable of fighting.<sup>2</sup> They wanted to offer resistance, and fight to the last man, but the arch-traitors, Rajab 'Ali and Ilāhi Bakhsh, told the

on 21 September 1857, he importuned General Wilson to allow him to promise the King his life. . . . Hodson did give the King a quarter of his life before the royal family left the palace of Delhi, and I have also proved that he was not authorised to give that guarantee. I would not insult the intelligence of readers by demonstrating the obvious fact that he did not give it out of charity." Holmes, pp. 614-15.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 385.

<sup>2</sup> "In it were the princes and about 3000 Mussulman followers. In the suburb close by about 3000 more all armed, so it was rather a ticklish bit of work." Letter of Lieutenant Macdonell, second in command to Hodson, quoted in Hodson, p. 310.

Princes that the best course for them was to follow their father and ask for a guarantee for their lives,<sup>1</sup> but after two hours of fruitless negotiations Hodson refused the request. The helpless Princes were now put in a *rath* (covered chariot) which along with Hodson's party and a large crowd of men took the road to the city. When they were at a distance of one mile from Delhi, Hodson "ordered the Princes roughly to get out of the cart and strip,—for even in his thirst for blood, he had, as it would seem, an eye to the value of their outer clothes—he ordered them into the cart again, he seized a carbine from one of his troopers, and, then and there, with his own hand shot them down deliberately one after the other"<sup>2</sup> The heads of the Princes were removed from their bodies and according to some authorities, were sent to the wretched Emperor in a tray with a message from Hodson that "it was the *nadh* which had been stopped and for whose restoration he had joined the mutineers." With a grim sense of humour Bahādur Shāh is stated to have remarked : "Thank God, the Timurid Princes have

1 The traitors told the Princes that the Emperor was safe and quite well, giving them the impression that they would also be treated well  
See LusasynI, II, 453.

2 Hodson has been deservedly condemned for this act of butchery. Bosworth-Smith calls it "a stupid, cold-blooded three fold murder," because "the princes were unresisting prisoners in his hands. No evidence worthy of the name had been or could have been given as to their participation in the slaughter of our countrymen. Their very identity depended solely on the unsupported testimony of that traitorous villain the Mirza Elahee Buksh, who would have sworn away the life of his dearest friend if he had aught to gain thereby" Smith II, 122-23 Kaye's comments are : "He wanted blood. His senses were blinded by his brutal instincts." Kaye and Malletson, IV, 55.

The official view of Ilahi Bakhsh's "services" was however different. Commissioner Saunders, for instance, recommended him to the Secretary to Government, Panjab, in these words : "Mirza Ilahi Bukhsh performed a most undoubted service in detaining the Ex-King and preventing him from taking his departure with the rebel army where his name would have become a rallying point for the disaffected and rebellious throughout the country." C. B. Saunders to R. H. Davies, Secretary to Government, Panjab, dated 13 June, 1859. The letter is quoted in Mahdi Hussain, p. 354.



always appeared before their fathers with reddened faces *sarkh-ru*.”<sup>1</sup> ‘Allāmah Faḍl i Haqq does not repeat the words of Bahādur Shāh but he is definite that “they sent their severed heads in a tray to the King as a present”<sup>2</sup> Their heads were later hung on an old gate outside the city, which has since then popularly come to be known as the *Khūnī Darwāzah* (Blood Gate); “three bodies (were) exposed in the Kotwalee”;<sup>3</sup> here they remained till 24 September when they were removed and thrown into the river.

This was not the end of the atrocities inflicted on the *Salāḥīn* (the princes); “a large number, not less than twentynine, of these Princes had been picked up, lurking in the neighbourhood of the city.”<sup>4</sup> In their trials false evidence was produced against them by hostile and interested persons. Speaking about two of these Princes, Mirzā Mendhū and Bakhtāwar Shāh, Muir says: “I do not remember to have heard their names prominently mentioned in any of the rebel proceedings”<sup>5</sup> Some of the Princes were shot or hanged and

1 Nizāmī, *Dilhī ki Jan kani*, p. 53.

The incident is not mentioned by the Western writers but several contemporary authorities refer to it in some form or the other; and the action is quite in keeping with the character of Hodson who wrote in a letter dated 23 September, 1857: “I am not cruel, but I confess that I rejoice in the opportunity of ridding the earth of these ruffians” Quoted in Kaye and Mallsion, IV, 54 n.

2 *J P H S.*, Vol. V, p. 37. Also see Zāhir Dihlawī, p. 164. Khwājah Hassan Nī āmī relates on the authority of his father, who had heard it from a friend of Mirzā Ilāhī Bakht, that Hodson drank the blood of the Princes saying that he would have lost his mental balance if he had not tasted it. Mawlawī Zakā Allāh admits that the people of Delhi believed the story although he himself considered it improbable. Zakā Allāh p. 650.

3 Letter by an Engineer officer, quoted in Ball, I, 516; Also see Holmes, p. 387; *State Papers*, I, 369, also see Ball, I, 511.

Kamāl al-Dīn Haydar says that they were buried in the *Dargāh* of Khwājah Bāq-Billāh. See Husaynī, Vol. II, p. 453.

4 Smith, II, 150

5 *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 166

several were thrown into prison where they were treated like ordinary prisoners and subjected to hard labour<sup>1</sup>. No consideration was shown to health or age ; some of them died because they could not stand the torture to which they were subjected.<sup>2</sup> These incidents and other details available in contemporary records and books show that the officers of the Company's Army did not pay much heed to John Lawrence's orders, whose instructions were : "try them fairly, and if they are found guilty of having authorized or abetted the massacre of English women or children, by all means condemn them to death. But deal with no one as Hodson dealt with his victims."<sup>3</sup>

### **Bahadur Shah's "Trial"**

On receiving a report of Bahādūr Shāh's surrender John Lawrence sent a telegram to Barnes at Ambala that he would like him to be sent to Meerut. It was feared that his presence in Delhi or any other important place would be a source of encouragement to the Revolutionaries.<sup>4</sup> Saunders suggested that he should be sent to Govindgarh in Amritsar<sup>5</sup>. If he was to be kept in the Panjab, Lawrence thought, he could be lodged in the fort of Kangra<sup>6</sup>. Ultimately, it was decided that the Emperor should be tried by a

1 *Ghālib, Dastanbū in Kulliyāt i Na'hr i Ghālib*, (Lucknow, 1884) p. 401.

Twenty-four Princes were hanged in Delhi on 18 November, 1857 ; of these "two were brothers-in-law, two sons-in-law of the King, the remainder nephews, etc." *Intelligence Records*, I, 273.

2 One of the Princes, Mirzā Qayṣar, was the son of Shāh 'Alam and was very old and weak ; he was hanged. Another, Mirzā Muḥmūd, son of Akbar Shāh II, was suffering from gout and could not even move about ; he was also hanged. For other details see *Delhi ki Jānkani*, pp. 66-77.

3 For the wretched fate of the daughters and some relatives of Bahādūr Shāh, see Ja'fri, R. A., *Bahādūr Shāh Zafar awr unka 'Ahd* (Lahore, 1955), pp. 978-90. Smith, II, 150.

4 Telegram from Lawrence to Barnes, dated 22 September 1857, *Mutiny Records*, VII, pt. II, 104.

5 Telegram from General Wilson to Lawrence, dated 29 September, 1857, *Ibid.*, p. 109.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 130.

Commission.<sup>1</sup> At this stage arose the question of the guarantee given to Bahādur Shāh about his life. Wilson could not deny that he had given verbal instructions to Hodson that if the Emperor surrendered unconditionally his life should be guaranteed, but, he added, this was done on the recommendation of Saunders;<sup>2</sup> Saunders, however, denied this when he was called upon to submit an explanation<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, preparations for the trial of the Emperor were started in November and the final approval of the proposal by the Government of the Company was given early in 1858.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, on 27 January commenced the historic "trial" of Bahādur Shāh before a court comprised of British military officers in the *Divān-i-Khāy*. The trial was to have commenced at 11 A. M., but considerable delay was caused owing to a last minute change in the Commission, and Bahādur Shāh who had been brought in time was made to wait for an hour and a half. Perhaps this was done deliberately to insult the Emperor.<sup>5</sup> During the trial he was made to sit on "a mean charpoy" between the President of the Commission and the Judge-Advocate, his son, Prince Jawān Bakht, standing to his left. The charges having been read out to him, the Emperor was asked to give a reply to the question, "Guilty or not Guilty"? In the beginning the Emperor was unable to understand what it was all about, ultimately, however, he was persuaded to say "not Guilty." Knowing that the trial was a farce the Emperor took no interest whatsoever in its proceedings. "During the greater part of the day, the royal prisoner appeared to consider the proceedings as perfectly unimportant, and merely tiresome; and he occasionally

1 *Ibid.*, p. 135

2 Wilson to the Chief Commissioner, dated 27 December, *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 332

3 Saunders' explanation to the Government of India *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 335-36.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 371.

5 Zakā-allāh adds that in order to insult Bahādur Shāh British soldiers had painted his caricature portraits on the walls of the Lahore Gate of the Fort. The Emperor was shown with a hanging noose round his neck. See p. 723

found relief from ennui by dozing. His son appeared more animated, and laughed and chatted with his father's attendant without appearing at all embarrassed<sup>1</sup>. The Court could not tolerate this. The Prince was, therefore, ordered not to attend. The preliminary formalities having been gone through, Bahādur Shāh was charged with (1) encouraging, aiding and abetting Muhammad Bakht Khān and others in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the State, (2) encouraging, aiding and abetting Mirzā Moghul, "a subject of the British Government," and others to rebel and wage war against the State, (3) proclaiming and declaring himself King and Sovereign, "being a subject of the British Government in India," and (4) feloniously causing and becoming accessory to the murder of 49 persons at Delhi on the 16th of May 1857 within the precincts of the Palace.

Bahādur Shāh's 'defence'<sup>2</sup> is an interesting document; he had always regarded himself as the *de jure* Sovereign of Hind-Pakistan; as such he could not be tried by a Commission appointed by the Company; evidently it is for this reason that he thought it advisable not to open the question of the competence of the court. Of course, he knew that the sanction behind the Commission's authority was brute force, and no agency born of brute force has ever shown respect to the principles of justice and equity. Under these circumstances he thought it was useless to defend his case before the Commission. He, therefore, makes no reference to the Movement or the War of Independence in his statement. The only argument which he puts forward is that he was a tool in the hands of the Revolutionaries. Forced into a position where he had to say something in his 'defence' he gave a half-hearted and brief statement referring to a few incidents only. The crafty and traitorous Ilāhi Bakhtsh had demoralized him by persuading him to surrender and beg for his life.<sup>3</sup> After committing the blunder of surrendering himself to the enemy instead of

1 *Trial*, Introduction: p. VIII

2 *Ibid.*, 227-31

3 Kaye and Mollison, IV, 51.

acting on Bakht Khān's advice to continue the struggle. Bahādur Shāh had no choice but to assert that he was helpless. The logic of the situation created by his unconditional surrender demanded that he should tell the court that he could not help obeying the Revolutionaries. By making this statement, however, he could not vitiate the evidence that had been collected and produced about Miān Ḥasan 'Askari's work<sup>1</sup> in connection with the Movement. The Judge Advocate-General addressed the court,<sup>2</sup> and gave a resume of the evidence ; on the *same day* (9 March 1858) the Commission delivered its findings in these words :

"The Court, on the evidence before them, are of opinion that the Prisoner Muhammad Bahadur Shāh, Ex. King of Delhi, is guilty of all and every part of the charges preferred against him."<sup>3</sup>

John Lawrence, to whom the proceedings of the trial had been forwarded, wrote a lengthy minute,<sup>4</sup> to the Government of India recommending transportation of the Emperor overseas. The Government agreed, and Bahādur Shāh, escorted by a strong guard, proceeded towards Calcutta. The party of the Emperor consisted of sixteen persons including two of his wives, Zinat Maḥal and Tāj Maḥal, and his favourite and youthful son, Jawān Bakht. The Emperor wore ochre-coloured clothes, a mark of humility and renunciation of worldly pleasures.<sup>5</sup> From Calcutta he was taken to Rangoon where he lived as a prisoner till his death.<sup>6</sup> He passed his days

1 For Miān Ḥasan 'Askari, See *Dilli kī Sazā*, p. 63.

2 See *Trial* pp. 231-55.

3 See *Ibid.* p. 255

4 *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt II, 381 *et seq.*

5 For details see Ḥusaynī, II, 454.

6 He was given a paltry allowance of 600 rupees per month for the expenses of the party. Zinat Maḥal had some ornaments, which were utilized by the family in their moment of distress. Ḥusaynī, II, p. 454.

Also see 'Alawī. Amir Ahmad, *Bahādur Shāh Zāfar* (Lucknow), pp. 160-61.

in complete retirement and spent his time mostly in prayers ; his main hobby was the composing of poems.

Bahādur Shāh is regarded as one of the leading *ghazl*-writers of Urdu ; he also composed other types of poems, such as songs, *thumrīs*, etc.<sup>1</sup> His style is simple but elegant ; his poems are full of pathos and elicit feelings of sympathy and appreciation. The great scholar and lexicographer, Munshī Karīm al-Dīn, a contemporary of Bahādur Shāh, places him in the first rank of the poets of his day and says : "he composed poetry of an order which in these days none else can produce."<sup>2</sup> Besides composing *ghazals* Bahādur Shāh wrote a commentary of Shaykh Sa'di's famous *Gulistān* ; it is known as *Sharh Gulistān*.<sup>3</sup> In its introduction he mentions another work, *Tālīfāt i abu Zafar* in which he discussed the uses of words and terms.<sup>4</sup> He was a good calligraphist and used to train pupils in this art.<sup>5</sup>

The Revolution had created a terror among the British and the bureaucrats were obsessed with the idea that Bahādur Shāh could at any time again be made the leader of a revolt. They therefore took every care to keep him at a distance from his people. They feared that his poems which recorded his hardships and tribulations, though couched in metaphorical language, could easily stir the

1 An account of Bahādur Shāh's proficiency in writing poetry may be read in any work on the history of Urdu literature. His contemporaries considered him to be one of the best poets of their age. See for example, Carsin De Tassey's *Khuthbāt* (Urdu version), pp. 221-22

2 Muḡhī Karīm-al-Dīn was co-author with Fallon of a well-known Urdu-English Dictionary, he has produced an Urdu dictionary, *Karīm al-Luḡhāt*. Besides this, he wrote a *Ti dḥkirah* of Urdu poets, called *Ṭabaqāt-al-Shū'arā*, and a short history of Hind-Pakistan, *Tawārikh i Hind*, which was published in 1863 in the Government Press, Lahore.

3 The commentasy of *Gulistān* was written from the point of view of a *sūfi*. Bahādur Shāh was interested in Sufism from the days of his youth and his inclination towards it continued to grow with age. It was published in the *Matba' Sultānī*, Delhi, in 1259 A. H.

4 'Alawī, pp. 201-02.

5 See Zāhīr Dihlawī, p. 41 *et. seq.*

sympathies of the readers. Professional musicians were not allowed to recite his beautiful and highly popular songs.<sup>1</sup>

Bahādur Shāh expired on 7 November 1862.<sup>2</sup> His favourite Queen, Zinat Mahal, their son Jawān Bakht, and the latter's wife and daughter were the only members of his family by his side at the time of his death which was kept a secret. He was buried in the house in which he had lived as a prisoner; Hāfiz Muhammad Ibrāhīm, the tutor of Prince Jawān Bakht, led the prayers, and supervised the burial. The only trace of his grave was a zephyrus tree which stood near its head. As the grave was not looked after and no one was allowed to visit the place it was lost in an overgrowth of the bushes.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently the guard was removed, as it was thought that the grave was lost for ever. In 1903 'Abd al-Ṣalām Rafiqī, editor of the monthly *al-Rafiq*, became interested in repairing Bahādur Shāh's grave. He drew the attention of the people to this matter by writing an article in his magazine in the form of an appeal from Bahādur Shāh himself. He also met the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma and requested him to allow him to repair his grave. The Government did not agree to it and rejected the proposal; but Rafiqī did not give up his efforts, and the Nawab of Dacca also became interested in the matter. Ultimately the grave was released to the Muslims and they were allowed to raise a structure over it. In 1932 the Nizām of Hyderabad was approached by a deputation for a donation; he refused.


1 Ma āhirī, Ibrāhīm Ahmad, *Ringun men Bahādur Shāh Zafar ke ākhri ayyām* in the daily *Dawn* 1 *Jad'id*, Rangoon, 23 December, 1956.

2 The chronogram of his accession to the throne was *Uṭrāgh-i Dihlī, Bujhā kay Chirāgh-i Dihlī* yields the year of his death. See Alawī, p. 163.

3 It is interesting that almost in a prophetic strain Bahādur Shāh had composed a line about the disappearance of the traces of the grave.

بس مرئی قبر پر اے طغر کوئی فاجہ یہی کہاں پڑے  
وہ جو ٹوٹی فر کا تھا نشان اس سے ٹھوکروں سے اڑا دیا

*Translation* — After death, O 'afar' where is one to offer prayers on the grave? the marks of the broken grave have been effaced by the kicks (of some one)



**Bahādur Shāh's surrender**  
(From C. Ball's *History of the Indian Mutiny*)



شہزادہ ہندوستان کے تخت پر بیٹھے ہوئے

شاہ ہندوستان کے تخت پر بیٹھے ہوئے



Bahādur Shāh's tomb  
(The author, third from left, offering *fātiḥah*)

However, two years later a trust was set up and a tomb was constructed,<sup>1</sup> which has since then been visited by many a lover of freedom.

1 For details See *Rangūn min Bahādur Shāh Zafar ki qabr in Dawr i Jadid*, 23 December, 1956. The writer's main source of information were the articles published in *al Rafiq* and the *Safarnāmah i Barma* of Sayyid Abū Zafar N. dawī

## CHAPTER XI

### THE SACK OF DELHI

#### Delhi, the main centre of cultural life

Delhi's fall was much more than the end of a ruling dynasty or the loss of a capital town; with it closed one of the most important chapters in the history of our civilization. The Muslims had found the subcontinent broken politically into a number of States of different sizes and socially into countless groups and sub-groups created by the caste system of the Hindus. They had brought with themselves entirely different concepts of life; in the field of administration they had created a universal caliphal State, in social life classlessness [was the aim which their Prophet had directed them to achieve.<sup>1</sup> The impact of Islam on the people of Hind-Pakistan, therefore, brought about a drastic change in their political system; in social life and religious thought also its influence was considerable. The first wave of Muslim conquests led by Muhammad b. Qāsim (711 A. C.) was brought to a halt as a result of internal dissensions and for a time the political supremacy of Islam remained confined only to a portion of the subcontinent. The conquests of Sultān Muḥmūd of Ghazna in the early decades of the eleventh and those of Sultān Mu'izz al-Dīn in the last quarter of the twelfth century brought a vast area in the north under Muslim rule.

<sup>1</sup> See for instance the last sermon of the Prophet, known as *Khutbah Hujjat-al-Wida'* in which he refers to the social theory of Islam in these words;

لا فضل لعربي على عجمي ولا عجمي على عربي ولا لا حمر على اسود و  
لا لا سود على احمر الا بالتقوى

*Translation* .- (An 'Arab has no superiority over an 'Ajami, nor an 'Ajami over an 'Arab, the red-coloured races have no superiority over the black ones, nor the black over the red, except for their piety.)

The independent Sultanate of Delhi founded early in the thirteenth century became powerful empire in the course of a hundred years. Its capital, Dehli, was in the time of Sultān 'Alā-al-Dīn (d. 1316 A. C.) "the envy of Baghdād and Egypt, equal in rank to Constantinople and Bayt al-Muqaddas"<sup>1</sup>; it had a special sanctity for the people because it was the chief centre of cultural life, a seat of learning, and the abode of distinguished *shaykhs*, scholars and other leaders of the Muslims. Its development and progress as a cultural centre, was uninterrupted even during the periods when it was not the capital of the Sultanate or its successor, the Mughul Empire<sup>2</sup>

Along with the political expansion of the Sultanate the cultural forces of Islam were also finding their way into the remotest parts of the subcontinent mostly through the efforts of the selfless *sūfī shaykhs*. Under Muḥammad b. Tughluq's scheme of the so-called transference of the capital to Daulatabad the atmosphere became more favourable for the expansion of Islamic culture. The Mughul Emperors were great patrons of art and literature and had created good traditions by encouraging the growth and promotion of learning; these were kept alive even in the days of the decline of the Empire. It was during this period that the cultural life of Delhi was enriched by the achievements of eminent thinkers, writers and religious leaders, like Shāh Walī Allāh (d. 1762), Mirzā Maḥzar Jān Jānān (d. 1781) and Shāh Fakhr al-Dīn, and the well-known poets Khwājah Dard (d. 1784) Sawdā (d. 1781) and Mu (d. 1810). In the nineteenth century the names of Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 1823) his grandson, Shāh Muhammad Ishāq (d. 1845) Shāh Ghulām 'Alī (d. 1824) and Shāh 'Abd al-Ghānī (d. 1878) may be mentioned as the great scholars and *shaykhs* of the period; Ghālib (d. 1869) Dhawq (d. 1854), Mumin (d. 1851) and Shiftohi are counted among the most famous poets of Urdu. There were

1 Barani, *Tārīkh-i Firūz-Shāhī* (Bibliotheca India, 1862) p. 341.

2 Sikandar Lūdhi had shifted the capital to Agra. In the time of Shāhjahān Delhi was again made the seat of Government.

numerous other scholars, *shaykhs*, poets and artists who contributed to the growth and development of the cultural life of Delhi.

It was this great centre of Islamic civilization in Hind-Pakistan which was destroyed by the revengeful soldiers of the British Army, when they entered the city. There is abundant recorded evidence left by eye-witnesses and contemporary writers to give us an idea of the devastation wrought by the British soldiers.

#### **Evacuation enmasse**

The assault of 14 September created a stir in the life of the people of Delhi, and when British forces made some headway into the city on the 17th the defenders decided to fight for every inch of ground. But with the departure of the Emperor, the people became demoralized and began to leave the city; some families were able to escape to the eastern districts across the boat-bridge on the Jamunā, but the overwhelming majority of the citizens poured forth from the Delhi Gate and moved southwards in the direction of Khwājan Qutb al-Din's *Da'gāh* taking shelter in the fields, the ruins of old monuments, the tombs, and other places. In their distress the evacuees had left all their wealth and belongings except small sums of money or ornaments that they could carry along with them. Much of what they were able to take with them was robbed by the Gujars. A large number of Hindus and some Muslims who had remained loyal to the British naturally decided not to leave their houses. The poorer sections of the people wanted to remain in the city, but they were forced out. The soldiers had orders to drag the people out of their houses and present them before Colonel Burn who was appointed military governor and held his office in the house of a merchant, Qutb al-Din. The male members of the families were forced to carry on their heads bundles containing articles which were considered essential—they were followed by their women and children weeping and crying bitterly. The Colonel ordered his men to pick up from

their burdens anything that was worth plundering, and then take them to Lahore Gate and push them out of the city.<sup>1</sup>

### Indiscriminate plundering and killing

When entering the city the British soldiers shot the people indiscriminately.<sup>2</sup> The quarter of the town known as *Kūchah i Chīlān* was the special object of victimisation because the houses of many old and leading Muslim families were situated in or near it. The well-known historian, Zakā Allāh, also lived there. He was friendly to the British, but even he had to leave the city. He says that a European soldier had entered the house of a Muslim Nawāb with the intention of committing rape, but the owner of the house resisted and wounded him. In retaliation an order was issued by the Commanding Officer that all the male persons of the *maḥallah* should be massacred or captured alive. The order was brutally carried out: many were butchered within the four-walls of their houses and those who were captured alive were tied with ropes and shot on the bank of the Jamunā. Luckily two of them Wazir al Dīn, a nephew of Maw'ānā *Sahbāi* and Muṣṭafā Beg, survived. According to Zahir Dīhlāwī the number of the residents of this *maḥallah* shot by the soldiers on the bank of the river was fourteen hundred; twenty-one members of Sahbāi's family were among these unfortunate victims.<sup>3</sup>

However, a large part of the population having left the city, "it fared ill indeed with those few natives who, trusting to their friendly feelings towards us or wearied out with the sufferings which they had undergone at the hands of their own countrymen, thought more of saving their houses or the remnant of their

1 *Jān-Kamī* p. 61; Zakā Allāh, p. 702.

2 John Lawrence had to write to General Penny: "No man is more ready to hang or shoot mutineers and murderers than I am, but unless we endeavour to distinguish friend from foe, we shall unite all classes against us." Smith, II, 158. Also see complaint of Unied Singh, tutor of Mahārāja Holkar. *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, 284-86; Zakā Allāh, p. 705.

3 *Jān-Kamī*, 64; Zahir, p. 171.

property more than lives. Few of these escaped."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, loot had begun simultaneously with the entry of British forces. Muir writes to Edmonstone that there were only ten men in the Red Fort when it was stormed on 20 September; "they were all killed, and the first comers served themselves to some nice loot. . . ."<sup>2</sup> On the following day, Griffiths reports, "not a single house or building remained intact . . ." and the streets of the city were "deserted and silent, they resembled a city of the dead . . . It was difficult to realize that we were passing through what had been only a few days before, the abode of thousands of people."<sup>3</sup>

Keith Young briefly refers to the decorations and equipment of a house which was of course plundered.<sup>4</sup> Three days of unrestricted loot were allowed to the Army,<sup>5</sup> which meant that Bahadur *Shāh* was treated as a belligerent, although he was later tried for treason. Nothing could be more illogical than treating Delhi as a captured city from a belligerent power and at the same time trying the Emperor as a traitor.

The soldiers took the fullest advantage of the permission to loot. 'Like hounds drawing a cover, they took street by street, and, entering one deserted house after another, tapped each

1 Bosworth Smith, II, 146.

2 *Intelligence Records*, I, 125.

3 Griffiths, C. J. *Narrative of the Siege of Delhi* (London, 1910), p. 199.

4 On 19 September he writes to his wife, "there are lots of spare houses. The one where the Rifles are is one of the best houses I have seen in India, and the very largest; the whole of the regiment is there, officers and men, and there are dozens of rooms still unoccupied. The house is beautifully furnished - chandeliers, large mirrors, couches etc. Most of the mirrors were smashed by our troops - when we first came in, it was great pity, but there is no preventing the men committing all kinds of devastation. I was amused when I went over the house (it belongs to a native noble Ahmed Ali Khan) to see most of the men of the Rifles lying on nice Mirzapore carpets. The Prize Agents will however, take possession of all these in time." Young, pp. 297-98.

5 Bosworth Smith defend. this loot in these words "if three days for looting had not been allowed them by the authorities, they would, probably, have taken it to themselves." See vol. II, 146-147. This is an argument which can satisfy but very few peoples.

wall or panel with the delicate touch of an artist, poured water over the floors, observing where it sank through fastest, and then, as though they had been gifted with the eye of an eagle, the ear of the Red Indian, or the nose of the bloodhound, cut their way straight through to the cranny or the cupboard, or the underground jars which contained the savings of a lifetime or of generations. Happily it was a city of the dead which they were plundering." These remarks of Bosworth Smith refer to "the Sikhs and other Punjabi races;" by implication he suggests that the Hind-Pakistāni soldiers of the British Army were the greatest looters. The truth, however, is that all sections of the Army indulged in looting and killing Griffiths writes: "To my certain knowledge, also many soldiers of the English regiments got possession of jewellery and gold ornaments taken from the bodies of the slain sepoy and city inhabitants, and I was shown by men of my regiment strings of pearls and gold mohurs which had fallen into their hands."<sup>1</sup>

An idea of the destruction wrought by the British forces in three days of unrestricted loot can be formed by the condition of the city as Lord Roberts saw it on the morning of 24 September. "Our way from the Lahore Gate by the Chandi Chauk," he writes, "led through a veritable city of the dead; not a sound was to be heard but the falling of our own footsteps; not a living creature was to be seen. Dead bodies were strewn about in all directions, in every attitude that the death struggle had caused them to assume, and in every stage of decomposition. We marched in silence, or involuntarily spoke in whispers, as though fearing to disturb those ghastly remains of humanity. The sights we encountered were horrible and sickening to the last degree. Here a dog gnawed at an uncovered limb; there a vulture, disturbed by our approach from its loathsome meal, but too completely gorged to fly, fluttered away to a safer distance. In many instances the position of the bodies were appallingly life-like. Some lay with their arms uplifted

<sup>1</sup> Griffiths, p. 232



as if beckoning, and, indeed, the whole scene was weird and terrible beyond description. Our horses seemed to feel the horror of it as much as we did ; for they shook and snorted in evident terror.”<sup>1</sup>

### **Prize Agents**

After three days, plundering assumed a different shape ; the Prize Agents appointed by the Government started their work and carried it out with vengeance. A plan to plunder the city through these Agents had been formed even before the assault;<sup>2</sup> in any case they had been appointed earlier than 19 September<sup>3</sup> They followed no laws and had no checks on their activities. Colonel Pelham Burn, Military Governor of Delhi, was ultimately forced to write to John Lawrence about their misconduct.<sup>4</sup> In spite of the appointment of the Prize Agents, private plundering continued. Neither the Prize Agents nor private plundering parties showed any regard to the conduct of their victims during the siege. The Military Governor appealed to Major-General Penny to lay down defined rules regarding the collection of loot ; he suggested that the matter should be referred to John Lawrence.<sup>5</sup> The latter wrote to the Governor-General-in-Council, but pending a final decision he authorized Penny to restrain the Prize Agents and keep them “within such bounds as may appear to you just and reasonable ;” he also added that “the property of bankers and others who took no active part in the rebellion” was not to be touched.<sup>6</sup> The Company’s Government issued orders in the last week of November; in compliance with this notification the Prize Agents were withdrawn by an order of General Penny, dated 15 December, which said

1 Roberts, I, 258-59.

2 Young, p. 263

3 *Ibid*, p. 298.

4 Lieutenant-Colonel Burn to Major-General N Penny, Commander, Delhi Field Force, dated 18 October 1857. See *Mutiny Records*, VII part II, p. 272.

5 *Ibid* p. 274

6 *Ibid.*, p. 276

that "search for, and appropriation, of private property in the city of De'hi shall cease from this date."<sup>1</sup>

The value of the property seized by the plundering soldiery and the Prize Agents must have been enormous ; most of the loot however, seems to have gone into the coffers of individuals. Officially, "not more than fifteen lakhs of rupees have been, or will be realized by the Prize Agents," although "we found that almost every thing of any value, with the exception of the ex-King's jewels and those of Begum Zeenut Mahul, had been disposed of by public auction "<sup>2</sup> Obviously the soldiers and Prize Agents robbed the Government of its share of loot on a large scale. The Crown jewels seized by the Army were also to be treated as prize money.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Destruction of buildings, bazaar and cultural institutions etc.**

It is not easy to assess the extent of devastation caused by this unrestricted plunder by the British soldiers and the Prize Agents : Delhi was reduced to a third rate town with nothing of distinction left in it, except old monuments which it would have benefited no

1 *Field Force order dated 15 December 1857. Ibid.*, p 281.

2 Military Governor of Delhi to the Chief Commissshioner. *Ibid.*, 289-90. It may be of some interest to add that in his complaint Umed Singh who was, to quote his own words, one of the old servants and partisans of the English gives some details about his own house. He says : "The gates of the city were shut, ingress and egress was by a ticket, and the digging of the best houses for hidden and buried property commenced. Three officers with a few builders are said to have come to my once grand house, and having demolished it, are said to have carried I don't know what ! Our property in cash, gold and jewels, silver vessels, shawls and furniture, alone was never less—it might be more—than two lacs. I have got a list of it all " *Mutiny Records*, VII part II, p 285.

Muir wrote to Sherer on 31 October ; "The plunder daily being found in the city is more than enormous ; it is almost incredible". *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 239

3 The decision of the Governor-General was communicated to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab in a letter dated Allahabad, 20 March 1858. *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. II, p 298. Even Hindu temples did not escape plunder and desecration. For a graphic account of the desecration of a "a hideous idol" and the plundering of a temple by British officers, see Griffiths, pp 245-46

one to demolish. However, there is sufficient contemporary evidence to form an idea of the destruction of houses, uprooting of families and conversion of prosperous quarters of the city into wildernesses. The pages, of Mawlawi Zakā-Allāh's *Tārīkh-i 'Urūj-i Inglīshīyah*, Ghulām Husayn's *Nuṣratnāmah* and Ghālib's letters besides some other contemporary works contain horrifying details and make dismal reading.<sup>1</sup> A few references to the fate of some of the well-known buildings and sites may be made. The more enthusiastic among the British officers wanted the city to be completely destroyed and all its buildings razed to the ground; some were anxious to see the *Jāmi' Masjid* converted into a church. It was, however, given over to the Army and "the Punjab Rifles were quartered" in it.<sup>2</sup> The Red Fort was the chief centre of opposition; it is not surprising therefore that some officers insisted on the total destruction.<sup>3</sup> Lawrence was against all such proposals, and refused to accept them. Despite his orders however some houses were burnt to ashes.<sup>4</sup> Among the buildings and bazars demolished by the orders of the British authorities Chawk Sa'd-Allah Khān (an extremely beautiful quarter adjacent to the Delhi Gate of the Fort), Urdū bāzār, Khānam kā bāzār, Khān Dawrān kī Hawilī and Angūrī Bāgh may be mentioned; most of the houses and shops from the *Jāmi' Masjid* to the Rajghat Gate and from Calcutta Gate to Lahore Gate were either completely or partially destroyed. Within the Fort also a number of buildings and apartments were demolished. Ghālib says that the builder of the city would not have taken so much care to raise the structures as the Rulers of the day took in razing them to the ground. Most of the buildings inside the Fort and some in the city were so strong that axes and spades were bro-

1 It may be noted that these writers were pro-British and are extremely cautious in their statements.

2 Griffiths, p. 207.

3 Bosworth Smith, II, 149.

4 Mawlanā Zakā-Allāh refers to such incidents in an interesting manner. He says that "if a house caught fire for some reason no effort was made to extinguish it." p. 710.

ken; inside the Palace, mines of powder had to be laid and exploded.<sup>1</sup>

### Executions

Of the persons who were killed by the soldiers of the British Army or executed under orders of the authorities no estimate can possibly be made. Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥaydar whose sympathies are with the British puts the figure of executions of the Muslims at twenty-seven thousand. He adds: "general massacre lasted for seven days, it is not known how many people were butchered .. even children were massacred and it is not possible to describe how the women were treated."<sup>2</sup> In any case, the judicial machinery set up by the Government acted in a most irresponsible manner.<sup>3</sup> A Military Commission was appointed to try persons accused of rebellion; their sentences were executed by a Provost-Marshal "Offenders," wrote a dispassionate author, "who were seized were handed over to a Military Commission to be tried. The work went on with celerity. Death was almost the only punishment and condemnation almost the only issue of a trial."<sup>4</sup>

The executions were carried out in the main street of the city, the Chandni Chawk, in front of the Kotwalī. A four square gallows was erected here; it soon became "a fashionable lounge" for the

1 *Ḥalīb to Shāfaq* See Ikram, S.M., *Hayāt i Ḥalīb* (Lahore), p. 156.

2 Husaynī, II, 454. In any case "for a long period after the capture of Delhi," says Griffiths, "executions by hanging were of common occurrence in the city, and the hands of the old provost-sergeant were full. Disguised sepoys and inhabitants taken with arms in their possession had short shrift, and were at once consigned to the gallows, a batch of ten one day suffering death opposite the Kotwalī." See Griffiths, *op. cit.* 213-14.

3 Bosworth Smith refers to this in these words: 'What wonder, that many individuals, seeing the reckless manner in which powers of life and death had been granted to men, some at least of whom were likely to use them in anything but a judicial spirit, claimed and put into exercise the same terrible right for themselves; that there was a very carnival of revenge, and that deeds were done, of which those who were compelled to witness them speak, even now, with bated breath?' See vol II 154.

4 *Ibid.*, 153 n

English officers who wanted to enjoy the sight. They sat on chairs arranged in front of a shop to witness the horrid scenes of "the death agonies of the men who dangled in groups from all four cross-beams at once, and whose bodies were soon deftly dropped, one on the top of another, into a cart beneath, to make room for fresh victims."<sup>1</sup> The Commission did not bother about the evidence against the accused ; if he looked like a soldier, that was enough.<sup>2</sup> In another case an innocent person was hanged because he bore the name of a 'rebel.'<sup>3</sup>

### Delhi Agency Estates

Under the Delhi Agency there were seven estates—Jhajjar, Farrukhnagar, Ballabhgarh, Loharu, Dujana and Pataudi. The Chiefs of the last two estates remained loyal to the British.<sup>4</sup> Raja Nahar Singh of Ballabhgarh supported the Revolutionary Government and faithfully obeyed the instructions issued to him in connection with the maintenance of peace and order, recruitment of forces and collection of funds for the War. Mun'in al-Dīn says that he was virtually the governor of the city during the period of the siege. He was executed on 7 January, 1858.<sup>5</sup> Aḥmad 'Alī Khān Bilūch the Chief of Farrukhnagar, was a supporter of the Revolution ; he had to pay for it with his life and was hanged in Delhi.<sup>6</sup> Nawāb 'Abd al-Rahmān Khān of Jhajjar also supported the Revolution, but on occasions his attitude became wavering

1 Bosworth Smith II, 145

2 *Ibid*

3 Jafri, Rais Aḥmad, *Bahādur Shāh aur unkā 'ahd* (Lahore, 1955) p. 1092.

4 Husaynī, II, 456-57, also see *Jan-Kani*, p. 72.

5 *Trial*, pp. 4961. Husaynī, II, 456-57. Lawrence wrote to Saunders that he had heard "a rumour that the Bullabhgarh Raja is half-witted. If this be the case the Commission should be duly informed ; we should not hang beings who are not able to take care of themselves". The Commission, however, thought that he was perfectly sane and sentenced him to death. See Bosworth Smith. II, 156 ; *TNA*, p. 73

6 *Sazā*, p. 64, *Jān-Kāni* p. 72 ; Husaynī, II, 456-57.

His father-in-law, 'Abd al-Ṣamād Khān was, however, an active leader of the Revolutionaries. He had managed to escape along with Bakht Khān, but his son-in-law was sentenced to death and hanged on 23 December, 1857, in spite of his cautious attitude towards the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> It is stated that the mother of the Nawab reached the place where his son was hanged, and embracing his dead body she began to weep bitterly. This pitiable scene moved the onlookers, many of whom had tears in their eyes. Bahādur Jang Khān of Bahādurgarh had remained inactive; even as such he was not spared; his entire estate was confiscated.<sup>2</sup> The Chiefs of Loharu, Amin al-Dīn Khān and Dīā al-Dīn Khān were not active Revolutionaries, although they were in sympathy with the Movement and were among the courtiers and advisers of Bahādur Shāh. On the fall of Delhi they managed to escape with their families and, according to *Ghālīb*, they had three elephants, forty horses and other paraphernalia with them. When they were staying at Mihrāuli, twelve miles from Delhi, plundering parties of the soldiers robbed them of every thing except the clothes on their bodies.<sup>3</sup> Reduced to a state of destitution they resumed their journey to Loharu; on the way they were invited by the Nawab of Dujana to accept his hospitality. When Saunders, the Commissioner of Delhi, came to know of it, he asked the Nawab to surrender them. They were surrendered,<sup>4</sup> and were imprisoned in the Fort. Later they had to face a

1 Metcalfe claimed to be a personal friend of Nawab 'Abd al-Rahmān Khān. When Delhi was seized by the Revolutionaries, Metcalfe managed to escape from there and made his way to Jhajjar, but "the town was in a condition of great excitement." The Nawab therefore advised Metcalfe not to stay there and sent him a sum of one hundred rupees. Metcalfe succeeded in reaching Skinner's house. It is strange that Metcalfe did nothing to save his erstwhile friend from the gallows. *T. N. N.*, p. 243; *Mutiny Records*, VIII, part II, 376. *Intelligence Records* I, 319

2 *Husaynī*, II, 457

3 *Dastanbū*, p. 399.

4 Lawrence to the Governor-General dated 20 October, 1857 in *Mutiny Records* VII, Pt. II, 189; also see *Jān-Kānī*, p. 72

trial, but were ultimately released ; they had to pay, however, a sum of six lakhs of rupees as ransom.<sup>1</sup>

### Notables

Besides the Mughul Princes and Chiefs of the Estates in the Delhi Agency a large number of leading persons were hanged or shot by the authorities. In the ghastly tragedy of the *Kūchah i Chīlān*, already mentioned, the great scholar-poet *Ṣahbāi* was killed ; he was innocent and had not played an active role in the Revolution.<sup>2</sup> Muzaffar al-Dawlah was a well-to-do person who had no interest in politics; he was sentenced to death because the envoy of Lucknow to the Court of Bahādur *Shāh* was his friend and had stayed with him.<sup>3</sup> Amir Mirzā, the father-in-law of the author of *Dāstān i Ghadhī*, had given protection to some Christian women. After the fall of the city a number of Muslim families took shelter in his house in the hope that some consideration would be shown to him for having protected the Christians, but the plundering parties of British soldiers came to his house, one after the other, and looted his property until nothing of valuables was left there. One morning two British soldiers came to him and asked him to surrender his wealth. Amir Mirzā said he had none left with him ; instantly he was shot dead.<sup>4</sup> Nawab Akbar was hanged merely on suspicion ;<sup>5</sup> Nawab Mir *Khān*, *jagirdar* of Palwal, was executed because he used to pay visits to one of the Princes.<sup>6</sup> Nizām al-Dīn *Khān*, son of Hakim *Sharaf al-Dīn Khān*, and *Khilīfah* Ismā'īl, son of the famous poet, *Zawq*, were arrested and hanged, although

1 Husaynī, II, p. 457

2 The well-known poet *Āzurdah* refers to *Ṣahbāi*'s murder in the following couplet.

کیوں کر آزدہ نکل جائے یہ سودائی ہو      قتل اس طرح سے ہے حرم حوض صہبائی ہو

Translation :- How is it possible for *Āzurdah* not to go into exile and become insane, when an innocent man like *Sahbai* is murdered so (mercilessly)

3 Husaynī, II.

4 *Zāhir Dīhlawī*, pp. 168-69

5 *Suzā*, p. 52

6 *Ibid*, p. 51

they were absolutely innocent.<sup>1</sup> Mawlawī Muḥammad Bāqar, the father of the famous Urdu writer, *Āzād*, was not an active Revolutionary ; on the contrary he had tried to save the life of Taylor, Principal of the Delhi College by keeping him in his house. When the Revolutionaries came to know of it, they attacked the house of the Mawlawī. Taylor had left his place ; but he was later captured and put to death. Mawlawī Muḥammad Bāqar was executed, because he could not save Taylor's life<sup>2</sup> Neither age nor proficiency in fine arts and learning could save innocent people from the gallows. Sayyid Aḥmad Miān *Mir Panjah-Kash* was the best calligraphist of his time and had attained wide reputation for his excellent hand ; paradoxically enough he was also an expert in the art of *panjah-kashī* for which extra strong fingers are needed ; he was an old man of ninety-five. None of these considerations could save him because he was associated with the *Darbār* of Bahādur Shāh.<sup>3</sup> Besides these, the cases of a number of scholars and leading persons have been mentioned by contemporary writers.<sup>4</sup>

### Libraries, khanqahs and madrasahs destroyed

The story of the sack of Delhi would remain incomplete if a reference, however brief, is not made to the destruction of libraries, *khānqahs*, colleges and other cultural institutions of the city. Foremost among the collections of rare and useful books was the Imperial Library. Most of the Mughul Emperors were interested in learning, and some of them patronized art. Akbar had left a large collection having 24,000 volumes,<sup>5</sup> to which additions must have been made by his illustrious successors.

1 *Ibid*, p. 58.

2 It has been stated that Taylor had given to the Mawlawī a packet containing some papers with a request that they should be handed over to some European officer. The Mawlawī agreed and did it ; Taylor had written on one of the papers that if the Mawlawī had so desired he could have saved his life.

3 *Sazā*, p. 55.

4 See, for instance, *Ghadr ki Subh wa Shām*, pp. 86-89.

5 See Smith, V.A., *Akbar, the Great Mogul* (Reprint, Delhi, 1958), pp. 307-08.



Mufti Şadr al-Dīn Āzurdah was one of the top-ranking scholars of the nineteenth century; he was a pupil of Şah 'Abd al-'Aziz, and was widely respected for his learning and piety. For about twenty-five years he had served the East India Company as the Şadr al-Şudūr of Delhi. During the Revolution he was associated with the Emperor's Court and was one of the signatories of the famous *fatwā of jihād*. He was arrested by the British Government and kept in custody. Subsequently he was released,<sup>1</sup> but his extensive property and collection of books were confiscated.<sup>2</sup> He was reduced to such a state of poverty that from his death-bed he had to make an appeal to the Ruler of Rampur for a stipend for his wife.<sup>3</sup>

Nawab Dīyā al-Dīn Ahmad Khān was the son of Ahmad Bakhsh, Chief of Loharu. He wrote poetry in Persian and Urdu with *Rakhshān* and *Nayyar* respectively as his pseudonyms. He was greatly interested in collecting books. *Ghālīb* refers to him as a brother, mentions his collection frequently and laments its loss in these words: "the library which, I fear to say, was worth twenty thousand rupees, has been plundered". Dīyā al-Dīn had a good collection of historical works, and the British historian Elliot had received considerable help from him in compiling his well-known History of Hind Pakistan. Along with Dīyā al-Dīn's library *Ghālīb* mentions the collection of Naẓir Husayn Mirzā: the houses of both were swept clean of their belongings.<sup>4</sup> Şhāh Walī-Allāh had

1 With his signature of the *fatwā* he had written the words ماله (without dots or diacritical marks). This can have two different readings according to the position of dots بالخير (bil Khayr) which means "with a good end", and بالجبر (under compulsion). The Mufti stated that he had written بالجبر (bil jabr) and had the same in his mind while other people thought it was bil khayr. He was acquitted by the Court. If this story is correct and if he had written bil jabr avoiding the dots deliberately the Mufti can not be given much credit for his courage of conviction. See Sherwani, M. 'Abd al-Shāhid "Khān, Bāzihī Hindustān, (Bijnor, 1947), p. 171.

2 Jilani, Faqir Muḥammad Ḥadāiq al-'Ānāfiyah p. 482.

3 Kitābīki Adab, (quoted in 'Afrī, Bahādur Shāh Zafar, p. 349.

4 Ikram p. 160

a good library ; in the time of his son, Shāh 'Abd al-'Aziz, considerable additions were made, and it had become the largest collection of books on religious learning in Delhi. Similarly the libraries of the descendants of Shaykh 'Abd al-Haqq and Khwājah : Dard were among the good private collections of Delhi.<sup>1</sup>

Some of the well-known khānqahs and colleges were also destroyed. Between the Red Fort and the Jāmi' Masjid stood the khānqah of Shāh Kalim Allāh Jahānābādī (d. 1729) ; it had become a regular colony where most of his descendants lived. "God only knows," writes Ghālīb, "where have the residents of this locality gone, if they ever survived the bullet ; they had some relics of the shaykh." An eminent scholar, as the Shaykh was, his relics must have included rare manuscripts. The khānqah was razed to the ground, his grave, which stands even today, alone escaping destruction.<sup>2</sup> Another leading khānqah destroyed in the holocaust was that of Mirzā Maẓhar Jān Jānān.

Of the numerous mosques that were either demolished or suffered at the hands of the retaliators only a few may be mentioned ; besides their sanctity as houses of worship some of them were excellent monuments showing the development of Muslim architecture. The Akbarābādī Masjid which is now covered by the lawns of the Edward Park was, in the words of Syed Ahmad Khan, "a mosque, attractive, heart-ravishing, delightful and life-giving ;" "as a prominent building of Shāh Jahān's Delhi. It was built by a wife of the Emperor, who was known as Akbarābādī Khātūn. It was built of red stone and had a marble pish-tāq. Around the mosque were rows of cubicles (hujrahs) for the students who lived there. Shāh Wali-Allāh's two sons, Shāh 'Abd al-Qādir (d. 1814) and Shāh Rafī' al-Dīn (d. 1817) used to lecture to their pupils in this mosque. A market known as the Urdu Bāzār lay

Ikram, p. 160.

Nizāmī, Khaliq Ahmad Tārīkh-i Mashā'ikh-i Chishtī, p. 422 ; also see Ghālīb to Ḥakīm Sayyid Ahmad Ḥasan Mawdūdī in Mihr Ghulam II, Khutbat-i Ghālīb, (Lahore), II, 138.

between the *Akbarāhādī Masjid* and the Lahore Gate of the Fort. It was demolished under orders of the British authorities.<sup>1</sup>

The *Zinat al-Masājīd*, second only to the *Jāmi' Masjid* in grandeur and size, was built by 'Ālamgīr's younger daughter, Zinat al-Nisā.<sup>2</sup> It was seized by the British Government and placed at the disposal of the Army. Some parts of the beautiful edifice were demolished including the tomb of Princess Zinat al-Nisā, which was attached to its court-yard; it was further defaced by the construction of ugly walls which were removed during the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon.<sup>3</sup>

### The Jāmi' Masjid

The *Jāmi' Masjid* of *Shāh Jahān*, one of the prettiest mosques of the world and a fine specimen of Muslim architecture in this land, was, since its construction, looked upon as a place of special interest and sanctity. During the Revolutionary regime, as has been stated previously, it had played a vital role; it was in this mosque that the *fatwā* of *jihād* was proclaimed. The British soldiers and officers were full of fury against it because it had defied their attacks; they wanted it to be demolished or as an alternative converted into a church. "Others," says Bosworth, "in the still worse spirit of religious savagery, urged that the *Jumma masjid*, one of the noblest Muslim buildings in the world, should be destroyed, or, at least, that the cross should be planted on its summit and that it should be turned bodily into a Christian church."<sup>4</sup> This was considered impolitic, but the revenge of the victor took another form; the mosque was placed at the disposal of the Sikh soldiers to be used as barracks. Zakā-Allāh writes: "The *Jāmi'*


1 Khan Sved Ahmed, *Āthār al-Jānādīd* (ed. S. Moin ul Haq, Karachi, 1966), p. 178, *Baḥār al-Dīn op. cit.*, II, 140-42.

2 For a detailed description of the mosque before the Revolution see *Āthār*, p. 180 and *Baḥār al-Dīn*, II, 127-32.

3 *Baḥār al-Dīn*, II, p. 131.

For the desecration and demolition of other mosques see Ja'fari, pp. 1013-20.

4 Bosworth Smith, *op. cit.*, II, 149.



Mawlawi Fayd Aḥmad Ruswā Badāyūni  
(From Imdād Ṣābirī's *Mujahid Shu'arā*)



Mawlawī Kifāyat 'Alī Kāfi  
(From Imdād ṣābirī's *Mujahid Shu'arā*)



... 21-1-11 11:11



Imām Bakhsh Shāhbāī

*Masjid* was desecrated in this way that it was used as barracks for the Sikh soldiers ; no effort was made to avoid using (parts of) it as lavatories and urinals ; pigs were slaughtered and their flesh was cooked within its precincts"<sup>1</sup> Subsequently the Sikh soldiers were ordered to vacate the mosque, but it was locked up, and the Muslims were not allowed to use it as a house of worship. It is not easy to realize the intensity of their grief at being deprived of the right of praying in the great mosque.<sup>2</sup> After four years the Government released the mosque but laid down a number of conditions with regard to the offering of prayers by the Muslims. They were to leave the mosque immediately after prayers ; non-Muslims could enter it, and sentries were to be posted at its gates. The Managing Committee had to give an undertaking that in case any thing was done in the mosque against the wishes of the Government it would have the right of locking it up.<sup>3</sup>

The details of the acts of vandalism, ruthless killings and "indiscriminate judicial murders,"<sup>4</sup> committed by the British soldiery in Delhi could not have been known in other areas in their full enormity. Within a week of the entry of British forces the city had become "a fearful picture of desolation ; the retribution has indeed been awful".<sup>5</sup> However, on the basis of the limited information which reached Lahore the chief Commissioner thought it necessary to give a warning to the authorities concerned. On 23 October he wrote to Saunders : "It is too bad, the way that the troops are allowed to plunder."<sup>6</sup> It appears

1 Zakā Allāh, p. 716. Also see previous references.

2 The poet Qurbān 'Alī Beg *Sālik* refers to the feelings of the Muslims in the following line :

نہ اذان ہے نہ کوئی جاتا ہے جب اس کو دیکھے خالی ہو حیر آتا ہے

(Neither the prayers are offered, nor is the *adhān* called there ; when one sees it empty one's heart is touched with pity), See Ja'fri, p. 1131.

3 Ja'fri, p. 1011

4 For Canning's comments on the "acts of tyranny, cruelty, and injustice of the most brutal and horrible nature," see Bosworth Smith, II, 164.

5 Muir to Edmonstone, referring to Saunderson's account. *Intelligence Records*, I, 124.

6 Bosworth Smith, II, 155

that plundering continued even after the final withdrawal of the Prize Agents in December, 1857. Late in February in the following year Lawrence visited Delhi and found that "the work of plunder and bloodshed was still going on. The people . . . were still being arrested in large numbers, and many of them hanged or put in irons."<sup>1</sup> When he thought he had put a final stop to these things he left Delhi ; but he had to return because he learnt that a prisoner had been executed in defiance of his orders. He condemned the action in "a severe despatch." The Magistrate of the city requested him to modify some strong of his expressions. "No," replied Lawrence, "there is not a word of it I will alter. It is not half strong enough."<sup>2</sup> Besides Lawrence some other British officers also thought that their countrymen had been doing shameless things. "I have heard", wrote Lord Elphinstone to Lawrence on 25 November, "some very painful accounts of the doings of our troops at Delhi since the place has been taken. Friend and foe are treated alike. The pillage has been more complete than even that of Nadir Shāh".<sup>3</sup> In comparing British vandalism with Nādir Shāh's sack of Delhi, Elphinstone has not taken all factors into consideration : Nādir Shāh's massacre lasted for seven hours (8 A. M. to 3 P. M.)<sup>4</sup> only, while British killings continued for months ; Nādir Shāh collected his booty from the rich citizens, but the British Army made no distinction between the rich and the poor, and most of the wealth plundered by them went to the coffers of the individuals.<sup>5</sup>

1 Bosworth Smith, II, pp. 159-60

2 *Ibid*, p. 160

3 *Ibid*, p. 162

4 Fraser, James *The History of Nadir Shah* (Second edition, London, 1742), p. 185.

5 The number of persons massacred by Nādir's men has been given as 8000 by one historian and 30000 by another. Against these figures the 27000 executions (mentioned in *Qaysar al Tawārikh*) besides individual killings in the streets make horrible record. On 25 October the wife of the Commissioner of Delhi wrote, "every native that could be found was killed by the soldiers, women and children were spared" Quoted in Spear, *Twilight of the Mughuls* (Cambridge 1951) p. 218.

Canning was deeply affected by the horrors of British vandalism in Delhi, and in a letter addressed to the Queen he attributed it to the "rabid and indiscriminate vindictiveness . . . even amongst men who ought to set a better example". The Queen shared his "feelings of sorrow and indignation," but most of the English people did not ; in fact she lamented the "unchristian spirit shown . . . here by the public towards India in general, and towards Sepoys without discrimination".<sup>1</sup> In England a section of the press condemned the Governor-General's "action" ; he was called Clemency Canning out of mockery.

The citizens of Delhi had been driven out and were lying in shelterless places in the neighbourhood of the city, chiefly in the Qutb and Nizām al-Dīn areas. Dr. Farquhar reported, in December 1857, that they were still lying there exposed to the rigours of the cold weather and winter rains. This is corroborated by *Ghālib* who writes in a letter, dated 5 December, to Har Gopal : "You can not find in this city a Muslim, however much you search for one."<sup>2</sup> Early in the following year (January 1858) the Hindus were allowed to return, and it was not until July that the courts reopened.<sup>3</sup>

1 For relevant quotations from the letters see Bosworth Smith, II, 162-63.

2 *Mihr*, p. 134.

3 Spear, (p. 220) on the authority of the *Delhi Settlement Report of 1862*.



## CHAPTER XII

### THE PANJAB, FRONTIER AND SIND REGION (I)

The organizers of the Movement seem to have fully realized the importance of propagating their cause in the areas now covered by West Pakistan; there is abundant evidence to prove that they had been carrying on their work in this area simultaneously with their activities in the upper and eastern Provinces.<sup>1</sup> Edward Hare refers to an incident which is of considerable significance "In the winter of 1856-57," he writes, "we were encamped at Umballa with the annual army of exercise. The mutinous sepoys took advantage of the assembly of so many of their regiments to arrange their plans and they tried their utmost to corrupt the Goorkha Regiment which came down with us for exercise from

1. Cave-Browne's assessment of the situation in the Panjab, which at the time included the Frontier region also, is correct. He says: "That the disaffection which had disclosed itself in Bengal and Oude had also extended among the native troops in the province, there can be little doubt. The disease had not yet broken out, but it had shown premonitory symptoms." See Vol. I, p. 41.

However, the British Government had certain circumstances in their favour as far as the population of the Panjab was concerned. The Muslims who were in majority had passed through a terrible ordeal of over half a century of Sikh rule. It was almost a reign of terror for them and, therefore, it is not surprising that they had felt a relief on the fall of the Sikh power. Only eight years had passed to the establishment of British rule, and this period was not long enough for the people to form a correct idea of what this change would mean. In the population there existed a "gulf between the Sikhs and the Muhammadans of the Panjab;" this could be well utilized by a Government which believed in and acted upon the policy of *divide et impera*. Referring to the policy of British officers at Amritsar, Cave-Browne says: "To keep the two classes thus in mutual check— to counterbalance race by race, and creed by creed— was the great aim of the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. F. Cooper, on whom the duty devolved." See Vol. I, p. 104.

Jutogh, near Simla.”<sup>1</sup> As early as the beginning of May, 1857, it was reported about Ambala that the fires had become “an almost nightly occurrence.” It was however significant that they were “directed against property belonging to Government or officers attached to the Depot or assigned to them for shelter during the hot months.”<sup>2</sup> Later, a Sikh sepoy informed Deputy-Commissioner Forsyth, that the soldiers were indignant and excited and there was every likelihood of a general rising. The Kotwal also reported that a Pandit had prophesied that blood would be shed within a week in Delhi, Meerut or Ambala. As in Delhi, most of the authorities here, too, did not attach much importance to these incidents. However, some precautionary measures were adopted by the Government : district officers in most cases had the post bags opened in their presence and suspicious letters were suppressed. The vernacular press was also kept under control through repressive measures ; the editor of the *Moortizae* was imprisoned for publishing treasonable matter, and his paper was stopped . . . The editor of the *Chesma-i-Feiz* was ordered to remove his establishment from Sealkote to Lahore where his paper, together with the two already published at the capital, was put under rigid surveillance.”<sup>3</sup>

### **Plans of the Revolutionaries betrayed**

The telegram carrying the news of the outbreak of the Revolution at Delhi had reached Ambala in the afternoon (11 May) ; from here reports were sent to all important stations on the following morning. Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, was in Rawalpindi, consequently Montgomery, the next senior official who was present in Lahore, “held an immediate consultation with the Officers,” and then proceeded to the cantonments at Miān-

1 Hare, Edward, *Memoirs*, (London, 1900), p. 101.

2 G C Barnes to R. Montgomery, 7 May, 1857. *Mutiny Records*, VII, Part I, p 7

3 *Punjab Mutiny Report* (Selections from the Public Correspondence of the Administration for the affairs of the Punjab, Lahore, 1859), pp. 6-7.

Mir to consult Brigadier Corbett. They agreed that the Hind-Pakistāni troops should be deprived of their ammunition and gun caps. Soon after this, a Sikh Non-commissioned Officer betrayed the plans of the sepoys to his superiors. It had been decided that on 15 May when a wing of the 26th Sipahis on guard at the fort would be relieved by a wing of the 49th N. I, they would all rise and take possession of the citadel, the magazine and the treasury, and their comrades at Miān-Mir would follow suit. Then the sepoys would go to the jail, release the prisoners and establish their own machinery of administration. The betrayal of these plans by the Sikh informer upset the whole programme of the Revolutionaries.

#### **Hind-Pakistani forces disarmed at Lahore**

The British authorities took a prompt decision to disarm the native troops : this was to be carried out by a *coup d'état* on the following morning. The entire Brigade was to come to the parade ground, "*avowedly* to hear the general order for disbanding the seven companies of the 34th N. I. at Barrackpore, *really* to enact a drama" The decision was kept secret ; even a ball arranged for the night was not postponed. Early in the morning the parade was held. When it was over the Hind-Pakistāni Regiments were ordered to ground arms, which they did though not without some hesitation. In the meantime some European troops had been sent to the Fort ; here, too, the sepoys were disarmed and ordered to march to Miān Mir. The same night messengers were sent to Ferozepur, Multan and Kangra,<sup>1</sup> and troops despatched to Govindgarh<sup>2</sup> and Phillaur. At Amritsar a rumour had spread that the disarmed sepoys of Lahore were coming to help the Regiments posted there to capture the fort of Govindgarh. The Deputy Commissioner, G. Cooper, took with him a party of Irregular horsemen and loyal Sikhs to guard the fort gates. His Assistant

1 Cave-Browne, I, 92-100 ; *Punjab Mutiny Report*, para, 57.

2 It had no strategic advantage, but the Sikhs had a special regard for it, because it was named after Guru Govind Singh.

went out of the town, collected a body of villagers and took the road to Lahore to intercept the disarmed sepoy. About midnight they met some Companies of the 81st, coming from Lahore. Before daybreak they reached the fort and made it safe against possible attacks. Montgomery's prompt action in Lahore had far-reaching effects on the course of the Revolution. The plans of the Revolutionaries were upset, and they could not act according to their original programme. However, the Movement could not be suppressed in its entirety, and at a number of places we find the people and the sepoy rising against the British Government as and when they found the circumstances favourable to their cause.

### **Ferozepur**

Ferozepur, the largest arsenal in Upper India, could not have been overlooked by the organizers of the Revolutionaries; nor could Montgomery forget it in his discussions at Lahore on 12 May. Brigadier Innes, who held the command of the station, had been informed of the decision about the disarming of the sepoy in Lahore; he also knew that the Regiments at Ferozepur had shown signs of disaffection.<sup>1</sup> On 13 May he held a parade to judge for himself the temper of his men; their conduct was not above suspicion, and "it was plain that something was coming." He held a meeting of the local authorities, and it was decided that immediate disarming of the whole force being a measure that could not be attempted without danger the two corps, the 45th N. I. and the 57th N. I., should be placed apart and disarmed separately on the next day. Accordingly they were called to their parade grounds and ordered to march off to their respective camping sites which were about two miles apart. The 57th obeyed the orders and

1 "A placard," writes Cave-Browne, 'had been posted up in cantonments, threatening the life of their commandant. A native officer had openly declared at a court of inquiry that not a man of the corps would touch a cartridge. It was known also that meetings were held night after night, at which seditious language was used.'" Vol. I, p. 105, *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt I, p. 47.

reached the allotted ground where they bivouacked for the night ; but the 45th took road passing through the Sadr Bazaar. From here they could see the European soldiers filing into the gateway of the entrenchment containing the magazine. Their suspicions were roused and "fanatic moulvies and disaffected bunneahs were at hand to incite them ; 'Dugha hai,' (There is treachery.) became the cry."<sup>1</sup> A few Companies, however, separated themselves from the main body and were soon within the entrenchment ; the Europeans resisted their attack on the Magazine and saved it, and to make it more secure additional Companies were thrown in.<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries now attacked the cantonment and burnt to ashes a number of houses and other buildings. On the following morning the 57th was disarmed. This weakened the position of the Revolutionaries, who, now decided to make an escape. They were pursued for several miles, but ultimately they managed to reach Delhi.<sup>3</sup> Brigadier Innes was censured for not disarming the two corps immediately. Lawrence thought he had "missed an excellent opportunity of teaching a lesson to the sepoys" and was sorry that the Revolutionaries "got off with little loss."<sup>4</sup>

### Phillaur

Phillaur, situated on the banks of the Sutlaj, was important because it had an arsenal. The authorities at Jullundur, only twenty-four miles from Phillaur, decided on 12 May to send a detachment of European troops in the darkness of night ; arrangements were also made to open a signalling office inside the fort. Before dawn these troops reached Phillaur. The Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana was apprised of the situation and asked to take

1 Cave-Browne, I, 108.

2 The Sadr Kotwal was suspected with having supplied scaling ladders to the sepoys ; he was tried by a court-martial and sentenced to 14 years, imprisonment. *Mutiny Records*, VIII. Pt. I, p. 50

3 Kaye and Malletson, II, 332 ; also see *Press-list of Mutiny Papers*, p. 359, no. 54.

4 John Lawrence to the Commander-in-Chief, dated 21 May, Rawalpindi ; see Bosworth Smith, I, p. 147.

of the bridge of boats on the river. At Jullundur itself precautionary measures were adopted to prevent the possibility of attack by the cavalrymen; heaps of *kankar*<sup>1</sup> were irregularly laid in a manner that although the guns could move about, a cavalry charge would not be easy. The Commanding Officer's hope lay in the loyalty of the Raja of Kapurthala who happened to arrive at Phillaur on his way back from a pilgrimage to Hardwar. The companies of the 3rd N. I. cantoned at Phillaur, met the Raja's messengers and tried to persuade them to join the Revolution; but, like most of the other Ruling Princes the Raja decided to support the British. He immediately broke camp, went to Jullundur and placed himself at the disposal of the British Commandant and assured him of his loyalty to the Company's Government.

The Revolutionaries had planned a rising and an attack on Phillaur for the morning of 15 May; it was to become the rendezvous of their forces in the Panjab. Their plans could not materialize because reinforcements arrived early in the morning of 13 May, and the Raja of Kapurthala threw himself on the side of the British Government. Praising this unpatriotic act of the Raja, the Commissioner of Trans-Sutlej States wrote: "To the decision thus taken by the Rajah at the commencement of the outbreak I attribute in a great measure the safety of the civil station at Jullundur on the night of the mutiny . . ."<sup>2</sup>

**tan**

Another important town alerted by Montgomery was Multan; it had been for centuries the great emporium of trade with Kabul and Herat in the north, and Sind, the Persian Gulf and Arabia in the south and west; it also commanded the land route connecting the north-western regions with the rest of the world. Equally important was the fact that Multan lay at the only route connecting the Panjab with the north-western regions with Bombay, and, for that matter,

*Kankar* : small pieces of lime stone.

*Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 147.

with England ; its loss to the British would have created for them great difficulties. Multan had not remained unaffected by the Revolutionary spirit. In the bazaars, Revolution was openly talked about ; the crowding of the sepoys at the post office and their impatience to receive their letters "implied a knowledge that any mail might bring them the signal for an outbreak."<sup>1</sup> Some of the officers had seen more definite symptoms of disaffection : Major Crawford Chamberlain, Cammander of the 'Sikinner's Horse' (1st Irregular Cavalry), for instance, was informed by his *Risaldār* that the sepoys were trying "to tamper with his men ;" on the night of 11 May a man muffled up to the eyes came to the senior *Risaldār* of the 1st Irregulars and asked him point-blank what the intentions of his Regiment were ; gold *mohurs* were being sold at premium, and the sepoys preferred transmission of their money through private agencies to Government remittances.<sup>2</sup> These unmistakable signs clearly showed 'which way the wind blew.' The countryside had a population of sturdy and religious-minded men who could have easily joined the Movement if the British Government had not adopted repressive measures. On 14 May, Major Chamberlain called three or four 'native officers' of each corps and "harrangued them on the enormity of a soldier being *nimuk haram* (false to his salt)." It was proposed that they should all set their seals to a declaration that they would be responsible for their respective corps ; but none agreed to take that responsibility, and one of them clearly said that they would not be obeyed by their men. It was also pointed out that according to the general rumour two boxes full of greazed cartridges had been brought from Bombay and were in the Magazine. Chamberlain ordered a parade and had the cartridges examined by the soldiers themselves.<sup>3</sup>

1 Cave Browne, I, 120.

2 *Ibid.*, I, 121. Also see the letter of Major F. E. Voyle, Deputy-Commissioner of Multan, to Major G. W. Hamilton, Commissioner and Superintendent, dated 30 January, 1858, in *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 30 *et. seq.*

3 Cave-Browne I. 125.

The fort was taken over by the Commissioner ; its weak points were strengthened and heavy guns placed in commanding positions. From the countryside the influential men were summoned and detained as hostages for the good conduct of their respective clans ; ferries were guarded and *faqirs* and suspicious characters arrested and confined.<sup>1</sup> The precautions taken by the authorities, however, could not stop the Revolutionaries from attempting a rising. On 9 June an order was received that the 62nd and 69th N. I. posted in Multan should be disarmed. Some men of the disarmed 69th escaped in the night ; one of them was however caught and condemned to death. On the night preceding the day of his execution, he disclosed some secrets of the Revolutionaries. He was reprieved but as a result of these disclosures the Subahdar-Major and ten other men of the 69th were hanged as "traitors".

It was discovered subsequently that the Revolutionaries had decided to rise against their officers on the night of 7 June. The Woordie-Major of the 1st Irregular Cavalry and a doctor betrayed the secret to Major Chamberlain by requesting him to remove his family, but he did not accept the advice. The Revolutionaries however, failed to carry out their programme, and "a merciful Providence intervened between the Christians and the fate prepared for them."<sup>2</sup>

### **Peshawar**

The valley of Peshawar, which was a part of the Province of the Panjab until the end of the nineteenth century, had in its neighbourhood a number of Pathan tribes whose relations with the British Government at this time were by no means friendly.<sup>3</sup> Beyond the tribal area lay the Amirate of Kabul. The friendship

1 Cave-Browne, pp 127-28.

2 *Ibid* , I, 265-70 ; also see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 31.

3 "There was hardly one tribe that was not what is technically called *in a state of blockade*, . . . All intercourse with Peshawar, all traffic with the city, all trading through the valley . . . the very privilege of *entering the valley* . . . was forbidden . . ." Cave-Browne, I, 139-40 ; also see pp. 152-54.



of its Ruler, Dost Muḥammad Khān, "had been purchased by our British gold, but he had never ceased to deplore the dismemberment of his empire by the Sikhs," and "it was difficult to feel any confidence in his forbearance at such a time."<sup>1</sup> The news of the outbreak of the Revolution reached Peshawar late in the night on 11 May ; on the following morning detailed and authentic reports confirmed the story. A council of war was held on the 13th at the residence of the Commander of the Division, General Reed ; it was attended by Brig. Sydney Cotton, who commanded the Peshawar Brigade, Herbert Edwardes,<sup>2</sup> the Commissioner, John Nicholson, the Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar, and Neville Chamberlain who had been called from Kohat by express message. Here it was decided that General Reed should assume the chief command and meet John Lawrence at Rawalpindi.

The next resolution of the council was that a Movable Column should be organized to operate in any part of the Panjab, where danger might threaten the British power. It was also resolved that the ferry at Attock should be secured and Hind-Pakistānī Regiments isolated<sup>3</sup> Chamberlain was given the command of the Movable Column ; to avoid complications he was raised to the rank of Brigadier-General. On 16 May Edwardes was summoned by John Lawrence for consultation. When he returned to his post, five days later, he learnt that the danger had not actually subsided.

1 Kay and Malleeson, II, 337.

2 Edwardes was a bigoted Christian : "like many other Anglo-Indian officers of a past generation, he was a man of strong religious convictions, and an ardent, perhaps a rash, supporter of missionary effort." Holmes, p. 318.

3 The general impression of the British authorities was that the Sikhs as well as the Panjabi and Pathan Muslims had no sympathy with the Hindustānī sepays and would not make common cause with them. They had followed a policy of creating feelings of estrangement among the peoples of the various regions. "The Sikh" writes Cave-Browne, "despises the Hindostanee and the Mohammedan of the Punjab and Frontier disowns his degenerate (often uncircumcised) Poor beah name-Sake," See Vol. I, p. 146, n 1.

is contrary it was now gathering force and threatened war.<sup>1</sup>

#### Intercepted letters

The sepoy letters intercepted by the Government had left no doubt as to the widespread nature of the Revolutionary Movement, among these were epistles from Thanenwar, Patna, Swat and Peshawar, calling upon the sepoys to *declare* themselves; besides some had come from Meerut, Delhi and other places in that neighbourhood in which appeals were made to them to join the Movement just as their kinsmen had done on that side. A letter, more convincing than all the rest, showed that the danger was far nearer than many could suspect. It was from the 51st N. I., and was addressed to the 64th at Shubkuddur. "This letter," it ran, "is from the Peshawar cantonment to the whole *Heriot*\* regiment . . . may it reach the subahdar Bahadoor." After some complimentary phrases it continued, ". . . on the 22nd day of the month the cartridges will be given to the *Dubernet*† regiment, whatever seems to you proper . . . all are discontented with the business, whether small or great. What more need be written? As you think best." A postscript added to it said: "In whatever way you can manage it, come into Peshawar on the 21st, and thoroughly understand that point! In fact, eat *there* and so on."<sup>2</sup> This letter was delivered to a sepoy of the 64th on the evening of 18 May; he handed it over to the officer commanding

and it was evident that the capture of Peshawar by the Revolutionaries would seriously affect the British position in the entire area of the Punjab and north-west.

Cave-Browne relates an interesting story of a Sikh who, on being asked by the British why he was so anxious about Peshawar, rolled up the end of his scarf and said: "If Peshawar goes, the whole Punjab will be rolled up in rebellion!" Vol. I, p. 153; also see Holmes, p. 323.

See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt II, 141-42; also quoted in Cave-Browne, p. 6.

See 64th N. I.

See 51st N. I.

his detachment. It is difficult to explain the motives of the sepoy in betraying his comrades.

Another document equally interesting fell into the hands of the Extra-Assistant Commissioner of Peshawar, Wakefield, on the following day. He found a *faqir* sitting under a tree near his house in circumstances which created a suspicion in his mind. He ordered him to be searched and found with him nothing except a small bag containing fifty new rupees. When interrogated the *faqir* said that he had collected them by begging in the Lines of the 24th N. I. Wakefield became more suspicious and ordered another search. A "small bag or 'housewife' was detected in the hollow of the armpit avowedly for the purpose of carrying antimony for the eyes." It, however, had a Persian note, which read thus : "My beloved Moollah ; Salam ! Salutation to you . . . this is the point, that instantly on receiving this ; on the 2nd day of the festival of the Eed, you must—Yes, must—come here ; and if it be easy, bring a few pounds of fruits with you. Now is the time ! Admit no fear into your heart. Such an opportunity will not occur again. Set out, I enjoin you -(Signed) Fakeer Moollah Naeem." The interpretation of the contents of the letter was easy enough ; "*a few pounds of fruit*," mentioned in the note, according to Colonel Edwardes, meant the heads of English officers. However, the *faqir* was arrested and hanged.<sup>1</sup>

A letter from 'Kuleefa Nathoo' at Thanesar was addressed to friends in Swat. It said : "On all four sides there is disturbance, and on account of cartridges the whole of the native army as far as Lahore have become disaffected."<sup>2</sup>

#### The 55th N. I. and 51st N. I

These startling revelations clearly proved the existence of widespread plans of the Revolutionaries, and Edwardes and Nicholson had not to wait long to witness the outcome. On

1 Cave-Browne, I, 156-57, *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, 143.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 143, n. 2.

the night of 21 May, a messenger came in to tell them that some Companies of the 55th N. I. had risen at Naushahrah.<sup>1</sup> The two officers went to Brigadier Cotton and roused him from sleep; he held a council and decided to disarm the Hind-Pakistāni Regiments. Within an hour four Regiments were paraded and disarmed. This proved to be a wise step, for some of the local Chiefs who had to witness the parade were now convinced that the British authorities could still assert their supremacy, and it was now easy for them to raise levies.<sup>2</sup> After the disarming of the Regiments a Column was organized for being sent to Hoti Mardan where the main body of the 55th was posted, but it held back because the authorities became nervous on account of the rumours that the 64 N. I. was about to advance on the city of Peshawar. On that night about two hundred fifty sepoyes belonging to the 51st N. I. slipped away from the Lines in the hope of securing the sympathy and cooperation of the tribesmen. Edwardes immediately issued an order putting a price on every deserter. The result was that "the following morning saw many a wretched fugitive brought in alive, and the Affreede and Mohmund whom he had trusted carrying off to his home the 'head-money', and all the spoil, sometimes no inconsiderable sum, that he found on the person of his luckless captive . . ."<sup>3</sup>

1 A detachment of the 55th N. I. was on duty at the Attock ferry. Fath Khan Khatak who was also posted there informed a British officer in the fort on the morning of 21 May, that the detachment of the 55th N. I. was in a 'mutinous state'. The report proved to be too true. The 'mutinous' detachment soon marched away towards Naushahrah. The Commanding Officer at Naushahrah had, however, been informed of this incident. He came out, met them at the Attock road and disarmed them. When the other Companies of the same Regiment saw their comrades as prisoners they also rose. *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 145-46

2 John Lawrence wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawar: "I look on the disarming of the four corps at Peshawar as a master-stroke . . ." Quoted in Kaye and Mallsen, II, p. 361.

3 Cave-Browne, I, p. 162.

The Subahdar-Major of the Regiment was hanged; he was the first Revolutionary at Peshawar to give his life in the cause of freedom. *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 149.

The British policy of corrupting the tribesmen by offering them "rewards" for the capture of the sepoys proved effective in creating antagonism and hatred between the different sections of the people of the subcontinent.

### **Mardan**

The men of the 55th N. I. who had risen at Naushahra liberated their comrades whom the officers had disarmed and imprisoned on their way from the Attock ferry. They wanted to go to Mardan-Hoti, but the bridge having been demolished by the enemy, they returned to their Lines; a couple of them, however, managed to cross the stream and report the events of the day to their comrades at Mardan. Colonel Spottiswoode had implicit confidence in his men; he had written to Brig. Cotton not to send troops against them as he was ready "to stake his own life on their staunchness."<sup>1</sup> This request was ignored and the Column prepared for the purpose left Peshawar on the night of 23 May. The Hind-Pakistāni officers of the Regiment learnt on the following day that forces were already on their way to operate against them. they asked Spottiswoode to explain what this treachery meant; he could not satisfy them. It was too much for him, and he immediately committed suicide.<sup>2</sup>

The Column from Peshawar reached Mardan on the morning of 25 May; the 55th had by that time left the place, only 120 of them remaining there. Nicholson who accompanied the Column as Political Officer went out in pursuit of the party. The Revolutionaries, it may be mentioned, had been in contact with some people in Swat and the neighbouring hills.<sup>3</sup> "The 55th", to quote Nicholson himself,

1 There were two hundred Sikhs in his Regiment. They offered to fight the rest of the sepoys if they were separated, but the Colonel's confidence in his men was so strong that he rejected the proposal. Kaye and Mallsen, II, 364.

2 Cave-Browne (Vol I, p. 170. n. 2.) attributes Spottiswoode's suicide to lack of moral courage on his part. Holmes (p. 326) refers to it as "insane generosity." There are undoubtedly harsh judgment.

3 It was discovered later that the emissaries of the Movement had been working in the 55th, the 64th N. I. and 10th Irregular Cavalry as well as

"fought determinately," but they were forced to disperse in the neighbouring villages ; 120 of them died resisting. 150 were taken captive and many were wounded in the course of a full day's pursuit on 25 May. They were received with favour by the people of the Lund Khur valley, and about 600 managed to enter Swat.

#### **Swat and the neighbouring areas**

Under the influence of their religious leader, Akhund Şāhib, the people of Swat had accepted Sayyid Akbar Şah as their Ruler. He had died on 11 May ; his son, Mubārak, had put forward his claims to the throne of his father. The majority of the people, however, were against him. It was about this time that the Revolutionary sepoy arrived in Swat. The young Prince Mubārak immediately took them into his service, but he had no money to maintain an army. The Akhund Şāhib told them to leave the valley ; they were provided with guides and asked to move to the other side of the Indus. This decision of Akhund Şāhib about Swat's attitude towards the Revolution was solely prompted by the local conditions which were uncertain. Otherwise, "had the Akhoond of Swat," writes Edwardes in his official report, "at this time, standing forward as the champion of the faith, preached a crescentade against us, and hushing intestine strife, moved across the passes and descended into Peshawur Valley, with all the prestige of the 55th Sepoys in his favour, I do not doubt that he would have excited among our subjects that spirit of religious zeal which may be overlaid for a while, but never extinguished by material prosperity. Instead of this he suddenly sided with the popular party, dismissed the 55th Sepoys with guides to conduct them across the Indus and expelled the young King from Swat."<sup>1</sup>

in Swat and the country around ; "two Hindoostanee moulvies in the collectorate of Murdan were the hosts of the emissaries who passed to and fro. They both fled the night before the force came from Peshawar, but one was caught months afterwards and hanged." *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, 152,

1 *Mutiny Records*. VIII, Pt. II, 160-61.

This is a correct assesment of the situation, and there can be no doubt that with the departure of the sepoy of the 55th from Swat the course of the Revolution was changed in that region.

After suffering great hardships the Revolutionary sepoy decided to go to Kashmir ; their route lay through Hazara. On 23 June, Major Becher, the Deputy-Commissioner of that district, was informed of their movements by Muhammad Khān Malik of Butul in Kounsh. He had enclosed with his note a letter from Jamāl Khān, an influential member of the *Jirgah* of Ullie,<sup>1</sup> asking for assistance and safe passage for 600 'Hindoostanee soldiers.' They had crossed the Indus on rafts of skins and halted by the side of the river near Jamāl Khān's village. Becher directed the Sayyids of Kaghan, the sons of Muẓaffar Khān of Nundyar and some other leading persons, to collect their followers and secure the passes at the head of the Pakhlī valley. On the following day (24 June) Becher left Abbotabad and reached Dodyal which was three miles from Shinkyari and controlled all the principal roads. Muhammad Amin Khān and Muẓaffar Khān wanted to enter Ullie and fight the Revolutionaries. Becher did not allow them to do so, because they "had doubtless purposes of their own to serve" ; in fact they were in communication with the party in Ullie opposed to Jamāl Khān whose sympathies with the Revolutionaries were not a secret. On 27 June the Revolutionaries came to the village of Raeshung<sup>2</sup> on the Nundyar border ; they turned back and on the following morning went to another village which belonged to Sayyid Ghulām 'Alī Shāh and Dīlārām Shāh. Becher succeeded in persuading the Sayyids to attack the Revolutionaries ; in the

1 "The independent district of Ullie, . . . is about two days journey from our extreme possession of Kounsh ; between them intervenes the independent district of Nundyar, all are held by Swatees of a common ancestry, and Kounsh is held in a jageer or fief by Mohamed Ameen Khan, Chief of Gurhee and head of the Swatees in Huzara." Becher to Edwardes, 4 January 1858, *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 115.

2 Here one of their Jamadars made an appeal to his comrades to give up the idea of flight and lay down their lives fighting like soldiers. His appeal was not accepted ; he took his musket and ended his life. *Ibid*, p. 117.

contest Ghulām 'Ali Shāh's son was wounded. This made the Sayyids and their *murīds* more bitter against the Revolutionaries who were now faced with miseries and hardships; "the knapsacks and bayonets and many of the muskets were cast down the rocks, and a large payment in silver could scarcely procure a seer of flour."<sup>1</sup>

Becher had succeeded in thoroughly exciting the Sayyids of Kaghan against the Revolutionaries who had by this time (5 July) reached a place called Bela Sānpān. They were surrounded and charged by the Sayyids and the Kuhistānis. In the fight that ensued some of the Revolutionaries were killed, but they ultimately succeeded in capturing the bridge and the village. It was about this time that their further molestation was stopped by a *mullā* who had received a message from the Akhund Shāhib.<sup>2</sup> Becher now sent word to another chief, Shir Ahamd Khān, who was a vassal of the Maharaja of Kashmir. On 15 July the Sayyids brought fifty-four Revolutionaries as captives; thirteen of them were taken to Shinkyari and hanged in the presence of the troops. The *mullā* who had stopped their molestation took them to Kote Gali; from here they went to a place called Nūri-Nār, near the Lalūsar Lake. The Sayyids again attacked them; after a short resistance they surrendered, and of 124 men who were made captive all except a few were executed;<sup>3</sup> 23 of these Revolutionaries fell into the hands of Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Kashmir. He did not like to lag behind the Sayyids of Kaghan in demonstrating his loyalty to the British. He surrendered them to the British, and like their comrades these were also executed.<sup>4</sup>

1 *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt II, p 118.

2 *Ibid*, p. 119.

3 The treacherous conduct of the Sayyids was not appreciated even by the people of the area. Sayyid 'Abd al-Jabbār Shāh in his work, *Kitab al-'Ibrat* has quoted a local song expressing a condemnation of the treachery. For the song and its Urdu translation see *Mihr*, Ghulam Rasul, 1857, (Lahore, 1957) p. 332.

4 *Mutiny Records*, Vol. VIII, Pt. II, p. 120.



On 26 May Nicholson learnt that Ajun Khan, "a notorious outlaw" descended from the hills and came down to Prangar; was believed that he had been invited by a detachment of the 64th Regiment stationed in the fort of Abazyi. If he had been joined by the Revolutionary sepoys of the 55th and "boldly come down to Abazyi and got the fort betrayed to him by the garrison the whole front would have been in a flame." But the force under Colonel Chelmsford and Nicholson had been considerably reinforced, and they were now in a position to move against Ajun Khan. The success in disarming of the forces at Peshawar had left an impression on the people that the British were still capable of sustaining themselves. Ajun Khan, therefore, decided not to risk an engagement with them. He soon withdrew into the hills.<sup>1</sup>

#### **Peshawar versus Delhi controversy**

The defeat of the Revolutionaries in different parts of the Panjab and the North-west proved of immense advantage to the British. For them the only means of educating public opinion were personal contacts and postal correspondence both were rendered ineffective by the Company's Government. Besides this the British authorities had excited communal and regional prejudices of the people by painting the struggle for freedom as a mutiny of the "Hindustānis" who formed the bulk of the men in the Bengal Army. To win the sympathy of the Sikhs it was enough to point out that the leader of the Movement was a Muslim Monarch. The Panjab Chiefs, to quote Holmes's comment "remembering the tyranny of the Khālṣa army, had no desire in the success of a revolt which threatened to place them at the mercy of an insolent soldiery. Even if there had been a general spirit of disaffection, it would have been weakened by the national antipathy between Sikh and Mohamedan."<sup>2</sup>

John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, had earlier realized that the recovery of Delhi was indispensable for the recovery of the north-west.

1 *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 152-53.

2 Holmes, p. 311.

existence of British rule in India. In the Panjab and Frontier region conditions were not alarming, but in Delhi and other parts of the subcontinent the situation was every day growing more delicate. Lawrence, therefore, decided to send all possible help to the armies besieging the capital of Bahādur Shāh. As early as 9 June he wrote to Edwardes that "day after day, more and more regiments fall away," and it was, therefore, necessary to calmly consider the consequences of the permanent loss of Delhi. He thought that if an attempt was made "to hold the whole country, we shall be cut up in detail". To save Delhi, he proposed, "we could easily retire from Peshawar early in the day," because "at the eleventh hour, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible." His plan was to hand over Peshawar to Dost Muḥammad and thereby "make a merit of our necessities". When the friendship of the Afghans is thus secured "we could . . . hold Attock in strength, and have the Indus for our barrier." Edwardes did not agree with this proposal. Peshawar, he thought, was the "anchor of the Punjab," and should not be abandoned under any circumstances. The idea of purchasing Dost Muḥammad's friendship by ceding Peshawar appeared to him to be ridiculous because the surrender of the territory would be interpreted as the end of British dominion in the subcontinent, and he laid emphasis on this point by reminding Lawrence that "Caulbul would come again"<sup>1</sup>

In the meantime, however, Lawrence had written to the Governor-General for a verdict on what has sometimes been called the Peshawar versus Delhi controversy.<sup>2</sup> The correspondence

<sup>1</sup> Bosworth Smith, II, 49-52.

<sup>2</sup> In a letter dated 21 July, John Lawrence wrote to his brother: "I have proposed to the Governor-General that, in the event of necessity, I may give up Peshawar and Kohat; this would give us 1000 European Infantry 3200 Panjabee Infantry, some few cavalry, and 3 odd guns. With such addition we might take Delhi." See *Intelligence Records*, I, 435.

It may be mentioned that this letter was written nearly 3 weeks after Henry Lawrence had been killed at Lucknow.

between Lawrence and the Peshawar authorities dragged on, both parties remaining firm in their views. To Lawrence's arguments in favour of sending ever more reinforcements to Delhi and thereby weakening the British position in the Panjab, Cotton replied in these words : "If General Reed cannot take Delhi with eight thousand men, he will not take it with nine thousand or ten thousand . . . Make sure of one practicable policy. If General Reed, with all the men you have sent him, cannot get into Delhi, *let Delhi go*."<sup>1</sup> Lawrence did not agree with this view ; he continued sending reinforcements to the besiegers of Delhi. On 24 July he again wrote to Canning saying rather emphatically that "the Punjab will prove short work to the mutineers when the Delhi army is destroyed." Before this letter was received by Canning, he had given a verdict against Lawrence.<sup>2</sup> The Governor-General thought that such a proposal from the Chief Commissioner was perhaps the result of his failing health and a nervous tension.<sup>3</sup> However, throughout the earlier weeks of the War, Lawrence continued sending reinforcements to the Delhi Field Force.

### **The Movable Column : Lahore, 3 June**

On receiving reports of the outbreak the authorities at Peshawar had decided to form a Movable Column which could go to any place where it was needed.<sup>4</sup> As the formation of the Column needed some time the Guides Corps stationed at Mardan

1 Ms. Correspondance quoted in Holmes, p. 356.

2 *Ibid*

3 As late as 1878, this proposal of Lawrence was being criticized in his country. On 9 December, Lord Cranbrook, speaking on the Second Afghan War referred to it in these words : " . . . the *retiring modesty* which a noble lord exhibited on a former occasion, having wished England to retire behind the Indus " John Lawrence replied in his speech the same evening that he was still prepared to defend his policy if challenged to do so, Bosworth Smith, II, 47-48, 67.

4 The suggestion for a Movable Column was made by Nicholson ; Edwardes and Cotton readily agreed with the proposal. See Cave-Browne I, 142, 144.

was ordered to proceed to Delhi ; they reached their destination on 9 June 1857 The Column commanded by Chamberlain reached Lahore on 3 June. Here, six days later, they witnessed the public execution of two sepoys of the 35th Light Infantry who were "charged with using seditious language, and endeavouring to instigate their comrades to open mutiny." The Column reached Amritsar on the 10th.

### **Jullunder**

The departure of the Column from Lahore had been hastened owing to disturbing news from Jullunder. Its Deputy Commissioner, Captain Farrington, had taken precautionary measures to keep the town quiet, but the aspect of affairs in the cantonments was not quite satisfactory. There had been several cases of fires ; the merchants and shop-keepers of the Sadr Bazaar had started removing their property to the city. A foolish step taken by the authorities excited the sepoys ; they had been assured that "so long as they remained quiet, not a hair of their heads should be touched," and yet under orders from Lawrence the treasure "had been rescued from the sepoy guard " Subsequently it was divided into two parts, each being placed in the custody of a separate guard ; the sepoys could easily see the humiliation to which they were thus subjected. Spies brought reports of secret nightly meetings, and fires were also revived ; a more definite indication was provided by a writing in charcoal on a wall at the Paymaster's office. Three persons who were known favourites of the British officers were mentioned as men of bad character ; inquiries were made but with no results. The authorities were alarmed and decided upon disarming the sepoys on the morning of 6 June ; in the afternoon the plan was dropped. It was again decided to disarm them on Sunday morning (7 June), but it was again put off. The sepoys could easily read the nervousness of their officers : the same night they rose at about 11 p. m. Some of the officers were attacked, and the treasure chests were plundered. Soon after midnight the sepoys assembled on the main road, and then

they broke up into two detachments ; the larger party made for Phillaur while the smaller one took the road to Hoshiarpur. A force was sent in pursuit of the larger detachment, but it was delayed on the way. The Revolutionary sepoys were joined by the 3rd N. I. and proceeded towards the bridge which they wanted to cross on their way to Ludhiana. The bridge was found to have been cut away by the orders of a civilian, Thornton.<sup>1</sup>

Determined to continue their march to Ludhiana the Revolutionaries decided to cross the river at a ferry known as Lussara Ghat, about four miles from the bridge. Rickets, Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana, had the town with three Companies of the 4th Sikhs, commanded by Lieutenant G. A. Williams, a force of Nabha's men and two guns with the object of stopping the Revolutionaries from crossing the river. He went to Phillaur and crossed the river in a Government ferry boat ; he was told that the sepoys were seen pushing upwards to one of the ferries. He, therefore, recrossed the stream and taking Williams and his men moved upwards to Lussara Ghat, where he reached at ten o'clock in the night. As they were pushing on in the sandy bed of the river they were challenged. In reply they unlimbered the guns, but the horses dragging one of them took fright and fled ; "at the first volley the Nabha rajah's cavalry and infantry bolted away," and the men of the 4th Sikhs had to fight out the battle alone against the bulk of the Revolutionary sepoys who had crossed the ferry. Rickets was handling the 9 pounder which worked effectively, while Williams was directing his Sikh soldiers. The Revolutionaries fought with firmness and determination, and after two hours' struggle the British forces found their pressure to be too heavy. Suddenly the clouds covering the moon moved away ; the Revolutionaries saw the enemy's ranks and "poured in a murderous volley, to which the gallant Sikhs could reply but feebly." Williams was wounded and fell ; he was taken to

<sup>1</sup> Thornton had come to Phillaur from Ludhiana to pay the troops of the 3rd N. I. On seeing the sepoys moving towards the bridge, he rushed to the spot, crossed the bridge and had it cut away. See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Part I, 102.

the rear and then sent to Ludhiana. The struggle was now over ; for Ricketts there was no course left but to make a retreat, which of course he did.<sup>1</sup>

### Ludhiana

The Revolutionaries triumphantly marched forward and captured Ludhiana on the forenoon of 9 June. It was a city of mixed population and had a regular colony of the *Kabulis*—descendants of *Shāh Zamān* and *Shāh Shujā'* and a large number of their dependents and retainers ; these princes were known as *Shāhzādahs*. One of these *Shāhzādahs*, who had joined the Revolution, had taken along with him some of his kinsmen to Delhi with a view to participate in its defence, but unfortunately he had died of fatigue.<sup>2</sup> *Şafdar Jang*, "another Sudozye prisoner" distinguished himself by actively joining the struggle for independence. He was influenced by the preachings of a *mawlawī* who "was indefatigable in exciting the Mussulman population, causing seditious meetings and giving so much trouble that I was obliged to request your permission to expel him for a time from the city."<sup>3</sup> The Kashmiri *shawl-workers* who had settled in Ludhiana also joined the Revolution, but their activities remained confined to burning and plundering the Government stores and offices and supplying information to the sepoys about their main supporters ; a number of these artisans were executed for their participation in the Movement.<sup>4</sup>

The entire Muslim population of Ludhiana, particularly the Sayyids and the Gujars, had been prepared for a *jihād* by a *mawlawī* ;

1 Cave-Browne, I, 254-60 ; *Mutiny Records*, VII, Pt. I, 104. Kaye and Malleon, II, 379-80.

2 Among the *Kabuli Shāhzādahs*, Hasan Khān, was with the British Government and actively fought on their side ; Şāliḥ Muḥammad also remained loyal. Another, Sikandar by name, is stated to have given protection in his dwelling to "the Christian children supported and educated by the American mission". *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, pp. 92-93.

3 G. H. M. Ricketts to G. C. Barnes, dated 22 February, 1858. See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, 92

4 *Ibid.*, p. 94.

"he had twice roused." wrote Ricketts, "the whole of the Mahomedan population to the verge of an outbreak ; his influence extended to all classes"<sup>1</sup> He was respected throughout the district. At one time he had also worked in collaboration with the Akhund of Swat.<sup>2</sup>

Thus the citizens of Ludhiana were ready to receive the Revolutionaries when they came there after their victory over Ricketts in the battle of the Lussarah Ghat. Here they were joined by the *mawlawi* ; "he collected all his disciples, hoisted the green ensign of his faith, and led them to Delhi."<sup>3</sup> They did not take the Grand Trunk Road, and by-passed Ambala. The British sent a force from there to intercept them, but it could not meet them, and they managed to reach Delhi, in time to take an active part in the important battle of 23 June. "... The Hindu portion of the population, the principal chowdries, traders, and the banking community, . . . quietly shut themselves up with their money bags in places of safety and concealment, and allowed matters to take their course."<sup>4</sup> A few days after their departure the 1st Punjab Irregulars came to Ludhiana and it was with their help that Ricketts brought its people under his control ; he "mercilessly executed all who had been found guilty of violent crimes, disarmed the city population . . . and imposed a heavy fine upon them."<sup>5</sup>

### Kulu

Kulu, a small hill principality near Kangra, was ruled by a Rajput family. On the death of its chief in the twenties of the nine-

1 *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 94

2 *Ibid.*, p. 95.

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Ibid.*

5 Holmes, p. 332, "None suffered eventually from the riot," says the *Panjab Mutiny Report*. "except the rioters themselves, and the city which harboured them 22 of the plunderers were hanged the next day, and the city was fined Rs 55, 294", para. 31.

teenth century the claim of his son was contested by his uncle. In a battle fought between them the uncle, Kishan Singh, was defeated and captured ; subsequently he died in the prison. His supporters produced a child, Partab Singh, as his son.<sup>1</sup> Partab grew to be an active trooper and took part in the Sikh War of 1845-46. He was supposed to have been killed in the War, and, therefore, a pension was given to his widow. Ten years later, in 1855, a *faqir* appeared in the village of Tirmali and gave himself out as Partab Singh ; he was recognized by his "wife" although not without some hesitation on her part. He was thus able to gather around him a small retinue and live like a chief. On the outbreak of the Revolution he was tempted to assert his position. He sent letters and emissaries to the people of the neighbouring villages with a message that he should be accepted as their leader and the authority of the British Government be thrown off. Some of his letters, however, fell into the hands of the Assistant-Commissioner : he was taken prisoner and hanged with five of his chief supporters. He was believed by some officers to have been made a tool by the workers of the Movement. "It may perhaps be a question," says Cave-Browne, "whether this man originated this conspiracy, or was not rather the tool of others, who remained concealed behind the dignity of their position, and put him forth as the firebrand to kindle the flames of sedition throughout the country, ready themselves to step in and reap the fruits of the intrigue."<sup>2</sup>

1 When Kishan Singh was in prison it was notified that his wife had given birth to a boy ; "but instead of rejoicing like a worthy Rajpoot at the birth of a son, he repudiated the unexpected honour, saying that it was no child of his." See Cave-Browne, I, 306.

2 Cave-Browne, I, 308 ; also see *Punjab Mutiny Report*, para 53.



## CHAPTER XIII

### THE PANJAB, FRONTIER AND SIND REGION (II)

#### Rawalpindi

By the end of June 1857, the British authorities in the Panjab were making official announcements to the effect that the Province was "perfectly quiet". This, however, was not the full truth; it was true that no fresh reports of violence were coming from the districts, but nothing could have been more misleading than to believe that the several Hind-Pakistāni Regiments stationed<sup>1</sup> at different places would not rise whenever they found an opportunity to do so. Of all these Regiments the 14th N. I. posted at Jhelum was looked upon with great suspicion. Lawrence, therefore, decided to weaken it by calling a detachment of two of its Companies on the pretext that they would escort treasure to Rawalpindi. To the west of the district flowed the mighty Indus which separated it from Peshawar as well as parts of the tribal territory. It was a well-known fact that the people of Sitānah and Mangalthānah were in contact with the Nawabs of Tonk and Jhajjar, and some influential persons in the North-Western Provinces<sup>2</sup>. The local authorities, had, therefore, taken precautionary steps against possible dangers, particularly in respect of guarding the ferries on the Indus and the Jhelum; in this work they had enlisted the support of a number of the landlords.

Nevertheless, the officers were constantly in a state of fear. Kanhayya Lal says on the authority of a personal letter that on 4

1 The following Regiments had not been disarmed: the 58th N. I. (Rawalpindi); the 14th N. I. (Jhelum); the 46th N.I. and a wing of the 9th Light Cavalry (Stalkot), the 59th N. I. (Amritsar); the 4th N. I. (Kangra and Nurpur); the 2nd Irregular Cavalry (Gurdaspur)

2 *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 364.

June a sepoy of the 58th N. I. was stated to have told the people that he still had ten bullets which he would use when he would be required to do so. This created a panic. the writer continues, and a number of families left their houses to take refuge in the barracks. The sepoy was later arrested<sup>1</sup>. However, the situation soon became so threatening that it was decided to disarm two Companies of the 14th N. I. and the 58th N. I. ; 7 June, was fixed for carrying this out. A parade was called for that day early in the morning, avowedly for the proclamation of an order that the heirs of soldiers killed in action would be given pensions. At the parade an order to this effect was read. The Brigadier then gave word that the Infantry and Artillery were to wheel to the left. The sepoys now realized that they had been deceived ; they immediately rushed to their Lines. Their officers endeavoured to persuade them to lay down their arms. The 58th complied with their demand, but the Companies of the 14th fled towards the city. Some of them escaped but a price having been set on them "the next morning their heads were brought in by the villagers"<sup>2</sup>

#### **Jhelum and Murree : symptoms of unrest**

It was arranged that the sepoy Companies at Jhelum should be disarmed simultaneously with those at Rawalpindi. As at some other important stations, symptoms of unrest were becoming evident in this area also. In his report the Commissioner of the division, Edward Thornton, admits that "great interest was exhibited"<sup>3</sup> by the people in the Revolution and reports of occurrences elsewhere, but they remained observant and professed loyalty, obviously waiting for a suitable moment. Among certain sections, however, a feeling of unrest existed and it was generally believed that something *would* happen. Edward Thornton says that a thoroughly reliable person whose loyalty was unquestion-

1 For details see Kanhayya Lal, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-22

2 Cave Browne, II, 52.

3 Edward Thornton to R. Montgomery, 23 February, 1858. *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 315

able, "communicated to me in confidence his great distress at the calamity, as his belief was we could not succeed " He was so much convinced of the coming of the Revolution that he had not only "removed his family to a place of special shelter," but "his conduct as respected several parties who were likely to take the lead at a season of disorganization seemed to be regulated by a wish to establish claims to their consideration in the time of need"<sup>1</sup>.

From Murree also reports had been received about the violation of rules relating to fires in the neighbouring forests. In view of the threatening situation the Asistent-Commissioner was instructed not to punish the offenders, but to affect to believe that the tracts burnt did not have useful wood and were, therefor, exempt from the restrictions laid down by the Government. Even in cases about which it was impossible for him to appear ignorant, "he had better do no more than send for the headmen and remind them of the rules and enjoin carefulness ; . . ." Another indication was provided by the unruly behaviour of the people of a village called Kakira Kuhuttee. The situation was, however, brought under control by the detention of its landlords, Faqir Khān and Muhammad Khān, as hostages, in Muree. An attempt to seize the headman of Kakira Kuhuttee did not succeed and was given up as inexpedient. Besides these indirect indications, a definite case was detected on 1 July ; a Jamadar in Chakwal was found "plotting" against the Tahsildar and spreading reports of the restoration of Bahādur Shah. He was arrested and convicted.

### **The rising at Jhelum**

The arrangements for disarming the sepoys in Jhelum were kept secret to the last moment, because the authorities had a fairly clear idea of the uncertain conditions in that area. Colonel Ellice, Commander of the 24th Queens, who was given sealed orders, reached Dinah on 6 July. In the night all the

<sup>1</sup> *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, 318-19.

troops who were to be employed in disarming the 14th N. I. and the 39th N. I. entered the cantonments and took positions. A Sikh detachment of about 100 men had been separated from the 14th and was standing apart. As the Europeans advanced forward, the sepoys took alarm and began loading. Their officer and Sikh comrades fled towards the Europeans as soon as they started firing. The sepoys now returned to the Lines, making the brick building of the quarter-guard their advanced defence. The Multani Horse were ordered to charge; but the sepoys had taken shelter in the verandah and on the battlemented roof of the quarter-guard and in their own huts.<sup>1</sup> In a short contest, lasting ten minutes, of the two hundred and forty attackers nine had fallen and twenty-eight were wounded. The Infantry and the Artillery now came to their help. The sepoys resisted the pressure, but were ultimately forced to make for the Lines of the 39th. They could not stay here for long, because the Regimental Magazine was blown up. They moved to the village of Saemlee; here they could get a respite, because the British soldiers spent some time in doing justice to the abundant stores in the mess house of the 39th<sup>2</sup>. About 5 p. m. in the afternoon fighting recommenced. The Artillery being in the front and rather near the village the sepoys could "pick off the gunners with fatal precision," while the grape shot from the side of the attackers spent itself on the mud walls of village houses. As the men and horses were falling fast and ammunition running short, orders were given for a retreat. The Revolutionaries came out of the village, made a sally and captured the howitzer which their enemy had left behind at the time of his retreat. It was now dark and the British gave up the idea of any further attempt to seize the village. The

1 The huts were loop-holed, which shows that they were prepared for this eventuality.

2 "The men of H. M. 24th . . . unfortunately, finding out the 39th N. I. mess-house and Major Knatchbull's far-famed stores, they helped themselves, perhaps too freely; so that for a time all order was lost." Cave-Browne, II, 55.

news of the defeat was telegraphed to Rawalpindi, from where reinforcements were despatched immediately. On the following morning, however, it was discovered that the Revolutionaries had evacuated the village. They wanted to cross the river but the bridge of boats and ferries were under the control of the landlords who were in sympathy with their enemy. They tried to disperse in different directions in private boats which were in the river, but in this attempt many of them were captured and executed. The 14th N. I. was thus destroyed, but the losses suffered by the British were not inconsiderable. In a single day forty-four officers and men were killed and one hundred and nine wounded.<sup>1</sup>

#### Sialkot.

Sialkot played a significant role in the Revolution. On receiving the news of the outbreak of the Revolution the Deputy Commissioner had, as a precautionary step, written to an American missionary on 14 May: "Please suspend your preaching for a season—especially do not allow your native preachers to go about."<sup>2</sup> These measures of the local officers however proved ineffective and could not stop the activities of the workers of the Movement. The 66th N. I. posted there pledged itself to joining the Revolutionary forces months before its outbreak. Colonel Farquharson was later informed by a sepoy who had saved his life that "the names of the 35th L. I. and the 46th N. I. were down in the King of Delhi's book as pledged to join in the mutiny so long ago as last January"<sup>3</sup>. A 'seditious' letter had been seized as early as February in the musketry depot<sup>4</sup>. A reminder to the pledge given by the sepoys and instructions to rise were communicated to the people concerned through an Imperial *shuqqah*. The bearer of this letter passed through the village of Tulwundee, a

1 Cave-Browne, II, pp. 52-58; also see *Mutiny Records*, VIII. Pt. II, pp. 245-46, Kaye and Malletson, II, 469-471.

2 See Rich, Captain Gregory, *The Mutiny in Sialkot* (Sialkot, 1924), p. 8.

3 Cave-Browne, II, 60n.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 69, n. 2.

day before the outbreak of the Revolution in Sialkot. "An officer of the 46th N. I.," writes Cave-Browne, "on galloping down the lines, met his pay-havildar, and asked him what the disturbance all meant; the havildar replied that four troopers of the 9th Cavalry had just been through the lines and said that 'the *chhuppa* (printed letter or circular) had come, and' added the havildar, 'What can we do?'<sup>1</sup> This is corroborated by Ḥakīm Aḥsan-Allah Khān in his evidence at Bahādur Shāh's trial. He says that a petition was sent by the Revolutionaries of Sialkot to the Emperor requesting him to allow them to proceed to Delhi; "a reply was ordered to be sent"<sup>2</sup>. The truth however is that "for weeks the outburst had been expected, and every English inhabitant of Sialkot had thought painfully over the coming crisis, and had calculated the best means of escape."<sup>3</sup> The sepoys in Sialkot were thus ready to rise, and, it was for this reason that on receiving reports of the successful defiance of authority by the 14th N. I. at Jhelum they became excited and rose immediately. It is significant that the domestic servants of the European officers in Sialkot were loyal not to their employers but to the cause of the Revolution.<sup>4</sup>

On the night of 8 July the troopers of the 9th Cavalry took necessary steps and established pickets on the main roads. It was still dark when the officers were roused from their sleep by the uproar of the rising and learnt that the crisis had come. A loyal trooper rushed to the house of his officer, Captain Balmain, and

1 Cave-Browne, II, 60 n.

2 *Trial*, p. 272 : Aḥsan-Allāh Khān puts this correspondence "two months and upwards" after the outbreak in May; it appears that he has miscalculated the time.

Actually, on the evening of 8 July. "a messenger had come from Delhi, bringing a summons from the King commanding them to join the Royal Army." Cf. Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 471

3 Cf. Kaye and Malleon, II, 472.

4 As an illustration the case of the cook of Brigadier Brind is quoted; he was supposed to have removed the caps of his master's pistol in the night. See Cave Browne, II, p. 68n; also see Rich, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

informed him of the rising ; the latter roused Brigadier Brind and went to the Lines in the hope of keeping his men, under control, which, he did not realize, had now become impossible. The officers tried to make for the fort. They were pursued, "and a ball from the pistol of a mounted trooper entered the broad back of the Brigadier, and he was carried to the fort only to die."<sup>1</sup> On the parade ground of the 46th some of the sepoys were more considerate ; they told their officers to leave the place immediately, who, no other road being open, fled towards Gujranwala. Doctor Graham, the Superintending Engineer, was driving in a buggy towards the fort. He was shot in the carriage, but his daughter, who accompanied him, was allowed to take shelter in a garden : from here a trooper took her to the Cavalry quarterguard where she found Colonel and Mrs. Campbell. A few other Europeans also were attacked, but several succeeded in reaching the fort, the Deputy Commissioner, Monckton, and his Assistant, McMahon, being among them. A missionary, J. Hunter, and his wife were seized and killed by some chaprasis near the jail.<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries had in the meantime broken the jail and released the convicts ; the kutchery was burnt to ashes and the houses of the Deputy-Commissioner and other officers were plundered. It may be mentioned, however, that not one of the five churches, for which Sialkot was famous, was damaged. The Revolutionary troops, joined in numbers by the people, now took the road to Hoshiarpur, hoping to meet the men of the 15th N. I. who, they believed, had escaped from Jhelum. No sooner had they left Sialkot than the Gujars living in the neighbouring villages rushed to the cantonments and "flocked in like vultures to the prey"; they demolished the buildings and plundered the property they could lay hands upon.<sup>3</sup>

1 Kaye and Malleon, II, 473

2 Cave-Browne, II, 65 and note. Subsequently a Resaldar and a Subahdar of police were hanged for not saving them. It has been stated that the Hunters were killed by a mob led by Hurmat, the leader of the Revolutionaries at Sialkot See Rich, pp. 24-25.

3 Cave-Browne, II, 68-69.

No time was lost in sending the reports of the rising at Sialkot to Lahore, Kangra, Ferozepur and Amritsar. On 9 July, Nicholson, who had brought the Movable Column to Amritsar four days earlier, succeeded in disarming the 59th N. I. Next day (10 July) a messenger from Lahore brought the report of the outbreak at Sialkot ; almost simultaneously came the direct message sent from there asking Nicholson to take the Column to Gurdaspur and disarm the 2nd Irregulars. By nine o'clock the Column was in motion ; eighteen hours later it entered Gurdaspur.<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionaries were still on the banks of the Ravi, about eight miles from Gurdaspur, and they could never have expected to find the Column there. An unfortunate incident placed them under a further handicap. Two men of the 46th had come to the camp in the crowd of villagers who had brought milk, eggs and vegetables. They were arrested and confessed that they were emissaries and had come to raise the 2nd Irregulars.<sup>2</sup> Had these men succeeded in carrying back the report that the Column had arrived there the Revolutionaries would have certainly changed their strategy, but, as things stood, they remained ignorant of Nicholson's movements. When they reached the Trimmu Ghat they found that the boats had been scuttled by the district authorities of Gurdaspur ; nevertheless, they crossed the Ravi on the morning of 12 July wading through the water up to their throats<sup>3</sup>. The same day early in the afternoon Nicholson arrived within a mile of the river bank : he could see the Revolutionaries actually crossing the river.

1 The official report says that the district officers of Lahore and Amritsar "were ordered to seize every ekka, bylee, and pony that was to be seen, and to despatch them under police guards to General Nicholson's camp at Amritsar on urgent public service. These vehicles on their arrival there were promptly loaded with British soldiers, and the force started at dusk for Gurdaspur, which is at a distance of forty-four miles from Amritsar, reaching it at 3 p. m. of July 11." Quoted in Kaye and Malletson, II, 480 n.

2 Cave Browne, II, 74-75 and notes ; *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, pp 295-96.

3 Report of the Deputy-Commissioner of Gurdaspur in *Mutiny Records* VIII, Pt. I, p. 296.



**Battle of Trimmu Ghat**

The Revolutionaries gave the enemy no time, and, to quote Colonel Bouchier, who participated in the action, "scarcely had the artillery crossed the bridge, and were forming on the opposite side, screened by the Punjab levies, than down came the 9th Cavalry on their flanks (before the 52nd could form to receive them), gnashing their teeth, and worked up to the utmost with intoxicating durgs; they cut right and left at the gunners and drivers.<sup>1</sup> Away scampered the mounted levies back to Goordaspore; the enemy pushed out their skirmishers to within fifty yards of the guns, and a tremendous volley from the whole line, delivered as simultaneously as if on parade at Sialkote, made things look very ugly".<sup>2</sup> But against heavy odds<sup>3</sup> and superior equipment the Revolutionaries could not carry their successful charge to its logical end; they had not come prepared for a full scale battle against the Movable Column. They were forced to make a retreat and decided to recross the river. Here, however, they met with a calamity which they had not anticipated in the least. The river at this place is divided into two channels with an island between them. The southern channel was deep with a strong current, and they knew it; but the other one, which was shallow and fordable, when they had waded through it, had by now risen and become absolutely unfordable. Having been thus entrapped they made what little preparations they could to meet the attack of the enemy, which they knew was almost certain; they ran up a breast work close to the edge of the water and placed an old gun behind it; an attempt was also made to fortify the walls of a small village which was situated on the northern end of the Island.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In his official report Nicholson says that he did not oppose their passage across the river because they "might break away southwards, and so escape me." Quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 322.

<sup>2</sup> Bouchier's *Eight Months Campaign*, quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 76.

<sup>3</sup> See Nicholson's official report quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 323, para 14.

<sup>4</sup> According to Nicholson there were only 300 Revolutionaries on the island.

Nicholson, on the other hand, had both time and equipment to prepare himself for a decisive attack on the entrapped contingent of the Revolutionaries. He took three full days to get ready, and it was not before the morning of 16 July that the British guns were brought down to the bank of the river ; they were immediately put into action. This was, however, to draw off the attention of the Revolutionaries from the movements of the Infantry which could thus proceed unobserved to the southern end of the island. They took positions and reconnoitered the ground which was covered with thick brushwood. Without any loss of time the skirmishers marched forward and pushed back the pickets of the Revolutionaries. "It was now helter-skelter", wrote an eyewitness in the *Lahore Chronicle*, "they ran to the head of the island, were followed up by our fellows, and took to the water ; many of them must have been drowned ; numbers were like mud-larks on sand-banks and small islands,...There is deep water on the other side, and the villagers are up,.....<sup>1</sup> Many were drowned when trying to escape ; some were caught by the police. About a hundred managed to escape into Kashmir but under pressure from Lawrence the Maharaja expelled them from his State. They wandered in the hills for some time and wanted to go to Awadh, but in August, 1858 they were captured by the Deputy-Commissioner of Kulu in Kangra Valley.<sup>2</sup> "In short," wrote the latter, "few could altogether have escaped ; many were executed at Goordaspore ; at Shuckurgurh. I presided at the disposal of several camp followers ; innumerable were flogged, deprived of their ill-gotten gain, and sent back to the place from which they came there to receive the punishment that awaited them for any act of violence or crime <sup>3</sup>"

As a result of the message sent after the outbreak at Sialkot the 10th Light Cavalry was disarmed and dismounted at Ferozepur

1 The *Lahore Chronicle*, quoted in Cave-Browne. II, p. 79

2 Cave-Browne, II, p. 80 n.

3 *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. I, p. 297.

on 11 July, and the two wings of the 4th N. I. at Kangra and Nurpur<sup>1</sup> Soon after this, the emissaries of the Revolutionary Movement began to work among the men of the 10th Cavalry. "In the meanwhile," says Cave-Browne, "emissaries from Delhi had been among them ; in spite of the strictist *espionage*, letters breathing sedition would find their way into the lines, then two of the Irregular Cavalry corps, sent back from Delhi under a cloud, passed through a wing of the 17th Irregular cavalry, bound for Leia, under captain P. R. Hockin, who had dropped seventeen suspicious characters *en-passant*, to be taken care of in the Ferozepore jail".<sup>2</sup> On 19 August the men of 10th Cavalry rose and after minor triumphs they managed to leave for Delhi.<sup>3</sup>

### **Tribal Area**

By the end of June the Revolutionary Movement had entered the region generally known as the tribal area. To the south-west of Peshawar stood a fort named after a British officer, Colonel Mackeson, who had been murdered in September, 1853. Some men of the 24th N. I. stationed here had contacts with the Bussee Khail Afridis in the hilly tracts hard by. When Edwardes, Commissioner of Peshawar, came to know of these developments he persuaded the tribesmen to ask the men of the 24th N. I. to give them in writing that the fort would be surrendered.<sup>4</sup> The Afridis obtained this promise in writing and gave it to Edwardes. On the night of 6 July, the British forces marched out of Peshawar, reaching the fort before daybreak. The sepoy were surprised ; they were ordered to come out of the fort and lay down their arms ; this was considered to be a great achievement. "Edwardes

1 *Mutiny Records* VIII, Pt I, p. 213, 341 ; also see Cave-Browne, II, 104-05.

2 Cave-Browne, II, p. 106.

3 For the rising of the 10th Cavalry and their successful march to Delhi see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt I, 409, 412-17; Cave-Browne, II, p. 190, n 3.

4 Cave Browne II, p. 90

The official report says that the sepoy had promised to give 3,000 rupees to the Afridis of Biree for escorting them to a ferry on the Indus. See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 163.

deserves great credit," wrote a correspondent in a letter to *The Times*, "for this peaceful termination of his expedition ; for knowing the fort, he had taken the precaution of seizing the keep, the fort itself having no gates."<sup>1</sup>

Another incident pertaining to this area may be mentioned. On 9 July Malik Sirāj al-Din, leader of the Sipah tribe, and a powerful chief in the Khyber, sent a letter to the *sawārs* of the 18th Irregular Cavalry offering "an asylum in the writer's hills to any 'black-men' either of the cavalry or Infantry, who chose to mutiny and come to him . . ." The letter hinted that the writer had the authority of Kabul for this invitation. It was taken by some of the *sawārs* to their officer. When the Malik was asked if the letter was genuine he acknowledged it and said : "If the black-men had come he meant to give them up." After this incident the Malik remained loyal to the British.<sup>2</sup>

### Narinji

Far more serious than these incidents was the battle of Narinji.<sup>3</sup> A small group of the sepoys of the 55th N.I. had accompanied the expelled ruler of Swat, Sayyid Mubārak Shāh, into the valley of Panjtār, where a colony of the Revolutionaries had grown up under the leadership of Mawlawi 'Ināyat 'Alī, a successor of the great Sayyid Aḥmad Shahid.<sup>4</sup> Mawlawi 'Ināyat 'Alī had been preaching *jihād* in the neighbouring area for some time, and a number of people had come under his influence, including the Khān of Panjtār, Muqarrab Khān. The Khān sent a small party of the Revolutionaries under the command of his cousin, Mīr Bāz Khān, towards Mardan to "raise the standard of

1 Quoted in Cave-Browne, II, p. 91 n.

2 See *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt II, p. 164.

3 Naranji : "The mountain village was so strongly situated that the police scarcely dared to go near it", *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67.

4 Sayyid Aḥmad Shahid : For an account of his life and work see *H.F.M.*, Vol. I, pp. 557-600.

the Prophet" and work among the people. When the British authorities came to know of the movements of Bāz Khān's party, they sent a force against him under Major Vaughan, Commandant of the fort of Mardan. He fell upon the tiny group of the Revolutionaries on 2 July and overwhelmed them, killing Mir Bāz Khān; other leaders, Jān Muhammad Khān and Malik Z̤arīf, were taken prisoner and hanged; two villages were totally burnt and some were fired. The Revolutionaries however continued their work; emissaries from Delhi as well as Peshawar were arriving in this area and informing the people about the progress of the Revolution in other parts of the sub-continent. Mawlawī 'Ināyat 'Alī now set up his headquarters at Nariñji and planted there the standard of the Revolutionaries<sup>1</sup>. The village had a small population of about 400 souls, but they were devoted to the cause of freedom and acknowledged the authority of Mawlawī 'Ināyat 'Alī. Thus, to quote the sarcastic remark of the report, "The holy war seemed auspiciously opened with every requisite: a priest, a banner, a fastness, a howling crowd of bigots and several days' provisions."<sup>2</sup> On 21 July, Captain James attacked this small hamlet of the Revolutionaries with a strong force and took its occupants completely by surprise. Nevertheless they put up a determined resistance; "a few minutes sufficed to convert each peaceful labourer into an armed soldier, and every hut into a fortress; out rushed several Ghazees (Mohammedan martyrs), but they were quickly cut down by the 2nd Cavalry; and the lower part of the village was soon mastered and set on fire: but the remainder still held out desperately."<sup>3</sup> In spite of superior numbers and equipment the British forces had to fall back on Sewa. They did not find themselves strong enough to renew the

1 "The Ghazees came with the moulvie at their head and planted their standard (embroidered with butchery from the Koran) on the heights of Nowrunjee". Edwardes' report about Peshawar Division in *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 166; also see Holmes, p. 364.

2 Cave-Browne, II, p. 93 n.

3 *Ibid.*

attack and waited for reinforcements from Peshawar. These having arrived on 2 August, they moved forward on the following morning ; the Revolutionaries were ready to receive their charge. The main body of the British forces advanced by the direct route towards the village, but a detachment was separated with orders to mount the hill by a side-path. The Revolutionaries now found themselves between two forces, far superior to them, both in numbers and equipment. They made a retreat ; "the moulvi of course, was clear away ; he and the leading fanatics had gone off the night before, the cattle also, and all valuables, had been removed in anticipation of such a result. The village, however, was utterly destroyed."<sup>1</sup>

Peshawar itself had not been successfully quietened, and although the British had put it almost in a state of siege, and the sepoy had been disarmed, they still occupied their Lines ; these of course, were closely guarded. They were not in open revolt, but they were not wholly inactive either. Reports were reaching the officers that arms locally made were being purchased and probably secreted in the Lines ; the 27th N. I. and 51st N. I. were suspected most. On 28 August, an order was issued that the sepoy were to move out into tents on the plain near their respective parade-grounds ; precautions were also taken by their officers to meet resistance in case it was offered. The evacuation of the Lines began early in the morning and was carried out without any incident. About midday when the work of search was still going on the sepoy posted at quarter-guard in the Lines of the 51st N. I. made a sudden rush on Captain Bartlett who was supervising the operations.<sup>2</sup> Simultaneously with this came the rising of the entire Regiment. "with a whirr like a covey of partridges," to use the Captain's expression. Then followed a brief but contested action

1 Cave-Browne, II, p. 95.

2 Captain Bartlett was the Postmaster and Cantonment Magistrate ; he was an object of special hatred to the sepoy because among his duties were the interception of their letters and supervision of the executions.

in which "the sepoy fought well."<sup>1</sup> They were, however, overpowered by the enemy who had the advantage of superior arms and equipment, and "then began that memorable fusilade which commenced on the parade at Peshawar, and ended at Jumrood."<sup>2</sup> The losses of the sepoy were heavy; 660 out of a total of 871 were either "killed in the pursuit or subsequently executed by sentence of court martial"<sup>3</sup>

### Lahore

In the central and eastern districts of the Province also the Revolutionary Movement had been spreading fast and was growing stronger every day. Towards the end of July a letter was intercepted at the Post Office of Ambala; it was addressed by a seemingly quiet *bayrāgi* (priest) to the chief pundit of the Maharaja of Patiala, requesting him to use his influence to alienate his Chief from the 'unclean cow-slaying English.' The *bayrāgi* was seized and hanged.<sup>4</sup> More surprising was the case of the 26th N. I. The Regiment posted at Mian Mir (Lahore) had been disarmed in May. On 30 July, however, they rose, put to death their commanding officer, Major Spencer, and escaped, but instead of proceeding eastwards to Delhi they took the opposite direction. They were engaged by the Tahsildar of Ajnala and detained at the banks of the river until 31 July, when Frederick Cooper, Deputy-Commissioner of Amritsar, arrived on the scene with a small force. The Revolutionaries were "in a sorry plight; famished and footsore, on an island, with no means of defence or escape." Some of them surrendered, and some were brought by the villagers who had seized them, when they were trying to escape. In all Cooper had "500 rebel sepoy" bound in ropes and taken to Ajnala.

Cooper's barbarous treatment may be read in his own words. "It was midnight before all were safely lodged in the police

1 Cave-Browne, II, p. 113.

2 *Punjab Mutiny Report*, para. 164.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Cave-Browne, II, pp. 96-97 n. Also see Holmes, p. 362

station. A drizzling rain coming on prevented the commencement of the execution ; so a rest until day-break was announced. Before dawn another batch of sixty was brought in, and as the police station was then nearly full, they were ushered into a large tower or bastion.

"Previously, . . . the Deputy-Commissioner had ordered out a large supply of rope, in case the numbers captured were few enough for hanging (trees being scarce), and also a reserve of fifty Sikh Levies for a firing party, in case of the numbers demanding wholesale executions". Continuing the account he says that "when the execution commenced," the number of prisoners was "282 of all ranks, besides numbers of camp-followers." A dry well was discovered for the disposal of the corpses of the dishonoured soldiers." Cooper takes relish in using language which was shocking even to his own countrymen. "The climax of fortunate coincidences," he adds, "seemed to have arrived when it was remembered that the 1st of August was the anniversary of the great Mahomedan sacrificial festival of the Bukra Eed. A capital excuse was thus afforded to permit the Hindoostanee Mussulman horseman to return to celebrate it at Umritsar ; while the single, Christian, unembarrassed by their presence, and aided by the faithful Sikhs, might perform a ceremonial sacrifice of a different nature (and the nature of which they had not been made aware of) on the same morrow," Cooper describes the hideous details of the killings. The Revolutionaries on their part demonstrated by their actions that they were conscious of sacrificing their lives for a cause. When two hundred and thirty-seven of them had thus been put to death, the doors of the bastion were opened" to let the prisoners come out. "And behold !" continues the writer, "they were nearly all dead ! unconsciously, the tragedy of Holvell's Black Hole had been re-enacted".<sup>1</sup> Cooper was later condemned,

1 Cooper, Frederic, *The Crisis in the Punjab* (London : 1858), pp. 159-162, gives the number of Cooper's victims as 283, but this figure cannot be accepted against Cooper's own admission ; he says : "there fell by the law nearly 300 men." See p. 163 ; also see Holmes, p. 363.



both for the butchery and the mode in which he has described his actions. In his minute on the services of the civil officers, Lord Canning wrote about Cooper : "I hope (he) will be judged by his acts, done under stern necessity, rather than by the narrative of them."<sup>1</sup> Whether there was a "stern necessity" of butchering all the captives is highly doubtful.

About a fortnight after the dispersal of the 51st N. I. another Revolutionary leader gave the British Government some trouble Sayyid Amir with a band of about 50 Mohmunds and the men of the 51st who had escaped came down the hills and attacked the fort of Michni.<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries made an appeal to the men of the "*Kelat-i-Ghilzi*" who garrisoned the fort and requested them not to offer resistance if they had any regard for their faith and country which they wanted to liberate from the bondage of foreign rule. Edwardes admits : "We had no troops to move against them. It was a time for yielding with as good a grace as could be assumed." However, he succeeded in winning over the tribesmen by offering them the restoration of their confiscated privileges," and was able to persuade them to withdraw from the fort and settle the matter through negotiation. "The Mohmunds," writes Edwardes, "sent in their hostages to Peshawar, packed the Syud off unceremoniously and sat down quietly to wait for the return of peace in Hindoostan. The relief was indescribable."<sup>3</sup>

### Gugera

In September the Gugera district in Multan division became the scene of the greatest rising of the Revolutionaries in central Panjab. The region between Lahore and Multan was the home of sturdy peasants and cattle-rearing clansmen; the Lungreal, Khurruls and the Kathias may specially be mentioned. Besides these

<sup>1</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 103 n.

<sup>2</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 129.

<sup>3</sup> Cave-Browne, II, p. 129; *P. M. R.*, para 165. Also see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 177-78.

some other tribes—the Bhattis and Baluchis, for instance—had come from the neighbouring territories. To ensure safety of the important commercial road connecting Lahore with Multan and, through it, with Sind and Bombay, it was necessary to have a thorough control over this part of the Panjab. At Gugera which stood at a commanding position on this route precautionary steps were taken by the local authorities as soon as the news of the outbreak of the Revolution had reached them : the Treasury Guard (the 49th N. I.) was disarmed, a scrutiny of postal correspondence was started and extra police recruited.<sup>1</sup> In the last week of June, 1857, the jail overseer was dismissed from service, because he used to allow Ahmad Khān Khurrul, who subsequently became the chief leader of the Revolutionaries in this area, to pay visits to the prison house. Despite the precaution taken by the authorities the prisoners in the jail seem to have come under the influence of the agents of the Revolutionaries. On 26 July they rose and, in the words of the Assistant Commissioner, “were in a savage state of excitement” Equally “savage” were the measures taken to control them : “fifty-one prisoners were killed and wounded, and the *emeute* was promptly suppressed. Ahmad Khān Khurrul was suspected of having worked up the prisoners ; but this could not be established by evidence, and after being kept under surveillance for some time he was released.”<sup>2</sup>

However, if the authorities believed that they had crushed the Revolutionaries and secured the region they were grossly mistaken. Ahmad Khān was a man of courage and determination ; he had contacts with the Revolutionary leaders at Delhi and other places and even with the Emperor.<sup>3</sup> An impetus to their activities was provided by the released convicts of the central jail at Agra. Many of them returned to their homes in Gugera and Multan and told the people how the Movement was growing in strength and intensity

1 *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 41-42

2 *Ibid*, p. 44.

3 See Cave-Browne, II, pp. 203-04.

and how it was spreading in other parts of the subcontinent. They made an appeal to their kinsmen to rise against the British rule and put it to an end as their brethren had done elsewhere. The Khurruls led by Aḥmad Khān rose on 16 September, and were soon joined by a number of people ; in a short time the entire region was in the grip of the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> L. Berkeley who was sent with a small contingent of horsemen to capture Aḥmad Khān before he crossed the Ravi opposite to the village of Jhumra. He failed to do this, but when reinforcements arrived the Revolutionaries left the village which was burnt by the British forces.

Aḥmad Khān who had succeeded in winning over the support of the Wattu tribe, came up with the British forces at a place not far from Gugera. In a severe fight which ensued, "Aḥmad Khān and his followers fought stoutly ; and Captain Black and Lieutenant Chichester were surrounded more than once during the melee, the country being by no means favourable for the action of cavalry."<sup>2</sup> Both sides suffered heavy losses. "This expedition," says Elphinstone's report, "though attended with severe loss on our side, thus ended in irreparable disaster to the insurgents. Uhmud Khan had been the chief instigator of the movement ; his reputation for success in former insurrections was considerable, and his influence over the tribes on the Ravee unbounded"<sup>3</sup>. On 2 September Berkley was attacked near Kure Shah village by another party of the Revolutionaries "composed of the Futtanah, Turhanah, and Moordanah tribes, and led by their chiefs, Bhawul, Sullabut, and Walleedad."

1 In his report Lt Elphinstone, Assistant Commissioner, says : "The first information of the intended insurrection was brought to me by Surfiraz Khan, Khurral, in the night of the 16th. He insisted on seeing me about 11 p. m... and on being admitted informed me that all the Chiefs of the Ravee tribes, who were present at the Sudder on heavy *moochulkas*, had fled with all their followers, and that there could be no doubt that they intended to rise immediately. This was confirmed by other sources "Mutiny Records, VIII, Pt. II, p. 45 ; also see Kaye and Malleson, V, p. 211.

2 Cave-Browne, II, 208. Also see *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 49.

3 *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 50-51.

The Revolutionaries were dispersed but only to fall upon Berkley's forces on the following day, near the bank of the river. Here they had hidden themselves in the long grass standing by the side of the water. Berkley was defeated and slain in the action along with more than fifty of his men ; "and the loss would have been still more severe had it not been for a party of the Kuttar Mookhee Battalion, who rallied their comrades near the banks of the river and opposed a determined front to the pursuing enemy."<sup>1</sup> Among other leaders of the Revolutionaries, Muhammad Khān Khattia and Mir Bahāwal Fatwānah deserve to be specifically mentioned. The latter was considered to be "the greatest man among them, the bravest and most influential."<sup>1</sup>

### **Harrappa and Chichawatni**

Nevertheless, the Revolutionaries continued the struggle : they seized the Tahsil of Harappa and besieged the *sarāi* of Chichawatni behind which Major Crawford Chamberlain<sup>2</sup> had taken shelter after repulsing one of their parties on the afternoon of 23 September. He had seized a small two-storied tower which was considered to be 'the key' of the *sarāi*. Soon after nightfall the Revolutionaries attacked the British force ; they were provided with a shelter by the walls of the gardens and the houses in the village and their sharpshooters could ply the *sarāi* and the tower "with almost incessant musketry" ; even their women were helping them, "moving along the tops of the houses with their skirts stretched out, so as to cover the matchlockmen as they crept about from point to point." Chamberlain did not have the courage to risk a sortie, for, he feared, it would involve heavy loss of life. The pressure of the fire of the Revolutionaries was continually increasing, and "if a man showed himself for one minute, he was almost sure to be knocked over."<sup>3</sup> Chamberlain,

1 Cave-Browne, II, 214.

2 He had come from Multan with a force of the 1st Irregular Cavalry and Sikh Infantry. See *P. M. R.*, para, 126.

3 Cave-Brown, II, 207.

therefore, sent messages<sup>1</sup> for reinforcements and decided to wait for them. Lawrence had already despatched reinforcements to relieve the forces at Gogera. Paton who commanded the reinforcing Column from Lahore found on the morning of 26 September that the Revolutionaries had thrown themselves across the road, about two miles from Harappa. However, on seeing that the enemy had a stronger force and better equipment they withdrew without risking a battle; Paton could not go in their pursuit and decided to proceed to Chichawatni where he reached by midday. Two days later reinforcements also arrived from Multan, as well as another detachment from Lahore, under Captain Snow and McAndrew. On the way they had met a party of the Revolutionaries near Muhammadpur and had lost few of their men in the skirmish.<sup>2</sup>

The reports of the outbreak of the Revolution in Gogera had alerted the authorities in the neighbouring stations: Captain Hockin left Leia with a wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry and moved along the right bank of the Ravi to stop the Revolutionaries from crossing the river; Captain Hawes had moved out of Jhang "to arrest the spread of the insurrection in that quarter," while Captain Tronson and Major Voyle, the Deputy Commissioner of Multan, proceeded along the right bank of the Sutlej to cut off communications with the country of "that most dangerous of our neighbours, *our nominal ally*, the Nawab of Bahawalpoor"<sup>3</sup>

1 The first messenger carried Chamberlain's note sewn in the sole of his shoes: this was miscarried. Another note was sent through a small boy: this reached Colonel Paton about midnight. See Cave-Browne, II, p. 210.

2 Lieutenant Elphinstone's official report in *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt II, p. 52.

3 Cave-Browne, II p. 212

G. W. Hamilton, Commissioner of Multan Division, refers to the Nawab as "the more than doubtful Mahomedan ally of Bahawalpoor, holding a large tract of the left banks of the Indus and Sutlej, ever ready in the event of any further disaster to intrigue with our troops, invade the British territories and by his presence stimulate the people to rebellion and lay siege to the fort." *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, pp. 1-2.

The main task before the forces now concentrating at Chichawatni, was to guard the road between Lahore and Multan. Colonel Paton took charge of the portion from Lahore to Gugera, while Chamberlain was to move towards Multan. He was still on his way when distressing reports came from Kamalia, an important town across the river; McMahon, the Extra-Assistant Commissioner of the district was in dread of being attacked by the Revolutionaries. On 2 October Chamberlain retracted his steps and proceeded to Kamalia, but before he reached there McMahon had retreated and escaped to Jhang, leaving the town in the hands of Revolutionaries. Chamberlain crossed the river on 6 October and immediately moved towards Kamalia; it had been evacuated by the Revolutionaries who had plundered the wealthy *banyahs*<sup>1</sup>. The Revolutionaries had their own reasons for punishing, some sections of the population of Kamalia. The British forces had also been burning villages and inflicting severe punishments on their captives, and John Lawrence had to administer a rebuke to the authorities concerned. He wrote: "I am not aware of any orders which I have given for burning villages. I believe I have given none whatever on the subject. I hear that Mr. . . before he retreated from Koti-Kumalia caused all his prisoners to be shot. I beg that he may

1 The official report says that 'the cultivators (which sect alone formed the rebel forces) are deeply indebted to the money-lenders and bunnceahs, it was an object with them to efface all proof of their indebtedness. They did so most effectually.' *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt II, p. 74.

They had done it by destroying the records. It is to be noted, however, that this was not the only reason of the punishment of the *banyahs* by the Revolutionaries. Sometimes they acted as spies supplying information to the British officers. On the day preceding the occupation of Chichawatni by Chamberlain, "a letter was received in the afternoon from a bunya named 'Kunya' at Cheechawatnee stating that the news of the arrival of a small party of cavalry at Doboorejee had reached his village, near which was a strong gathering of rebels, and that no advance should be made in that direction without guns. The messenger who brought the letter computed the rebels at 3 to 4000, led by Mahomed, Lall and Nutto, Chiefs of the Khatya tribe, who would undoubtedly oppose the detachment." *Report of Major Chamberlain's Column*, paras. 5 and 19 in *Mutiny Records*, VIII Pt. II, pp. 65, 66, 74.

not be employed again in any military expedition. This is not the way to put down the insurrection."<sup>1</sup>

Chamberlain was unable to control the situation for "jungle fighting was madness, with all to lose and nothing to gain ;" he therefore decided to wait for reinforcements. His assessment of the situation, it appears, was not wrong, because the Revolutionaries were determined to make any sacrifices whatsoever for their cause.<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime reports were received that the Revolutionaries were concentrating in the jungle stronghold of Julli, which lay between the joint forces of Chamberlain and Cuerton and Hamilton's detachment from Multan, which was supported by a number of landlords of the neighbouring area.<sup>3</sup> On 10 October Chamberlain moved to Julli, having received reinforcements two days earlier.<sup>4</sup> The Revolutionaries had never expected that heavy guns could be brought against them into a dense jungle ; they could not therefore stand for long continuous firing from them. They left Julli on 22 October, crossed the Ravi

1 Bosworth Smith, II, p. 141.

2 Bahāwal Khān Fatwānah, and other, leaders of the Revolutionaries wrote a letter to Mir Barkat 'Ali 'Woordie-Major' of the 1st Irregular Cavalry telling him that "it is highly unbecoming and improper that you should be engaged in any hostile operations against the followers of Islam ; because the holy Prophet (may praises and blessings be upon his exalted head) has forbidden and proscribed it." After repeating oaths on Islam, the Prophet and the *Qur'ān* they offered Barkat 'Ali a *carte blanche* : "We tender whatever you may desire for your comfort and happiness, and we will henceforth consider you the lord and leader of our fortunes . You can do with us exactly as you please , whatever you order will be obeyed". An appeal was also made to forget the past : "pray banish it from your memory". The letter ended with an apology ; it had to be without an envelope because the writers had none with them ; nor, they said, they could find a more elegant writer. However, Barkat 'Ali thought that he could have a better future in remaining loyal to the British. Cave-Browne, II, pp 215-16n.

3 Cave-Browne writes Jublee in place of Julli. See vol. II, p. 217.

4 Major Chamberlain's Column (Report). *Mutiny Records*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 75.

and made for the Sutlej in the hope of entering Bahawalpur territories.<sup>1</sup> An attempt was made to go in their pursuit but it did not meet with success. Chamberlain was however able to capture a large number of cattle and sheep left behind by them.<sup>2</sup>

### **Leiah**

Captain Hockin who had left Leiah with a wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry was marching along the right bank of the river when reports came that the 9th Irregular Cavalry had risen at Kalabagh on the Indus, on its way to Bannu<sup>3</sup>. The leader of the Revolutionary *sawārs* was Risaldar Wazir Khān, "one of the bravest men in the Indian army".<sup>4</sup> Having fired a few shots on their Commandant, Captain Campbell<sup>5</sup>, they made for the Ravi. A party of the Mooltanee Horse under Cowan and Ensign Chalmers met them. Chalmers was severely wounded and his men fled away; Cowan fell back on a village and sent news to Captain Hockin, who had already started in that direction immediately on receiving the first report of the outbreak. When Hockin came upon the Revolutionaries Risāldar Wazir Khān stepped forward and challenged Risāldar 'Alī Wardī Khān of the 17th Cavalry to "let us see which is the best man." In the 'passage of arms' that followed Wazir Khān was mortally wounded; soon after, the men of 17th Cavalry fell upon the Revolutionaries and overwhelmed them by sheer weight of numbers.

1 "It was subsequently discovered that the rebels left Jhullee the previous day at *midday*, and, although they passed within 200 yards of the village of a Syud who had professed the greatest friendship and subservience to the British Government, he gave no information whatever and denied all knowledge of their departure, until the 'Koorā' or spoor of many cattle, goats, sheep, horses, men, etc., gave him the lie". *Ibid*, VIII, Pt. II, p. 77.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

3 The 9th I. C. had been withdrawn from Delhi because they were regarded with suspicion.

4 Cave-Browne, I, p. 220.

5 He was not hurt; of the four shots which entered the doolie in which he was sleeping, two passed through over his head and two lodged in his plow.



**Sind**

The annexation of Sind had taken place only fifteen years before the outbreak of the Revolution. Bartle Frere, who had been appointed its Commissioner in 1850<sup>1</sup>, was of the view that it was 'safe', and had therefore he not hesitated in sending the strongest of his Regiments, the 1st Fusiliers, to Multan. Two months later he found it necessary to issue a proclamation and take other precautionary measures.<sup>2</sup> In his circular letter sent with copies of the proclamation Frere says that it was suggested to him on various occasions that some proclamation or notification should be issued by him: He had, however, abstained from complying with these suggestions because he thought such notifications "often do more harm than good." But in July he had to change his opinion because "it appears certain that missionaries have been despatched in this direction, with a view to disturb the public peace, and that alarming rumours have been put in circulation in various parts of the Province" In the proclamation which was originally written in Persian he admits that "some evil disposed persons have of late come in the direction of Sind from Hindoostan and elsewhere spreading mischievous reports.....Moreover many sepoys of the Bengal Army have treacherously deserted from their Regiments and spread themselves over the country to try to seduce the faithful soldiers of the British Government from their alliance."<sup>3</sup> The Government directed its agents to find out such persons and hand them over to the nearest police stations. A threat of the confiscation of property was given to those who would be found guilty of withholding information; the spreading of seditious reports was made punishable with

1 Early in 1856 Frere had gone to England; he had returned in March, 1857.

2 Circular No. 1026 of 1857—Political Department (From H. B. E. Frere Esquire Commissioner of Sind, dated 16 July 1857)—*Secret Letters*.

3 It is rather significant that the Commissioner mentions "evil disposed persons" as well as "sepoys". Evidently the former were the workers sent by the organizers of the Movement or *missionaries* as Frere calls them.

death. By September, however, the activities of the Revolutionaries had penetrated as far as the Qalat territory.<sup>1</sup>

### **Karachi**

The results of the work done by the "missionaries" of the Revolution appeared in the form of the risings of the sepoy Regiments at different places. Karachi took the lead. In 1857 the 'native' town was, to quote Burton, "a mass of low mud hovels and high mud houses, with flat mud roofs, windowless mud walls and numerous mud ventilations, surrounded by a tumble-down parapet of mud built upon a low platform of mud covered-rock."<sup>2</sup> To the east of the town at a short distance was the vast area covered by the British cantonment. On the Frere Street were the bungalows of the officers, which formed the front row of the military quarters. Behind these houses were the regimental Lines, those of the British soldiers in the south and the Hind-Pakistāni Regiments to the north of Saddar Bazaar.

On 13 September<sup>3</sup> at about eleven o'clock in the night Major M'Gregor, the Commanding Officer of the 21st N. I., received information that his Regiment had made plans to rise at midnight,<sup>4</sup>

1 Bartle Frere's letter to Lawrence contains the following report about Qalat: "The Khelat papers sent to you will show that disaffected people are trying to stir up strife there, but I am in great hopes, Capt. Merewether will be able to set all right without detaining the upwards bound troops." John Lawrence Papers (MS.) In India Office Library, No 132.

2 Quoted in Gazetteer of the Province of Sind, Karachi District (Bombay, 1919), p. 59.

3 This is the date given by Bartle Frere in his official report to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay. On the morning of 14 September he sent his first report (No. 325, dated the 14th September, 1857). See *Secret Letters*, No. 328 of 1857, dated the 21st September.

Kanhayya Lall also gives the same date; he mentions Sunday which was 13 September. See p. 257.

Charles Ball gives 14 September which is not correct unless by the phrase "the night of the 14th" he means the night preceding 14 September. See Vol. II, p. 156

4 According to Kanhayya Lall the information was given by a havildar and other persons. See p. 257.

and, after seizing the treasure, it would proceed to Hyderabad. M'Gregor immediately rushed to the town to inform the authorities. Colonel Stiles, Commanding Officer of the 2nd European Light Infantry, strengthened the mess-guard where the families of the officers were to take shelter; a guard was also posted at the Treasury. Major Blake marched with his Horse-Artillery to the rear of the Lines of the 21st N. I. and took positions in front of the parade ground. The "assembly" was sounded and the men of the 21st completely taken by surprise had to obey the order. On the roll being called it was discovered that twenty-seven men had escaped with their muskets. However, the Regiment was disarmed and after a short harangue by General Scott the men returned to their Lines. Ten of the Revolutionary sepoys who had escaped were taken captive and tried by a court-martial. They were sentenced to death and on the same day (17 September) seven of them were hanged and three blown up by guns.

The search for the Revolutionaries was now undertaken on an elaborate scale. Descriptive rolls of the sepoys who had escaped were made out and sent by Major Marston, Captain of Police, to various *thanahs*, and directions were issued that the ferries were to be watched; the people living in the countryside were put 'on the alert'. The plan was successfully executed and information about their movements became available. Strong parties were sent in their pursuit. "Nine were taken on the other side of the Hubb, by a party under Soobahdar Allāh Yar Khan..." The Revolutionaries had unfortunately entered the village of the Subahdar and asked for conveyance "to go and join the Jam of Bayla." The Subahdar waited until it was dark; he then put guard round the hill which they had occupied, leaving one road open. He ordered some matchlocks to be fired at random giving an impression that a contingent of troops had arrived. "When day dawned on the morning of the 15th he took up their tracks, and by a rapid pursuit, caught them off their guard, among some thick jungle and at once charged them. ...all were secured uninjured." Within

the next two or three days more were captured—one was taken from the neighbourhood of 'Mugger' (Mangu) Pir.<sup>1</sup> In his report dated 21 September, Frere sums up the results of the efforts of the pursuing parties in these words : "Of the 31 mutineers 24 have been captured alive and brought in of whom 18 were tried and sentenced to death, 17 were executed ; the sentence of one commuted to transportation, and three yet remain to be tried, three were shot in a fight by the Police, three have been tracked, pursued and captured, but not brought in and only four remain to be accounted for."<sup>2</sup>

### Hyderabad

In Hyderabad also "for several days rumours had reached me of an intended rising of the Gulundauze but I was unable to trace them to any foundation, and regarded them merely as Bazar rumours. It was however evident to me, that a *feeling of insecurity existed to a great extent amongst the people*, which it was advisable to allay..."<sup>3</sup> An unpatriotic 'native' officer reported to the Commander that the sepoy had planned a rising and that the people of the town would join hands with them. He took preemptory steps to secure the Treasury and the pay office and then ordered the sepoy to assemble for a parade. They were all disarmed, and apparently showed no signs of resentment. In the night, a few of them disappeared : but they were captured and blown away with guns.<sup>4</sup> Frere's brief report sent to John Lawrence was that "we have had a very narrow escape at Hyderabad. The Subahdar Major of the Golundazes Batty., reported his men plotting...The Brigadier determined to disarm them which he effected very

1 For a brief description see *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*, Vol. I. Karachi District, (Bombay, 1919), pp. 100-01

2 *Secret Letters*, No. 328 of 1857, (Frere to Elphinstone, dated Karachi, 21 September, 1857).

3 Report of the Magistrate of Hyderabad, to the Commissioner, *Sind Records*, No. 1185 of 1857, Military Department. (Italics are mine.)

4 Kanhayya Lall. *op. cit.*, pp. 369-70.

skilfully and.....secured the guns which he moved into the Fort where.....they are safe ..1” The captive Revolutionaries were brought before the authorities, and, “our punishments here at Hyderabad seemed to have checked the disaffection in the native regiments and will I hope have the same effects at Shikarpoor, where the same kind of plot has been discovered just in time.”<sup>2</sup>

In Upper Sind, comparatively nearer to the main centres of the Movement than Karachi and Hyderabad, the workers of the Revolutionaries seem to have achieved better results Daryā Khān, was one of their leaders who worked in Jaccobabad ; he was also in contact with the sepoys at Shikarpur. In his report dated 1 October, Frere writes : “I have no doubt that but for the promptitude, and decision shown by Captain Montgomery in arresting these men at Shikarpoor, and by Captain Merewether in imprisoning and removing Durya Khan, the traitorous Jekranee Chief at Jacobabad, the men of the artillery who broke out into mutiny at Shikarpoor.....would have been joined by many discontented spirits, both there and at Jacobabad.....”<sup>3</sup> Daryā Khān was sent to Sukkur ; from there he was put on board a river steamer and taken to Karachi “to undergo his sentence of imprisonment for life in the jail of Ahmednuggur or such other place as your Lordship in Council may direct.....”<sup>4</sup> Despite these repressive measures adopted by the authorities a small number of ‘native’ artillerymen rose on the night of 23 September and took

1 Lawrence Papers, (MS), I. O. No. 131.

2 *Ibid*, No. 132.

3 The leaders arrested were Šūbahdār Bihārī Mišr, Havildar Imām ‘Alī Shāh (16th Regiment) and Muḥammad Shāh camp-follower. They were arrested two days before the rising at Shikarpur, “after a conference at which they had endeavoured to induce the Police to join them in mutiny.” “*Secret Letters*, No. 360 of 1857 (Frere to Elphinstone, dated 1 October, 1857).

4 *Secret Letters*, No. 198, 857—(Frere to Elphinstone, dated 17 October, 1857).

air guns to the parade-ground.<sup>1</sup> The rest of the men belonging to this Regiment and others available were brought into action against them : within two hours they were overpowered.<sup>2</sup> The risings

Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpur were small compared to the events of the War in other parts of the subcontinent. However they do establish the fact that Sind, Beluchistan, Qalat and the neighbouring areas did not remain wholly unaffected by the movement.

Kanhayya Lal says, their number was fourteen or sixteen, p. 223.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER XIV

### BIHAR AND BENGAL

In 1857 the territories now covered by East Pakistan and the Bharat States of Assam, West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa constituted a single Province which was in the charge of a Lieutenant Governor with eleven Commissioners under him. Patna a divisional headquarters, has been described by Commissioner Tayler as a city, six miles in length and nearly half a mile broad, with a population "estimated at about 40,000 souls—of whom about one-fourth are Mahomedans".<sup>1</sup> In the earlier decades of the century it had become an important centre of the *Jihād* Movement of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid. Twelve years before the Revolution of 1857, "a dangerous plot was detected, in which many of the Mahomedans of Patna, and the neighbouring districts were concerned,..... That the conspiracy of 1846, was but a branch of a more general branch is the opinion of many who are well acquainted with the country, and that the object of that conspiracy was the destruction of the English, the over-throw of the British Government, and the re-establishment of a Mahomedan dynasty, is, I imagine, beyond doubt."<sup>2</sup>

#### Danapur

Bihar thus offered a favourable ground for the dissemination of the Revolutionary ideas. The Commissioner was not unaware of the disaffection spreading in the area; two years before the Revolution he had reported to the Government that "the minds of the Behar people, and especially of the Mahomedans,

<sup>1</sup> Tayler, William, *The Patna Crisis* (London, 1858), p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

were greatly disturbed.....”<sup>1</sup> Soon after the outbreak of the Revolution the District Judge wrote to the Commissioner that he had received some information about the very “unsatisfactory state of affairs,” at Dānāpūr;<sup>2</sup> several plans were suggested with regard to the precautionary measures. However before any step could be taken by the local authorities information came on 7 June that the Regiment at Dānāpūr would rise that evening: it was obvious that they would march on Patna and release the prisoners. Tayler, therefore, decided to give refuge to the European families in his own house.<sup>3</sup> It was guarded by a party of the *Najibs* (Police Battalion) commanded by Major Nation and some troopers under Holmes. Tayler was busy making arrangements for the comforts of the refugees when two letters were delivered to him by Nation. A coolie had brought them from Dānāpūr, but they had fallen into the hands of a *Najib* who passed them on to his officer. The contents of the letters, particularly an emphasis on the sepoys being *ek-dil* (of one heart) with the *Najibs* at Patna, unnerved the authorities; Tayler admits: “My-feelings, at this moment,.....may be easily conceived.”<sup>4</sup> Before dawn, however, the anxiety of the refugees was relieved by the arrival of a Sikh Battalion under Captain Rattray.<sup>5</sup>

1 Tayler, p. 22

2 Dānāpūr (also written by some Europeans as Dīnāpur) was the headquarters of a Division of the Bengal Army; it was situated on the right bank of the Ganges, about 12 miles west of Patna. At the time of the outbreak of the Revolution three Regiments of Native Infantry, the 7th, 8th, and 40th, a Company of Europeans and one of Native Artillery and Her Majesty's 10th Foot were stationed there.

3 It was a spacious building and was known as the *Kothi Chhajju Bagh*. See Shād, Sayyid ‘Alī Muḥammad, *Tārīkh Sūbah Bihār*, (Azimabad, 1893), p. 123.

4 Tayler, p. 31.

5 Tayler (p. 31) says, he “had despatched urgent expresses to hasten on Captain Rattray’s Sikhs;” but Forrest does not give him the credit of calling the Sikhs in time. “It has been erroneously implied”, he writes in a footnote “that Mr. William Tayler summoned the Sikhs.” Cf. Forrest, III, p. 399.



Nothing happened that night, but on the following day what Rattray told the Commissioner about the contempt with which the Sikhs were received on their way to Patna and again in the city itself was more than enough to indicate that preparations for the Revolution were being made on an extensive scale.<sup>1</sup> Hidāyat 'All, the Subahdar of the Battalion, confirms this by reporting that he had overheard several respectable persons talking about the end of the Company's raj and the re-establishment of the Emperor's rule. On making detailed enquiries about the state of affairs in the town, Tayler learnt that "conferences were held at night, both in mosques, and private houses, though with such secrecy and cunning that proof or capture was impossible."<sup>2</sup> He went to Dānāpūr on 11 June to gather further information directly by contacting the sepoys, but he met with no success. On his return to Patna he found letters from the Magistrate of Arrah that the Railway employees at Shāhābād had become panicky and were leaving it for Dānāpūr.<sup>3</sup>

### Repressive measure

Tayler thought that disaffection which was now spreading rather fast could be suppressed by repressive measures. His first

1 ".....the Seikhs were constantly reviled on their march towards Patna, and.....accused of being renegades to their faith, and asked whether they intended to fight for the 'kafir' or for their 'desn'. As they entered the town, a wild-looking fakeer rushed forward into the road, with savage menaces and threatening gestures, reviled them as traitors and accursed." They were not allowed to enter the 'Sikh Temple' and "wherever they were seen, the most palpable evidences of contempt and hatred were openly shewn." Tayler, pp. 3, 34.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 35

3 Some interesting reports had found currency about the flight of the Europeans from Shāhābād. Quite a few of the men, the story went, had put on women's clothes, because the Revolutionaries did not molest the fair sex. An *ekka* was stopped and challenged by a sentry: '*hum aurat hei*' came the reply but in a gruff voice. When the curtain was lifted a burly red-faced Englishman was found sitting inside.

Shād says that General Lloyd, Commandant of Dānāpūr, had written to Tayler that people were coming to Dānāpūr from all sides and flocking there in large numbers. See p. 124.

blow was directed against the leaders of the "Wahhābis"—Mawlawī Aḥmad Allāh, Wā'iz al-Ḥaqq and Shāh Aḥmad Ḥasan. For Tayler the main reason of suspicion against their activities was that they had contacts with Luṭf 'Alī Khān, a rich Shī'ah banker of the city. To arrest these leaders the Commissioner resorted to a ruse. A conference was notified and they were invited to it along with some other persons. When the farce of a consultation was over, it was decided that "our three little friends should be taken quiet possession of and marched off to the Seikh lines." The game was played with great skill; and the three leaders, now helpless victims of deceit and chicanery, offered themselves for custody with a bitter sarcasm "Great is your Excellency's kindness, great your wisdom," Mawlawī Aḥmad Allāh is stated to have told Tayler, "what you order is the best for your slaves, so shall our enemies be unable to bring false charges against us." Tayler seems to have caught the sarcasm; he replied with a vicious smile: "what is pleasing to you, is agreeable to me."<sup>1</sup> Before leaving the room Tayler, resuming the rigidity of the bureaucrat, warned Mawlawī Aḥmad Allāh that his father had not been arrested, "but his life is in your hands, yours in his."<sup>2</sup> The action against the *mawlawīs* had been taken not on the basis of any evidence against them but because the Commissioner wanted to have hostages for the "good conduct of their whole brotherhood." However, the method which he adopted was by no means creditable; "it must always be a matter of regret that the mode of arrest was not more in accordance with faith and honour."<sup>3</sup> Soon after this Mawlawī Mahdī, a patrolling *Dārūghah* in the city, was arrested, against the advice of the Collector.<sup>4</sup>

1 Tayler, p. 50

2 *Ibid*, p. 51.

3 Forrest, III, pp. 401-02. It never occurred to Tayler that his methods were condemnable; on the contrary he jauntily praises his action: "To this day I look at the detention of these men as one of the most successful strokes of policy which I was able to carry into execution" Tayler, p. 51. Also see Mas'ūd 'Alam Nadwī *Hindustan ki pahilī Islāmī Tahrik*, (Hyderabad, 1371 H.), pp. 80-81.

4 It may be noted that Mawlawī Mahdī had been in touch with 'Alī Naqī

The arrest of the "Wahhabi" leaders was followed by other harsh measures ; the citizens were ordered to surrender their arms within twenty-four hours and not to move out of their houses after nine o'clock at night ; these orders were issued without prior approval of the Provincial Government. Halliday<sup>1</sup> wanted to stop this unrestrained repression ; Tayler was, therefore, informed that "the Lieutenant-Governor would earnestly caution against unnecessary harshness, and against all illegal proceedings" Tayler paid no heed to this advice and continued his policy of repression ; on 22 June a *Najib* was tried on the charge of having made an attempt to tamper with the Sikhs ; he was hanged. At the same time three *faqirs* found in the camp were imprisoned.<sup>3</sup>

### The rising at Patna

Tayler's repression could not stop the progress of the Revolutionary Movement. On 23 June the Magistrate of Tirhut arrested a police officer, Wārith 'Alī by name<sup>4</sup> A number of letters 'of a seditious character,' were found with him ; they had been written by a leading Muslim resident of Gaya, Mawlawī 'Alī Karīm, zamindar of Dumri, who was at that time residing at a place about nine miles from Patna. A party of fifty Sikhs under Rattray was sent with a Magistrate, Lewis, to arrest him but 'Alī Karīm having received a report of these decisions in time, had fled to the house on an elephant. The Magistrate tried hard, but could not get him.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently it was reported that 'Alī Karīm was

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and other leaders of Awadh. Later when he was released he returned to Awadh and participated in the battles at Azamgarh and some other places.

1 Frederick Halliday was Lieutenant Governor of Bengal.

2 Letter quoted in Forrest, III, p. 405.

3 Tayler, p. 56.

4 He was resident of Delhi and connected with the Imperial farman. Cf. Tayler, p. 71 ; also see *Shād*, p. 125.

Tayler wanted to extract information from Wārith 'Alī, but could get more than what he already knew. Wārith 'Alī was, of course, hanged. Cf. Forrest, III, p. 409.

5 *Ibid*, also see Kay and Malletson, III, pp. 34-35.

Patna, hiding in some house ; his property was attached and a price of 5,000 rupees was put on his head.

The last week of June was quiet, but on the third day of July a large body of Muslims, nearly two hundred, led by a book-seller, Pīr 'Alī, rushed into the streets ; they carried with them a flag and a drum and were raising the slogan, "Dīn".<sup>1</sup> Doctor R. Lyall, Assistant to the Opium Agent, rushed to the scene with a party of fifty *Najibs* and eight Sikhs. Lyall came too near the Revolutionaries and was shot dead. On receiving a report of this incident, Tayler, who had already sent Rattray with 150 Sikhs to control the situation, despatched a messenger to Dānāpur asking the Commander for reinforcements. A contingent of European soldiers immediately left Dānāpur, reaching Patna at two o'clock in the night. Before their arrival the Sikhs had overpowered and dispersed the unarmed Revolutionaries ; one of them was killed and another, Imām-al-Dīn, was severely wounded. On the following two days searches were made for the leaders of the outbreak ; thirty-one men were apprehended, of whom fourteen were hanged without delay.<sup>2</sup>

#### Pīr 'Alī and his co-workers

Among the Revolutionaries who were hanged was the leading organizer of the Movement at Patna, Pīr 'Alī, who originally came from Lucknow, but had established a book shop in the city. He was in contact with other workers of the Movement, particularly Maṣīh al-Zamān, in Lucknow, who was also, like him, a book-seller.

1 *Shād* says that the flag was white and blue ; in other places the Revolutionary flag was invariably of green colour. See *Shād*, pp. 126-27. Also see Kaye and Malleeson, III, p. 37.

2 Kaye and Malleeson, III, p. 37.

Tayler, however, puts the number of persons hanged at twenty-one, and of the imprisoned twenty-three. See p. 66. *Shād* (p. 127), gives a few names, such as Hājī Jān, Aḡ ḡar 'Alī Khān, Buddhan Jān, Awaḡaf Husayn with two brothers, Ṣhyāḡ Ghulām 'Abbās and Nandwā Kahār.

Also see *Fawq*, Sayyid Awlād Ḥaydar, *Tārīkh-i-Jadīd Subah Urisah wa Bihār* (Patna, 1915).

Pir 'Alī's colleague in Patna was Ghasitā Khān, a jamadar of the rich banker, Lutf 'Alī Khān. Tayler examined the letters of Maṣīh al-Zamān, which made it clear that the object of the Movement was to obtain a victory over the Christian rulers ("*futteh ooper Naṣara*"), that in this effort all sections of people, "Hindoos, Wahabees and Rafzees, were to combine with the orthodox Mahomedans." The main argument was the interference of the British Government in religious matters. It was quite evident that the efforts of these people were only a link of a far wider campaign.<sup>1</sup> Before sending him to the gallows, Tayler tried to extract information from Pir 'Alī, but the latter "heavily fettered, his soiled garments stained deeply with blood from a wound in his side, confronted with myself and several other English gentlemen, the last hope of life departed, not for a moment did betray agitation, despondency, or fear". When offered a bait in the form of a question, if he would agree to do something which would make it worth while to save his life, Pir 'Alī replied, "with supreme coolness and some contempt", that "there are some cases in which it is good to save life, others in which it is better to lose it". Continuing his taunts on the oppressive policy of the Commissioner he added; "You may hang me, or such as me, every day, but thousands will rise in my place, and your object will never be gained." Like many a martyr of the Revolution, Pir 'Alī, after listening to orders for his execution, "walked out unmoved, and, to all appearance, unconcerned."<sup>2</sup>

An interesting letter in Pir 'Alī's papers was from Maṣīh al-Zamān addressed to Wā'iz al-Ḥaqq, the "Wahhabi" leader: it was in code and said that whatever had been written "though obscure and under a metaphor, the Moulvee being a *wise man* would understand!"<sup>3</sup> Besides Pir 'Alī's correspondence some

1 Tayler, pp. 68-69.

2 *Ibid*, pp. 66-67.

3 Maṣīh al-Zamān: He was born at Lucknow in 1806; after completing the course of the *Dars-i-Nizāmī* he set up a publishing house and later a

letters seized from the possession of Wārith 'Alī are also important ; they do not only add to the strength of evidence in favour of the view that the Movement was being organized on an extensive scale but also give a clue to the nature and style of the code language used by its organizers. He speaks of the work in which he was engaged as *tijārat* (commerce) and mentions "partners of respectability who had joined it from the east and the west" and "a secure place of rendezvous, which robbers could not enter," as well as "extensive profit to be derived by the shareholders". In another letter he refers to the "*pilau* which he had been cooking, which was now ready for eating."<sup>1</sup>

#### Danapur contingent over-powered

The agents of the Revolutionary Movement had succeeded in influencing the sepoys of the Regiments posted at Dānāpūr.<sup>2</sup> The unwise action of the Government in allowing the European residents of Calcutta to publicly canvass the question of the disarming of the sepoys had added considerably to the intensity of their disaffection. On 15 July the Commander-in-Chief wrote

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press known as *Maṭha' Masthī* in the Kashmiri Maḥallah. Subsequently another press with the same name was established in Kanpur. Finding it difficult to supervise his business at two places he closed the Lucknow press in 1850. He was interested in manuscripts and had a fine collection of them. He was an active worker of the Revolutionary Movement. After the Revolution his entire property was confiscated. He migrated to Hyderabad where he was appointed Superintendent of the Government Press of the State. Maḡīh al-Zaman was a man of literary tastes ; he wrote poetry with '*Atā* as his pseudonym ; he has also written a good Urdu text-book for children entitled *Maktabnāmah*.

In the last year of his life he had become a disciple of the great *ṣūfī*-scholar of Delhi, *Shāh 'Abd al-Ghānī*. In 1877 he went to Mecca to perform *hajj* ; he settled there and died in 1878. See Chishtī, Muhammad 'Abu-al-Ḥallīm, *Ḥayāt-i-Waḥīd al-Zamān* (Karachi, 1957), pp. 11-15.

1 Tayler, p. 70.

2 "There was no sign of a mutiny. The repressive measures at Patna were however bound to affect the native regiments". Forrest, III, p. 413.

to General Lloyd, Officer Commanding the Dānāpūr Division, that a detachment of Her Majesty's Fifth Fusiliers had left that morning for Banāras, and that if he thought it was necessary to disarm his troops he could ask the Fusiliers to disembark and help him. The General did not think it was necessary to take the extreme measure of disarming the sepoys ; he let the detachment of the Fusiliers proceed on their way to Banāras. Two days later he changed his opinion and decided to deprive the sepoys of the percussion-caps. Fortunately for him two Companies of H. M.'s 37th Regiment reached Dānāpūr on 24 July ; they were disembarked under the orders of the General. On the following morning the European troops were drawn up in a square close to their barracks and two carts were sent to the Magazine. When these carts loaded with cap-cases were on their way back the men of the 7th and 8th N. I. saw them and became excited ; they were, however, quieted by the officers. The General issued orders at about 10 A. M. that the remaining caps should also be collected in the Lines by the 'native' officers. He thought that there was no possibility of opposition, because "the men would feel it quite madness to attempt resistance with only fifteen caps per man." The sepoys thought otherwise ; they resisted, and asked the officers "to be off." The hospital guard saw the European officers fleeing from the Lines of the sepoys and fired off the signal guns ; the patients, says the Medical Officer, "got on the top of it. They kept up a steady fire, and managed, infirm in health as they were, to kill about a dozen of the scoundrels." The reaction of this firing on the sepoys was that the men of the 40th N. I. who had till then remained aloof also joined the Revolutionaries.<sup>1</sup> The British soldiers fired at them also, but they were now beyond the range of their guns ; thus, the men of all the three Regiments escaped *enmasse*. The country around being either under water or swampy the British soldiers could not gather enough courage to pursue them. General Lloyd, "who had no horse in canton-

1 Forrest, III, p. 417

ment," boarded a steamer which was equipped with guns and rifles, and "expected to get some good shots at the sepoys; the latter, however, disappointed him because the majority of them did not go by the straight road to Arrah, which ran beside the river. They had taken another route connecting that place with Patna and passed through the small town of Phulwāri. General Lloyd lost no time in despatching troops to relieve Arrah but due to a mishap they could not move for another day, and at last when they managed to arrive in the vicinity of town they were ambushed by the Revolutionaries under the leadership of Kunwar Singh, the zamindar of Jagdishpur.<sup>1</sup> The night was dark and the British troops were entangled in a mango grove; they fell in numbers. As attempt to make a retreat on the following morning soon became a rout; "of the four hundred men who had gone on the day before, full of health and hope, one half had been left behind to gorge the vultures and the jackals, and of those who

1 He was a big zemindar in the district of Shāhābad and held estates of the annual rental of Rs 3 lakhs, but his prodigality had landed him into debts running to the high figure of thirteen lakhs. On the eve of the Revolution he was in a state of bankruptcy. His motives for joining the Revolution have been a subject of controversy. Tayler was a personal friend of Kunwar Singh and as late as 14 June he wrote to the Government that a number of letters imputing him with disloyalty were received by him, but "my personal friendship for him and the attachment he has always shown me enabled me to contradict the report." Quite different was the view of Wake, the Magistrate of the district in which Kunwar Singh had his lands; he writes. "I know there is an idea prevalent that Koer Singh's treason was not premeditated, but I am certain that for three months at least he was only bidding for his time." Among the modern writers Dr. Sen has taken pains to show that Kunwar Singh joined the Movement because he was the natural leader of the Rajputs of Shāhābad and these latter were out to prove that Rajput valour was not a thing of the past." This is putting perhaps too low a premium on Kunwar Singh's sacrifices in the cause of freedom. If the War of Independence was the only occasion for a demonstration of "Rajput valour" and Kunwar Singh was guided by no other consideration he could have fought with advantage on the side of his "friend," Tayler, as his contemporary, Jang Bahādur, had been doing with a view to gain advantages for the Gurkhas. Sen pp. 257-59.



returned only about fifty were unwounded." Dunbar, the Commander of the forces, was among the slain. The remnant of the party returned to Dānāpūr, sadly dejected.<sup>1</sup>

### Arrah

Arrah, about thirty-five miles to the west of Patna, was the chief town of the district of *Shāhābād*. On the outbreak of the Revolution the European population became panicky; the Railway officials stationed here had fled on 11 June. As a precautionary measure the treasury was removed to Patna. One of the residents, Vicers Boyle, a civil Engineer, had fortified his house, known as *chota-ghar*, and stored some provisions. In the meantime rumours of all sorts continued to spread; on 8 July, for instance, it was reported that the prisoners in the jail had risen in revolt; the Magistrate and the District Judge rushed to the place, but only to find that they had been quarrelling in joke. However, on hearing of the rising and departure of the sepoys from Dānāpūr the residents of Arrah decided to take refuge in the fortified house of Boyle, which was now further strengthened.<sup>2</sup> The sepoys crossed the river on 26 July, and under the advice of Kunwar Singh, "it was decided to march on Arrah, slaughter the residents, and plunder the treasury."<sup>3</sup> They reached Arrah, released the prisoners and marched on Boyle's *chota-ghar*. An attempt was made to win over the Sikh defenders, but they remained firm in their loyalty to "the Government which gave them their salt". The hopes of the besieged party were dashed to pieces when a wounded Sikh of Dunbar's party managed to crawl up to the *chota-ghar* to inform the garrison of these incidents.<sup>4</sup> The news was bad enough, but it did not unnerve the garrison; they

1 Sieveking, I. G., *A Turning Point in the India's Mutiny*, (London, 1910), pp. 67-68; Also see Sen, pp. 254-55.

2 *Fawq*, p. 355. Also see Kaye and Melleason, III, pp. 52-53; Forrest, III, pp. 427-28

3 Kaye and Melleason, III, p. 58.

4 Wake's Diary quoted in Forrest, III, p. 439.

decided to resist to the last moment. The walls of the house, it appears, were strong and well defended ; "the balls are about four pounds ; how they do so little damage we cannot imagine."<sup>1</sup> Ultimately the Revolutionaries started sinking a mine ; the besieged garrison began to lay a counter-mine. Before this was completed a column of the British forces arrived there and engaged a party of the Revolutionaries.

Major Vincent Eyre who commanded the column had fought in the First Afghan War ; he had now been called from Burma and ordered to proceed to Allahabad. Leaving Calcutta on 10 July he reached Buxar on the 28th. On the following afternoon he went to Ghazipur and returned the same evening, bringing with him a small party of the Highlanders. At Buxar he found that another steamer had brought a detachment of H. M. 5th Fusiliers under Captain L'Estrange. He persuaded the latter to join him in the relief of the garrison at Arrah. On the afternoon of 30 July he left Buxar reaching Gajraiganj on 1 August, where the forces bivouacked for the night. Next morning they resumed their march, but they had hardly covered half a mile when they were started by "a familiar note of the assembly" coming from a thick wood in front of them. The Artillery and the Enfield Rifles of the British were far superior to the muskets of the Revolutionaries ; they were soon routed, dispersing in different directions, and Eyre resumed his march.

### **Destruction of Jagdishpur**

Near Bibiganj, Eyre was again forced to give battle to the Revolutionaries, and once again he pushed them back. The road to Arrah was now clear but the night had to be spent in making improvised arrangements for crossing a *nālah*. Eyre reached Arrah on 3 August ;<sup>2</sup> the garrison was relieved. After their defeat the Irregulars of Kunwar Singh accompanied by the sepoys took the road to Jagdishpur, his jungle strong-hold. Eyre decided to follow

1 Wake's Diary quoted in Forrest, III, p. 439

2 *Ibid.*, III 452

to cooperate with the alien government, but also keep themselves away from the Muslims, who thus receded into a position of disadvantage. This was the beginning of a new current in the social life of Bengal which gave birth to a class of aristocrats who had received their education under the western system and many of whom had accepted the Christian faith. These English educated and westernised Bengali Hindus were great admirers of the British rule; their loyalty to the Government, like that of the landed aristocracy, was beyond doubt.<sup>1</sup> The Hindu masses, therefore, had no leaders to guide them on the path of the Revolution, while the Muslims had been crushed so thoroughly by the Company's policies of political domination and economic exploitation that they could hardly be expected to organize themselves for a great struggle against the British. However, the leaders of the Revolution seem to have succeeded to some extent at least in their efforts as the symptoms of the coming storm had begun to appear fairly early in Calcutta.<sup>2</sup>

In January 1857, Major Orfeur Cavenagh, Town Major of Fort William, had received reports about a "conspiracy" among the sepoys. He took necessary precautions which, to quote his own words, "in all human probability saved Fort William and Calcutta and possibly our Indian Empire."<sup>3</sup>

### Calcutta

After the outbreak of the Revolution in May the enthusiasm and excitement of the people increased. By this time some of the courtiers of Wājid 'Alī Shāh, who was residing at Garden Reach

1 "On May 22, 1857 the committee of the British Indian Association passed a resolution condemning the disgraceful and mutinous conduct of the native soldiers at Meerut and Delhi. A loyal address was presented by the Maharaja of Burdwan and 2 500 other signatories after the fall of Delhi recounting the benefits of British rule." *Jen*, 408, n.

2 Kanhayya Lal's correspondent mentions some incidents which indicate that the organizers of the Movement were fairly active in Calcutta. Kanhayya Lal, pp. 144-45. Also see Kave and Malleon, V, p. 292.

3 Quoted in Kaye and Malleon, VI, p. 11.

with about a thousand armed retainers, particularly his ex-minister, 'Ali Naqī Khān, seem to have become active agents of the Revolution. An idea of the perturbed state of the minds of the Europeans of Calcutta can be formed by the fact that a rumour about a rising of the sepoys on 14 June (Sunday) created a widespread panic. "Those highest in office," says an eye-witness, "were the first to give the alarm. There were Secretaries to Government running over to Members of Council, loading their pistols, barricading the doors, sleeping on sofas; Members of Council abandoning their houses with their families, and taking refuge on board ship, . . . A score of London thieves would have made their fortunes by plundering the houses in the neighbourhood of Chauringhi which had been abandoned by their inmates."<sup>1</sup> On the morrow of "Panic Sunday" Edmonstone, the Foreign Secretary of Canning, waited on Wājīd 'Alī Shāh and told him that "emissaries had made a mischievous use of his name;" subsequently the ex-king was removed to Fort William.<sup>2</sup> This step however did not prove to be effective, for in August "three retainers of the Ex-King of Oudh" had to be arrested and imprisoned. In the same month another worker, Sayyid Ḥusayn Šubahdar, was also arrested with four of his comrades and put in jail. Sayyid Ḥusayn had "assumed title of Bishop of Baghdad" and was in correspondence with 'Alī Naqī Khān and other retainers of Wājīd 'Alī Shāh. The letters in possession of Sayyid Ḥusayn indicated that another retainer of the ex-king, named Muẓaffar Ḥusayn, who lived in Chandarnagar under the assumed name of Āghā Mirzā Šāhib, was also working in the Movement.<sup>3</sup>

1 Kaye and Malletson, III, pp. 16-17.

2 Wājīd 'Alī Shāh "behaved on this occasion with dignity" and assured the British authorities that "neither by word nor deed had he encouraged the mutineers," but "not far from Alipore is Garden Reach, where the Mussulman population, generally armed" are "breathing a fanatical vengeance on the 'Infidels' and praying in their mosques for the success of the Delhi Rebels". Duff Alexander, *The Indian Rebellion, its Causes and Results*, quoted in *F.S.U.P.* I, p. 361.

3 *Ibid*

reinforcements ; before their arrival, however, the old Rajput chief died.

Kunwar Singh was succeeded by his brother Amar Singh. Although not possessed of the qualities of a good commander he managed to continue the struggle against heavy odds. Three British armies were now converging on Arrah ; Douglas came from Dānāpur, Edward Lugard from Azamgarh and Colonel Cornfield from Sahasram. Amar Singh decided to fight a guerilla war, for which the jungles provided excellent opportunities. Again and again the British officers brought Amar Singh's men to action and invariably defeated them, but these victories "were not worth the powder and shot which was expended in gaining them.<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionaries replied by causing as much damage to the enemy as they could. The fatigue and hardships of the campaign proved too heavy a strain on Lugard ; he resigned his post and relinquished the command on grounds of ill health. Douglas who succeeded Lugard carried on the weary struggle through the scorching heat and drenching showers of the summer rains. The Revolutionaries had broken themselves into small parties which roamed over the countryside, maintaining themselves by plunder and raiding the British camps whenever they found a suitable opportunity

When the rains were over Douglas divided his forces into seven columns ; four of these were to move from Buxar and drive the Revolutionaries towards Jagdishpur, while the remaining three were to hem in the western, southern and eastern sides of the jungle ; on the northern side was the Ganges. The columns began to move on 13 October ; one of them could not keep to schedule with the result that the Revolutionaries got an opportunity of rushing out of the jungle and making for the river Son. With the help of a detachment of mounted infantry armed with Enfield rifles a young officer, Major Henry Havelock, pursued them. He prevented them from crossing the Son, and chased them from

<sup>1</sup> Holmes, p 455.

place to place, at times inflicting heavy losses. In spite of their efforts, however, the British forces could not stop the main body of the Revolutionaries from escaping into the Kaimur hills. Douglas was ordered to pursue and dislodge them from their new asylum. The venture involved extraordinary toil and sufferings, but Douglas did not abandon the task. At last on the night of 24 November he found them in a jungle; his troops moved forward and charged when they were only fifty yards. They fled towards the Ganges and were now unable to continue the struggle.<sup>1</sup>

### Conditions in Bengal

The story of the Revolution in the districts of eastern Bihar is linked up with its progress in Bengal. Throughout the period of Muslim rule in Hind-Pakistan Bengal was an important part of the Empire. By virtue of its geographical position, however, and the slow means of communications in those days the local authorities enjoyed far greater autonomy than could be conceded to regions nearer the capital. The administration of Bengal was therefore invariably entrusted to eminent and capable persons.<sup>2</sup> 'Ālamgir had appointed Ja'far Khān, one of his best officers, as the *Diwān* of Bengal. During his long tenure of office, which lasted until his death in 1725, Ja'far Khān added considerably to the prosperity of the Province. In 1742 'Alī Wardī Khān occupied the *masnad*, and governed Bengal with remarkable ability for nearly sixteen years. His successor, Sirāj al-Dawlah, as is well-known, lost the *masnad* and along with it his life in consequence of a conspiracy engineered and executed by Robert Clive in 1757. With Sirāj-al-Dawlah's murder the rule of the Nawabs came to an end, for his successors were mere puppets in the hands of the British authorities. The establishment of British ascendancy changed the entire pattern of political and socio-economic life of the people of Bengal. The Hindus living in the urban areas were encouraged not only

1 Holmes, pp 457-58.

2 Beveridge rightly remarks ; "Bengal formed so important a branch of the Mogul empire, that the Government of it became an object of ambition to the leading members of the imperial family, . . ." See Vol. I, p. 516.

up his victory and go in pursuit of Kunwar Singh. He had however to stay in Arrah for a few days, because he had asked for some reinforcements for his new expedition. On the pretext of restoring order he hanged a number of the Revolutionaries who had fallen into his hands.<sup>1</sup> The reinforcements having arrived on 8 and 9 August, Eyre set forth on his march to Jagdishpur. On the morning of 13 August he saw the Revolutionaries occupying a village behind which flowed a stream. Both sides started firing; ultimately Eyre's men seized the village. About three hundred yards from the village was the edge of a jungle in which the main body of the Revolutionaries lay concealed. When they saw the British forces advancing towards them they came out and offered battle. Eyre 'brought his artillery to bear upon them and forced them to huddle in confusion further to the right;'' then followed a bayonet charge, which the Revolutionaries could not resist.<sup>2</sup> Eyre moved to Jagdishpur, reaching there early in the afternoon. Kunwar Singh had, however, managed to escape. A party under L'Estrange went out in his pursuit, but it returned "with the information that the place is empty, though Kunwar Singh had recently been there."<sup>3</sup> Eyre destroyed the palace and other buildings at Jagdishpur, including a Hindu temple; "I did this" he wrote 'because it is known that the Brahmins have instigated him to rebellion.'<sup>4</sup> The Commander-in-Chief expressed his disapproval of the demolition of the temple although he appreciated "the judgement evinced by Major Eyre throughout these movements."<sup>5</sup>

### **Kunwar Singh's movements**

After being defeated and dislodged from his stronghold Kunwar Singh went to the jungles of Rohtas and later entered

1 Holmes, p. 198; *Shād*, p. 138.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 199.

3 Forrest, III, p. 455.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 455-56.

5 Letter of the Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General, quoted in Forrest, III, 456. Also see *Shād*, p. 139.

Rewah in the hope of getting a safe passage to Delhi. But the Raja, although related to him, acted on the advice of the British Political Agent, and offered resistance. Kunwar Singh changed his plans and moved northwards : on 1 September he was reported near Bijaygarh, threatening Mirzapur ;<sup>1</sup> a week later he was in Bāndah. "coquetting with the Nawab."<sup>2</sup> On 28 October Sherer reports that "Kooer Singh with 12 or 1500 of the Banda rebels and 3 or 400 of his own men has arrived at Calpee."<sup>3</sup> After the battle of Kanpur he decided to go to Lucknow, where he was invested by the *Wālī* with a robe of honour and granted a *farmān* for Azamgarh. In the spring of the following year he again became active, and seized the village of Atraulha, twenty miles from Azamgarh, on 17 March.<sup>4</sup> When Colonel Milman, who was encamping at Koelsar, heard this he broke up camp, marched all night, and came face to face with Kunwar Singh's forces early in the morning on 22 March. The British commander attacked the Revolutionaries soon after breakfast ; he was defeated and withdrew to Koelsar where he shut himself up in the jail, around which an entrenchment had been thrown. Kunwar Singh captured Azamgarh on the 26th, and on the following day he repulsed an attempt made by Colonel Dames to assail the town. Lord Canning, who was in Allahabad, realising the gravity of the situation, ordered a strong force to be sent to Azamgarh under Mark Kerr. Kunwar Singh decided to withdraw into Bihar, and crossing the Ganges he again entered the jungles of Jagdishpur. Having strengthened his forces with the help of his brother, he won his last victory on 23 April by signally defeating the British in a battle near Jagdishpur. The British casualties were heavy ; "the disaster was as complete as it was sudden."<sup>5</sup> Terrified by this disaster, the British officer sent for

1 *Intelligence Records*, I p. 539.

2 *Ibid*, II, p. 183.

3 *Ibid*, II, p. 322.

4 Forrest, III, p. 458.

5 *Ibid*, p. 472.



A marked change in the tone of the vernacular press alarmed the Government ; on 13 June Canning went to the Legislative Council, and, referring to the "incendiary tone" of the vernacular press "brought forward and carried a measure to place the native press under restrictions so galling that, compared to them, the restrictions on the press of France during the darkest days of the reign of Napoleon III were light and easy."<sup>1</sup> The result of these repressive measures was that secret and underground agencies became active, but the people of Bengal, being at a distance from the main centres of the Revolution, could not keep pace with the Revolutionaries of the upper Provinces, although they were in contact with them.<sup>2</sup>

### Chittagong

Chittagong was the first station of East Bengal where the sepoys rose. On 18 November, 1857, the detachments of the 34th Regiment N 1. left their Lines, burnt some houses rushed to the prison and released the prisoners, seized the contents of the local treasury in the collectorate, and made off in the direction of the Tipperah State. They did not resort to violence and no officer was attacked ; but the Hind-Pakistānī guard was punished and killed because he had tried to resist them. The Revolutionaries were led by Rājah 'Alī Khān, originally pay-havildar of the 4th company of the detachment . At Sitakund they abandoned the main highway to avoid the British territory and took the route to Sylhet which passed through the hilly tracts. Crossing the ferry at Ramghat they turned northwards and proceeded to Agartal, the seat of the Raja of Tipperah, who, having received instructions from the British authorities at Chittagong to check them, had despatched his men to Sankhula. The Revolutionaries were therefore forced to change their line of march, and move in the direction of Singar hill, north of Comilla. They had to face great

1 Kave and Malleson, III, p. 13.

2 Kanhayya Lal mentions three emissaries who had been sent from Delhi to Calcutta. See p. 146.

3 Report of Captain Dewool of the 34th Regiment, quoted in Ball, II, p. 220.

hardships in the course of their march ; three elephants and part of the money which they had seized in Chittagong were lost, and a number of prisoners whom they had released abandoned them. Their route lay in hilly tracts where sometimes they had to cut passages to move forward ; lastly, they were harassed by the Raja and some other zamindars of the region. In the face of these difficulties their progress was necessarily slow. However, after considerable difficulties they managed to cross the hills and entered the British territory in the middle of December.

As soon as the report of the arrival of the Revolutionaries reached Sylhet, Major R. B. Byng was ordered to go in their pursuit. When he reached Partabgarh, about eighty miles from Sylhet, he was told that the Revolutionaries had changed their route and were likely to have reached Latu through which he had passed on 17 December. Byng immediately turned back and came face to face with them on the morning of the 18th. He was however killed early in the action and was succeeded by Shere. The Revolutionaries fought with courage and determination but were forced to withdraw into the jungles after a loss of twenty-six killed. They spent nearly a month in the jungles of Manipur. On 22 January, 1858, they were suddenly attacked by the enemy at a time when their arms were piled, and were compelled to save their lives by leaving their accoutrements and arms. They were now blocked up in the hilly country, and the outlets having been closed, most of them perished, but not one of them surrendered ; all sacrificed their lives in the cause of freedom.<sup>1</sup>

### **Dacca**

Dacca had been made the capital of Bengal in the early years of Jahāngir's reign, and was given the name of Jahāngirnagar. It soon became the chief emporium for the products of that region. The Imperial officers and nobles brought with them new ideas and fashions ; in course of time the old town developed into a thoroughly

1 Kaye and Malleon, IV, p. 297.

Moslemized Mughul city. In the last decades of the seventeenth century it had attained an international status and was, in the words of Tavernier, "a large city, and a town of great trade." With the rise of British power the centre of gravity shifted to Calcutta, and Dacca began to lose its prosperity. It declined rapidly in the first quarter of the nineteenth century; "in 1800" says Doctor Taylor who compiled the statistics of the district, "the inhabitants were 200,000 but now they do not amount to more than 68,038 in number, according to the census of 1838. Poverty has increased in a far greater ratio than population has decreased."<sup>1</sup> Conditions had been created, of course deliberately, which made "many of the younger Mussulmans of rank, who have no hope of advancement, either in the army or the state, sooner or later sink into sloth, or kindle into dacons and rebels . . ."<sup>2</sup>

Thus by the middle of the nineteenth century Dacca, once a great city, had lost much of its glory. However, in June 1857 the rumour that the two Companies of the 73rd had decided to revolt on their way to Jalpaigori created a stir in the city, some of the European residents became panicky. On 30 July a meeting of the Europeans and the local residents who were in sympathy with them was held at the Dacca College and decided to organize a volunteer corps each of infantry and horsemen.<sup>3</sup>

The report of the rising of the sepoys at Chittagong had reached Dacca at about five o'clock on the afternoon of 21 November. At a hastily convened meeting of the officers it was decided that the sepoys of the 73rd N.I. stationed there should be disarmed immediately.<sup>4</sup> Lieutenant Lewis, who was entrusted with this task, found no difficulty in disarming the detached guards at the Treasury. From here he went to the Lines of the sepoys in the Lalbagh, and made a heavy charge. The Revolutionaries

1 Taylor's Topography, quoted in Dani, A H, *Dacca* (Dacca, 1956), p. 61.

2 *Ibid.* p. 57.

3 See *Tayish*, Rahmān 'Alī, *Tawā'hirī l-Dhākah*, (Arāh, 1910), pp. 133-34 - also see *Dacca Review*, Vol. V 1915, pp 245-49.

4 Report of the Commanding Officer at Dacca quoted in Ball, II, p. 221

however managed to escape in different directions.<sup>1</sup> They wanted to get to Jalpaigori, but they were forced to change their route and found a temporary refuge in Bhutan.<sup>2</sup> Those who had fallen into the hands of the British from time to time were hanged<sup>3</sup>.

### **Jalpaigori**

On 4 December the detachments of the 11th Irregular Cavalry at Madārganj and Jalpaigori rose and marched towards Purnea. The Commissioner, George Yule, heard this when he was at Kishanganj. He lost no time in returning to Purnea and saved it from falling into the hands of the Revolutionaries. He went in their pursuit but stopped at Nathpur when he learnt that they had entered the territory of Nepal. Here he received information that the Dacca Revolutionaries who had entered Bhutan were threatening Jalpaigori from the north-east. He moved to Kishanganj where a message was delivered to him to the effect that he should take position between Siliguri and Pankabari on the Darjeeling road. On 26 December he decided to move and occupy the Chawa Ghat on the river Tista, but on approaching the place his men "discovered the enemy on the left bank of the river, occupying a position so strong and so favourable for defence that it would have been madness for him, with his small force, to attack it." He now occupied the main road, hoping to check the advance of the Revolutionaries, but they outmanoeuvred him and marching by an unfrequented path they made for the Darjeeling road. Yule went out in their pursuit but failed to intercept them; equally unsuccessfully was another party of the Europeans and the Gurkhas who were under the command of Captain Curzon. However, he persisted in continuing his pursuit of the Dacca Revolutionaries; the two forces were now marching westward in parallel lines, the intervening space

1 The losses of the Revolutionaries were rather heavy : forty-one were killed and eight wounded in the action, and three were drowned in the river. On the side of the British the number of casualties was eighteen:

2 Kaye and Malletson, IV, p. 293.

3 *Taysh*, p. 139 et. seq.

being mostly covered by jungles. On 11 January, 1858, Yule was joined by a reinforcing party under Richardson ; about the same time Jang Bahādur of Nepal ordered one of his lieutenants to help him. Yule now crossed into Nepal reaching on 19 January at a place about ten miles from the camp of the Revolutionaries at Chatra, but once again Yule was outmanoeuvred and the Revolutionaries succeeded in taking the road to Awadh.<sup>1</sup>

### **Chotanagpur**

In the Division of Chotanagpur which lay in the south-west of the Province the people rose in several places. In Palamau the Revolutionaries surrounded Lieutenant Graham in his well-defended house, but he was relieved by a detachment of the 13th Light Infantry. Graham soon succeeded in securing the support of the local chiefs and zamindārs.<sup>2</sup> Among other places affected by the Revolution Singhbhum and Sambhalpur may also be mentioned.

1 Kaye and Mollison, IV, p. 304.

2 *Ibid*, IV, p. 305.

## CHAPTER XV

### BUNDELKHAND AND CENTRAL INDIA

#### Ali Bahadur, Lakshmibai and Tantia Topi

##### Jhansi

The Raja of Jhansi, a small principality in Bundelkhand, had died in 1853, leaving behind a widow, Lakshmibai<sup>1</sup>, and an adopted son, Damodar. In the following year Dalhousie annexed the State ; the Rani was given a life pension of sixty-thousand rupees and allowed to stay in the city palace. In the beginning she refused to accept the pension, but after some time she reconciled herself to her lot ; like some other aggrieved Chiefs she also sent her agents to London to represent her case before the Court of Directors, but the decision of the Company's Government remained unchanged. Lakshmibai did not forget the injustice, done to her and the adopted son of her late husband. On the outbreak of the Revolution her "passions of anger and revenge," were rekindled and she became active ; "she dexterously employed religious mendicants . . . to fan among the people the embers of religious hate caused by the open slaughter of kine for the purpose of food amid a Hindu population."<sup>2</sup>

1 Lakshmibai who became one of the leading Hindu leaders of the Revolution and sacrificed her life in its cause, came of a humble Brahmin family. Her father, Moropant Balwant Rao Tambe, had taken service with the Peshwa's brother, Amritrao and, on his death, had joined the staff of the deposed Peshwa at Bithur. At the latter's suggestion, it is stated, Lakshmibai was married to Gangadhar Rao, whose first wife had died, although she was considerably younger than him. However, in 1851, she bore him a son, but the child died when he was only three months old. See Kincaid, S. A., *Lakshmibai Rani of Jhansi and other Essays*, (Bombay), p. 3.

2 Forrest, III, p. 4.

Jhansi was garrisoned by the 12th Regiment N. I. and the right wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry. A taunting message from Delhi moved the sepoys into action ; they seized the State Fort which contained the magazine and treasure amounting to four lakhs and a half (5 June). The Revolutionary standard was planted and the "men of the deen" were invited to flock to it ; a remuneration of twelve rupees a month was announced for all who would join the Revolution as active fighters.<sup>1</sup> In a letter dated 6 June the Deputy Superintendent of Jhansi, Captain Gordon, describes the incident thus : "At 3 p. m. yesterday a lot of the sepoys having raised a clamour that the Magazine was being attacked by Dacoits, made a rush for the place. A number of men not implicated directly got in with the mutineers, . . ." <sup>2</sup> On the following day Captain Dunlop, Commander of the 12th N. I. was shot dead on his way back from the Post Office where he had gone to post his letters. The men of the Irregular Cavalry now spread themselves in pursuit of the Europeans, several of whom were killed. A strong party of the Revolutionaries, consisting of fifty *sawārs* and three hundred sepoys rushed to the town, accompanied by *Bakhshish* 'Ali ; they were received with the cry of *dīn kī jai*. The Rani's Guard joined the Revolutionaries who marched on the town and besieged it.

For the first two or three days they could not do much, perhaps because their guns were defective, while the fire of the musketry from the fort proved effective. It was however not long before the garrison, inadequate in numbers and having only a limited supply of provisions, realized that it could not survive without aid from outside. It was decided to open communications with Nagod and Gwalior, but the messengers sent by them were intercepted and killed. Every moment the situation was becoming more critical ; the supply of ammunition was nearly exhausted and

1 Kanhayya Lall, p. 280. Forrest relates this incident on the authority of the "Written Disposition of a Native of Bengal", but puts it under 1 June. See Vol. III, p. 5.

2 Quoted in Sen, p. 271.

provisions seriously diminished. It was at this juncture that a message was received that if the garrison surrendered the fort they would be escorted to some other station. Major Skene, who was Political Agent at Jhansi and now commanded the garrison accepted the terms and then commenced the last act of the drama. No sooner had the Europeans came out from the fort then the rebels fell upon them and carried them to a garden called Jokan Bagh. Arrived there they were halted near a cluster of trees. The word then passed that the Risaldār had ordered them to be massacred. The prisoners disarmed and bound, were then ranged in three lines, the first containing the adult males, the second the adult females, the third the children . . . The murderers then went to work, . . . Not a man, woman, or child, survived that afternoon's butchery. Such was the massacre of Jhansi<sup>1</sup> Three days after the massacre the dead bodies were removed and buried in a pit<sup>2</sup>

Two hundred miles east of Jhansi was the cantonment of Naogaon ; the right wing of the 12th Regiment N 1, the left wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, besides some other toops, were stationed there. On 23 May, 1857, Major Kirke who commanded the station was told by a 'native Officer' that a letter had been received from Delhi reporting that every Christian there had been killed ; a week later reports about the rise of the gunners were rife. Four persons who were suspected were dismissed from the station and precautionary measures were adopted. Quiet was thus restored, and on 5 June the men of the 12th N 1. went to the extent of volunteering to serve against the Revolutionaries. Four days later came the news of the rising at Jhansi ; the following day brought the more disastrous tidings of the

1 Kaye and Malleon, II, p 126. -

2 A doubt has been raised as to the complicity of the Rani in the massacre. Dr. Sen holds the view that she was innocent (*Eighteen Fiftyseven*, pp 273-76). The English historians think otherwise. We know that the sepoys had massacred the Europeans in Delhi : Bahādur Shāh was not responsible for that. Similarly the responsibility of the Rani was not direct, whether she could stop the sepoys from carrying out the orders of their immediate officers is doubtful.



massacre. This news had a magical effect on the sepoys who the same evening. Kirke ordered the officers to leave the without delay. They set forth accompanied by a number of women and children and some sepoys who had remained loyal. They wanted to go to Chatarpur, but in the darkness of the night they took the wrong road, and the Revolutionaries who had gone forth in their pursuit could not find them. However early in the morning they reached Chatarpur where the Rani treated them with consideration, "though some of her chiefs were Muhammadans seemed to sympathise with the rebels." From here they proceeded towards Allahabad ; on 17 June they were attacked by a party of bandits, and forced to return to Chatarpur territory after suffering some losses. This was not the end of their sufferings, after a few days the Nawab of Bāndah helped them in escaping to Nagoda<sup>1</sup> where they reached on the 29th.

### **Bāndah**

The district of Bāndah, with the Jamunā on its north and north west, Allahabad on the east and the States of Pannā, Rohilkhand and Charkhari in the south, played an important role in the Revolution of Independence. The chief station of the district, also called Bāndah, was a little less than a hundred miles from Allahabad. The strong fortress town of Kalinjar was also situated in the district. In 1857 the head of the leading family of Bāndah, Nawab 'Ali Bahādur,<sup>2</sup> In the beginning he was inclined to sup-

1 Nagoda was nearly a hundred and eighty miles from Allahabad. The 52nd Regiment N. I. which was stationed there remained quiet till the end of August. Cf. Forrest III, p. 21.

2 The family of the Nawābs of Bāndah was known for its patronage of literature. The well-known poet *Ghālib* was related to *Dhū al-Fiqār Bahādur* uncle and predecessor of 'Ali Bahādur Khān. In the following couplet *Ghālib* refers to Nawāb 'Ali Bahādur and prays for his rise to dignity :

لب ' خدا کرے کہ سوار سمند ناز      دیکھوں علی بہادر عالی گہر کو میں

(O *Ghālib* ! May God give me an opportunity to see 'Ali Bahādur of



Ghazanfar Husayn Khān (hanged in 1862)  
(From *Imdad Sābir's Mujāhid Shuh'ara*)



Iqbālmand Khān (hanged in 1862)  
(From *Imdad Sābir's Mujāhid Shuh'ara*)



**Mawlawi Leyāqat 'Ali of Allahabad**

the British, but he could not long resist the growing strength of the popular Revolutionary Movement. He took a firm decision and assumed the leadership of his men, and then events began to move fast. On 14 June the news of the rising at Kānpur reached Bāndah ; on hearing it the men on detachment duty rose and joined the Revolution. "Never," said Mayne, the chief civil officer of the district, "was revolution more rapid, never more complete"<sup>1</sup>

The Revolutionaries held sway in Bāndah and the neighbouring district, till the beginning of April 1858. On 9 April a British force commanded by Brigadier General Whitlock reached Chatarpur on its march towards Bāndah. The Nawab without losing any time ordered the contingent of the Revolutionary forces stationed at Mahobā to take up a position in ambush at Kabraī. The British troops reached that place before dawn ; the Revolutionaries opened fire but Whitlock met the charge and managed to

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origin ride the horse of gracefulness). See *Mihir*, Ghulām Rasūl, *Khutūf-i-Ghālib*, (Lahore), II, pp. 40-42.

Dhū al-Fiqār was a great patron of learning ; at his request the distinguished scholar, ṣ hāh Muḥammad Ishāq of Delhi, sent one of his pupils, Mawlawī Qarī ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Pānīpatī, to start a college at Bāndah. On the outbreak of the Revolution in Bāndah a number of Europeans were allowed to take refuge in his *Madrasah*. After the reestablishment of British authority one of these refugees came to the Mawlānā and advised him to address an application to the officer concerned for a reward for having saved European lives. The Mawlānā recognized the man with some difficulty and then told him that he had given protection to the refugees because it was his human and religious duty, and for no other consideration. "Neither I nor my children," he added, "would like to have anything from the Government in lieu of the help extended to the refugees." See *Nuqūsh* (Lahore, 1953), pp. 8, 11.

The four volumes of the well-known Ḥanafī work on *fiqh*, *Durr-i-Muḥītar*, were translated into Urdu by Mawlawī Khurīam ‘Alī Bilhawarī at the instance of Dhū al-Fiqār Bahādur. The work of translation was completed in a period of twelve years (1258-1270 H.) See Raḥmān ‘Alī *Tadhkirah-i-‘Ulamā-i-Hind* (Lucknow, 1914), pp. 56-57. Also see Urdu Trn. by M. A. Qadrī (Karachi, 1961), pp. 577-78.

1 Kaye and Melleeson, VI, pp. 81-82.

continue his march, reaching the vicinity of Bāndah on the 18th. At 4 o'clock in the morning Whitlock broke camp and fell upon the Revolutionaries. After a seven-hour hotly contested action the Nawab whose forces were suffering heavy casualties withdrew from the field of battle and took the road to Kālpi. Whitlock entered Bāndah and took up his quarters there; the valuable property of the Nawāb's palace was plundered and a considerable quantity of ammunition and several guns were seized by the British.<sup>1</sup> On reaching Kālpi the Nawab joined the Rani of Jansi and Tantia Topi and participated in the battle fought there on 23 May. He also fought with the Maratha leader in the battle of Gwalior and was with him in his adventures in Central India.

'Ali Bahādur surrendered to the British Government when Queen Victoria issued her proclamation of amnesty. In spite of this however he was punished for his participation in the War of Independence; his jagir and property were confiscated and he was interned in Indore. 'Ali Bahādur was one of the few leading landlords who joined the Movement and sacrificed their lives and property in the cause of freedom.

### **Hugh Rose's campaign in Central India**

In the beginning of January 1858 Sir Hugh Rose set out from Indore at the head of a Column consisting of two Brigades with the object of recovering the territories of Central India and ultimately reaching Kālpi by way of Jhansi. Another column under Whitlock left Jabalpur on 17 February and was to proceed northwards by way of Saugor. Rose sent one of his Brigades to clear the Grand Trunk Road of the Revolutionaries and then proceed to Jhansi to join its besiegers. With the other Brigade he moved towards Ratgarh, reaching there on 25 January.<sup>2</sup> After reconnoitr-

1 Kaye and Malleson, V, p. 137

2 Rose had to pass through Bhopal. "The Begam . . . who had put off the mutinous solicitations of her people from day to day by assuring them that the proper time for the expulsion of the British had not yet arrived, welcomed the British force, and supplied Rose with provisions and a contingent of 600 or 700 troops." Forrest, III, p. 153.

ing the surrounding area Rose invested the hill fortress of Ratgarh. A road had to be cut up and the guns dragged along it. On the morning of 28 January the Revolutionaries commanded by the Raja of Banpur attacked the besieging forces from the rear. Rose moved hurriedly to meet them ; he was soon followed by Brigadier Stuart who brought his guns and opened fire. The Revolutionaries were forced to make a retreat. The same night the breach in the wall having been completed, arrangements were made for an assault on the following morning. The garrison of the fort, however, evacuated it in the night, having let themselves down by the ropes which were still hanging from the top of the wall. A report was received on 30 June when the buildings were being demolished that the Revolutionaries had concentrated at the village of Barodia on the left bank of the Binā, about twelve miles from Ratgarh. About noon on the following day the British General moved in that direction. In the battle that followed, "the Afghans and Pathans fought with their accustomed courage. several of them, even when dying, springing from the ground and inflicting mortal wounds with their broadswords" ; they could not, however, withstand the enemy's fire for long and made a retreat.<sup>1</sup> The road to Saugor was now clear ; Rose's Column entered the town on 3 February in the midst of the rejoicings of the garrison.<sup>2</sup> About twenty-five miles east of Saugor stood the fortress and town of Garhkota. Rose marched on it on the 9th ; eight days later he returned after capturing the fort which had been abandoned by the Revolutionaries.

Jhansi was the next objective of Hugh Rose ; at 2 a.m. on the morning of 27 February he put his force in motion. The Revolutionaries had planned to check his advance at the pass of Narut, which was guarded by eight or ten thousand men. Rose, however, took his main body to another pass, sending a detachment "to make a serious feint against Narut." His advance

1 Forrest, III, pp. 163-64.

2 Holmes, p. 506

was not uncontested, but he continued his march overcoming opposition wherever it was offered. On the evening of 11 March the palace of the Raja of Banpur was blown up and burnt "like a great bonfire." Six days later the British army crossed the Betwa and moved towards Jhansi. When it was just fourteen miles from that town, Rose received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to march at once to Charkhari where the Raja, a loyal friend of the British, lay besieged by Tantia Topi. The General knew that the order was ill-judged, but he had to obey it. Fortunately for the British, he had with him Robert Hamilton as his Political officer. Hamilton had also received similar instructions from the Governor-General; but he decided to use his discretion and directed Rose to go ahead with his plan. Subsequently this step was approved by the Governor-General.<sup>1</sup>

Early in the morning on 21 March, Rose's Column was before Jhansi where the Rani had established her government; "she proved herself a most capable ruler. She established a mint, fortified the strong places, cast cannon, raised fresh troops. Into every act of government she threw all the energy of a strong and resolute character"<sup>2</sup> Among the advisers of the Rani there were some civil officers who wanted her to go over to the British side, while the sepoys and the Revolutionary leaders pressed her to fight to the last. Even if the enemy was too strong for her forces, the latter argued, it was better to die fighting than to surrender and be shot like dogs.<sup>3</sup> The Rani accepted their advice

1 "I am desired," said the letter of the Secretary to the Governor-General, "by his Lordship to inform you that under the circumstances represented . . . the decision taken in respect of prior reduction of that place was unquestionably right and is, therefore, entirely approved". Quoted in Forrest, III, p. 191.

2 Kaye and Malleron, III, p. 26.

3 It seems that the counsels offered by the pro-British section of her advisers had at one time made her wavering in her adhesion to the cause of the Revolution. Kincaid writes, "With the help of her Brahman relatives, she assumed the administration herself and sent word to the Commissioner of Jabalpur and other Englishmen in authority that she was holding the Jhansi district only

and remained firm up to the last moment ; she died fighting like a hero.

### Siege of Jhansi

Rose knew that Jhansi was a fortified town with a strong hill fortress to guard it. The walls of the fort were from sixteen to twenty feet thick with a number of towers mounted with guns ; three of its four faces were protected by the city which in its turn was surrounded by a wall about twenty-five feet high ; the fourth face appeared to be almost impregnable because it stood on a steep rock. On the eastern side of the city wall there was a large tank and a beautiful palace besides gardens and temples, some of which also lay on its western side. To breach the walls of the fort was out of the question ; Rose, therefore, decided to break the southern wall of the city. The same night a detachment of Cavalry arrived from Chanderi.<sup>1</sup>

On 22 March the British forces invested the town of Jhansi; they succeeded in throwing up four batteries by the evening of the 24th—one towards the south and three on a rocky knoll about five hundred yards from the eastern wall of the city—and opened fire on the following morning. The hay-stacks in the southern quarter of the city were struck by shells and burst into a blaze ; the fire soon spread to the neighbouring houses and other buildings, creating great confusion. The garrison, comprised of the

until their government could make arrangements to reoccupy it" See p. 6. This is corroborated by other sources also. See, for instance, *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 296.

1 Chanderi : It was a prosperous town under the Mughuls, with "fourteen thousand houses built of stone, three hundred and eighty-four markets, three hundred and sixty caravansar is, and twelve thousand mosques." Under the Maratha rule its prosperity suffered a serious set-back ; the fort, however, retained its defences and reputation for strength. A garrison of the Revolutionaries defended it against the attacks of Brigadier Stuart, supported by Major Orr and Major Keating. It was stormed and captured by the besiegers on 17 March, 1858. Cf. Kaye and Malleson, V, pp. 104—06.



Bundelahs and the Wilāyatī<sup>1</sup>, offered a heroic resistance for seventeen days. Even "women and children were seen assisting in repairing the defences of the walls, and in carrying water and food to the troops on duty, . . ." <sup>2</sup> The determination and courage of the garrison, however, could not long resist the growing pressure of the ceaseless and galling fire of the besiegers, and by 30 March a breach was made in the city wall.

#### **Battle of the Betwa 1 April**

Rose was now confronted with a new danger. Tantia Topi, who was coming in response to an appeal from the Rani, crossed the Betwa on 31 March and brought with him a large force to relieve the garrison. Rose realized the seriousness of the danger, but he did not lose nerve. Without relaxing the siege he took with him about 1500 men to contest the advance of the Revolutionaries. On the other side the garrison were happy at the reports of the arrival of Tantia: "all night their drums beat, their bugles sounded, and their riflemen poured fire into the batteries. All night our batteries threw their shot and shell into the city." It was still dark when between 4 and 5 a.m. (1 April) the Revolutionaries made an advance; in the light of the morning "dense masses of infantry, accompanied by numerous batteries and many hundred cavalry, were seen pouring over a knoll . . . No sooner had the enemy reached within six hundred yards of the British line than they unlimbered, and their guns began with the roar of thunder to pour forth a storm of fire, which was at once answered. Musketry replied to musketry, . . ." As the Revolutionaries had the advantage of superior numbers the British commander decided to attack their flanks which he thought could be "rolled together if well struck." He ordered the Artillery to advance and enfilade the flanks of the Revolutionaries. Lieutenant Clarke of the Hyderabad Cavalry was directed to charge their battery, "but

<sup>1</sup> Wilayati; The term was generally used in the subcontinent for the Afghans

<sup>2</sup> Kaye and Malleon, V, p. 111

showers of grape and volleys from the Afghan matchlock-men moved them down and checked their advance." Rose now placed himself at the head of a troop of dragoons and dashed into the left of the Revolutionaries. This caused confusion in their ranks ; they broke and fled. The British pursued them, and the "chase was continued until the cavalry suddenly found themselves confronting a long line of Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry drawn up on some jungle ground. It was the third division of the Peshwa's army under the personal command of Tantia Topi." He soon opened fire on the British, but was defeated by them. Like a wise commander he decided to save his broken army from total destruction, and recrossing the Betwa he fled towards Kalpi. He was however unable to carry back his guns across the river.<sup>1</sup>

### **Fall of Jhansi**

Rose's victory over the forces of Tantia Topi raised the morale of the British forces ; it was decided to assault the town of Jhansi on 3 April. The assaulting force was divided into two Columns to be called the right attack and the left attack. At about three o'clock in the morning they took positions, but the moon being bright, they had to wait till the light became pale. As they turned into the road, "round shot, bullets, and rockets flew down upon them." They continued their advance ; but "the cannon roared, and rockets hissed and burst, and tom-toms clashed, stinkpots, stones, blocks of wood, and trees crashed down from the wall, and the columns, momentarily wavering, sought shelter from the pelting storm."<sup>2</sup> A few British soldiers, however, managed to clamber up and gain the rampart. It was about this time that the men of the left attack arrived on the scene and threw themselves upon the flank and rear of the defenders who were grappling with the right attack. The Revolutionaries who were not prepared for this sudden charge were pushed back and the men of the left attack joined those of the right. Soon after

1 Forrest, III, pp. 202-206

2 Holmes, p. 513

commenced a grim fight for the possession of the road leading to the palace; "house after house was desperately defended and resolutely stormed. Many rebels whose retreat was cut off jumped down into the wells; but the infuriated soldiers dragged them out and slew them. The street was choked with corpses, and the houses on either side were all ablaze."<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionaries fought with the courage of desperation but they were greatly disheartened and could not repel the enemy's attack. On the night of 4 April the Rani escaped from the fort. In the darkness of the night "let down from a window in the turret, she was mounted with her step-son in her lap, and accompanied by three hundred Afghans and twenty-five troopers she stole away. . ."<sup>2</sup> and took the road to Kalpi;<sup>3</sup> this was the signal for a general retreat. Then followed the slaughter of the defenders of Jhansi; the blood-stained city<sup>4</sup> was in the hands of the British on the 6th, or a day earlier, according to some authorities.<sup>5</sup>

### **Battle of Kunch**

Lakshmibai reached Kālpi the same evening as Tantia Topi who had been moving rather leisurely. She requested Rao Sahib, a nephew of Nana Sahib, who held Kālpi, to place an army at her disposal. The Rao directed Tantia to lead his troops against the British. Tantia obeyed the instructions and, accompanied by the Rani, marched to Kunch, nearly forty miles from Kālpi on the Jhansi road. Rose had left Jhansi on 25 April; a week later, he learnt that his opponent was at Kunch;

1 Holmes, p. 514.

2 Forrest, II, p. 218.

3 Holmes, p. 524.

4 G. C. Stent describes in his *Personal adventures* . . . , "how during the siege, he himself and other British soldiers plundered and slew defenceless citizens, who nightly tried to escape from the town." Quoted in Holmes, p. 514n.

5 The British losses in these operations were three hundred and forty-three killed and wounded, including thirty-six officers. The Revolutionaries suffered a loss of five thousand. Cf. Kaye and Mallsen, V, p. 119.

he resumed his march on 6 May before dawn. In the battle that was fought at Kunch the Revolutionaries were again defeated and driven back. However, they conducted their retreat in a most remarkable manner ; "there was no hurry, no disorder, no rushing to the rear. All was orderly as on a field-day. Though their line of skirmishers was two miles in length, it never wavered in a single point. The men fired, then ran behind the relieving men, and loaded. The relieving men then fired, and ran back in their turn. They even attempted, when they thought the pursuit was too rash, to take up a position, so as to bring on it an enfilading fire!" Ultimately "they crowded into Kalpi road," and pursuit came to an end.

### **Kalpi**

The defeat of the Revolutionaries at Kunch shook their morale ; the Infantry criticized the cavalry for their cowardice, and both censured Tantia Topi who had fled from the battle before it was over. A general feeling of frustration killed the spirit which had sustained them throughout the struggle, and the rumour that Rose was marching towards Kālpi induced them to disperse ; at one time, it is believed, only eleven sipahis were left in the fort.<sup>2</sup> However, it was not long before 'Alī Bahādur Khān, Nawab of Bāndah, accompanied by his minister, Muḥammad Ishāq, arrived with a strong force ; this made the Maratha Revolutionaries pluck up courage. They started preparing themselves for the expected attack on Kālpi. But Rose, outmanœuvred them : instead of taking the Kālpi road, which was not free from risk, he moved towards the village of Gulaoli on the south bank of the Jamunā. On the other side of the river was posted an army under Colonel Maxwell whom the Commander-in-Chief had sent to help Rose. He asked Maxwell to move upwards, and "one of the most important of my instructions was now carried out. My force had marched from Bombay to the Jamuna, and had effected an union

1 Kaye and Malletson, V, p. 124.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 125.

with the Bengal army, the immediate result of which was a combined operation of Bengal and Bombay troops against Calpee."<sup>1</sup>

Neither of the two parties was anxious to participate the battle: the Revolutionaries knew that exposure to sun would affect the health and morale of the enemy; the British Commander waited for a suitable opportunity to fight out a decisive action. On 16 May however the Revolutionaries took the initiative, and skirmishing continued for four days; Maxwell opened fire from his camp across the river on the 21st Rose decided to deliver his attack on the following morning because he had received reports that the Revolutionaries were planning an offensive for that day. Their plan was that their right would make a false demonstrational attack on the British left, and subsequently when the enemy would weaken his right by sending detachments to support his left they would deliver a full scale charge against his right. Accordingly they marched out at about ten o'clock on the morning of the 22nd and made a charge on the left of the British; they were led by 'Ali Bahādur, the Nawab of Bāndah, and Nana's nephew. In spite of the increasing pressure on his left, Rose did not detach a single man from his right; his calculations were correct, for, "suddenly, as if by magic, the whole line of ravines became a mass of fire; the enemy's batteries opened, and their infantry, climbing from below, poured in an overwhelming musketry fire on the right of the British line . . . They pressed on with loud yells, the British falling back, until they approached the British light field-guns and mortar battery."<sup>2</sup> The victory of the Revolutionaries was all but complete when the men of Maxwell's Camel corps, who had crossed the river the same morning, were dismounted and, led by Rose himself, they charged the advancing forces in so determined a manner that their opponents gave way. "Well do I remember," wrote an officer "Well do I remember that day. Nearly four

1 Quoted in Forrest III, p. 238

2 Kaye and Malleon, V, p. 128

ndred of my regiment, 'the 86' were *hors de combat*, the native  
giment was not much better, and thousands of yelling savages  
re pressing on, a river in our rear. We were well-nigh beaten,  
en the Camel corps came up, . . . and sent the bhang-possessed  
emy to the right-about again . . . Ever since that day I have  
oked upon a camel with eyes of affection<sup>1</sup>. The defeat of the  
volutionaries at the hands of the British right affected their  
ier wing also ; it was greatly disheartened and began to retreat,  
acuating the fort and the town during the night. When the  
itish entered Kālpi on the morning of 23 May, "pigs and pariah  
gs were fighting over the corpses that lay scattered over the  
eets ; but hardly a human being was to be seen"<sup>2</sup>

#### valior

After the fall of Kālpi the scene shifted to Gwalior, an impor-  
it and strongly fortified town. Its ruler, a young Maratha  
ince, Jayayaji Rao Sindhia was assisted by an energetic and clever  
nister, Dinkar Rao. Both remained conspicuously loyal to the  
itish Government during the War.<sup>3</sup> Besides Sindhia's own force,  
out ten thousand strong, the State had the Gwalior Contingent  
the Company's Army posted in its contonments. On 13 May  
e Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, John  
lvin, asked the Resident at Gwalior to send the 18th Regiment  
Cavalry and a battery to Agra. Soon after their arrival at  
ra the horse were directed to go to Aligarh ; from here they  
urned to Hathras. On 23 May, a large number of them joined  
e Revolution and "shouting Deen moved off to Delhi". The  
litical Agent persuaded Sindhia to send his own body-guard to  
ra, because "their despatch would certainly import more

Kaye and Malleon, V, pp. 128-29n

Holmes, p. 520

Major Charter Macpherson, Political Agent at Gwalior, was a great  
irer of Dinkar Rao : "the Englishman and the Maratha soon learned  
now each other's worth ; and there grew up between them the familiar  
course that may subsist between able and highminded men, however,  
rse their national characteristics may be." *Ibid* , p. 145.

unequivocally than any other act then possible his cooperation with us" The guard was placed under the command of Captain Campbell. Sindhia's loyalty and cooperation, however, proved ineffectual in stopping the Gwalior Contingent and his own people from joining the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> On 14 June the news of the massacre at Jhansi reached Gwalior;<sup>2</sup> on the same day, after the nine o'clock gun was fired the sepoys of the Gwalior Contingent came out of their huts.<sup>3</sup> The officers tried to hurry down to the Lines but several of them were shot dead on the spot. "Of the fourteen British officers present that morning at Gwalior one half were slain. With them likewise, three women and three children, and six sergeants and pensioners"<sup>4</sup> Those who survived along with women and children made their way to Agra Macpherson, who was among these survivors, achieved a political triumph before leaving Gwalior; "narrowly escaping an attack from a strong party of Mahomedan fanatics, he had made his way to the Maharaja's palace, and before he had left him, had persuaded him to use all his influence to detain the mutinous contingent and his own army within the limits of Gwalior."<sup>5</sup>

1 Forrest refers to the feelings of the people in these words; "The people of Gwalior showed by their manner—full of insolence, of exaggerated deference or of pity—their ripe conviction that our rule was over. The only question to the soldiery and people was when Scindia, blinded by the Resident and Diwan, would accept and act upon the conviction." *Cf* Vol. III, p. 46

2 *Ibid*, p. 47.

3 The symptoms of the rising had become clear soon after midday when a of bungalow was set on fire. Mrs. Coopland, the wife of the Chaplain, writes that when she and her husband went out for a drive "we saw scarcely anyone about, everything looked as it had done for days past; but as we were returning, we passed several parties of sipahis, none of whom saluted us. We met the Brigadier and Major Blake, who were just going to pass a party of sipahis, and I remember saying to my husband 'If the sipahis don't salute the Brigadier the storm is nigh at hand *They did not*'" *A Lady's Escape from Gwalior*, quoted in Kaye and Malleeson, III, p. 114

4 Kaye and Malleeson, III, pp. 115-16.

5 Holmes, p. 148.

The Rani, who had left Kālpi for Gopalpur joined Tantia Topi. They now proceeded to Gwalior, reaching there on 31 May. Sindhia came out to Morar and met them in battle. He was thoroughly beaten and fled with a few of his followers "and did not draw rein till he reached Agra." The Revolutionaries entered Gwalior and proclaimed Nānā Rāo as Peshwa. The news of this *coup de main* reached Kālpi on 4 June. Two days later Rose left for Gwalior, and was near Morar, on the 16th. He captured it immediately; this gave him command of the Agra road. On the following morning Brigadier Smith reached Kotah-ki-Sarai which was about four miles to the south-east of Gwalior. Smith's orders were to stop at this place and receive instructions from Rose but finding the place unsuitable for a halt, and the Revolutionaries ready to strike he decided to take the initiative. In the battle that followed the Nawab of Bāndah was wounded<sup>1</sup> and the Rani killed. A brave woman, she used to "lead her men in military attire, a red jacket, trousers, and a white turban on her head." The Brahmin concubine of her late husband, dressed as a trooper, was her constant companion. They were both drinking *sharbat* near the *Phul Bāgh* batteries when a contingent of the Hussars attacked them. She tried to escape but her horse failed her and did not jump into the canal. Although she had received a shot in her side, she tried to ride off. Soon after, she fell dead and was burnt in a garden close by.<sup>2</sup> Her courage and determination, her love for freedom and, above all, her indefatigable energy and undaunted bravery, entitle her to a prominent position among the numerous persons who sacrificed their lives in an honourable cause.

Smith sent an account of his action to Rose on the morning of 17 June and requested him to send reinforcements. On the following afternoon he left for Kotah ki Sarai leaving Brigadier

1 Report of the agent of Nawab Sikandar Jahan Begam of Bhopal dated 18 June 1858, quoted in *F. S. U. P.* III, p. 436.

2 *Macpherson's Report on the Affairs of Gwalior*, quoted in Forrest, III, p. 282.



General Napier to General Morar. He found that despite their reverse two days earlier the Revolutionaries threatened Smith's position - they had constructed a battery on a ridge on the other side of the canal, and a strong force had been posted near it. Besides this a body of Infantry was stationed in a gorge of the hills at a distance of a mile and a half. Rose ordered a bridge to be thrown over the canal; he wanted to cross it before dawn on the 20th, and thus place himself between the position taken by the Revolutionaries and the town of Gwalior. His plan was, however, thwarted by the movements of the Revolutionaries who poured forth from Gwalior, determined to attack his left flank which they knew was weak. He decided to take the offensive and sent a party comprised of the 86th Regiment and the 95th Bombay N. I. to cross the canal and attack the Revolutionaries on the left; at the same time Brigadier Smith supported by the 10th Bombay N. I. was to make a diversion in their favour by attacking a battery on the same side. The plan succeeded and the highest range was captured. "To our right was the handsome Palace of the Phoolbagh," wrote Hugh Rose, "its gardens and the old city, surmounted by the fort, remarkable for its ancient architecture, with lines of extensive fortifications round the high and precipitous rock of Gwalior. To our left lay the 'Lashkar' or new city, with its spacious houses half hidden by trees"<sup>1</sup>. He thought he would have no difficulty in capturing Gwalior; orders were, therefore, given for a general attack from the south. The Revolutionaries who were not expecting this move withdrew to Lashkar and were pursued; in the meantime, Brigadier Smith had succeeded in capturing *Phul-Bāgh*<sup>2</sup>.

On the morning of 20 June the Political Agent received the Maharajah who had returned from Agra two days earlier.

1 Quoted in Forrest, III, p. 286.

2 "This residence is more princely than the town palace, it has such wealth of space, with handsome lofty rooms, pillars, fountains, terraces, and gardens of flowers, . . ." Mrs. Henry F. Duberly *Campaigning Experiences*, p. 159; quoted in Forrest, III, p. 51n

As they were moving along the approach road the Palace shots were fired at them from the ramparts of the fort, although it had been reported to have been evacuated in the night. In fact, the bulk of the garrison had left, but a party of thirteen *Ghāzis* was still there to resist to the end. Two junior officers, Lieutenant Rose and Waller were ordered by the General to invest and capture the fort. The tiny band of defenders offered a heroic resistance at the last of the six gates; "the Ghazees, having taken post on a bastion, flung over the walls all their gold and silver coin, slew their women and the child, and swore to die. The gun burst at the third discharge, and the attacking party rushed through the archway and made their way, regardless of the bullets sent down upon them, to the top of the wall. On the bastion the fanatics withstood them steadfastly, and slaying, were slain. Rose, who was swift to do battle among the foremost, fell mortally wounded. .<sup>1</sup> He was shot and then cut "across the knee and wrist with a sword," by a Revolutionary from Bareilly.<sup>2</sup>

Rose now directed Brigadier Robert Napier to pursue the Revolutionaries; he overtook them at Jaura-Alipur, about thirty-two miles north-west of Gwalior. In the battle that ensued Tantia was again defeated, but he managed to escape into Rajputana. The British gained in this victory "a considerable quantity of ammunition, elephants, tents, carts and baggage."<sup>3</sup> After capturing Gwalior Sir Hugh Rose returned to Bombay, handing over command of his force to Napier on 29 June.<sup>4</sup>

### **Pursuit of Tantia Topi**

After his discomfiture at Jaura-Alipur, Tantia Topi, accompanied by 'Ali Bahādur and Rao Sahib, proceeded towards Jaipur.

1 Forrest, III, p. 292.

2 Kaye and Malleeson, V, p. 160

3 Forrest, III, pp. 294-95.

4 Forrest gives 29 June as the date of this battle; Holmes puts it on the 22nd; Malleeson says 21 June. See Kay and Malleeson, V, p. 161; Forrest, III, p. 293; Holmes, p. 541.

The pursuit and overthrow of these leaders of the Revolutionaries were now the main concern of General Napier's army. He was to be assisted by Major-General H. G. Roberts who had the command of the Rajputana Field Force and was posted in Nasirabad. On 27 June he was informed that the emissaries of Tantia and his comrades had been sent to Jaipur, and were on their way. On the following day Roberts moved out of his station and forestalled the Revolutionaries in capturing Jaipur. They abandoned the Jaipur road and marched instead towards Tonk. Nawab Wazir Muḥammad Khān shut himself up in his citadel leaving the bulk of his forces to meet Tantia Topi, but instead of opposing the Revolutionaries the army of Tonk welcomed them as bretheren and joined them<sup>1</sup>. The river Chambal being in a state of flood, Tantia could not continue his march in a south-easterly direction. He went to Bundi, but the Raja did not extend hospitality to his army. He was, therefore, obliged to change his destination, and turned northwards, making for the region between Nasirabad and Nimach, which, he knew, was in sympathy with the Revolution. As the rains were now falling almost incessantly, movement of the troops had become very slow. It was not before the first week of August when flood in the rivers of Rajputana had subsided that Roberts could go in pursuit of the Revolutionaries. On approaching a small river, Kotaria, he found that they were encamping on the opposite side near the town of Bhilwara. He crossed the river on the 8th, but was disappointed to learn that the Revolutionaries had broken camp and moved away. Five days later he was near the village of Kankrauli, thirty-eight miles south-east of Udaipur, when he was told Tantia's camp was only seven miles off<sup>2</sup>.

Tantia who had gone on a pilgrimage to Nāthdwārā returned to camp the same night. On hearing that the enemy was close behind him he ordered the bugle of march to be sounded; but his Infantry did not move because, they said, they were exhausted.

<sup>1</sup> Forrest, III, p. 568 : Kaye and Malleison, V, p. 223

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Kaye and Malleison, V, p. 224.

Early on the following morning (14 August) Roberts approached the river ; only a few rounds were fired when the Revolutionaries again made an escape. Roberts entrusted the duty of pursuing the Revolutionaries to another officer, Brigadier Parke, who had met him on 18 August. Parke tried his best but could not stop the Revolutionaries from crossing the Chambal. Tantia marched on Jhalra-Patan, and collecting some money and recruiting fresh troops from there he took the road to Indore. Spending some weeks in the jungles, he ultimately reached Lalitpur, below the Betwa. From here he wanted to take a north-westerly route, but he found that the river was guarded by the British troops ; he, therefore, changed his plans and proceeded towards the Narbada. He crossed it about forty miles north-east of Hoshangabad and moved to the south and then turned towards the north-west. He captured Kargun (19 November) and stayed there for some time to refresh his followers and deliberate. The British feared that he might recross the Narbada and enter Indore or cut off communications between Bombay and Rajputana by seizing the Trunk Road. As a precautionary measure Major Sutherland had been sent from Mhow to watch the fords on the Narbada. Tantia, too clever for Sutherland, boldly crossed the river leaving his pursuer disappointed<sup>1</sup>. Brigadier Parke, however, had better luck. Starting from Charwah, a town below the Narbada, he marched continuously for two hundred and forty miles to reach Chota Udaipur where he defeated Tantia on 1 December. He now found himself surrounded by British forces stationed at places through which he could escape.

#### **Firuz Shah comes to Tantia's rescue**

It was at this critical moment that Tantia Topi received the news that Prince Firūz Shāh<sup>2</sup> was coming to his help. It rekindled his hopes, and making a dash to break the net encompassing him, he pushed back Major Roche, who wanted to check his advance near Par-tabgarh. He now proceeded in an easterly direction and then turning

1 *Ibid.*, p. 245.

2 Forrest, III, p 611 *et. seq*

to the north he crossed the Chambal and joined the Prince at Indargarh on 15 January, 1859. They could not however assemble more than two thousand men ; they had been reduced to such straits that an officer who took part in the campaign wrote ; "Many a well-bred charger was left standing by the roadside, its back swarming with maggots, and its hoofs worn to the sensible sole."<sup>1</sup> The British continued the pursuit with increased vigour ; Colonel Holmes who had been sent out from Nasirabad surprised them at Sikar on the 21st. The defeat crushed Tantia's morale as well as his forces ; he quarrelled with Rao Sahib and plainly said to him ; "that I could flee no longer, and that, whenever I saw an opportunity for doing so, I should leave him." He separated himself from the remnant of his army and with a few personal attendants managed to reach the Paron jungle, where he joined Man Singh for a second time and threw himself at his mercy.<sup>2</sup> The latter censured him for leaving his forces ; Tantia replied : "I will remain with you whether I have done right or wrong"<sup>3</sup>

Napier knew that "to capture Tantia Topi the preliminary step was to gain Man Singh . . . (and) there were strong grounds for believing that it might be possible to gain Man Singh"<sup>4</sup> He, therefore entrusted to Captain Meade the task of pursuing him. With the help of a local zemindar Meade was able to contact the *Diwān* of Man Singh on 11 March, and promised him liberal terms if he and his family would surrender themselves. On 25 March, the ladies of Man Singh's family came to Meade who sent them to one of the Raja's villages near Sipri. Man Singh surrendered himself

1 An article on the pursuit of Tantia Topi in the *Blackwood Magazine*, quoted in Holmes, pp 547-48

2 Man Singh was the chief of Narwar and a vassal of Sindhia. Having quarrelled with his lord he had left him, captured Paori on 2 August and consolidated his position. Brigadier Smith, afraid of assaulting Paori alone asked for reinforcements. Napier reached the place on 19 August and expelled Man Singh from his new stronghold. He joined Tantia at Bhilwara but left him soon after and went into hiding in the jungles of Paron. Forrest, III, p 578 *et. seq.*

3 Kaye and Malleson, V, p. 257

4 *Ibid.*, V, p. 258.

on 2 April. Having been completely demoralized by defeats and reverses he agreed to betray his erstwhile comrades and relatives, and only a day after his surrender he guided Meade to a place where his uncle Ajit Singh was hiding. Ajit Singh stood to him "in a relation than which there can scarcely be a closer between man and man—friend, comrade and uncle, and yet Man Singh grieved bitterly that this man had not been captured by his enemies. It was a first step in moral debasement—a prelude to one still lower."<sup>1</sup>

Man Singh offered to betray Tantia for a reward in the form of a *jagir* consisting of a few villages. Meade selected a detachment of the 9th Bombay N. I. for the job, and its Hind-Pakistānī Commander was directed simply to obey Man Singh; he did not know what he was going to do. Tantia had in the meantime received a request from his old comrades—Firuz *Shāh*, Ambāpani Nawab, 'Adil Muhammad and Imam 'Alī, wardī-Major of the 5th Irregulars.<sup>2</sup> But his judgment had become so clouded that instead of rejoining Prince Firūz *Shāh* and other Muslim leaders of the Revolution he preferred to place his confidence in a Hindu traitor who was now playing in the hands of his enemies; he sent word to Man Singh that he had received a letter from Imām 'Alī and asked his advice as to what he should do. Man Singh sent a reply that within three days he would come and discuss their future programme.<sup>3</sup> Man Singh more than kept his word. At midnight on the third day, the 7th of April, he came to the hiding place—followed at a distance by the Bombay Sipahis. Tantia was asleep. Asleep he was seized, roughly awakened, and conveyed to Meade's camp."<sup>4</sup> He was taken to Sipri where he was tried by a court-

1 Kaye and Malleon, V, p. 262.

2 Rao Sahib had left them and gone towards Sironj *Ibid.*, p. 263.

3 Tantia's statement made on 10 April; see Kaye and Malleon for the statement, V, Appendix B, p. 310

4 *Ibid.*, V, p. 264.

Man Singh's treachery was not entirely devoid of dramatic touch. He took Tantia to a place in the jungle which as friends they had often visited.

martial ; on 18 April, he was hanged. Tantia Topi was one of the bravest and most prominent fighters among the Revolutionaries, and showed strength of character in resisting the foreign rulers till the last moment. Perhaps he would have escaped the gallows or at least would have died fighting like a soldier if he had trusted Firūz Shāh instead of Man Singh.

There he kept him engaged in a long conversation. At midnight, when Tantia was sleeping he returned, followed by the sepoy who now woke Tantia up. When Tantia opened his eyes he found himself a prisoner, "his arms being seized by Man Singh himself." In the course of their conversation Tantia is stated to have asked Man Singh if it would be right for him to rejoin Firūz Shāh. Man Singh's reply was 'that he would give him a definite answer in the morning.' See Holmes, p. 550 ; also Sen, p. 378.

## CHAPTER XVI

### RAJPUTANA, WEST INDIA AND THE DECCAN

At one time the pride of the Imperial armies, the Rajputs like the Mughuls had steadily degenerated in the decades following the death of 'Ālamgir I. By the beginning of the nineteenth century they had become so weak that they were unable to guard themselves against the predatory raids of the Maratha Chiefs, particularly Sindhia and Holkar, and the Pindaris. The Rajput Princes had consequently placed themselves under British protection and surrendered their sovereignty.<sup>1</sup> Ajmer which occupied a central and commanding position in Rajputana had been seized by the Marathas; subsequently it was ceded to the British by Sindhia in 1818. An old Mughul palace there had been converted into an arsenal and a powder magazine. In 1857 Colonel George Lawrence, brother of Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, was the British Political Agent in Rajputana. He was at Mount Abu when the news of the outbreak of the Revolution reached him on 19 May. Four days later he issued a proclamation to the Princes of Rajputana asking them to maintain peace in their respective territories and concentrate their forces on the borders of their States so that they might become easily available. The Commandants at the various stations were also alerted. He then told the Government of Bombay that European troops could safely go to the North-West Provinces, through Gujrat and Rajputana.

#### Nasirabad

Colonel Lawrence's assessment of the situation in Rajputana was not correct, for only five days after his proclamation the sepoys

1 There were eighteen States in Rajputana, of these only one—Tonk—had a Muslim ruler, the rest having Hindu Rajputs as their Chiefs.



of the 15th Regiment N. I. rose at Nasirabad, about 15 miles from Ajmer, and a big cantonment in the area. An hour later they were joined by the other Regiment, the 30th N. I. posted at the station. The British officers expected that the 1st Lancers will remain loyal to them, but their hopes were soon belied and some of the officers were killed by the sepoy. It was decided that the survivors, including women and children, should be sent to Beawar. They travelled all through the night, reaching their destination at 11 o'clock next morning. The Revolutionary sepoy left the station and marched for Delhi.<sup>1</sup>

### Nimach

A hundred and fifty miles south of Nasirabad was the cantonment of Nimach ; the 72nd Regiment N. I. and the 7th Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent were posted there. The details of the rising at Nasirabad having reached Nimach on 3 June, the guns announced that the sepoy had risen. The officers rushed to a fortified square which was guarded by the 7th Regiment. At four o'clock in the morning this Regiment also left the place to join the Revolutionaries. They did not kill any of their officers, but allowed them to escape to a village, about fifty miles from Udaipur. Two messengers were sent to the Rana with a request for help. Captain Showers who was Political Agent at Udaipur brought the refugees to his headquarters. The Revolutionaries, like those from Nasirabad, made for Delhi by way of Agra.<sup>2</sup>

On receiving reports of the rising at Nasirabad early in June, Colonel Lawrence had also left for Beawar. He was now nominated Brigadier-General and set up his headquarters at Ajmer.<sup>3</sup>

1 Bill, I, pp. 162-63.

2 Nimach Brigade : It played a significant role in the defence of Delhi, where they arrived on 26 July, 1857. See Young, p. 156.

3 "During June and July I resided alternately between Ajmir, Biaur, and Nasirbad, as I deemed my presence necessary at each place . . . My headquarters were, however, at Ajmir, where I resided in the Daolat Bagh, close to the city " Lawrence, Lieutenant-General Sir George, *Forty Years' Service in India* quoted in Kave and Malleson, III, p. 170n.

In the months of June and July the States of Rajputana remained comparatively quiet<sup>1</sup>, but, Malleeson rightly points out that "throughout this period there was, there could not help being, a considerable amount of sympathy between the native soldiers of the Company and the native soldiers of the indigenous princes . . . The causes which impelled the British Sipahis to mutiny could not fail to influence greatly their comrades in other services."<sup>2</sup> The progress of the Revolution in other parts of the subcontinent could have become a vital source of inspiration and encouragement for the people of Rajputana if they had not completely lost, during their period of British tutelage, the little stamina that was left in them after a century of gradual degeneration. Nevertheless, a section of its population had been influenced by the Revolutionary Movement ; for instance, "there was indeed a strong Mahomedan faction in Jeypore, which eagerly desired the success of the Delhi Mutineers."<sup>3</sup>

#### Some stray incidents

On 9 August a number of prisoners escaped from the Ajmer goal. They were pursued and all who were not slain were captured, but their attempt to release themselves was a clear enough symptom of the temper of the people. Similar occurrences followed elsewhere in the region. On the following day (10 August) a trooper of the 1st Bombay Lancers posted at Nasirabad suddenly mounting his charger came galloping in front of the lines and made an appeal to his comrades to rise. The Bombay Lancers, however, preferred to remain loyal and tried to overpower him, but he managed to escape and rushed to the Lines of the 12th Bombay N. I., where he was received with some enthusiasm. Brigadier Henry Macan issued immediate orders to the men of the

1 During the period "trade and agriculture went on as usual", there was no difficulty even in the collection of revenue. *Secret Enclosures*, October, 1857, quoted in Holmes, p. 395, n. 3.

2 Kaye and Malleeson, IV, p. 386.

3 Holmes, p. 395.

4 Kaye and Malleeson, IV, p. 387.

12th to turn out ; only forty of them obeyed. He now ordered H. M. 83rd Regiment to proceed to the Lines of the 12th. All of its men who had not obeyed the Brigadier's orders to turn out were disarmed ; of their leaders five were hanged and three sentenced to imprisonment for life. Three days later a similar attempt of the sepoys made at Nimruch ended in failure. Some men of the 12th N I. and the Commanding Officer, Colonel Jackson, acted with promptitude ; the leaders of the Revolutionaries were arrested except eight persons who escaped.<sup>1</sup>

### **Jodhpur**

The rising of the men of Jodhpur Legion posted at Erinpura, a few miles north of Abu, proved to be more serious. Early in the morning on 22 August an intercepted letter was brought to Lieutenant Conolly by one of his servants ; it was addressed to the men of Jodhpur Legion calling upon them to join the Revolution. He rushed to the parade ground and found that the troops were ready to rise ; he appealed to them but in vain. The Revolutionaries, however, committed no act of violence. On the following morning they were joined by their comrades who had attempted but failed to capture Abū. The combined forces of the Revolutionaries now left Erinpura and took the road to Ajmer. Their route lay through the territories of the Raja of Jodhpur, who, prompted by a feeling of loyalty to the British, decided to demonstrate his sincerity on this occasion. To intercept the Revolutionaries he sent an army under Amar Singh who encamped at Pali. The Revolutionaries who had been joined in the meantime by a local chief, the Thakur of Awah, defeated the army of Jodhpur on 8 September, and captured all its guns and military stores. After this victory they returned to Awah and repaired its defences. They had rightly calculated that the British would not ignore their concentration at Awah for as soon as George Lawrence heard about it he assembled an army and marched against them ; on the 18th he was before Awah, reconnoitring the surrounding area. He thought the fortress

<sup>1</sup> Kave and Malleson, IV, p. 388.

was too strong for him and could not gather up courage to assault it ; he, therefore, fell back upon a village about four miles away, hoping that the Revolutionaries would come out to give him a battle in the open. He waited for three days and then finding that the Revolutionaries were not likely to come out of the fort he withdrew to Ajmer.

Having thus defied Lawrence the Revolutionaries took the road to Delhi. To check their advance an army commanded by Colonel Gerrard was sent from Delhi on 10 November ; at Rewari he was joined by two squadrons of carabineers and later at Kanaund by the Haryana Field Force under Captain Stafford. Their combined forces now advanced on Narnul<sup>1</sup> which the Revolutionaries had occupied on the 16th. Gerrard took a long time to drag his guns along the sandy route, and it was past 11 A. M. when he encamped at a place about two miles from Narnul.<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries not knowing that the enemy was so near abandoned the strong fort and came out ; the battle commenced almost immediately and soon developed into a cavalry duel.<sup>3</sup> The British cavalry wheeled to the left and swooped upon the gunners of the Revolutionaries, and the 1st Bengal Fusiliers overpowered their Infantry. They were pushed back but not before they had shot the British Commander who, riding a horse and wearing a red coat, was conspicuous enough to be easily spotted. Gerrard was succeeded by Colonel Seaton.

### Kotah

Kotah, originally a part of Bundi, was a separate State in 1857, the ruling Chief at the time of the outbreak of the Revolutions

1 "Narnul was a veay strong place. It lay under a hill about four hundred feet high, which formed part of a ridge extending some miles to the south-east." Kaye and Malleeson, IV, p. 77

2 Holmes (p. 396) on the authority of an article in the *Blackwood's Magazine*, June 1858.

3 Malleeson refers to this duel in these words . ' It was a gallant conflict. Never did the enemy fight better. There was neither shirking nor flinching. Both sides went at it with a will.' Kaye and Malleeson, IV, p. 80.

being Maharao Ram Singh. Major Burton, the Political Agent of the British Government in the State, had been sent by Lawrence to Nimach when the revolt of the sepoys at that station had been brought under control. After the defeat of the British forces at Awah he returned to his headquarters against the advice of the Maharao's Hindu agent who had explained to him that the troops could not be 'trusted'. Burton's two sons who accompanied him are stated to have made light of the fears expressed by the Maharao's agent. On 12 October the Maharao came to see Burton ; two days later he returned the visit. In the course of their interview Burton mentioned the names of some officers of the Maharao and urged upon him the need of punishing them. "Whether Burton gave this advice can never be certainly known ; but this is certain," writes Malleon, "that same day the Maharao caused the officers and men of the contingent to be informed that he had given it"<sup>1</sup> The officers and men took the hint. On the following morning the sepoys rose, and led by Mihrāb Khān and Jai Lal, they attacked the Residency ; the guards and the servants left the premises and Burton with his sons and one camel driver was left alone. They defended themselves for several hours, till at last they were overpowered and put to death.<sup>2</sup> The Maharao sent a report of the occurrences to Lawrence ; he was, however, not in a position at the time to send a force to recapture Kotah ; it was in the spring of the following year that the British regained its possession.<sup>3</sup>

1 Kaye and Malleon IV, p. 398. Sen adds, "this, however, could not be proved." See p. 320 n. 29

2 The Maharao tried to stop the Revolutionaries from killing Burton, but his messenger was captured and executed

3 Some details about the attack on the Residency are given in a statement by one of the surviving sons of Burton. According to this statement the Maharao had posted 140 Sikhs at the Residency "for the personal protection of the agent." When Burton sent a message to them to loose the boat and enable him to escape across the river they replied "We have had no orders." Perhaps they feared that the Revolutionaries were too strong for them. See Ball, II, p. 160

**Indore**

Indore, the headquarters of the Political Agent for Central India States, had become a centre of the pre-war activities of the Revolutionaries in that region. Early in April, 1857, "a sepoy was caught in the act of carrying a treasonable message to the Rewah Darbar." The news of the rising at Meerut in the following month alerted the Political Agent, Colonel Henry Marion Durand. He was not slow to realize that the main task before him was to keep under British control the line of the Narbada and thus prevent the Revolution from spreading southward; to guard the trunk road connecting Bombay with Agra and passing through Indore was equally, if not more, important.<sup>1</sup> The chances of achieving these objectives depended to a large extent on the loyalty of Holkar.<sup>2</sup> However, Durand took necessary precautions;

1 In 1857 there was no direct telegraphic link between Madras and Calcutta. The only connection was through a circular route touching Agra and Indore

2 Holkar's attitude towards the Revolution and his loyalty to the British were not very defined. According to Durand, "Holkar's fears and interests are on our side, and, so far as any Durbar, especially a Maratha Durbar, is trustworthy, Holkar's seems to be so." This is a guarded view: in any case Durand did not consider him personally involved in the rising of 1 July, although "he had been trimming and trying to stand fair with both sides." Subsequently events made the problem more complicated and the Government was unable to form a definite opinion on the issue of his loyalty. In March, 1859, Canning made it known that Holkar's loyalty, like that of the Nizam and Sindhia, would be rewarded by an addition to his territory, this promise was conveyed to him. Subsequently Canning thought "it would not be right to fulfil the promise." Nor did his successors find it possible to change this decision. Holkar was rather keen on clarifying his position. "Either I was loyal, "he would argue, "or I was disloyal. If I was disloyal I ought to have been hanged. But Government knew that I was not disloyal, or they never would have made me a G.C.S.I. Then why did they not keep their promise?" Against his anxiety to establish his loyalty there is considerable circumstantial evidence to show that he was in touch with the Revolutionaries: Sa'adat Khan, an active leader of the Revolutionaries of Indore, had been appointed *Bakhshi*, although under the pressure of a demand by the troops. Holkar's family priest

he asked for and got reinforcements from Bhopal, a detachment of two hundred and seventy Bhils was summoned from Sirdapur; Holkar also placed three guns and two companies of Infantry at the disposal of Durand. After the arrival of the Bhopal Cavalry contingent the responsibility of all military arrangements was taken over by its Commanding officer, Colonel Travers. Soon after taking charge he requested Durand to send the ladies and Government treasure to Mhow; but this advice was not accepted. The Europeans and Eurasian residents of the place were however advised to move into the Residency in case of a rising.

On the night of 30 June, a servant of Travers came to Durand and told him that the sepoys would rise next morning; he was rebuffed.<sup>1</sup> Durand had not to wait long to find that the report of the servant was only too true. At about half past eight o'clock, when he was writing a telegram to the Governor of Bombay, one of his servants rushed into the room and said that there was a great uproar in the bazar. Durand could not ignore this report in the same way as he had done the previous one on the night before. Early in the morning Sa'adat Khān, an officer in Holkar's Army, had galloped from Indore to the Durbar troops who were posted between the city and the Residency, shouting, "Get ready; come on; kill the Sahibs: it is the order of Maharajah." The troopers obeyed his instructions, the gunners opened fire and the Infantry and

had written letters to a friend about "the destruction of the red ants by the black ants," the men of the 27th Regiment at Kolahpur asserted that they had been instigated by Holkar; on the pretext of shikar excursions he used to go to a hill in the jungles to meet his spies; lastly, the son of the ex-Raja of Satara and his adherents said that he had promised assistance in their attempt to recover the territories of Satara. See Holmes, pp. 619-21.

Holkar was in reality undecided, he was unable to muster up enough courage to espouse the Revolutionary cause openly; nor could he take a determined stand against the Movement because he was afraid of the Revolutionaries in the State. When the latter asked him to accompany them to Delhi he apologized to them, putting forward the plea that he had not enough resources to recruit an army. *Kanhiyya Lal*, p. 342.

1 *Secret Letters*, 15 to 31 March, 1858, also see Holmes, p. 479.

the Revolutionaries from the city attacked and burnt the houses of the Europeans. Travers hastened to the Residency Stables Square, and placing himself at the head of the Cavalry ordered a charge ; only a few of his men obeyed the order. "As I cast my eye back", he wrote in a letter, dated 4 July, "and found only six or seven following me, and not in good order, much as I despise the Mahrattas as soldiers, I saw we could not by any possibility make an impression. Still at it I went ; to draw rein or turn after giving the order to charge was too much against the grain . . . but what could half a dozen do against so many ?"<sup>1</sup> He made a retreat and took shelter in the Residency which the Revolutionaries were now ready to bombard. Durand was greatly disappointed to learn that the Bhopal and Malwa contingents were not willing to oppose the Revolutionaries while the Bhils had not the courage to do so ; "when the cannon-balls of the enemy came crashing into the building they abandoned their posts and rushed into the inner room " About ten o'clock the Cavalry offered to take the defenders under their protection and carry them to a place of safety. It was humiliating to accept the offer, and yet it had to be accepted "First," wrote Durand, "came the humiliation of being forced to withdraw and before an enemy that I despised . . . So that we retired unmolested . . . of all the bitter days of my life I thought this the worst, for I never had to retreat, still less to order a retreat myself, and though the game was up, . . . still my pride as a soldier was wounded beyond expression, and I would have been thankful if any one had shot me."<sup>2</sup> However, preferring humiliation to destruction the British abandoned the Residency. Durand wanted to cross at the Simrol Ghat, but he found it occupied by Holkar's forces ; he, therefore, took the road to Sehore in the territories of Bhopal. He reached there on 4 July, but "his old friend, the Begum . . . loyal to the core," politely told him "that the whole of India is now at enmity with us, that our remaining here is a source of weakness to her and endangers the

1 Quoted in Forrest, III, p. 95 et seq.

2 *Ibid* , pp. 98-99



State and her " Consequently, after staying there for a day he set forth for Hoshangabad <sup>1</sup>

### **Mhow**

The rising at Indore encouraged the sepoys at Mhow to follow in their footsteps ;<sup>2</sup> they rose the same night, set fire to the mess house, killed a few British officers and then hurried off to join the Indore Revolutionaries. A couple of days later they all left Indore and moved northwards taking the road to Gwalior. Soon after their departure Holkar changed his policy and began to support the British. On 7 July he sent a number of Europeans, who had been wandering about in the countryside in search of protection, to Mhow along with the remnant of the treasure. In the meantime Durand had not remained inactive from Hoshangabad he went to Asirgarh, reaching there on 22 July, and joined Stuart who now commanded Woodburn's Column. Durand reached Mhow on 1 August.<sup>3</sup>

### **Firuz Shah's exploits in Malwa**

Mandeswar, about a hundred and twenty miles to the north-west of Indore, had become an important and formidable stronghold of the Revolutionaries. "A Delhi Shahzada," wrote Captain C. L. Showers to George Lawrence on 1 August, "has been proclaimed at Mundisore, and been joined by some three thousand Mewatees, besides by all the troops of the Soobah. All the Artillery of the place has fallen into the possession of this new Viceroy." The letter also contained an account of the activities of

<sup>1</sup> Forrest, III, p. 101 ; Holmes, pp. 480-81

<sup>2</sup> The Regiments of sepoys stationed at different places in Central India were in contact with one another through their emissaries. Durand had received "intelligence that emissaries from the native regiment at Mau had been discovered tampering with the men of the Bhopal contingent . . ." Kaye and Malleon, III, p. 139, also see p. 156

<sup>3</sup> Woodburn's Column had been sent from Bombay towards Mhow ; but he had to return on account of ill health. Stuart had taken charge of the Column. Kaye and Malleon, III, pp. 161-62

the Revolutionary leaders in that area ; this was based on two intercepted letters written by Aḥmad Yār Khān, 'Āmil of Nimbahira, one of them was addressed to Lala Mahi Lal, Tonk Wakīl at Nimach. The Lala was requested to send a *sawār* to Belode. In the second letter a similar request was made to Bakḥshī Ghulām Qādir ; he was to send a *sawār* and a horse to Pādshāh Miyān who was at Belode. Pādshāh Miyān was to go from Belode to Nimach. In case he did not like to return he could remain at Belode for some time, but he was to be provided with a horse. A full explanation of the situation and the activities of the Revolutionary leaders is given by Showers in his lengthy post-script. "The Padshah Mean," he tells us in this note, "is a Mahomedan Peer, who is said to have come from Ajmere about a fortnight ago, staved in Hajee Mahomed's house, and is now with . . . Samin Allee Khan of Beelode, to bring him whence this urgent missive was sent . . . Another letter . . . has an order to send one of the shopkeepers of Neemuch with all the guns, Pistols, swords etc. he had to Neembahera." The real significance of these letters and their contents can be realized only when we examine them in the context of events at Mandeswar. Taken in connection with the religious Mussulman Movement just going on at Mundisore," Shower adds, "and with the suspicion attaching to Samin Allee Khan (for it must be mentioned that Colonel Jackson has received intelligence that he was greatly concerned in instigating the troops to revolt in June and that I had received intelligence that he was a dangerous intriguer on which account I got Captain Lloyd, who thought well of him, to send him away from Nimach and considering generally the suspicions not to say the hostile attitude held by Neembahera throughout the crisis, Colonel Jackson agrees with me that the resistance of the Tonk pergunnah in its present independent state is a source of inquietude to this post at the present juncture, and may at any moment become a cause of peril."<sup>1</sup> Shower's comments on the intercepted letters

1 *Secret Letters*, 196 of 1857, dated 17 October.

leave no doubt about the propaganda work of the Revolutionaries preceding the outbreak of the War of Independence.

Mandiswar's importance lay in the fact that Prince Firūz Shāh, one of the most capable of the Revolutionary leaders, was present there. Besides the Revolutionary sepoys he had at his command a number of *Ghāzis*, and his own attitude towards the Movement was also marked by the spirit of a martyr. Most of the Chiefs in Central India, Rajputana and Malwa were loyal to the British cause, but the bulk of the people in these areas seem to have been behind the Movement. The Nawab of Tonk, for instance, was with the British Government, but not so the people whom he governed. Showers knew this and was therefore anxious to have the sanction of the authorities to seize Nimbahera; subsequently, he occupied it.

#### **Dhar captured by the British**

By September the Revolutionaries of Mandeswar had stabilised their position and built up a fairly strong force.<sup>1</sup> Early in October Firuz Shah advanced towards the Bombay road with a view to cut off the enemy's communications and then control the line of the Narbada. Durand promptly sent a detachment of the Haidarabad Cavalry to defend Mandleser on the Narbada, and, a week later (19 October) he moved with his main army towards Dhar which had already risen and now obeyed Firūz Shāh's authority. On hearing of the advance of British forces the leaders of the garrison sent a letter to Firūz Shāh requesting him to send a contingent of two to three thousand men to help them. Unfortunately the letter could not reach the Prince because it was intercepted by

<sup>1</sup> They were in contact with the people of the neighbouring areas. Durand 'had intercepted letters from Haidarabad, from Nagur, from Surat, from Ujjen, from Gawaliar, and from Mandesar, all telling the same tale. The tale was to the effect that after the conclusion of the Dasahra festival, a general rising would take place in Malwa, and that influential personages were coming from Nagpur and Haidarabad for the purpose of giving life and strength to the insurrection.' Kaye and Malletson, V, pp 45-46.

the men of the Nawab of Jaora and handed over to Durand.<sup>1</sup> However, Durand arrived before Dhar on 22 October ; "the Arab and Mekrani levies who garrisoned that fort gave a signal instance of the confidence engendered by the long compulsory inaction of the British . . . Planting three brass guns on a hill south of the fort, they . . . advanced boldly against the British."<sup>2</sup> In the skirmish that followed, the Revolutionaries were pushed back ; they retreated and returned to the fort which stood on a mound nearly thirty feet above the plain and had a massive wall of red granite with a number of bastions and towers. The British siege-train arrived on the morning of 21 October, and now they started throwing a breaching battery on another mound which was about three hundred yards from the western face of the fort. In the beginning the bombardment did not produce much effect, but by incessant firing for several days, they succeeded in breaching the walls. An assault was made on the night of 31 October ; the British forces entered the fort but only to find that the garrison had evacuated it and left for Mandeswar. Durand demolished the fort and attached the State of Dhar.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Firuz Shah captures Jiran**

Though a severe blow, the loss of Dhar did not affect the spirits of the Revolutionaries. One of their parties, led by Prince Fīrūz Shāh himself, attacked Jiran, a fortified town, about twelve miles from Nimach and captured it. To recover its possession a force was sent on 23 October under the command of Captain Tucker. He opened fire upon its defences and then sent his Infantry to attack the town. The Revolutionaries sallied forth from the town, defeated and drove back the British and captured the

1 See *Jang Daily*, (Karachi), dated 1 December, 1955.

2 Kaye and Malletson, V, p. 47.

3 See Holmes. p. 486. "It was subsequently restored to Rajah Anand Rao Puar, . . . but was retained under British management till the Chief should attain the age of eighteen years, or until he should become competent to manage his own affairs. The management of the State was entrusted to the Chief in October, 1864." Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties*, III, 380

mortar ; Tucker was killed. However, in spite of their victory the Revolutionaries decided to abandon Jiran.

### **Mahidpur**

Another party of the Revolutionaries, mainly consisting of the *Wilāyatīs*, attacked Mahidpur on 8 November ; it was garrisoned by the men of Malwa Contingent, some of whom were in contact with the Revolutionary leaders ; ‘the Subadar-Major opened his jacket as the rebels approached, took out a green flag and hoisted it.’ The British officers, however, managed to escape and joined Durand’s camp on the following day. The same night an army commanded by Major Orr was despatched to Mahidpur. As the Revolutionaries had abandoned the place and moved away, he went in their pursuit and met them at the village of Rāwal, where a tough battle was fought. A British officer came up with a Ruhilah chief ; ‘he was a fine fellow, and perhaps a leader. He was requested to surrender, thus he refused to do ; he was then told that unless he did so death would assuredly be his portion. Then ensued the struggle for life in deadly conflict, which he manfully maintained upon foot till the cold sharp spear of his antagonist pierced his breast ; he then fell upon the field, cast one agonised withering look of a still unvanquished spirit on his foe, threw his arms across his eyes, and died without a groan.’<sup>1</sup> The battle continued unabated until nightfall, when the Revolutionaries withdrew from the field ; one hundred fifty of them lay dead, the British casualties being one hundred.

### **Mandeswar**

Mandeswar was now the headquarters of *Firūz Shāh* and could not be captured without a major offensive. Durand, therefore, pushed his column as fast as he could. He reached the bank of the Chambal on 19 November and took two days to cross the river, although it was not contested by the Revolutionaries.<sup>2</sup> *Firūz*

1 Kaye and Malletson, IV, p. 400.

2 Forrest, III, p. 130.

Shāh's decision not to contest the passage of the river by the enemy is rather surprising. He could have checked the advance of the British column if he had so decided, for even without a hindrance from him the crossing of the river "presented no inconsiderable difficulties." After crossing the Chambal the British forces proceeded towards Mandeswar. On the morning of the 21st they were in a position to select a strategic site for encampment; it was covered in front by a rising ground, flanked on the left by villages, gardens and cultivated fields, and by hills on the right. The same afternoon the Revolutionaries came out of Mandeswar and occupied a village on the left of the enemy. The British opened fire which proved effective, and the Revolutionaries were forced to withdraw and re-enter the town.

Next morning Durand moved towards the north to check the advance of a Revolutionary force coming from Nimach to reinforce the defenders of Mandeswar. In a hotly contested action fought near the village of Goraria, where the Nimach force was encamping, the British were defeated and suffered heavy losses, sixty officers and men having been killed or wounded. On the following morning (23 November) "the place" was shelled till it became a mere wreck; everything that could be burned in it was consumed. Still the rebels held on. At last, about mid-day, some two hundred and twenty came out and surrendered. Those that remained were Rohilas, and they stuck to the last brick in the place . . . The stern defence of the Rohilabs did service to their cause. Whilst the British force was dealing with them the Shahzada and his two thousand Afghans and Mekranis evacuated Mandesar and retreated on Nangarh. The cavalry . . . was unable to pursue them."<sup>1</sup> The noble and heroic conduct of the Rohilabs and their sacrifices in the defence of Goraira convinced Firāz Shāh that they were among the most devoted and sincere fighters in the cause of freedom; he decided to move to Rohilkhand which had now become one of the main theatres of the War.

1 Kay and Malletson, V. p. 55.

**Satara**

The activities of the Revolutionaries in Central India had alerted Lord Elphinstone,<sup>1</sup> the Governor of Bombay; on hearing the news of the rising at Nimach he formed a Column with the object of keeping the Bombay-Agra road open for the movement of British forces. Major-General Woodburn was given the command of the Column and was to proceed to Mhow and obey the instructions of the Governor-General's Agent in Indore. Elphinstone also authorised the Commissioner of Sind to send the 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Karachi to the Panjab and made arrangements that some Regiments returning from Iran could proceed direct to Calcutta without landing at Bombay. Soon after, however, he learnt that the areas nearer him were also under the influence of the Revolutionary Movement. A 'plot' was reported to have been formed in Satara under the leadership of Ranga Bapuji.<sup>2</sup> He had managed to escape, while his followers were dispersed by Lieutenant Kerr. Seventeen persons were captured and put to death.<sup>3</sup>

**Bombay and Poona**

It appears that the Revolutionary leaders had sent a number of emissaries to Bombay and the Deccan. The leader of the

1 Twenty years before the Great Revolution, Elphinstone was the Governor of Madras. He did not enjoy a good reputation at the time. "We want a Governor," an officer had said, "and they send us a guardsman, we want a statesman, and they send us a dancer." Holmes, p. 462.

He had, however, improved considerably and showed efficiency as Governor of Bombay during the present crisis.

2 Ranga Bapuji was sent to England to plead the case of the Raja of Satara; he had failed in his mission but had returned from there 'a rebel'. Kaye and Mallsen, I, pp. 79, 425.

3 For a long time the officers of the Government delayed the trial of these persons "in the hope that Rango Bappoojee the Ring leader and some other prominent characters in the conspiracy who are still at large, might be apprehended . . ." Letter from Rose to the Government of Bombay. See *Secret Letters*, 13 August, 1857, No. XVI, p. 3.

workers at Baroach was Mawlawi Aḥmad Miyān Nasr Allāh ; he was arrested and placed in confinement.<sup>1</sup>

In Poona, the chief worker of the Revolutionaries was Muḥammad Ismā'il who started his activities by addressing a small group of Muslims in the *Jāmi' Masjid*. He told them that "matters are progressing favourably at Delhi . . . and other words of a similar seditious kind." He was however chased by a police spy and ultimately arrested. In his statement he said that he belonged to a place near Haidarabad (Deccan) and that he had come to Poona in search of employment. He denied that he had any companions although the informer of the police had said that he had seen the prisoners with two others only a couple of days earlier. "The police spy . . . is sure," says the Superintendent of Police in his letter to the Magistrate dated 24 July, "that he came here with seditious intentions. It is certainly most suspicious, his coming in the disguise of a Fakcer . . . There are five men who make a practice of discussing the probability of the mutineers being successful . . ."<sup>2</sup> The report of the Superintendent of Police says that Muḥammad Ismā'il was arrested on the evening of 23 July. Two days later Setan Karr warned Davidson at Poona "to look out for the letters of Noor-ul Hooda Moolvee . . . particularly for (one) posted at Belgaum on the 24th." This letter was intercepted and Mawlawi Nūr al-Hudā was arrested on the morning of 28 July ; "he is now reflecting in a solitary cell at Gorepury." It was

1 In a letter dated 23 July and addressed to the Government of Bombay A. Odgers wrote: "I yesterday placed in confinement Ahmad Mean Nusseeroollah, one of the sons of the Moolvee of this place, he is distinctly recognized by two men of the Grenadiers, whom Major Konner sent out sometime ago after the lot as spies, as the man who offered them service upon high pay to induce them to combine with others to plunder the treasures and towns of Broach and Surat." *Secret Letters*, July 1857. No. 152, letter no. 32

2 The names of the five persons given in the report are: "Hussunrah, lives on his private means—Chand Muddar—a pipe-maker, Shaik sinool Abdeen, lives on his own means, was formerly in Ponna Horse ; Ishommed Hayat, a drug seller. These two are trustees for the Joomma Iusjid." *Secret Letters*, 13 August, 1857.



suggested that the Mawlawi and his companions should be sent to the Tanna Jail, but Davidson preferred to wait for instructions from Bombay.<sup>1</sup> These were communicated to him by the Secretary to the Government of Bombay on 30 July; they said: "I am desired by His Lordship in Council to direct that the Moolvee be forwarded by Phaeton and Rail to the Gaol at Tanna . . ."<sup>2</sup>

### Belgaum

In the south and parts of Bombay, Belgaum seems to have been the main centre of the Revolutionary activities. There is ample evidence on record to show that here too the main workers of the Movement were Muslims; "Mr. Seton-Karr" writes Malleson, "discovered a plot of the Muhammadan population of Belgaon. He soon found that this conspiracy had its ramifications at Kohlapur, at Haidarabad, and at Puna . . . Mr. Seton-Karr, therefore, no sooner received information of this event than he secured the local leaders at Belgaon . . . the principal conspirator was convicted . . . and he was blown from a gun in company with the

1 The letter intercepted by Davidson is interesting and may be reproduced here

"Huzruh Moolana, After salaam be it known, I have got your letter, it has been dispatched as addressed—the bundobust of the assembly and affairs here has been settled and the pultunwalas are in expectation—the outside people are expected—on their arrival the whole at once will take the topkhana and the treasury. Every appearance of the miscreants and the abortions (?) shall be annihilated the Alija Sahib is in great concern, and his friends, jagirdars are of the same mind as he. You had written about the release of his son-in-law. You must exert yourself greatly regarding it—letters from the regiments of your limits have been received—they are ready—further details will be learnt from the letters of the Sahib.

(Sgd.) Mahomed."

*Secret Letters*, 13 August, 1857, No. 160 Letter XI.

1 *Ibid.* also see Holmes, p. 466.

It was perhaps this party consisting of "ten prisoners (Mussulmans)" to which a reference has been made by C. I. Erskine, Acting Sessions Judge, Bombay, in his letter to the Secretary, Government of Bombay. The letter is dated 31 July and was sent from "Konkun Adawlat, Tanna. The "prisoners" were kept in separate cells.

emissary from Jamkhandi . . .”<sup>1</sup> A study of the relevant documents in the enclosures to *Secret Letters* leaves no doubt that the Revolutionary leaders at Belgaum had contacts not only in Maharashtra and the Nizam’s Dominion, but also in the Presidency of Madras<sup>2</sup>. The plan was that the rising should take place simultaneously at a number of places. He did not know the names of the chief workers of Madras and other places but an emissary, Zain-ul Abedin, is stated to have left Belgaum for Madras on 27 July ; he was accompanied by a Mawlawi. Thus the Movement was now becoming popular in the southern regions. Even in private letters references were made to the progress of the Revolution in different parts of the subcontinent and reports, often exaggerated, about the victories of the ‘Imperial forces’ and the disintegration of British power. Akram ‘Ali, a resident of Aurangabad, sends a brief report of the rising at Haidarabad to Ghulām Muṣṭafā ; “on Friday the 24th zilcad (17 July),” he writes, “a few religious persons proceeded to the house of Abbun Sahib and took up their quarters, with the intention of committing a *jihad* (War against the infidels) and cutting the heads of all infidels. But when these persons knew that they would be apprehended by the cursed devils (infidels) they thought it proper to return from the place. Tooruhbaz Khan was wounded and

1 Kaye and Malleon, V, p. 22. Also see Holmes, p. 467.

2 In a letter dated 28 July Seton-Karr writes to S. Pycroft, Chief Secretary to Government of Madras : “I transmitted to you this day by Electric Telegraph a message to the effect that the Mahomedans in the Southern Maratha country are in active correspondance by post and by messengers with Madras, Mysore and Kurnaul. The object of the correspondence is to concert a simultaneous rising in all those quarters, . . .” Seton-Karr did not know the names or other particulars of the Revolutionary leaders of Madras and Mysore etc. but he knew for certain that “yesterday one of them named Zainool Ab-Deen left this place for Madras. He was accompanied by a Moolvee and they travelled on horse back . . . I have not succeeded as yet in intercepting any of the correspondence passing between the conspirators in this place and their accomplices at Madras, but I find it alluded to in terms which even without the corroboration of other circumstances can leave no doubt of its existence.” *Secret Letters*, No. 160, letter no. III, 2, dated. 13 August

taken prisoner." In another intercepted letter Mir Nuṣrat 'Alī of Aurangabad wrote to Mir Aḥmad 'Alī at Bombay that after the Daserah "the Mussulman army of the King of Delhi will reach as far as the Deccan. You may rest assured of this. There are circumstances which I cannot write." A week later the same writer again refers to the victories of the Royal army at Delhi and advises his addressee to "please send your reply to this at the shop of Futtehbhoy, the agent of Chandbhoy, in order that he may enclose it in his own letter which will reach me soon"<sup>1</sup>

The workers of the Revolutionary Movement in South India do not seem to have had a correct idea of the vigilance of the British Government and the efficiency of their arrangements for intercepting the letters. The district officers were keeping a strict watch over the postal correspondence, particularly letters addressed to the men of the army or persons suspected of being anti-British. The Revolutionary workers thought that because they wrote their letters in code their contents would excite no suspicions, while, in fact, they were deciphered and the plans of their writers became known to the enemy before they were executed. In the upper Provinces, or at least in many districts of those regions, secret propaganda had preceded the outbreak of the Revolution, but in the south, it seems, work was started rather late, and the British Government could take effective counter-measures. The plans of the Revolutionaries were therefore thwarted and a number of local leaders and other workers taken into custody. Nevertheless, the Revolutionaries did succeed in raising the standard of revolt at some places.

### Kolhapur

Kolhapur was in touch with Belgaum and Dharwar. The Regiments at these places had made arrangements for a concerted action in which Kolhapur was to give the lead. Accordingly, on

<sup>1</sup> *Secret Letters* No. 173 (XVI). also see Kaye and Malletson, V, p. 83; Cf. Najm al-Ghani, *Tārīḥ-i Riyāsat Haydarābād Dakhān*, (Lucknow, 1930). pp. 534-35.

the night of 31 July the 27th N. I. rose, and a message was sent to Belgaum, but the telegraphic communication forestalled the express intelligence service of the Revolutionaries. However, the sepoy after seizing the treasury marched on the town where the Gates were closed against them. The bulk of the Revolutionaries went towards Sawant Wari, and a small party of about forty men threw themselves into a small outwork near the town. This tiny party was easily overpowered by Lieutenant Kerr who had rushed from Satara to attack them. A few days later Colonel George de Grand Jacob arrived at Kolahpur, and was soon reinforced by a strong force. The Regiment was disarmed on 18 August, and then followed the executions : "two were hanged, eleven shot, and eight blown away from guns"<sup>1</sup> The rising at Kolahpur created a panic in Bombay, and the European residents began to remove their families to the ships lying in the harbour. It was feared that the approaching week of the *Muharram* celebrations would be utilized by the Revolutionaries for a general rising. These apprehensions of the officers were not baseless, because on the last but one night of the celebrations the Christian drummer of the 10th Regiment N I whilst in a state of intoxication attacked a Hindu procession. The police arrested him, but the sepoy came to the drummer's rescue and carried him along with some policemen to their Lines. Forjett, the Superintendent of Police, however, rushed to the Lines and brought the situation under control. Similarly, a subsequent attempt of the sepoy to reorganize a rising in October was detected and counteracted : two soldiers were executed and six transported for life.

In December another attempt was made by the people of Kolahpur at the instance of the brother of the Raja ; this was also suppressed. Colonel Jacob was appointed Commissioner of the Southern Maratha country in May, 1858 ; he was to be assisted by Charles Manson who had sat on the *Inam Commission* ; a few days later Bābā Ṣāhib, the Chief of Nargund, "declared war" on the

<sup>1</sup> Holmes, p. 467.

British (27 May, 1858). Manson who was on his way to the northern districts was informed of this and ordered by Jacob to return to Kolahpur. He decided to proceed to Nargund, but before he could reach the place he was overpowered and slain by the Revolutionaries, in a temple at Suriban where he had stopped for the night. Nargund was, however, attacked and captured by another British officer, Colonel George Malcolm (2 June) : its Chief, Bābā Ṣāhib, was caught in a jungle ; he was convicted, and hanged on the 12th.<sup>1</sup>

### Hyderabad

Hyderabad, the capital of the Nizam's Dominion, was a predominantly Muslim city. On 18 May the ruling Nizam had died ; he was succeeded by his son Afḡal al-Dawlah. The Chief Minister of the State, Sālār Jang, was "a man whose name deserves to be ever mentioned by Englishmen with gratitude and admiration." He persuaded his young master to openly declare his loyalty to the British Government. The people, however, were in sympathy with the Revolutionary Movement,<sup>2</sup> "and their leaders were ready to take advantage of their temper. Moulvis put forth all their eloquence to stir up the passions of the Mahomedan gentry to crusading fervour. Fakirs preached, in ruder phrases, to ragged zealots. The poison soon took effect."<sup>3</sup> To prove that he was intensely loyal to the British, Sālār Jang handed over several persons to the Resident for trial, because he considered their

1 Holmes, pp. 470-72.

2 In this connection it would be of some interest to mention a poster, *Izhār nāmih barai dīn-i Islam . . . wa istawāri-i-riyāsat-i-Dakhan wa jihād kardan az Kāfirān* . . . making an appeal to the people to rise for *jihad*. The most interesting part of this poster is a threat to the Nizam and Sālār Jang and a curse on the *mawlawis* who do not issue a *fatwa* for *jihad*.

For the text (partly Urdu, partly Persian) and its photostat see Siddiqi, 'Atiq, *Atharah saw Sattāwan, iḥḥbar awr Dastāwizin* (Delhi, 1966), pp. 377-78.

3 Holmes, p. 500.

activities to be of a suspicious character<sup>1</sup>. In spite of his efforts, however, the Revolutionaries succeeded in staging a revolt on 17 July. The leaders of the rising were Mawlawi 'Alā al-Dīn and an Afghan chief, Ṭurrah Bāz Khān. About five o'clock in the afternoon the Revolutionaries seized two buildings near the western face of the Residency, and then ensued an exchange of fire, which continued till late in the night. Next morning the Pathans of Ṭurrah Bāz Khān having suffered heavy casualties decided to withdraw. Two days later he was captured and imprisoned under orders of Sālār Jang; after some time he managed to escape from the prison, but only to be slain by some zamīndars in the neighbouring villages. Mawlāwi 'Alā-al-Dīn was also arrested and sent in exile to the Andamans.<sup>2</sup>

Aurangabad deriving its name from Prince Awrangzib (later 'Ālamgir I), was situated in the north-western corner of the Nizam's Dominions. The Muslims formed the bulk of the forces stationed at Aurangabad. By the middle of June 1857 it had become evident that the Revolutionary spirit had penetrated the ranks of the forces. On the 12th of that month Captain Abbot, the Commanding Officer, was surprised to learn that "mischievous influences had been operating throughout the cantonment for several days previous."<sup>3</sup> The pretext for a demonstration made by the men of the 1st Cavalry on 13 June, was the rumour that they would be sent to the north with Woodburn's Column. The report was not baseless,<sup>4</sup> but Abbot thought it advisable to give assurances to the disaffected men that they would not be required

1 See, for instance, his letter to the Resident informing him that he had arrested a *faqir* who was publicly preaching sedition *Sakhunān i-farīb wa iftārā*—and that he was being sent to him. For the text of the letter, see Siddiqi, pp. 373-74.

2 Kaye and Malleon, V, 81.

3 Captain Abbot, the Commanding Officer of the Station, sent to the Resident at Hyderabad a detailed report of the circumstances under which he had come to know of the disaffection. See Ball, I, pp. 426-27.

4 Kaye and Malleon, V, p. 8.

to move out of the Nizam's Dominions. In the meantime a message was sent to General Woodburn at Ahmadnagar to march upon Aurangabad. He arrived there on the morning of the 23rd, marched immediately to the parade ground of the 1st Cavalry, and ordered them to surrender their arms. All obeyed except one troop; the artillery opened fire on its men. Some of them were killed or captured, but a fairly large number managed to escape to the city. Fidā 'Alī, who had fired at Abbot but had missed the aim, was courtmartialled and hanged the same evening. Referring to these Revolutionaries an officer who was an eyewitness wrote: "These mutineers are, without exception, the finest body of men I have seen in India—immense fellows of sixteen or seventeen stone each, and scarcely one of them under five feet ten inches." The court martial sat for several days and sentenced a large number of those who had been taken captive; "two were blown from guns; seven shot by the dragoons; four cut down in the charge; several hung; between thirty or forty transported; one hundred disbanded and turned out of the station; and some fifty or sixty others flogged or otherwise punished."<sup>1</sup>

### **Shorapur**

Shorapur was the seat of a Hindu Raja who owed allegiance to the Nizam. Soon after the outbreak of the Revolution, the young ruler had begun to levy Rūhilah and Arab soldiers. On hearing about these activities of the Raja the Resident of Hyderabad, Major Davidson, took some precautionary steps; a strong force commanded by Lieutenant Malcolm was called from Bombay and stationed between Shorapur and the Southern Maratha country; Major Hughes with his men was to watch the eastern frontier of the Raja's territories; lastly, a detachment of four hundred men of the Hyderabad Contingent with two guns under Captain Wyndham was ordered to occupy Linsugur. Early in

1 Ball, I, pp. 430-31. The numbers given by Ball are not accurate: Mawlānā Najm al-Ğhānī says, "twenty-one were shot dead, while three were blown from gun." *Tārīkh Riyāsat Haydarābad Dakhn*, p. 537.

January, 1858, Davidson sent his Assistant, Rose Campbell, to remonstrate with the Raja ; the latter "promised allegiance to the British."<sup>1</sup> Even if the Raja was sincere in his promise he was helpless, because of the influence of the Revolutionaries. Campbell, however, was informed by his relatives and servants that his life was in danger. He rushed to Linsugur and asked Wyndham to march on Shorapur. On 7 February, the British were before the town ; in the night the forces of the Raja attacked them. On the following morning Hughes also arrived with a strong contingent. In a short battle that was fought the Revolutionaries were defeated and had to withdraw to the town but not before the Ruhilahs had killed a British officer, Captain Newberry, and severely wounded another, Lieutenant Stewart. Hughes thought the town was strongly defended and it would be unwise to attack it before the arrival of Malcolm's force. The Raja instead of taking advantage of this fled towards Hyderabad,<sup>2</sup> which demoralized the Revolution, and they decided to withdraw. Malcolm arrived with his force

1 Taylor Colonel Philip Meadows *The Story of My Life* (Oxford University Press, 1920) p. 398.

Malleson says that Campbell was not successful in his mission and he "only wasted his efforts. The Raja had given himself to the fanatical party." See Kaye and Malleson, V, p. 86.

2 The Raja reached Hyderabad with two followers only; he was apprehended when loitering in the bazar and brought before Sālār Jang, who passed him on to the Resident. He was tried and sentenced to death, but the Governor-General commuted it to four years' imprisonment. The Raja was happy at this consideration, particularly because he was allowed to have his two favourite Ranis with him in the fortress in which he was to live as a prisoner. Thus, full of joy, he left for his prison fortress near Madras, travelling in a palankeen, but as the party arrived at their first encampment the Raja shot himself dead. The story of the Raja's suicide is interesting ; it is stated that the officer who was escorting him "took off his belt, in which was a loaded revolver, hung it over a chair and went outside the tent. While washing his face a moment afterwards, he heard a shot, and running back, found the Raja lying on the ground quite dead. The ball had entered his stomach and passed through the spine." Taylor thought that the death was due to an accident and that it was not a case of suicide ; however, "the grim old prophecy deduced from the horoscope was literally



in the evening and occupied the almost deserted town next morning (9 February).

The State of Hyderabad could have played an important role in the War of Independence if its ruler and his minister had been less enthusiastic in their loyalty to the British. "There can be no question," Malleson rightly remarks, "but that the rising of Haidarabad, headed by the Nizam, would have been a blow struck at the heart. The whole of western and southern India would have followed. Central India, the dominions of Holkar, and Rajputana could not have escaped ; and it is more than probable that the communication between Calcutta and the North-West would have been severed . . . For three months the fate of India was in the hands of Afzul-ud-Daulah and Salar Jang. Their wise policy proved that they preferred the certain position of a protected state to the doubtful chances of a resuscitation of the Delhi monarchy under the auspices of revolted Sipahis" <sup>1</sup>

fulfilled ! " The prophecy was that the Raja would die before completing the twenty-fourth year of his life, and Shorapur would be lost to the dynasty. *C.f.* Taylor, pp. 412-14 ; for the prophecy, pp. 239-40 ; and for the Raja's confession of guilt in rebelling against the British, pp. 389-402

1 Davidson supports this view : "Fortunately for us, the Government remains staunch . . . were it otherwise, no force . . . at present in Southern India could in my opinion stem the torrent of revolt . . . the eyes of all the Mussulmans in Mysore and the Carnatic are turned in this direction, and they are already impatient at the delay of their friends here in proceeding to action." Quoted in Holmes, p. 501, n. 1

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE DU'AB DISTRICTS

**Haji Imdad Allah, Wali Dad Khan and Mawlawi Liyaqat 'Ali**

#### **Roorkee**

To the north of Meerut, is the small town of Roorkee, (in district Saharanpur) which was the headquarters of the Sappers and Miners of the Bengal Army ; from here "alone could be drawn a large portion of the siege-material indispensable for the reduction of Delhi".<sup>1</sup> In April 1857 the Hind-Pākistāni troops at Roorkee had refused to accept the flour because rumours had become current that the Government agents had mixed bone-dust in it.<sup>2</sup> On 12 May, Robert Spankie, the District Magistrate of Saharanpur, heard about the rising of the sepoys at Meerut. Unlike other Europeans in the district he took a serious view of the outbreak and sent the families of the Europeans to the hills on the following day; he also recruited additional policemen for duty. The Gujars who lived in the neighbouring villages took advantage of the chaos and resorted to lawlessness; the *mahājans*<sup>3</sup> and zamindars were plundered, the Government treasuries were siezed, and the documents pertaining to debts and other official records were destroyed. Spankie organized expeditions to different places to stop these depredations. In the city, however, events were moving in a different channel : "the head of the city police, who was of that faith (Islam) was led astray either by fanaticism or by

1 Holmes, p 134.

It may be mentioned that one of the organizers of the Revolutionary Movement, Muḥammad 'Alī, who was a co-worker of Aẓīm Allāh Khān, was a graduate of the Roorkee Engineering College. For details of his career see Forbes-Mitchell, pp. 171-93.

2 Keene, Henry George, *Fifty-seven*, p. 8.

1 i. e. money lenders.

ambition. He began corresponding with the rebel cabinet at Delhi and received a patent creating him Nawab Lieutenant-Governor of the Upper Duab".<sup>1</sup> Spankie in the meanwhile had written to the Panjab authorities and a small force had come to his help. On 2 June the uneasiness of the sepoys became evident ; attempts were made on the lives of Spankie and three other officers, but they managed to escape. Roorki and Dehradun also gave trouble to the British authorities. At Roorki some men of the Sappers deserted, but before they could organize a rising the Commandant managed to throw fortifications round the workshop. Dehradun was attacked by a party of Jullundur Revolutionaries ; however, they soon withdrew and the town remained under British authorities.

### **Saharanpur**

In Saharanpur a serious incident took place in the second week of July. Spankie and other officers were at their dinner when a messenger rushed in and reported that the Stud-guard had deserted. The officers immediately rushed to the treasury. They found its contents intact, although the sepoys of the 29th N. I. who constituted its guard had disappeared. To put an end to the activities of the Revolutionaries, Spankie resorted to trick. He called the "Nawab" to his presence, thanked him for his good work, promoted him to the post of a sub-collector, and transferred him to Nokur, in the north-western part of the district. This act of "kindness" put the Nawab completely off his guard, and one morning he was arrested in his own office by a party sent under Lieutenant Boisragon and was sent to Ambala where he was hanged.<sup>2</sup>

### **Muzaffarnagar**

To the south of Saharanpur and separated from it by an imaginary boundary was the district of Muzaffarnagar.<sup>3</sup> In one of

1 Keene, p. 10.

2 *Ibid*, pp. 15-16

3 "On the eastern side are some Muhammadan landholders, Saiads by origin and professing the Shiah, or Persian form of the faith, which separates

its towns, Thanah Bhawan, lived the well-known and influential *sufi-shaykh*, Ḥājī Imdād Allāh, who had among his disciples a number of distinguished scholars and other respected person. There is no recorded evidence to indicate that he was actively preaching *jihād* before the Revolution, but it is beyond doubt that after its outbreak, he thought, it had become obligatory on the Muslims to join the Movement. A quiet *darwish*, living more or less a retired life and devoting his entire time to guiding and training his disciples, Ḥājī Imdād Allāh ultimately decided to take an active part in the struggle.<sup>1</sup>

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them in feeling and interest from the Indian Muslims generally. It is hard to say that the Shiah are less fanatical, or more so, than the Sunnis ; but the fact that they are a minority in India probably disposes them, however slightly, in favour of a foreign and impartial government." Keene, p. 16

The fallacy in the above passage is evident. If the Shiāhs of Muzaffarnagar did not join the Movement it does not mean that the community as a whole was with the British Government. In spite of the technical difficulty that the presence of the Imām was necessary for the declaration of a *jihād* the share of the Shiāhs in the Revolutionary War, particularly in Awadh, was by no means insignificant.

1 Ḥājī Imdād Allāh, son of Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Amīn, belonged to a family of the *shaykhs* of Thanah Bhawan. In the beginning he became a *murid* of Mawlawī Naṣīr-al-Dīn of Delhi, who was one of the disciples of the famous *Mujāhid* leader, Sayyid Ahmad *Shahid*. Subsequently he got himself enrolled as a disciple of another *sufi-shaykh*, Nūr Muḥammad Jhanjhānawī. Ḥājī Imdād Allāh enjoyed widespread reputation as a pious *shaykh* and scholar. A number of 'ulama, for instance, Mawlawis Raḥīd Ahmad of Gangūh, Muḥammad Ya'qūb, Muḥammad Qāsim, Muḥammad Husayn of Allahabad, Ahmad Hasan of Kānpūr, and Abd al-Samī' *Bidil*, were among his numerous disciples. After the Revolution of 1857, Ḥājī Imdād Allāh migrated to Mecca ; he died in 1317 A. H. /1899 A. C. He is the author of several works on *taḡawwuf*, as, for instance, *Ḍiyā al Qulūb*, *Kulliyāt-i-Imdādīyah*, *Risālah Waḥdat al-Wūjūd*, *Ghiza-i-Rūḥ* and *Haft Mas'alah* ; he has also written a commentary on Mawlānā Rūmī's *Mathnawī*, which was printed at the Nami Press, Kānpur, under the supervision of his disciple Mawlawī Ahmad Hasan. For the life of Ḥājī Imdād Allāh. See *Imdād al-Mushṭaq* (Thanah Bhawan, 1929), and Ṣābrī, Imdād, *Firangiūn Kā Jāl* (Delhi, 1949, pp. 7-12), 'Aḡhiq Ilahī, *Tadhkirat al-Rashīdiyyah*, (Meerut, 1905), pp. 41-50, 73-79.

In the town of Muzaffarnagar the outbreak of the Revolution was precipitated by the cowardice of its Magistrate, Bedford. The guard of the treasury being comprised of the 20th N.I. which had taken a prominent part in the rising at Meerut, it was obvious that the town would sooner or later join the Revolution. The Magistrate, however, "with a precipitancy as unworthy as it was rare, closed the public offices on the receipt of the bad news from Mirath. He subsequently took refuge in a small house in the town, withdrawing the guards posted over the gaol for his own personal protection".<sup>1</sup> The people seized this opportunity, broke open the jail and took possession of its contents, the sepoys who had risen left for Moradabad. On 24 June R. M. Edwards was sent by Spankie to take charge from Bedford. He found the district in a disturbed state and took immediate steps to re-establish the British authority and restore communications. He could not, however, completely suppress the Revolutionaries. They had selected as their leader a Hindu zamindar, Mohur Singh, who been in contact with the Revolutionary Government at Delhi.<sup>2</sup>

At Thanah Bhawan, about a day's march from Muzaffarnagar, events had been moving rather fast. 'Abd al-Rahim, the younger brother of a leading zamindar, had gone to Saharanpur to purchase elephants. On the report of a Hindu spy he was arrested and publicly hanged by the orders of Spankie. The news of 'Abd al-Rahim's execution came as a blow to his brother and excited the people of the neighbouring towns and villages.<sup>3</sup> Some of the leading *mashā'ikh* and *'ulamā*, including Hāji Imdād Allāh, Hāfiẓ Muḥammad Dāmin, Mawlānā Muhammad Maẓhar, Mawlānā

1 Kaye and Malleon, III, p. 201

Keene adds that Bedford had taken refuge in the office of the sub-collector, Imdād Husayn. He "belonged to the influential tribe of Saiads, . . . and stoutly stood by the fallen authorities for which he was afterwards handsomely rewarded". See p. 17.

2 Kaye and Malleon, VI, p. 123

3 Keene refers (p. 18) to this incident without mentioning the cause of the execution. 'Āshiq Iāhī gives some details. See pp. 73-74.

Muḥammad Munir, Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim and Mawlāwī Raṣhīd Aḥmad, came to Thanah Bhawan and decided to organize the people for *jihād* ; Ḥājī Imdād Allāh was elected leader (*Amīr*) of the Revolutionaries.<sup>1</sup>

### Battle of Shamli

Hasty preparations were made, and a contingent of *Mujāhids*, led by 'Ināyat 'Alī, fought a battle by the side of the road near Shīr 'Alī's garden. The British force was defeated and routed in this action ; this initial victory raised the morale of the Revolutionaries, who now moved to Shāmli, a Tahsil under Ibrāhīm Khān,<sup>2</sup> who was an enthusiastic supporter of the British. Early in September 1857, and before the arrival of the Revolutionaries, Edwards had sent a detachment of Gurkha troops with two guns to Shāmli ; subsequently he himself had also arrived there. On the 14th of that month, however, he had left the place, leaving some men to defend it. The Revolutionaries from Thanah Bhawan "surrounded the office in which Ibrahim Khan and his men were posted. Ibrahim Khan defended his position all day".<sup>3</sup> In the evening the assailants set fire to the building which they had been besieging ; the defenders were thus forced to surrender. They had suffered heavy losses, Ibrāhīm Khān being among the slain. The Revolutionaries also had to pay a heavy price for their victory ; one of their leaders in the battle, Hāfiẓ Muḥammad Dāmin, was killed in the action.<sup>4</sup>

Edwards, anxious to recover Shāmli and Thanah Bhawan, attacked the latter on 16 September with Sikh and Gurkha troops,

1 The administration having broken down, the people came to Ḥājī Imdād Allāh and said : "As you are our spiritual guide you should also assume worldly leadership and solve our problems by becoming the Amir of Muslims." 'Āshiq Ilāhī, pp. 73-74.

2 For his services to his British employers see Graham, G. F. I, *Life and work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, K.C.S.I.* (Calcutta, 1909), p. 64.

3 Kaye and Malleson, VI, p. 124 ; Keene, p. 18.

4 Muḥammad Dāmin was, like Ḥājī Imdād Allāh, a disciple of Nūr Muḥammad Jhanjhānawī. See Ḥasan, Muḥammad Anwār, *Anwār ul-'Ārifin*, p. 456. Also see 'Āshiq Ilāhī, pp. 73-75

commanded by Captain Smith and Lieutenant Cuyler. The Revolutionaries fought with determination and pushed back the assailants. A few days later, however, British reinforcements arrived under Dunlop, and Thanah Bhawan and Shāmli were captured. After the fall of Delhi the activities of the Revolutionaries in the surrounding regions received a severe set-back. A number of the Revolutionary leaders who had fought in Thanah Bhawan and Shāmli and had not fallen into the hands of the British troops went into hiding. Hājī Imdād Allāh migrated to Mecca.<sup>1</sup>

### Keranah

The Revolutionaries had also overthrown the authority of the Government at Keranah, another small town in the district of Muzaffarnagar. The leader of the Revolutionaries here, Mawlawi Raḥmat Allāh, had already won fame for his efforts in checkmating the proselytizing activities of the Christian missionaries who had become very aggressive in the decades preceding the Revolution.<sup>2</sup> He was supported by Chaudhri 'Azim al-Dīn<sup>3</sup> who had great influence over Muslim Gujars and was able to utilize their services for the struggle.<sup>4</sup> The British troops, however, soon surrounded the town and bombarded the houses in the street, known as Darbār Maḥallah, where the Revolutionaries had taken refuge. Raḥmat Allāh escaped to a neighbouring village; he was pursued by the

1 Mawlawi Muḥammad Qāsim, Mawlānā Muḥammad Maḥzar and Mawlawī Muḥammad Munir were among those who had gone into hiding. They came out of their hiding places after the declaration of general amnesty. Mawlawi Raḥīd Aḥmad was arrested and remained in custody for several months. See 'Āḥiq Ilāhī, pp. 80-83; also see Gilānī, Manāẓir Aḥsan, *Sawānīḥ Qāsimī* (Delhi, 1375 A. H.), II, pp. 171-85.

2 See chapter II, p. 44, n. 2. Also see Akhtar, Mirza Muḥammad, *Tadhkirah-i-Awliyā-i-Hind* (Delhi, 1954), pp. 296-302.

3 After the Revolution 'Azīm al-Dīn migrated to Mecca. See Salim, Muḥammad, *Ik Mujāhid Mi'mār* (Karachi, 1952), p. 29.

4 Raḥmat Allāh used to address and give necessary instructions to the people at the steps of the *Jāmi' Masjid*.

enemy troops, but they could not capture him.<sup>1</sup> The village was surrounded and searched ; the headman was arrested but Raḥmat Allāh could not be found. He was, therefore, declared to be "an absconded rebel", and a reward of one thousand rupees was announced for his arrest ; he was tried *in absentia* and his property was confiscated in 1862. However, under the assumed name, Masiḥ al-Dīn, he managed to reach Delhi, and then passing through the desert of Rajputana he proceeded to Surat, from where he took boat for Jedda.<sup>2</sup>

#### **Bulandshahr : Malagarh**

Bulandshahr (ancient Baran), lay to the south of Meerut. The quarter known as Bārah-Basti, was populated by hardy Pathans, from whom recruits were often taken for the Irregular Cavalry. The charge of the district was held by Brand Spate ; a detachment of the 9th N.I. was posted here. On hearing that the main body of the Regiment stationed at Aligarh had risen on 21 May, Spate left the district and fled to Meerut. Subsequently other European officers who had also fled from Bulandshahr joined him. The Revolutionaries opened the jail, released the convicts, seized the records in the offices, and then made their way to Delhi.<sup>3</sup> Spate now returned to Bulandshahr (25 May) and punished some of the suspects on whom he could lay his hands. In the meantime the Revolutionaries captured Sikandarābād, about eight miles to the west of the town of Bulandshahr.<sup>4</sup> After the departure of the Gurkhas, the desertion of Hind-Pakistānī troops again made the position of

1 Raḥmat Allāh was advised by the headman of the village to disguise himself as a grass-cutter. "The British cavalrymen who were sent out to arrest him passed by the field where the Mawlānā was 'cutting the grass' but failed to recognize him," Salim, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

2 *Ibid*, pp. 30-32.

3 After the departure of the Revolutionary sepoys the Gujars plundered the abandoned houses of the Europeans and the Government offices. See Kaye and Malletson, VI, p. 135.

4 Keene, pp. 34-35.



Spatte untenable. Wali Dād Khān,<sup>1</sup> the chief of Mālāgarh, connected by near relationship with Emperor Bahādur Shāh, had begun to assert his authority as the representative of the Revolutionary Government at Delhi.<sup>2</sup> He was at Delhi at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution. The Emperor granted him a *sanad* for the administration of the Duāb. He left Delhi on 26 May and was able to recruit, at the small town of Dādri, a number of men for his new force. Spate made an effort to reassert his authority in Gulāothi, not far from Bulandshahr, but he was defeated and expelled from there and the district was completely lost to the British.<sup>3</sup>

For nearly four months Wali Dād Khān held the districts of Bulandshahr and Aligarh with the neighbouring regions; he did not only manage his own territories but also cooperated with other Revolutionary leaders as and when the need arose. "A Bareilly letter," writes Muir to Edmonstone on 10 October, 1857, "dated last Wednesday states that Wullee Dad Khan had arrived there two days before—i.e., on the 5th—with about 1,500 troops and 2 guns; it adds, 'Nana Sahib's troops, said to be about 400, are reported to have left Badaun yesterday for Lucknow. All the Hindoos almost are believed to be well disposed to us in that direction.'"<sup>4</sup> Wali Dād Khān had great influence over the people of the neighbouring area.<sup>5</sup>

1 Wali Dād Khān was the son of Bahādur Khān who held the charge of Bulandshahr on behalf of the Emperor of Delhi. He had built a strong fort at Mālāgarh on the banks of the Kālī-Nadi, about five miles from Bulandshahr. Since then it had become the main stronghold of the family. See *Al Jam'iyat* (Delhi), 7 January 1857.

2 See Radi al-Din, *op cit*, p. 305; also see Kaye and Malleison, VI, p. 135.

3 Kaye and Malleison, VI, p. 136.

4 *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 188.

5 "Malagarh" in the words of Spate, "became the resort of all the disaffected, far and near. Khurja and Aligarh were occupied by the followers of the rebel Nawab, to whose standard many of the fanatic Musalmans of the Bari Basti hastened to flock. The fort is about nine hundred yards from the road, which was consequently commanded by the guns, of which Wali Dad

The fall of Delhi in the third week of September adversely affected the spirit of the Revolutionaries in the Duāb ; it also enabled General Wilson to despatch a Column in the direction of Bulandshahr. Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Greathed who commanded it left Delhi on 24 September. Three days later it reached Sikandarābād which had been evacuated by the Revolutionaries on the 26th ; on the following day the Column was at a crossing of the roads near Bulandshahr. The Revolutionaries had taken position outside the town at a point where two roads leading to it converged ; their Infantry men were lined besides the walls of the gardens, while their guns were concealed by the crops. Greathed opened heavy fire on this position ; the Revolutionaries finding that they could not stand it for long moved back and entered the town. In the meanwhile the British Cavalry was subjected to a severe fire from a *sarāi* and the jail, but it continued its march forward ; this advantage was followed up by the Infantry, and ultimately the British forces were able to enter the town.<sup>1</sup> Roberts, who was with the Cavalry when it entered the town, says that "we soon became entangled in narrow streets, but at last found ourselves in a gateway leading out of the town..There we had hard fighting ; Sarel was wounded in the act of running a sepoy through the body...

Anson was surrounded by mutineers...I observed a sepoy taking deliberate aim at me...He fired ; my frightened animal reared and received in his head the bullet which was intended for me."<sup>2</sup> The Battle of Bulandshahr was a severely

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possessed six at the commencement of the outbreak. Communication with Agra was effected with extreme difficulty, for so well was the whole line of the road and its vicinity watched, that scarcely a man could pass without being intercepted . . . This rebel really became a formidable foe." Quoted in Keene, pp. 35-36.

1 Kaye and Malleon, IV, p. 63.

2 Roberts, I, p. 262.

contested action, both sides suffering heavy losses. Greathed left Bulandshahr on 3 October, reaching Khurja the same afternoon.<sup>1</sup> The strong fort of Mālāgarh which was the main objective of Greathed's Column had been evacuated by the Revolutionaries. It was blown up on the afternoon of 1 October; Lieutenant Home who had lighted the slow-match to blow up the fort was killed in the operation.<sup>2</sup>

The fall of Bulandshahr was followed, as usual, by executions and confiscation of property. Wali Dād Khān had managed to escape,<sup>3</sup> but there were other leaders and workers who had to face British retaliation. A mango tree, since known as *Kālā Ām*, was used as a gallows for hanging the people, obviously because their number must have been large. A comrade and supporter of Wali Dād Khān, Hajī Yād Allāh Khān, the police officer of Gulāothi, is stated to have played an important role in the struggle. He had placed his services at the disposal of the Revolutionary Government and served the cause of the Movement with devotion.

1 Roberts says that near the camp a Hindu *faqir* was found seated under a tree. He seemed to have been under a vow of silence. When he was interrogated by the British soldiers he kept silent but pointed to a wooden platter which was used for mixing food. When closely examined it was found "that a detachable square of wood had been let in at the bottom, on removing which a hollow became visible, and in it lay a small folded paper, that proved to be a note from General Havelock, written in the Greek character, containing the information that he was on his way to the relief of the Lucknow garrison, and begging any commander into whose hands the communication might fall to push on as fast as possible to his assistance... This decided Greathed to proceed with as little delay as might be to Cawnpore." Vol. I, pp 264 65. Roberts does not mention if the "faqir" was in any way rewarded for his "remarkable performance."

2 *Ibid.*, p. 263.

3 He went to Bareilly and remained with Khān Bahādur Khān till the fall of that city in May 1858. After that he went into hiding; ten years later, he is stated to have come to Mālāgarh in the guise of a *banjārah* (grain-merchant) and carried away his hidden treasure. Nothing, however is known about his end. See *al-Jam'iyat* (Delhi), 7 January, 1957.

He was arrested after the Revolution, and all his property was confiscated.<sup>1</sup>

### **Aligarh**

Another important town in the Duāb was Aligarh (ancient Koil). Under the later Mughuls when Sindhia's influence at the Court of Delhi had greatly increased it became one of his main strongholds. It had a bastioned fort, about a couple of miles to the north of the town, which was well capable of defence, but in 1857 it was not occupied. The men of the 9th N.I. who were stationed at Aligarh remained quiet for some days after the outbreak of the Revolution; in fact, they had handed over to their officers some of the workers of the Movement, who had entered their Lines to persuade them to join it. The plan of the Revolutionaries was that "under cover of the noise and excitement of a simulated marriage procession, the European officers might be murdered, and the money in the treasury, amounting to about £ 70,000 secured for the revolvers."<sup>2</sup> Among the men delivered by the sepoy to their officers was a Brahmin who had been sent by the Revolutionary leaders to the villages in the neighbourhood. He was tried and hanged the same day (20 May). Before the execution was carried out the sentence had been read to the prisoner and he was taken to the gallows in the presence of the sepoy, one of whom stepped forth and, pointing to the dangling corpse exclaimed: "Behold a martyr to our religion." His comrades took the hint and rose immediately; they opened the gates of the jail, and took possession of the treasury. They did not use violence, but they firmly asked their European officers to quit Aligarh. On their flight the administration of the district was taken over by a group of the Revolutionary leaders.<sup>3</sup>

1 *Al-Jam'iyat* (Delhi), January, 1957.

2 Kaye and Malleison, II, 102.

3 See *Jamhūr, Āzādī Number*, (Aligarh), 16 August, 1957

Mawlawī ‘Abd al-Jalīl,<sup>1</sup> a local leader of the Movement delivered a *fatwā* of *jihād* on 20 June, in consequence of which the Muslims, particularly the Mewatis, began to join the Revolution in large numbers.<sup>2</sup> The leader of the Mewatis, Ilāhī Bakhsh, was a man of great courage and devotion. With his clansmen under his command, he fought with remarkable perseverance and determination. Another local leader of the Revolutionaries was Mawlawī Muẓaffar ‘Alī who was a teacher in the *madrasah* of Bhikampur. On hearing about the outbreak of the Revolution he came to Aligarh with some of his pupils and joined the War. He was killed in action and buried in the *Jāmī’ Masjid*.<sup>3</sup>

Aligarh had thus become a centre of zealous supporters of the Revolution. Muir’s entry on 16 July runs thus: “16th, Thursday,—Coel is in disorder. The fanatical lower Mussulmans,

1 Mawlawī ‘Abd al-Jalīl belonged to a family of the Banū Isrā’īl, after whom a street in the city of Aligarh bears that name even today. He had completed his studies under the well-known scholars, Shāh Rafī‘ al-Dīn and Shāh Muḥammad Ishāq. Subsequently he took to teaching and was also appointed *Imām* of *Jāmī’ Masjid*. On the outbreak of the Revolution he gave a *fatwā* of *jihād* and later began to fight as a *Mujāhid*; he died fighting against the British and was buried with some of his comrade in the courtyard of the *Jāmī’ Masjid*. His house was demolished and razed to the ground by the Government. *Jamhūr* 16 August, 1657.

2 Muir was not certain of Mawlawī ‘Abd al-Jalīl’s attitude towards the Revolution till at least 3 August; he writes under that date: “He is a learned Moulvee who has hitherto held aloof from politics and the society of Europeans: a bigoted Muslim.” The information supplied to him by Āftāb Rāi Serishtadar was that “Moulvee Abdool Jalael had come in from Chhattaree and joined the public prayers. It was not known what his politics were.” The informer, it seems, had no knowledge of the *fatwā*. See *Intelligence Records*, II, pp. 23-24. In another section of his book Muir reproduces the report of “Pearce Lall, Tehseeldar, Allypurrh”, “dated 1 August. “Yesterday,” it says, “Moulvee Abdool Julleel (he is considered a highly respectable and religious man amongst the Mohammedans) came here from Chuttaree, and preached in the City Mosque to the Mohammedan Public: that whosoever shall kill a European or Christian shall get his salvation at once, and he will become as sinless as an innocent child, and whoever shall be killed in the religious war against the Kafirs shall directly go to heaven”. *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 443.

3 *Ibid.*

Joolahas, etc., raising the cry of 'Deen . . . Deen.' ”<sup>1</sup> The district was within the jurisdiction of Wali Dād Khān who had placed it under one of his officers, Ghawth Muḥammad.<sup>2</sup> The latter had reached Aligarh on 28 July to assume charge of his duties. He appointed trustworthy persons to different posts. Maḥbūb Khān became the Tahsildar of Koil and was also given the charge of *dāk* establishment. Hasan Khān Mewāti was appointed Kotwal; Ghawth Khān was to be *Nāib-Kotwal*. Amīr Bakhsh and Umrao Lal were made *Nāib-Ṣūbahs* in the *thanahs* of Juān and Somnā respectively; Nawāb Dūlah was appointed Tahsildar of Atrauli.<sup>3</sup>

In the third week of August the British made an attempt to expel the Revolutionaries from Aligarh. A force commanded by Major Montgomery left Agra on the 20th and reached Aligarh on the 24th. It “found the rebels consisting of a large body of Ghazis (fanatics) and a detachment of the 3rd Cavalry, in the occupation of a walled garden”. Montgomery directed one of his officers to attack them. The Revolutionaries let them come near their defences. Then they came out and attacked the Infantry of the enemy; “a considerable number of them, dressed in garments white as the driven snow, suddenly dashed from the enclosure, flourishing their scimitars aloft, and crying out ‘Religion! Victory!’ rushed on the advanced skirmishers of the Europeans. They fought with a desperation so furious and with a rage so frantic that it became

1 *Intelligence Records*, II, p. 6.

2 Ghawth Muḥammad had enlisted 800 men by the end of July, and was stated to have been trying to raise the number to five thousand. He paid Rs. 20/- p. m., to a *sawār* and Rs. 4/- or 5/- to a footman. He wanted to win over the zamindars of the area, but his efforts to get the support of Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān of Chatari did not meet with success. To the report of the informer Lieutenant-Governor Colvin had added a note: “Secy’s *perwanah* may go to Mahomed ‘Alee Khan of Chattaree, saying that his conduct will be well remembered and rewarded hereafter if he resists all efforts to entangle him in the plots of rebels”. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

For Ghawth Muḥammad’s efforts to win another zamindar, Tikām Singh, see pp. 27, 32.

3 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 21-22, 34.

necessary to bring up the guns to bear upon them".<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionaries had neither enough men nor equipment to withstand the deadly fire of the enemy, and no amount of courage and determination alone could turn back the mouths of the heavy guns of the British.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, early in October when Greathed's Column was about to reach Aligarh he "believed he should meet a considerable force of the rebels".<sup>3</sup> The city which had been evacuated by the Revolutionaries was occupied by the British forces on 5 October. About fourteen miles from Aligarh on the road to Kanpur was the village of Akraabad. Its zamindars, the two brothers Mangal Singh and Mahtāb Singh, with about a hundred followers were killed; "as I have just set the place on fire", writes Greathed in a letter, "and sent the whole cavalry out to cut up any fugitives who may be found in the fields, I hope we shall make an example which will ring through the District".<sup>4</sup> Two days later the Column moved towards Agra. After a few days, Cocks, accompanied by the new Magistrate, Bramly, came to Aligarh with a force of British and Sikh soldiers, and occupied the fort which was to be used as a barrack; "the city was held by a Jat chief, with a strong force of constables; . . ."<sup>5</sup>

### Agra

Agra, the capital of the Mughul Empire for more than a century, had lost much of its past glory and greatness. In the War of 1857, however, it played a distinct role. On the eve of the Revolution a number of *ulamā* and *shaykhs*, including Sayyid Aḥmad

1 Kaye and Malleison, III, p. 192.

2 It was perhaps in this battle that Mawlawī 'Abd al-Jalīl died fighting. Keene mentions this incident in these words: "Mr. Cocks, having occupied the place" (Hathras) " . . . marched out, to attack the enemy, assembled near the town of Koīl. A fight ensued, in which the enemy were defeated and put to flight, with the loss of their 'Maulvi' or spiritual guide" See. p. 49.

3 Kaye and Malleison, IV, p. 65.

4 *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 180; also see Roberts, I, p. 268.

5 Keene, pp. 49-50.

Allāh Shāh, had made it their headquarters.<sup>1</sup> Some of them had preached *jihād*, although not openly. It has already been stated that steps were taken to check proselytization by the Christian missionaries.<sup>2</sup>

The news of the outbreak at Meerut reached Agra, which was now the capital of the North-Western Provinces, on 11 May, and took Lieutenant-Governor Colvin entirely by surprise. Three days later he harangued the troops of the station; "prompted by their officers to cheer, the sipahis set up a yell; they looked, however, with a devilish scowl at us all."<sup>3</sup> He also sent messages to Sindhia at Gwalior and the Jat Chief of Bharatpur asking them to assist the Government; both reacted favourably.<sup>4</sup> The sepoy, however, acted in a different way. On 30 May a Company of a Regiment of the Infantry rose; the incident was reported to Colvin the same evening.<sup>5</sup> Next day the rising became more general; "the rebellion," writes Malleeson, "then, was not confined to sipahis in British pay."<sup>6</sup> On the same day (31 May) Colvin disarmed the sepoy of the 44th and 67th. This gave the Europeans at Agra some confidence, but Colvin's position was by no means enviable; "every day events were passing beyond his control . . . The initiative in fact had passed into the hands of the rebels."<sup>7</sup> Sindhia had already warned the British about the movements of the Gwalior Contingent. On 14 June came the expected rising; some of the officers were killed, and those who could manage to escape made their way to Agra.

In the third week of the month rumours had begun to reach Agra that the Revolutionary sepoy of Nimach and

1 Kaye and Malleeson, V, p. 292.

2 See Chapter II.

3 Raikes, Charles, *Notes on the Revolt in the North Western Provinces of India*, (London, 1858), p. 12.

4 Sindhia showed his loyalty by immediately sending a battery of six guns; on behalf of the Raja of Bharatpur, Captain Nixon was sent to occupy Mathura.

5 Raikes. p. 38.

6 Kaye and Malleeson, II., p. 109.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 111.



Naşirabad were marching in that direction. Colvin, therefore, ordered the Christian population to take refuge in the fort. On 2 July the Revolutionaries reached Fathpur-Sikri, only twenty-three miles from Agra. The same day necessary steps were taken by the authorities to place the available forces at strategic points. A detachment of the Kotah contingent was brought into the cantonment, while the Karauli matchlockmen, commanded by a civil officer, Sayf Allāh Khān, was posted at Shāhganj, four miles from the town on the road to Sikri. Tow days later these arrangements were changed because the men of the Kotah Contingent as well as those commanded by Sayf Allāh were suspected. On 5 July Brigadier Polwhele was pressed by other officers to move out and meet the Revolutionaries who were reported to be not far from Shāhganj. Early in the afternoon the British forces left the parade ground, and moved towards the village of Sucheta from where the Revolutionaries opened fire. Polwhele ordered the Infantry to lie down and directed the Artillery to reply. Polwhele, however, soon discovered that his men were suffering heavy losses; he therefore ordered a retreat "The beaten army reached the fort as the day was closing They had lost in killed forty-five, in wounded and missing one hundred and eight"<sup>1</sup> Taking a hasty meal after their victory the Revolutionaries set off for Delhi.<sup>2</sup> At the Imperial city they were received with a grand salute. Polwhele was soon punished for his incompetence: he was removed from command, Colonel Cotton being appointed in his place.

The defeat of the British at Sucheta raised the morale of the Revolutionaries; "on the morning after the battle the town-crier, at the order of Murad 'Alī Kotwal, proclaimed the reign of the King of Delhi through the city. The armed procession that accompanied the crier was composed of most of the leading Muhammadan police officers attached to the Kotwali, headed by

1 Kaye and Malleon, III, p 185; also see Raikes, pp. 62-63.

2 They reached Delhi on 8 July.

the Kotwal himself, and followed by a crowd of inferior grades and rabble; there is no reason to suppose that a single Muhammadan of any respectability was in any way engaged or accessory to this proceeding."<sup>1</sup> For the next three months the Christian population, nearly six thousand souls, remained in the Mughul Fort. The town returned to tranquillity on 8 July. Throughout this period Major Macpherson, the Resident of Gwalior, was in correspondence with Sindhia and his Minister, Dinkar Rao; it was mainly due to this contact with the Maratha Chief that the people were not subjected to a regular siege.<sup>2</sup>

Even before Colvin's death on 9 September, threatening rumours of an attack on Agra were agitating the garrison in the Fort. The sepoys of the 23rd N I. who had risen at Mau on 1 July and had been subsequently joined by contingents from Mehidpur and Bhopal had arrived in Gwalior early in September; they marched on Dholpur, without having been disturbed by the forces at Agra. On the 11th of that month the Revolutionary forces marched from Dholpur and captured Khairagarh, Fathpur-Sikri, Iradatnagar and Fathabad. Two weeks later they were strengthened by a band of fighters who arrived from Delhi under Prince Firūz Shāh.

In the meantime the British garrison in the Fort had prepared itself for resistance; it was decided that some important buildings including the beautiful *Jāmi' Masjid* should to be blown up with mines in case the Revolutionaries marched on Agra.<sup>3</sup> The last week of September saw a great improvement in the position of the garrison: the fall of Mālāgarh and Greathed's capture of Aligarh and Khurja left no doubt about the early arrival of reinforce-

1 Phillip's *Narrative*, quoted in Kaye and Malleon, III, p. 186n.

2 See Holmes, p. 159

3 The *Jāmi' Masjid* of Agra, like that of Delhi, was occupied by the British troops after the Revolution. It was closed to prayers and was used as a barrack for several years. In 1864 it was handed over to the Muslims; Mawlānā Qamr al-Islām, the *Mutawalli* of the Mosque, took charge of it. See Māhrahrawi, Sa'id Aḥmad, *Muraqqa-i-Akbarābād* (Agra, 1931), pp. 112-13.

ments. Nevertheless, the fear of an attack by the Revolutionaries of Dholpur was still there. In his report to the Governor-General dated 15 October the new Chief Commissioner, Colonel Fraser, justifies his action in recalling a small contingent posted at Sadabad in these words: "Because in the affair of 5th July at Susseah the mutineers with comparatively small numbers pressed us very severely . . . with their present reported strength this much smaller detachment might have been crushed at once . . ." <sup>1</sup>

### **Firuz Shah's surprise attack**

Greathed's Column crossed the Jamuna on 10 October and encamped at the parade ground.<sup>2</sup> On entering Agra they found that the Revolutionaries had 'fled' across the Kali-Nadi, about thirteen miles from there. In fact they were unable to take their guns to the Agra side across the stream, and without them it was difficult to face the enemy. They would not however let him take rest; "we had scarcely sat down, bent on enjoying such an unusual event as a meal in ladies' society, when we were startled by the report of a gun, then another, and another. Springing to our feet there was a general exclamation of, 'What can it mean? Not the enemy surely!' But the enemy it was . . ." <sup>3</sup> The Revolutionaries commanded by Prince Firūz Shāh had attempted a surprise attack and fallen upon the British forces immediately after they had settled.<sup>4</sup> The battle was short but it created panic in British ranks. Their Infantry suffered heavily, and they were about to

1 *Kaye's Papers*, No. 725, pp. 601-12.

2 "We went to the Shah Boorj (Royal Bastion)" writes Raikes under 10 October, "this morning to see Colonel Greathead's moveable column cross the bridge. Sikhs, lancers, three batteries of horse artillery, and the skeletons of two Queen's 8th passed within three yards of us" Raikes, p. 70.

3 Roberts, I, p. 273.

4 It has been suggested by some writers that the surprise attack was not planned but the two armies being ignorant of each other's position came to an unexpected clash. See, for instance, Keene, p. 47.

Roberts, on the other hand, holds the view that the intelligence service was poor and therefore the British authorities were ignorant of the movements of the Revolutionaries. See Vol, I, p. 271.

give way when a battery was brought from the Fort to reinforce them. This made the Revolutionaries feel that their position was becoming untenable; they made a retreat towards their camp, about four miles from Agra.<sup>1</sup> They were pushed back from here also and took the route to the Kāli-Nadī. Several of their guns and considerable baggage fell into the hands of the British forces. The loss of life on the side of the Revolutionaries was heavy, while, in the words of Lord Roberts, "Our casualties were slight: 12 officers and men were killed, 54 wounded and 2 missing, besides some 20 camp-followers killed and wounded."<sup>2</sup>

Fathpur-Sikri was still in the hands of the Revolutionaries; towards the end of the month an expedition under Colonel Cotton was sent against them. The place was captured, although the defenders put up a heroic resistance. From Fathpur-Sikri Cotton went to Mathura where some zamindars had joined the Revolutionary Movement. After the battle of October 10 no major action was fought at Agra, but the countryside was far from quiet. It was only after the fall of Gwalior to Hugh Rose in June, 1858, that Agra was considered to be safe against a Revolutionary attack. Till then "the guns of the Fort remained pointed at the native town—the focus of a rebellion which might at any moment break out." No doubt precaution was taken to prevent or rather to ward it off, but the fact that no European living beyond the range of the guns of the fort felt his life secure for a moment shows that there was a constant danger of a rising.<sup>3</sup>

#### Farrukhabad : Tafaddul Husayn Khan

Farrukhabad was the seat of a ruling dynasty of the Pathans, known as the Bangash. Şafdar Jang of Awadh realizing that his territories could at any moment be threatened by the Bangash chiefs had successfully tried to play them off against the Ruhilahs.

1 Bouchier, Colonel George, *Eight Months' Campaign against the Bengal Sepoys*, p. 104; also quoted in Forrest, II, p. 98.

2 Roberts, I, pp. 276-78.

3 Cf. Kaye and Malletson, V, p. 217.

In 1857 the head of the leading Bangash family was Tafaḍḍul Ḥusayn Khān nephew and successor of Tajammul Ḥusayn Khān, who was a distinguished and widely respected person.<sup>1</sup> Tafaḍḍul Ḥusayn was one of the very few aristocrats who had joined the Revolutionary Movement and made sacrifices in its cause without any ulterior motives. Farrukhabad was a predominantly Hindu area, the Muslims being only ten percent of its population ; but they were "of a peculiarly turbulent character", and although they had been under British rule for over half a century, "in their inmost hearts they had long rebelled against the system of order and care for life and property then imposed upon the district".<sup>2</sup> The love of freedom and the spirit of sacrifice exhibited by the Muslims of Farrukhabad have been attributed by the western writers to their turbulent nature, but even they admit that they were "mindful of the past glories of their ancestors."<sup>3</sup>

Four miles to the east of Farrukhabad lay the cantonment of Fathgarh ; it was the headquarters of the 10th N. I. and had a gun carriage manufactory. Although the reports of the outbreaks at different stations had begun to reach Fathgarh during the last week of May, it was not till after the risings at Bareilly and Shahjahanpur early in June that its Commandant, Colonel Smith, decided to send the European women and children to Kānpūr.<sup>4</sup>

1 The famous Urdu poet *Ghālīb* has praised him in these lines :

دیا ہے خلق کو بھی تا اسے نظر نہ لگے    بنا ہے عیش تجمل حسین خاں کے لئے  
زبان پہ بار خدایا یہ کس کا نام آیا    کہ میرے نطق نے بوسے میری زبان کے لئے

(Tr.—It has been conferred upon the other people so that he might become immune against the evil eye ; enjoyment (in fact) is created for Tajammul Ḥusayn Khān only.)

O my God ! whose name has passed my lips (lit. tongue) ? ; speech itself has kissed them.

2 Kaye and Malleon, III, p. 224.

3 See, for instance, Holmes, p. 138.

4 A party of one hundred and seventy persons left for Kānpūr on 4 June. On the following day some of these fugitives abandoned the idea of going to Kānpūr and accepted refuge offered to them by Hardeo Bakhsh, the zamindar of Dharampur.

He also wanted to remove the treasure to the fort ; but the sepoy did not allow this. Paradoxically enough, they evinced feelings of loyalty in reporting to him on 16 June that they had refused to join the Revolution in response to the appeals of the 41st N. I., who had risen at Sitapur and were on their way to Fathgarh ; they also carried out his orders to break the bridge of boats on the Ganges. On the following day, however, they surprised their Commander by telling him that it would be advisable on his part to retire within the fort along with other officers. Smith followed their advice, and it proved to be fortunate for him, because the 41st crossed the river and joined them on the 19th. The Revolutionaries accepted Nawab Tafaddul Husayn Khān as their leader and proclaimed it by a salute of 22 guns.<sup>1</sup>

The first problem of the new leader was to bring about conciliation between the 10th N.I. and 41st N.I.; they were quarrelling over the distribution of the treasure. It took him some time to bring the two regiments together, and not before both had suffered some losses.<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries now decided to attack the fort, and opened fire on the morning of 27 June. They soon discovered that they were inferior to the enemy in artillery and their muskets which had to be fired from behind the trees and bushes could not make much impression on the walls of the fort. After four or five days, therefore, they changed their strategy. They occupied a village called Husaynpur and poured a deadly fire from the roofs of its houses. They succeeded in breaching the walls by exploding a mine, but their attempts to storm the fortress failed, and in one of them the leader of the storming party, Multān Khān, was killed.<sup>3</sup> They

1 *Intelligence Records*, II, p. 29.

2 As in Delhi, Lucknow and other places, some of the sepoy could not resist the temptation of plundering the contents of the Government treasuries. The men of the 10th N.I. who could manage to seize some money left for their homes ; the rest were attacked by the 41st, and both sides suffered casualties. See Holmes, p. 139 ; Kaye and Malleison, III, pp. 226-27.

3 Edwards, W., *Personal Adventures* etc. (London, 1858), p. 58. In this book references are to the pages of Urdu translation called *Maṣā'ib-i-Ḡhadr*.

were, however, not discouraged by these failures and decided to lay another mine and further breach the walls of the fort. The defenders on the other hand were demoralised, because they "had lost some of their best men," and their "ammunition was running fast".<sup>1</sup> Colonel Smith, unable to continue the defence, decided to make an escape. On the night of 3 July the defenders left the fort and fled in three boats which had been kept ready for an emergency.<sup>2</sup>

On assuming power Taffaddul Husayn Khān made necessary arrangements for the administration of the district. He was assisted in his work by other patriotic zamindars; Aḥmad Yār Khān and Ashraf Yār Khān of Mhow, for instance, came to his help with a band of five or six hundred Bangash Pathans.<sup>3</sup> Of the appointments made by him some may be mentioned; Muḥammad Taqī was made his chief adviser, Hidāyat 'Alī became his *Dīwān*, and the office of Kotwal was conferred on Ghulām 'Alī.<sup>4</sup> Taffaddul Husayn Khān was anxious to put the administration on a high level of efficiency; he was strict in collecting revenue and punishing the defaulters. He was able to assemble a force of nearly 4000 men including 1,500 horsemen. Soon after taking over the administration he posted armed guards at the *ghats* and ferries; the bridge at Khudāganj was guarded by 2 guns and 200 men.<sup>5</sup>

1 Kaye and Malleon, III, p. 228.

2 The unfortunate fugitives from Fathgarh were either killed on the way or murdered at Kānpūr; only two escaped. See Keene, p. 75.

3 *Intelligence Records*, II, p. 30.

4 Besides these appointments general orders were issued confirming the old officers in their positions some of whom were promoted to higher posts; "Mahomed Sayeed, Thannahdar of Chibramow, was made Tahseeldar of Conouj; Khoorshad Ali, Thannahdar of Canouj, made Thannahdar of Mohamdabad. Tufussool Hossain Khan, Thannahdar of Kumalgunge, and Thannahdar of Mirutpore, continued at their posts under the Nawab. On the first inst Nawab Ahmed Yar Khan, Pathan of Mhow, was appointed Nazim". *Ibid.*, II, p. 31.

5 *Ibid.*

A futile attempt was made by the Awadh Government to bring Tafaḍḍul Ḥusayn Khān under their control. Khān 'Alī Khān was sent against Farrukhabad with five guns, but he did not proceed beyond Sandi; here he received some presents from Hardeo Bakhsh.<sup>1</sup> The Nawab tried but failed to get some aid from the Central Government at Delhi.<sup>2</sup>

After settling the affairs in his own district Tafaḍḍul Ḥusayn Khān took active steps to help other Revolutionary leaders. Early in August he is reported to have left for Kānpūr with two sepoy Regiments, one Regiment of Cavalry and more than a thousand Pathans and Mewatis of Shamsabad;<sup>3</sup> a week after this Muir writes to Havelock that "the Nawab Raees has sent forward his troops to Jelalabad; and they would probably form a junction in that quarter with the Saugor and Nagode troops".<sup>4</sup> Later, we find him supporting the Revolutionary leader, Tej Singh,<sup>5</sup> in Mainpuri and its neighbourhood. Early in December (1857) his men were threatening Etawah and Aligarh; "their movements have been stimulated by the advent of Wullee Dad".<sup>6</sup> Etawah was occupied by him before 7 December.<sup>7</sup>

The Nawab had become a formidable leader of the Revolutionaries. The British authorities realised the importance of holding Fathgarh, which intercepted communications to Agra, Delhi and the Panjab. To achieve this objective a strong Column commanded by Colonel Seaton had left Delhi in November 1857; "an enormous convoy, covering 17 miles of road, and comprising carts, camels and elephants, which were laden with tents, stores, and ammuni-

1 Ḥusaynī, II, pp. 301-02.

2 *Intelligence Records*, II, p. 133.

3 *Ibid.*, II, 22; also see Kaye and Malleeson, III, p. 347.

4 *Intelligence Record*, II, p. 114.

5 For the Nawab's assistance to Rajah Tej Singh of Mainpuri see *ibid.*, I, pp. 254, 263, 270.

6 *Ibid.*, II, p. 99.

7 *Ibid.*, I, p. 299.



tion for the supply of headquarters, accompanied him.”<sup>1</sup> Seaton defeated a small force of the Farrukhabad Revolutionaries at Patiali on 17 December and occupied Mainpuri;<sup>2</sup> he then moved towards Farrukhabad where “there would be some fighting” since Bakht Khān commanded the troops there.<sup>3</sup> The British forces arrived near Fathgarh about the end of December, where the cantonment had for its defence the Kālī-Nadi, with a suspension bridge over it. The Revolutionary leaders sent down a party to destroy the bridge on 31 December. If they had succeeded in the attempt the fort at Fathgarh would have fallen to them, but they could not complete the task during the night, and on the following morning British guns arrived at the spot; they seized the bridge and repaired it. Next day (2 January 1858) the Revolutionaries fought a contested action but failed to stop the enemy from crossing the bridge. They had to evacuate the town which was occupied by him on the 3rd.<sup>4</sup> The Nawab’s palace was plundered and razed to the ground.

Tafaddul Husayn Khān now decided to join the Revolutionary leaders fighting in Rohilkhand; on 19 January he is reported “to have been sent back with troops and guns by Khan Buhadoor to fight with us”<sup>5</sup> Ultimately like several other leaders he joined the camp of Ahmad Allāh Shāh.<sup>6</sup> Subsequently Tafaddul Husayn Khān left for Awadh and joined Hadrat Maḥal’s Court at Bondi.<sup>7</sup> He took an active part in the last phase of the War in Awadh.

1 See Shadwell, *General, Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde* (London, 1881), II, p. 49.

2 Kaye and Mallsen, IV, pp. 203-04; *Intelligence Records*, II, pp. 230-31; Shadwell, II, p. 49.

3 *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 311.

4 Shadwell, II, pp. 55-61.

5 *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 351; Husayni, II, p. 321.

6 He is mentioned along with Khān Bahādur Khān, Nizām ‘Alī Khān, Wilāyat Shāh and other chiefs who wanted to punish the Raja of Powain for his treacherous murder of their great leader, the Shāh. However, there arose some differences among them and the project of attacking Powain fell through. See Kaye and Mallsen, V, p. 191.

7 Husayni says that differences having arisen between Khān Bahādur Khān and Tafaddul Husayn, the latter decided to go to Bondi. See Vol. II, p. 321.

On receiving an offer from Major Barrow, that he would be pardoned if he surrendered, the Nawab came to the British camp.<sup>1</sup> Here he did not receive the treatment which he had expected, for he was sent as a prisoner to Fathgarh, reaching there on 29 January. He was tried by a commission and sentenced to death by hanging.<sup>2</sup> The Governor-General commuted the sentence into exile, but not without reluctance: "the Governor-General in Council entirely condemns and disavows the act of Major Barrow, in making a promise contrary to the royal proclamation and contrary to the express orders of the government excepting the prisoner from all benefits of pardon. But his excellency will not suffer it to be said that the prisoner, having been induced to surrender, on the promise of a British officer in Major Barrow's position, has in consequence of that surrender been put to death..."<sup>3</sup> The Nawab was allowed to go to Mecca.<sup>4</sup> In a news item dated 3 August, 1889, published in *The Friend of India* on the following day. It has been stated that the Nawab on his arrival in Bombay was lodged in the Thanah jail.<sup>5</sup> The well-known scholar, Nawab Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān of Bhopal, met him in Mecca in 1286 A. H. when he was there on a pilgrimage. Tafaḍḍul Ḥusayn Khān was living in a state of extreme poverty and was seen by him standing in a group of beggars. The Nawab was moved by his pitiable condition and gave his costly shawl to him as a present.<sup>6</sup>

1 See Ball, II, pp. 561-62 ; Shahwell, II, p. 371.

2 For the text of the judgment of the court, see Ball, II, pp. 594-96.

Also see *The Friend of India*, 10 February and 24 March, 1859, quoted in *F.S.U.P.*, V, p. 951.

Besides Tafaḍḍul Ḥusayn Khān several other important persons of Farrukhabad were also sentenced to death; his younger brother, Nawāb Saḡhāwat Ḥuṣayn, Iqbālmānd Khān and Ḡhaḍānfār Ḥusayn Khān may specifically be mentioned.

3 Ball, II, p. 661.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *F.S.U.P.*, V, p. 955.

6 Siddīq Ḥasan, obviously by mistake, has written Tajammul Ḥusayn Khān

Subsequently the Begam of Bhopal sanctioned a stipend for Tafaddul Husayn Khān.<sup>1</sup>

#### Allahabad : Liyaqat 'Ali

Strategically Allahabad was one of the most important places in the North-Western Provinces, because it commanded the high road connecting the upper regions with Bengal. The annexation of Awadh in 1856 had considerably added to its importance. On hearing the news of the outbreak the European residents were startled while the Muslims, who seemed to have been preparing themselves for the expected crisis, became excited.<sup>2</sup> On receiving the report of the rising at Banaras precautions were taken by the officers. It appears that in Allahbad the initiative was taken by the Mewatis; "in *Mauza Samadabad* . . . the Panchayat of Mewatis was held on June 5, 1857 at the house of Saif Khan Mewati and all, except Saif Khan, decided to rebel, the same day."<sup>3</sup>

On the following day a parade was arranged and a letter from the Governor-General was read thanking the 6th N.I. for their offer to march against Delhi. On the same evening, however, the sepoys rose and rushed to the city. They seized the jail, released the converts, and within a few hours Allahabad passed into the hands of the Revolutionaries. The establishment of the new Government was proclaimed in a ceremony at the Kotwali where the *Muhammadi Jhandā* was planted; the fort, however, was still in British hands, and one hundred sepoys posted there were disarmed.<sup>4</sup> Next day the Revolutionaries took possession of the treasury which contained thirty lakhs of rupees. Mawlawi Liyaqat 'Ali,<sup>5</sup>

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instead of Tafaddul Husayn. Actually the former had died in 1848. See Irvine. W., *Tārīkh-i-Farrukhābad* (Urdu Trans. Fathgarh, 1887), p. 148.

1 Khān, Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali, *Ma'athir-i-Siddiqi* (Lucknow, 1924), II, pp. 78-79.

2 See Holmes, pp. 215-16; Kaye and Malletson, II, p. 180 *et. seq.* Also see article, A District during a Rebellion, in *Calcutta Review*, July-December, 1858.

3 Trial Proceedings as quoted in *F.S.U.P.*, I, p. 549.

4 Marshman, J. C., *Memoirs of Sir Henry Havelock* (London, 1860), p. 270.

5 For Mawlawi Liyaqat 'Ali's work in the Revolution see Chapter I.

who had assumed their leadership, established his headquarters at the *Khusraw Bāgh*. "So for a little time," adds Sir John Kaye, "he succeeded in setting up the likeness of a provisional government, and the name of a Maulavi was on the lips of all the followers of the Prophet." However, Mawlawī Liyāqāt 'Alī had his own difficulties.<sup>1</sup> The interest of the seopys in the War seems to have abated after their plunder of the treasury, and the main burden of resisting the British offensive fell upon the *Mujāhids*.

Five days later (11 June), Neill arrived from Banaras, and captured the neighbouring village of Daryāganj on the following day. On the 14th he was able to take an offensive, and within a few days Allahabad was once again in the hands of the British; "by the 18th the districts were absolutely mastered".<sup>2</sup> The capture of the town was followed by retaliation and some of those who took part in it "... recked little whom they slew, so long as they could slay someone. Volunteers and Sikhs sallied out of the fort into the streets and slaughtered every native who crossed their path. A civilian boasted that a commission of which he was chief had hung eight or ten men a day, and wrote home a graphic account of the disgusting details of their execution."<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, Mawlawī Liyāqāt 'Alī managed to escape; he was present at the battle of Fathpur.

1 Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 196. For the names of some persons who were appointed to different posts by Mawlawī Liyāqāt 'Alī see Trial Proceedings, as quoted in *F.S.U.P.*, IV, pp. 550-51.

2 Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 195.

3 On this date a notification was made to the effect that the main mosque was henceforth to be used as a barrack. It said, "That by reason of this rebellion and sedition no recreant Mussalman be henceforth permitted to resort to this Masjid but that it be for the future converted into Barracks for the European soldiers of the British Government". *Kaye's Mutiny Papers*, 724 A, Vol. I, p. 159.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### KANPUR

#### Nana Rao and 'Azim Allah Khan

##### Nana Rao's pension

Kanpur,<sup>1</sup> more than six hundred miles from Calcutta and about two hundred and fifty miles from Delhi, became one of the leading centres of the Revolution and the headquarters of Nānā Rao.<sup>2</sup> He was the adopted son and heir of Baji Rao, the last of the Peshwas, who had been defeated by the British and surrendered on terms in May, 1818. He was granted a *jagir* and "a liberal pension . . . for the support of himself and family," and lived at Bithur, about twelve miles up the river from Kānpūr, until his death in 1851. Having no male heir born of his body, Baji Rao had adopted three sons: Dhondu Pant *alias* Nānā, Sadashiv Pant *alias* Dādā, and Gangadhar Rao *alias* Bālā. Nānā and Bālā survived their adoptive father. The ex-Peshwa had by a written testament of 1839 left his title and estate to Nānā, the

1 It is situated on the southern bank of the Ganges which was navigable for light craft downwards to the sea; being less than a hundred miles from Allahabad and within forty miles of Lucknow, it had become an emporium of trade in the Gangetic plain. It was selected by the British as the best place for cantoning the brigade which they had lent to the Nawab of Awadh. In 1801 it was ceded to the British and had during the first half of the nineteenth century developed into an important military station. With the extension of British frontiers after the Sikh wars, Kānpūr had lost much of its strategic importance; it had, however, developed into a big industrial town. For the life of the Europeans in the town, see Trevelyan, Chapter I.

2 Nānā's main interest before the Revolution was to secure his adoptive father's pension; but his *Wakil* 'Azīm Allāh Khān, became a Revolutionary *par excellence* during his stay in England; he dragged his master into the Movement, and then the War itself. It may however be added that after entering the struggle Nānā Rao remained firm till the last moment.

eldest of his adopted sons. He was thirty-two years of age at the time of his adoptive father's death, "but he looked at least forty". He was fond of European society and was ever ready to entertain civil and military officers on a lavish scale; "Nana seldom missed an occasion," says Trevelyan, "for giving ball or a banquet in European style to the society of the station; . . . The Maharaja mixed freely with the company; inquired after the health of the Major's lady; congratulated the judge on his rumoured promotion to the Sudder Court; joked the assistant magistrate about his last mishap in the hunting field; and complimented the belle of the evening on the colour she had brought down from Simla."<sup>1</sup>

#### Azīm Allāh Khan goes to England

Nānā's lavish expenditure on entertainment and presents to the European officers,<sup>2</sup> however, did not soften the attitude of the Company's Government on the question of his claims to the pension of his adoptive father. His memorials to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces and the Governor-General-in-Council, and his petition to the Court of Directors having been turned down, he decided to send a personal agent to England. 'Azīm Allāh Khān, who was chosen by the Nānā to plead his case in London, was "a remarkable person," and was eminently fitted for the task "Nature had endowed him with well-favoured features and a charming personality, to which he added,

1 Trevelyan, p. 65.

2 "Nothing could exceed the cordiality which he constantly displayed in his intercourse with our countrymen. The persons in authority placed an implicit confidence in his friendliness and good faith, and the ensigns emphatically pronounced him a capital fellow. He had a nod or a kind word for every Sahib in the station; bunting-parties and jewellery for the men, and picnics and shawls for the ladies. If a subaltern's wife required change of air, the Rajah's carriage was at the service of the young couple, and the European apartments at Bethoor were put in order to receive them. If a civilian had over-worked himself in court, he had but to speak the word, and the Rajah's elephants were sent on to the Oudh jungles". *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

by his own efforts, cultivated manners . . . It was no small compliment to his accomplishments that he won the affection of elderly matrons of the British aristocracy, and fair maidens found in him an object of love and admiration . . ."<sup>1</sup> In addition to the advantage of 'a charming personality' and proficiency in writing and speaking English and French, he "was well supplied with money to engage the best lawyers, and also to bribe high officials, if necessary".<sup>2</sup> But neither his accomplishments nor his money could help him in securing a reversal of Dalhousie's decision depriving him of the pension of his adoptive father.

No doubt, 'Azīm Allāh had failed in his mission, but he was now an entirely changed man—"a rebel" against the British.<sup>3</sup> He persuaded Nānā to join the Revolutionary Movement, and it was through him that some other Hindu Chiefs, particularly the Maratha Princes, were contacted. Nānā Rao accepted his advice, but he concealed his feelings and movements so well that till the last moment he continued to enjoy the confidence of the British officers. Whatever his other qualities Nānā was certainly a clever adept in dissimulation.<sup>4</sup> When General Wheeler, Commander of the Division at Kānpūr, became suspicious of the conduct of the sepoy's guarding the Treasury at Nawabganj he advised the Magistrate to place it under the protection of "two guns and three hundred men, cavalry and infantry, furnished by the Maharaja of Bithoor," in

1 Sen, p. 127

2 Muḥammad 'Alī *alias* Jamie Green, who accompanied 'Azīm Allāh Khān on his mission to England mentioned this fact when relating the story of his adventures. See Forbes-Mitchell, p. 186.

3 Kaye and Malletson, I, p. 425.

" . . . At this very moment, "refers Savarkar to this change in 'Azīm-Allāh Khān, "a new inspiration, a new hope, was rising in his heart. There was no necessity of any foreigner's consent to realise this hope, but it depended for its realisation on his own country and countrymen". Savarkar, V. D., *The Indian War of Independence, 1857*, (Bombay edition, 1947), p. 33.

4 Like Wheeler, the Collector and Magistrate of Kanpur, C. Hillersdon, also had implicit faith in Nānā's friendship and loyalty. His wife wrote to a friend

pite of a warning from Sir Henry Lawrence, Chief Commissioner, and Richard Gubbins, Financial Commissioner of Awadh.<sup>1</sup>

### Excitement in Kanpur

Soon after the capture of Delhi by the Revolutionaries rumours of all kinds had begun to spread; great excitement prevailed in important towns, particularly at stations where Regiments of the Bengal Army were posted. The cartridge story had become the topic of discussions everywhere; but in Kānpūr suspicions had also become rife that powdered bones of pigs and cows had ~~been mixed with wheat flour~~ sold in the markets.<sup>2</sup> Wheeler, "who had spent beneath an Indian sun more than two-thirds of his seventy-five years", was not insensible to the delicacy of the situation; his message to Calcutta, dated 18 May, said: "All well at Cawnpore. Quiet, but excitement continues among the people."<sup>3</sup> As days rolled by more definite reports began to reach his ears; the son of a trooper of the 2nd Cavalry was stated to have told his school-fellows that he knew what his father's Regiment intended to do for the good cause; Khān Muḥammad, a sepoy of the 56th, was found telling the men of the Cavalry Regiments that arrangements were being made to deprive them of their horses and swords. He was arrested and an urgent message for succour was telegraphed to Lucknow. Henry Lawrence was roused from sleep to receive it, and by day-break, "all the available post-carriages in the station were rolling along towards Cawnpore, crammed

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n 16 May: "Should the native troops here mutiny, we should either go intoantonments, or to a place called Bithoor, where the Peishwa's successor resides. He is a great friend of C...s (Magistrate's), and is a man of normous wealth and influence; and he had assured C... that we should all be uite safe there." She repeated this in another letter dated 18 May. See Sen, . 133, n. 30.

1 Gubbins, Martin Richard, *An Account of the Mutinies in Oudh*, (London, 858), p. 31; Holmes, p. 226.

2 Holmes, pp. 89-90.

3 Trevelyan, p. 77.



inside and out with English soldiers".<sup>1</sup> The same day (21 May) orders were given by the General that the non-combatant Europeans, and women and children were to be taken to the entrenchment.<sup>2</sup> Captain Fletcher Hayes, Military Secretary to Lawrence, who had come with the British forces from Lucknow gives an account of "the scene of frightful confusion," which the European barracks presented. "In short . . . I saw quite enough to convince me that if any insurrection took or takes place, we shall have no one to thank but ourselves, because we have now shown to the Natives how very easily we can become frightened, and when frightened utterly helpless."<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, Wheeler was thoroughly satisfied with his arrangements and considered the entrenchment quite safe.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile the Revolutionary leaders were organising their followers for a "revolt"; they used to hold their meetings at the quarters of the troopers, Shams al-Din Khān and Tikā Singh; Madad 'Ali, a horse-dealer, and Jwālā Prashad, a hanger-on at Bithur, represented the Nānā. The details of the agreement having been settled, Nānā accompanied

1 Trevelyan, p. 80.

2 The Magazine in the north-western corners of the military lines was considered to be the most suitable place for defence, but Wheeler preferred a spot not far from the huts of the sepoys and had an entrenchment thrown around it, and "orders were given to lay in supplies for twenty-five days." The defences were considered by the regimental officers to be poor and supplies inadequate. Trevelyan refers to an interesting chat between 'Azim Allāh and a British Lieutenant, while they were walking together. The former asked his friend what it was that they were 'making out in the plain," and then jestingly suggested the name, "The Fort of Despair." "No, No," said the Britisher, "we will call it the Fort of Victory". 'Azim Allāh received the statement "with an air of incredulous assent, which he must have acquired in West End drawing-rooms" *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

3 MS. Correspondence, quoted in Kaye and Malleeson, II, p. 227.

4 His telegraphic message of 26 May said: "All tranquil here and I think likely to continue. The disaffected, disconcerted by the efficient measures coolly but determinately taken to meet any outbreak that might be attempted, are sobering down . . . I have intrenched our position, and can hold it against large odds . . ." Quoted in Forrest, I, p. 411.

by 'Azīm Allāh, and his brother, Bālā, met the Revolutionaries in a boat in the Ganges early in June. Shams al-Dīn is stated to have announced these plans to 'Azīzan, "a favourite courtesan of the 2nd Cavalry troopers."<sup>1</sup> Nānā, still pretending friendship with the British, accounted for this meeting as a step towards securing the loyalty of the Hind-Pakistānī troops. By 3 June, however, he seems to have formed his plans. "I learnt today," writes Nanak Chand in his diary under that date, "that the Nana, Bala, Baba Bhut, Azeemool-lah, Mahomed Ishak, the Chowdhree zemindar of Bithoor, and the soobadars of the cavalry and infantry regiments, n all five or seven persons, were holding a consultation in the garden . . ." Wheeler was however so sure of the strength of his defences that he did not only send back the Lucknow reinforcements but also added to it a detachment from his own Command. In his report to Canning he said : "Sir Henry Lawrence having expressed some uneasiness, I have just sent him by dak gharris out of my small force two officers and fifty men, Her Majesty's 8th Foot; conveyance for more not available. This leaves me weak, but I trust to holding my own until more Europeans arrive."<sup>2</sup>

#### Nana Rao leads the Revolutionaries of Kanpur

Wheeler had not to wait long to discover that his calculations were utterly wrong. A drunken officer fired upon a patrol of the 2nd Cavalry and killed him. He was tried but acquitted on the plea that he was not in his senses. This naturally excited the sepoys. Shepherd has recorded the reactions of some of the angry horsemen : "if we, natives, had fired upon a European, we should have been hanged." Nanak Chand also refers to their excitement on hearing the news : "Possibly their muskets might go off by mistake in the same way."<sup>3</sup> Forrest rightly calls it "the

1 Trevelyan, p. 88 ; Forrest, I, 414. Also see *Zafarnāmah*, f. 33.

2 *State Papers*, II, p. 114.

3 See Nanak Chand's entries on 4 June. For his *Diary* see Sen, pp. 134-35.

spark which set fire to the magazine."<sup>1</sup> At about 2 A.M. on the morning of 5 June, Tika Singh, who was on picket duty near the entrenchment led off his people to Nawabganj where the treasury and the Magazine were located. He was followed by the entire corps; an old Subadhar-Major who tried to oppose the Revolutionaries was cut down.<sup>2</sup> The 2nd Cavalry was soon joined by the 1st Native Infantry, and later by other Regiments. At Nawabganj they fraternised with the retainers of Nānā who, ultimately accepted the leadership of the Kanpur Revolutionaries.<sup>3</sup>

In Kānpūr also the Revolutionaries started, as at many other places, by seizing the Treasury,<sup>4</sup> and breaking open the jail. They set fire to some houses of the Europeans and putting the treasure in the carts and on the backs of the elephants they moved towards Kalianpur on the road to Delhi. Next day the Nānā brought them back to Kānpūr. It has been stated that this decision was taken by Nānā on the advice of 'Azīm Allāh Khān who impressed upon his mind the need and importance of his staying in Kānpūr and making it the chief centre of his activities. At Delhi, 'Azīm Allāh is reported to have told him, he could not but hold a secondary position, while at Kānpūr he would play an important

1 Forrest, I, p. 415.


2 According to Mowbray Thomson he "was found in the morning severely wounded and lying in his blood at his post." Quoted in Forrest, I, p. 415.

3 There is considerable difference of opinion among contemporary writers and later historians as to the attitude of Nānā; Sherer, (*Report on Cawnpore*, 13 January, 1859) and Thornhill (*Annals of the Indian Rebellion*, pp. 597-99) hold the view that he was not in league with the Revolutionaries and corroborate Tantia Topi's statement that he was forced to accept their leadership. See Sen. 138. Forrest rejects this view and quotes the incident related by Trevelyan that a deputation of the officers of the Revolutionaries waited on the Nānā at Nawabganj and told him that he had to make a choice between a kingdom and death; obviously he preferred the former. See Forrest, I, p. 420 and note 1: Trevelyan, pp. 103-04 Sen, p. 138.

4 Nanak Chand adds that Nānā and 'Azīm Allāh had the door of the Treasury opened in their presence. See *State Papers*, II, p. 123.



Nānā Ṣaḥīb



Letter of Nānā Ṣaḥīb

(From S. N. Sen's *Eighteen Fifty-Seven*)



Rani Lakshmi Bai  
(From Savarkar's *The War of Independence*)



Tanya Topi

role.<sup>1</sup> His motive, it may be noted, in advising his master to remain at Kānpūr has been misunderstood. He wanted the Nānā to concentrate on Kanpur not because he would thus remain independent of a "Mahomedan King" but because he realised that the War would have to be fought in different theatres, and local leaders alone could organize the Revolutionaries in their respective spheres of influence. If Nānā had proceeded to Delhi the Revolutionaries would have lost a strong point of vantage, and weakened their position in Awadh. 'Azīm Allāh Khān's advice was sound. It may be emphasized, however, that although Nānā remained in Kānpūr he never aspired for the status of an independent ruler ; he acknowledged, like all other Chiefs who had joined the Movement, the suzerainty of the Emperor. The proclamations issued by him on 1 July makes this abundantly clear.<sup>2</sup>

1 Nanney Nawab, a local leader of Kānpūr does not mention 'Azīm Allāh Khān in his diary. He simply says : "Nana . . . repaired in person to the rebel sepoys at Kallianpore, and induced them by every means he could devise to come back the following day . . ." See *State Papers*, III, IX of Appendix A.

Holmes refers to the incident in these words : "This man ('A ĩm Allāh) exerted all his eloquence to dissuade his master from yielding to the wishes of the sepoys. The Nānā was easily convinced. Why should he, a Brahmin, place himself under the orders of a Mahomedan King? Why should he commit political suicide by going to a place where he would be lost among a crowd of greater men ? Why should he not return to Cawnpore with his new allies, overpower that handful of Englishmen collected in their miserable entrenchment, and establish, by right of conquest, the claim so unjustly denied by their detested Government. There was no time to be lost " See p. 228.

Holmes wrote his book in 1883 ; it is not surprising, therefore, that he introduces the term, "a Mahomedan King" to make his argument look more convincing

2 One of the proclamations commenced with the words: "As by the kindness of God, and the *Ikkal* or Good Fortune of the Emperor, all Christians . . ."

The other proclamation issued under the same date said : "As by the bounty of the glorious Almighty God and the enemy-destroying fortune of the Emperor, the yellow-faced and narrow-minded people have been sent to hell and Cawnpore has been conquered . . ." *State Papers*, II, p. 119. It may also be mentioned that after seizing the entrenchment Nānā broke camp and returned

The outbreak of the Revolution on 6 June had been proclaimed by the beat of drums, and the houses of some of the rich citizens of the town were plundered.<sup>1</sup> In the meantime Nānā Rao and his chief lieutenants were preparing for an attack on the entrenchment. It is interesting to note that before commencing operations Nānā sent a letter to General Wheeler announcing his intention of attacking him. This letter must have come as a great shock to Wheeler and his men, who were under the impression that the Revolutionary troopers and sepoys were well on their way to Delhi, and that they would have to defend themselves only against the untrained and ill-equipped crowds of the volunteers and the men from the town. Lieutenant Ashe who had been sent out to reconnoitre the area soon returned to inform the General that the Revolutionaries were arrayed in force on the canal bank. No sooner had this report been made by him than "the first shot struck the crest of the mud wall and glided over into the smaller barrack, where it broke the leg of an unhappy native footman, who breathed his last in the course of the afternoon."<sup>2</sup>

### The Siege

The regular siege of the entrenchment had now begun, and the officers received orders to take positions. On 7 June Nānā to Bithur (5 July); here he "caused 100 guns to be fired as a salute in honour of the King of Delhi." See post-script to *Shepherd's Narrative* in *State Papers*, II, p. 141.

1 Nanak Chand specifically mentions Nanney Nawab, 'A'im 'Alī Khān, Bāqar Ali, Nizām-al-Dawlah and Bādri Dass. See Nanak Chand's *Diary* in *State Papers*, III, CCXCVII. Nanney Nawab was captured by the sepoys and brought before Nānā who ordered him to be imprisoned. "While thus confined," he writes in his diary, "I received information from my men that they fired at my house six or seven guns, plundered it of all its property, amounting to ten lacs of rupees, . . ." Udhar Singh, a Subahdar-Major of the 2nd Light Cavalry, was the leader of the sepoys who plundered the Nawab's house. See *Dairy of Nanney Nawab* in *State Papers*, III, X. For Nanak Chand's diary see Sen. pp. 162-71; also, *State Papers*, III, for the text.

2 The entrenchment had "a mud-wall of the shape of a rectangular parallelogram; four feet in height; three feet in thickness at the base; and twenty-

Rao issued a proclamation, in Urdu as well as in Hindi, from the press of a school-master; his pupils distributed its copies. The proclamation contained an appeal to the Hindus and Muslims to unite and rally themselves under his leadership for the defence of their respective religions. "Neither Musulmans nor Hindoos," writes Trevelyan, "were slow to obey the call. The residents of the Butcher's Ward forthwith set up the green standard, and were joined by the dregs of the population. Respectable Mahomedans at first held aloof; but next day the banner was removed to an open square, south of the canal, whither a large and influential body of the faithful repaired to do homage to the symbol of their religion. Azeezun,<sup>1</sup> the Demoiselle. Theroigne of the revolt, appeared on horse back amidst a group of her admirers, dressed in the uniform of her favoured regiment, armed with pistols and decorated with medals. A priest of high consideration seated himself beneath the flag, rosary in hand, . . ."<sup>2</sup> Another woman leader of the Revolutionaries of Kānpūr was Šāhib Begum. She is referred to by Nanak Chand (under date 15 June) as "a warm supporter of Nana" and a party to "all these disturbances". She had persuaded her brother, Mir Nawab, to take command of two Regiments.<sup>3</sup>

Nānā Rao, who was now the local leader of the Revolution and was to administer the area on behalf of the

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four inches at the crest, which was therefore pervious to a bullet from an Enfield rifle." Trevelyan, p. 118; also pp. 124-25.

1 She remained active during the period of the siege. In his entries under 19 June, Nanak Chand writes; "she is always armed and present at the batteries. . ."

2 Trevelyan, p. 137; Kanhayya Lal, p. 122.

Nanney Nawab says that "Uzeczoolah is said to have first proposed the raising of the Jhunda." *Diary*, p. XI.

3 Nanak Chand mentions only one Regiment, which was known as the Nādirī Regiment but Trevelyan mentions two called the Nādirī and Akhtarī Regiments. See Trevelyan, p. 191. Forrest adds that originally they were known as the 4th and 5th Oudh Locals. Cf. Vol. I, p. 443n.



Emperor,<sup>1</sup> lost no time in assuming the responsibilities of government and organizing the civil and military administration. Nanak Chand makes a definite reference to the formal appointment of Nānā Rao by the Emperor.<sup>2</sup> "Then news came in", he writes under 11 June, Thursday, "that a person riding on a camel was made to proclaim on behalf of the King of Delhi, that the King had sent a *firman*, declaring that this part of the country had been conferred on the Nana, and Arjun Singh, vakeel, was sent for." Accordingly, he made some appointments on important civil and military posts; Teeka Singh was made a General and given the charge of the Army, Jwala Prasad, the Commander of his own troops, was raised to the rank of a Brigadier, and Subahdars, Dalbhanjan Singh and Gangadin became Colonels; Bābā Bhūt was to hold charge of the *Ṣadr Daftar* and 'Aẓim Allāh Khān was made a collector.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, as has been noted by Nanak Chand (under 17 June), a Committee, consisting of Aḥmad 'Alī Khān, wakil, Shāh 'Alī, Bābā Bhūt, 'Aẓim Allāh Khān and Jwala Prashad, was set up to decide "budmashee cases." Besides this, he issued several proclamations containing detailed instructions about the organization of the various branches of the Army, emoluments of the officers of different ranks and their duties.<sup>4</sup>

Nanney Nawab (*alias* Muḥammad 'Alī), who had been very badly treated by the Revolutionaries in the beginning, became in course of time a strong and active supporter of the Nānā. His friendship proved to be a great asset, because he had considerable influence over the Muslims of Kānpūr. Nanney Nawab was put in charge of the battery near the Racquet-Court. On 13 June a

1 Nānā accepted the green flag (Muḥammadi Jhandā) and his proclamation made on 11 June in the bazaars began with these words: "Khuluk Khoda Ka, Moolk Padsha ka, Hookm Nana Sahib and Fauj Bahadur Ka, . . ." Nanney Nawab's *Dairy*, p. XII.

2 See *State Papers*, III, pp. CCCVIII-IX.

3 Nanak Chand, under 7 June.

4 Cf. Trevelyan, p. 107. Copies of four proclamations of the Nānā were sent by Brigadier-General Neill to the Commander-in-Chief on 27 July 1857. See *State Papers*, II, pp. 157-160.

ball from this battery struck the roof of the thatched barrack<sup>1</sup> which caught fire and caused great hardship to the entrenched garrison. Shepherd refers to the incident in these words: "It was about 5 P.M., and that evening was one of unspeakable distress and trial, for all the wounded and sick were in it, also the families of the soldiers and drummers; the fire took on the south side of it, and the breeze being very strong the flames spread out so quickly that it was a hard matter to remove the women and children, who were all in great confusion, so that the helpless, wounded and sick could not be removed, and were all burnt down to ashes (about forty or upwards, in number)".<sup>2</sup> Riyāḍ 'Alī who had laid the gun received a sum of ninety rupees and a *shawl* in reward from Nanney Nawab, who in his turn was given rupees five thousand as a gift by the Nānā.<sup>3</sup> The Revolutionaries continued pouring shot and shell till late after midnight, and then crept forward with the intention of taking by storm Lieutenant Ashe's battery. The British allowed them to come nearer and nearer until they were within sixty yards of the entrenchment; now they opened fire and the Revolutionaries were forced to withdraw. The women and children were however rendered shelterless and had to face great hardships, which they bore without a murmur.<sup>4</sup> In the ranks of the combatants also casualties were pretty heavy during the first week of the seige; fifty-nine had been killed or wounded among the artillerymen

1 To safeguard the building tiles had been put over its thatched roof, but this could not save it from catching fire.

2 *State Papers*, II, p. 129.

3 *Shepherd's Narrative*, in *State Papers*, II, p. 129. In a narrative written for Sir George Forrest a woman who witnessed the scene said that some of the wounded were dragged out. See Forrest, I, p. 436.

4 Mobray Thomson, for instance, records an incident. Mrs. White was walking with her husband by her side and his twin children on her shoulders. The same ball killed her husband, broke her elbows and injured one of the children. The narrator "saw her afterwards in the main-guard lying upon her back, with the two children, twins, laid one at each breast, while the mother's bosom refused not what her arms had no power to administer." *The Story of Cownpore*, p. 101. Also see Forrest, I, p. 438; Trevelyan, p. 177.

alone. Wheeler was depressed by these reverses ; on the evening of 14 June he wrote to Gubbins : "Our defence has been noble and wonderful. Our loss heavy and cruel. We want aid, aid, aid !" Two days later he received a reply from Henry Lawrence himself expressing sorrow at his inability to help the garrison at Kānpūr. He told Wheeler that it would be unwise to attempt "the most difficult of military operations, the passage of a river, in the face of an enemy," because the prospect of success was not commensurate with the magnitude of risk involved in the venture.<sup>1</sup> A reply was sent on behalf of the General : "Sir Hugh regrets," it said, "you cannot send him the 200 men, as he believes with their assistance we could drive the insurgents from Cawnpore, and capture their guns . . . We trust in God, and if our exertions here assist your safety, it will be a consolation to know that our friends appreciate our devotion."<sup>2</sup>

On 16 June Mīr Nawab, commanding the Nādiri Regiment, crossed the river and joined the Revolutionaries ; he was given a cordial welcome by the Nānā who had ordered the confectioners of the town to prepare sweet dishes for his men.<sup>3</sup> Mīr Nawab allowed his men to take rest for a day only ; on 18 July his battery erected to the south-east of the entrenchment opened fire, disabled one of the enemy's guns and caused heavy casualties in his camp. "This manoeuvre," says Trevelyan, "forthwith debarred the garrison from obtaining occasional and perilous access to the tank ; a privation the more severely felt, because the Oude men, . . . worked their pieces with a will, and kept up at point blank range so hot a fire upon the mouth of our well that the drawing

1 Lawrence had made it clear that it was "not only my own opinion, but that of many ready to risk their lives to rescue you." Gubbins did not agree with this view at the time, but subsequently he changed his opinion : "I believe that Sir Henry Lawrence acted wisely in doing so". See Forrest, I, pp. 440-41.

2 Trevelyan, p. 160.

3 *Ibid*, p. 193.

of water was a deed of heroism by night, and in daylight an act of insanity."<sup>1</sup>

Another Revolutionary leader, Bāqar 'Alī, kept the outposts of the entrenchment under heavy bombardment on the west ; he had set his battery near the stables of the 2nd Cavalry. In the Lines of the 1st N.I. there was another battery, called the "Sepoy Battery," from where an attempt was being made at the laying of a mine. To the south-west of the entrenchment a stately mansion, the salvador (corrupted into Savada) was occupied by the Nānā's ministers and courtiers ; the battery erected near it was called after him. Besides these arrangements for bombarding the entrenchment from different sides the Revolutionaries had taken good care to stop the provisions reaching the garrison. Those who were found guilty of supplying provisions to the British garrison were severely dealt with.<sup>2</sup>

An intelligence service seems to have been organised by the besiegers. On the expiry of the second week of the siege a water-carrier managed to enter the enclosure of the British camp and gave out that he had brought a good news for the "Sahibs," for whom he had a great regard. He told them that he had seen two Companies of white soldiers on the other side of the Ganges, making efforts to carry their guns across the river. Next day he turned up again and said that they had been detained by an unexpected flood in the river ; however, they could be looked for after forty-eight hours. The men in the entrenchment anxiously waited for the promised limit of two days and much more, but no white soldier appeared ; in fact, the two visits of the water-carrier "had taught him all that Azimoolah desired to know of our impoverished and defenceless plight."<sup>3</sup>

1 Trevelyan p 198.

2 Trevelyan mentions two definite cases. A baker who was detected smuggling a basket of bread was severely punished. Similarly Ṣahūrī, an officer in the department of *Ābkārī*, used to supply eggs and bread. On 14 June fifteen of his emissaries were caught red-handed ; they were all blown from guns. See p. 173.

3 *Ibid*, p. 204.

As the days rolled by and the siege dragged on the position of the Revolutionaries grew stronger ; their ranks had swollen in number, and their morale had risen considerably, because of their successes in the struggle.<sup>1</sup> They had also set up their own machinery of civil administration in the city, made arrangements for the collection of revenue in the neighbouring areas and weakened the resistance of the British garrison by causing heavy casualties in its ranks. At midnight on 21 June, Major Vibart wrote a letter to Henry Lawrence, in which he refers to the unenviable condition of the besieged in these words : "We have been cannonaded for six hours a day by twelve guns. This evening in three hours upwards of thirty shells (mortars) were thrown into intrenchment. This has occurred daily for the last eight days ; *an idea may be formed of our casualties*, . . . Any aid, to be effective, must be immediate . . . We have lost about a third of our original number."<sup>2</sup> On the following day the camp of the Revolutionaries appeared to be more active than usual ; they were making preparations for a decisive assault on the 23rd, the centenary of Plassey, which, according to some prophecies, current all over the subcontinent was believed to be an auspicious day, when foreign rule would come to an end.<sup>3</sup>

Throughout the night preceding 23 June the Revolutionaries kept the garrison alert by making continuous "surprises and mock charges," and soon after day-break they launched a general attack, led by the Cavalry troopers. They rushed forward, full of zeal and excitement, until they were well within reach of the enemy's guns. However, they soon realised the folly of their action, and withdrew, but not before many of them had been killed. The

1 The morale of the besiegers had risen so high that on 21 June it was proclaimed by beat of drums that the Nānā's authority had been established in Poona, and Lucknow was governed by the Revolutionaries.

See Forrest, I, p. 445.

2 The letter is reproduced by Gubbin, in his *An Account of the Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 444 ; also in Trevelyan, pp. 207-08.

3 See Trevelyan, p. 212.

Infantry proceeded more cautiously; the skirmishers advanced, rolling before them huge bales of cotton as improvised ramparts. The Subadar-Major of the 1st Infantry, who was leading the attack was hit by a musket ball which "laid him low, and round after round of canister moved his followers down." When the number of casualties began to rise, and nearly two hundred of them were either killed or wounded, they decided to make a retreat. The British, though victorious in the day's struggle, had also suffered grievous losses. Wheeler, for instance, after spending three hours in the trenches "returned to find my favourite darling son-killed by a 9-pounder in the room with his mother and sisters."<sup>1</sup> Besides casualties in the action the garrison was now faced with terrible famine conditions.<sup>2</sup> On the following day Wheeler wrote to Lawrence: "British spirit alone remains, but it cannot last for ever". Instead of receiving a reply to this pathetic appeal he got a note from 'Azim-Allah Khan written in his own hand.<sup>3</sup>

### Wheeler surrenders

The repulse of the Revolutionaries on 23 June had left a deep impression on the mind of the Nānā and his advisers. The sepoys who had exhibited a great zeal for the war of liberation in the earlier days of the siege had been gradually losing their interest in fighting, which was dragging on and had become dull and

1 Forrest, I, p 450.

2 Sir John Kaye describes the situation in the entrenchment in these words: "... hunger had begun to gnaw our little garrison. Food, which in happier times would have been turned from with disgust, was seized with avidity and devoured with relish. To the flesh-pots of the besieged no carrion was unwelcome. A stray dog was turned into soup, an old horse, fit only for the knackers, was converted into savoury meat. And when glorious good fortune brought a Brahmani bull within the fire of our people, and with difficulty the carcase of the animal was hauled into the intrenchments, there was rejoicing as if a victory had been gained..." Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 250.

3 Trevelyan, p. 218.

monotonous.<sup>1</sup> Nānā was also worried over another problem : the influence of Muslim leaders was daily increasing because they were more active than the officers appointed by him. Nanney Nawab's battery and his men were causing more casualties in the British camp than any other unit. In fact he had become so popular that the people generally thought that he, and not the Nānā, was the real leader of the Revolutionaries at Kānpūr.<sup>2</sup> Tika Singh who had been raised to the rank of a General and was appointed Generalissimo of the Revolutionary forces had been put under house arrest "on the charge of amassing a private treasure."<sup>3</sup> Nānā was completely upset by these developments and he thought that the longer the siege would drag the greater would be the complications and difficulties that he would be required to face. Moreover, the possibility of the arrival of reinforcements from Lucknow or Allahabad could not be ruled out. He consulted his advisers who are stated to have suggested that they should resort to a stratagem. Nanak Chand asserts that the consultation was held on 20 June, and Nānā was advised to "induce the Europeans to come out and then despatch them." He adds that the Nānā did not accept the proposal in spite of the approval of his brother,

1 As early as 18 June, Nanak Chand writes in his diary "... the rebel troops are quite dispirited ; every rebel sepoy and trooper has a quantity of money by him, as his share of plunder, but some of them had deposited their money with their families, and returned to fight. Some sepoys had their wives with them, and these would not join the batteries for fear of losing their money, but would go about the city plundering. and others are comfortable seated in the shops along the canal and enjoying the provisions brought in as *rassud* ; they take quantities of sugar to make *shurbut* which they drink to their hearts' content. If the faithless zemindars and their dependent tenants had not assisted the rebels, it is most likely the rebel force would have turned and fled. None but the troops arrived from Lucknow, and the zemindars, show hostility to the Government . . ." See *State Papers*. III, p. CCCXVI-XVII.

2 Zakā Allāh, p. 530 ; Kaye and Malleison, II, p. 264.

3 Trevelyan, p. 216 ; Nanney Nawab writes under 20 June : "The troopers, jealous of the wealth Teeka Singh, Subadar had amassed, put him under arrest in his own tent, and a guard was placed to watch his movements." *State Papers*, III, p. XV.

**Bālā.** However, it was decided that further consultations should be held at the hospital. Nanak Chand could not get any information about this latter meeting, but, it appears, the Nānā ultimately accepted the proposal and gave his fullest blessing and cooperation to its implementation.

Among the European prisoners there was an elderly woman, Mrs. Jacobs, who had been arrested while endeavouring to escape, disguised in Indian clothes. On the evening of 23 June 'Azīm Allāh Khān and Jwala Prasad sent word to her that she was selected for being sent to the entrenchment with a message. She was brought before the Nānā on the 24th, and by about ten o'clock on the following morning her palanquin was on its way to the British camp. The document which she carried with her was an unsigned note in the hand-writing of 'Azīm Allāh, saying, "all those who are in no way connected with the acts of Lord Dalhousie, and are willing to lay down their arms, shall receive a safe passage to Allahabad." The superscription was : "To the subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria." On receiving the note Wheeler consulted Captains Moore and Whiting, and after a long discussion, though not personally in favour of surrender, he yielded to the advice of his colleagues. Mrs. Jacobs returned the same day early in the afternoon, and delivered to Nānā the reply which she had brought from the British camp.<sup>2</sup>

The same evening Nānā called "a council of war" in his tent ; "Bālā, the Nānā's brother, Azemoolah, Brigadier Jwala Pershad,

1 Trevelyan (p. 218) refers to it as a caricature of a proclamation from Government House, Calcutta ; Forrest, I, p. 451. Shepherd says Mrs. Greenway was sent. See *State Papers*, II, p 135 ; Vol. III, p. XVI.

2 At half past eight on the same evening Lieutenant G.A. Master of the 53rd N. I. wrote to his father Colonel Master of the 7th Cavalry, at Lucknow : "We have now held out for twenty-one days under a tremendous fire. The Rajah of Bithoor has offered to forward us in safety to Allahabad, and the General has accepted his terms. I am all right though twice wounded . . . I'll write from Allahabad, God bless you." Forrest, I, p 453.



Shal Alec and Ahmed Alec Vakeel were present."<sup>1</sup> What actually transpired at the meeting will never be known, but it has been generally held that the decision about the massacre at Sati Chaura Ghat was taken at this meeting. On 26 June "the roaring of cannon having ceased, a weight seemed taken off each heart, the joy was general, and everybody appeared to have at once forgotten their past sufferings." Early in the day Captains More and Whiting, accompanied by Mr. Roche, the postmaster, went out to meet 'Azim Allāh Khān and Brigadier Jwala Prasad to settle the terms of the capitulation; they "undertook to deliver up the fortification, the treasure, and the artillery, on condition that our force should march out under arms, with sixty rounds of ammunition to every man; that carriages should be provided for the conveyance of the wounded, the women and the children; and that boats victualled with a sufficiency of flour should be in readiness at the neighbouring landing-place."<sup>2</sup>

The terms of capitulation were committed to paper and the document was taken to Nānā Ṣāhib by 'Azim Allāh Khān himself. In the afternoon a trooper brought back the draft and said that the Nānā had approved the proposed conditions but insisted that the entrenchment should be evacuated that very night. When he was told that the departure could not take place before the next morning he declared that his master was inflexible on the point, and in case of delay his guns would again go into action. Whiting replied in a firm tone that if the Revolutionaries "succeeded in overpowering the garrison by force of numbers, there would always be sufficient men to blow up the magazine". The trooper returned to his master and came back after some time to inform the garrison that he had accepted their demand. Mr. Todd, who had been at one time Nānā's English tutor, now took the document for his signature. He signed it without any hesitation and told his erstwhile tutor that "arrangements should be made to enable our

1 "Synopsis of Evidence of the Cawnpore Mutiny," by Lieutenant Colonel G. Williams, quoted in Forrest, I, p. 453, n. 1.

2 Trevelyan, p. 222.

(i.e. the author's) countrymen to breakfast and dine on board, and start comfortably in the cool of the evening." He also added : "The servants had better stay behind, as ladies could look to their own wants on the voyage."<sup>1</sup> Nānā sent Jwala Prashad with two other men as hostages so that the British officers might not have the slightest suspicions about the promises given to them.<sup>2</sup> Jwala Prashad was all courtesy and condoled with the British Commander expressing regret that he and his men had suffered so much. The guns and the treasure, amounting to about £ 12,000 were surrendered to the Nānā, who, on his part, ordered the boats lying at the customs post to be moved down to the Sati Chaura Ghat, about a mile to the north-west of the entrenchment. Early in the morning of the following day (27 June) "the remnant of our garrison, with the women and the children, who had outlived the horrors of the siege—gaunt and ghastly, in tattered garments, emaciated and enfeebled by want, worn by long suffering," made their "wretched journey" to the river.<sup>3</sup>

### Sati Chaurah Ghat massacre

By nine o'clock all had got into the boats which had been brought into very shallow water, hardly two feet deep. Major Vibart then "clamboured into his boat and gave the word off—a

1 Trevelyan, p 224.

2 Nanak Chand says that he had come to know of the treacherous move on 26 June when search orders were given by Nānā to his officers. Holas Singh, the Magistrate of Kānpūr, was asked "to explain to the bridge contractor and ghat manjee to settle with the boatmen, that the boatmen must set the boats on fire upon a signal from them and jump off and swim to shore, the instant the Europeans get into the boats". He also adds that the troopers told the Nānā that they were against treachery and that it was more honourable to fight the enemy openly. The Nānā, however, assured them that "according to his creed it was quite allowable to take false oaths at such junctures, and that when the object was to annihilate an enemy, he would not hesitate to take an oath on burning oil, or to take an oath on the Ganges, or adopt any one of a hundred other artifices. Then the sowars agreed to do as he bid them, . . ." See Nanak Chand, *Diary*, under 26 June, *State Papers*, III, p. CCCXXIII.

3 Kaye and Malleeson, II, 253.

welcome sound after a weary month of incredible hardship and imprisonment." The boatmen did not cut the rope of their respective boats ; instead they leaped overboard and splashed towards the ground immediately on hearing the blast of a bugle. As soon as the rowers leaped into water the thatched roofs of several boats burst into flames, and bullets began to shower and the guns on the bank of the river threw out a hail of shot and grape.<sup>1</sup> The British soldiers returned the fire and desperately tried to push off the boats, but they could move only three. The sick and wounded perished in the flames, while all those who could manage to come out of the boats threw themselves into the water below. Tantia and Bālā now sent their men to enter the water and sabre as many of them as they could.

In the meantime a trooper went to the Nānā and told him that his enemies and their women and children were being slain. He sent him back with orders to stop the slaughter of women and children. These orders were obeyed, and a hundred and twenty-five women and children were brought before the Nānā ; he ordered them to be kept in the Savada House. Of the three boats that had floated down the *Ghat* two drifted on to the opposite bank where

1 The troops had been ordered to reach the *ghat* and take positions before day-break. A party of the sepoy with a gun was posted in a burnt building on a knoll overlooking and commanding the lines ; another was placed in a ravine which separated the knoll from the village of Satī Chaurah ; twenty-five men sat behind a pile of timber. A little above the Ghat was a temple of the fishermen ; in front of this building Nānā's chief advisers, Bālā, 'Azīm Allāh, Jwala Prasad and Tantia Topi sat on a carpet. On the opposite bank behind a sandy ridge were posted men of the 13th N. I. and 17th N. I. For details, see Trevelyan, pp. 229-30.

Munghī 'Ināyat Ḥusayn, Tahsildar of Jalaun in Orai District, fought for the English until he was captured by Tantia Topi and carried to Kānpūr as a prisoner. He was put in one of the boats along with the men of the British garrison, but he escaped the bullets of Nānā's forces and ultimately reached the bank of the river. In his account of the Revolution he says that the thatched roofs of the boats were set to fire by the rowers who seemed to have received instructions for this. See *Sarguzasht Ayyām-i-Ghadr*. (Nazir Press, Lucknow, 1936), pp. 22-23.

their inmates were killed or captured by the men of the 17th N. I. The third, that of Major Vibart, got into the full force of the stream ; late in the afternoon it struck on a sand-bank. However, it resumed its perilous journey on the following day early in the morning ; in the afternoon it got aground off the village of Najafgarh, and soon after a crowd of men emerged from the village and killed or wounded five men. All through the afternoon it was raining ; in the night rains were followed by a hurricane and the boat again floated. When the day broke the occupants of the boat saw a party of the sepoy's standing on the bank. The fourteen combatants now leaped out of it and fell upon the crowd. The boat in the meanwhile having floated far from the place, they had to run down the bank, to get to it. They were pursued, and seven of them were killed, the rest having thrown themselves into the water. Three more were killed, but the remaining four reached alive in the territory of a loyal Hindu zamindar.<sup>1</sup> Having kept them in his house for three weeks, he had them escorted to a detachment of British forces : ultimately they were able to join Havelock's army. In the meanwhile the boat having their companions had been pursued and captured by the Revolutionaries and all its eighty passengers were taken to Kānpūr as prisoners. The Nānā who was at Bithur "sent orders that the men were to be shot and the women confined."<sup>2</sup>

It is not easy to apportion the blame for this ghastly act of treachery between Nānā and his colleagues and officers. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that it could not have been possible without his approval. Moreover, in view of the growing influence of the Muslim leaders over the Revolutionaries, one can easily understand Nānā's anxiety to achieve something spectacular.<sup>3</sup>

1 Mowbray-Thomson, the author of *The Story of Cawnpore*, was one of them.

2 Forrest, I, p. 474 ; Nanney Nawab's *Diary*, p. XVIII.

3 For an effort to establish the innocence of Nānā, see Sen, pp. 149-51.

**Nana proclaims himself Peshwa**

After the massacre of Sati Chaurah, Nānā returned to his palace at Bithur and had himself proclaimed Peshwa on 1 July. He issued two proclamations on the same day notifying to the people the triumph of the Revolutionaries and asking them to resume their normal activities.<sup>1</sup> Copies of these proclamations were posted at public places all over Kānpūr. In the night the city was illuminated to celebrate the victory of the Revolutionary forces;<sup>2</sup> Nānā's rejoicings, however, were shortlived. On 5 July he had to alert the Kotwal of Kānpūr, because rumours of the arrival of European soldiers at Allahabad were causing panic in the city. "You are therefore directed to proclaim in each lane and street of the city," said his order, "that regiments of cavalry, infantry, and batteries have been despatched to check the Europeans . . . that the people should therefore remain in their houses without any apprehension, and engage their minds in carrying on their work."<sup>3</sup>

Besides panic among the residents of Kānpūr the new Peshwa was also worried because some of his colleagues were trying to expand the scope of their efforts. Nanak Chand says that they were in contact with the authorities of the Revolutionary Government at Lucknow.<sup>4</sup> Nānā's advisers could not have been unaware of

1 He mentions Bahādur Shāh as his Sovereign in both the proclamations. "As by the kindness of God and the Ikbal of the Emperor" ran the first proclamation "all the Christians who were at Delhi, Poona, Satara and other places, and even those 5,000 European soldiers who went in disguise into the former city.....are destroyed and sent to hell by the pious and sagacious troops who are firm to their religion, . . . it is the duty of all the subjects and servants of the Government to rejoice at the delightful intelligence and to carry on their respective work with comfort and ease". The second proclamation also mentions "the enemy-destroying fortune of the Emperor;" it was addressed to the landlords who were directed to carry out the orders of "the authorities of the pergunahs." See *State Papers*, II, p. 119.

2 Trevelyan, p. 295.

3 *State Papers*, II, p. 20.

4 According to Sir John Kaye "there was some talk of setting up the Nawab

these developments. On 5 July Azīm Allāh Khān, Jwala Prasad and Bālā went to the Kotwali and told the officers that they would take the management of affairs in their own hands ; Tika Singh and others rushed to Bithur to bring their Chief back to the city. On the following day Nānā returned to Kānpūr and took his residence in a hotel building originally belonging to a Muslim ; but here too he gave himself up to pleasure ; "The native gossips of the day related how, . . . he strove to drown the cares and anxieties which gathered round him with music, and dancing, and buffoonery in public ; and that he solaced himself, in more retired hours, with strong drink and the caresses of a famous courtesan".<sup>1</sup>

The victories of the Revolutionaries in Awadh had alarmed the British authorities at Calcutta. On 20 June, Havelock, who had just returned from Iran, was appointed to command a Movable Column which was to be formed at Allahabad and thence proceed to Awadh. Havelock reached Allahabad on 30 June ; on the same day Neill who had already started preparations for sending reinforcements to Kānpūr was able to despatch a contingent of the Madras Fusiliers under Major Renaud. A week later Havelock's Column left for Kanpur. When the British forces were defiling through the streets of Allahabad it was noted that "most of the Hindoos appeared to be either indifferent or apprehensive, but wherever a Mahomedan was seen there was a scowl on his brow."<sup>2</sup> Havelock's men marched through "a vast and dreary waste dotted as head of the new Government". Kaye and Malleison, II, p. 364.

Nanak Chand says that the sepoys were annoyed at Nānā's leaving Kanpur ; he had promised to return to Kanpur after a day, but he could not keep his word "The sepoys are very much displeased. If the Nana does not return, they will place the Nunney Nawab on the thorne" On the following day ( 3 July) he reports that "Ahmad Ally Khan the vakeel is preparing to proceed to Lucknow to discuss the affairs of that province." See *State Papers*, II, p CCCXXIX.

1 Kay and Malleison, II, p. 265.

2 *Saturday Review*, 9 September, 1857, p. 260, quoted in Holmes, p. 283, n. 2 ; also see Marshman, J. C., *Memoirs of Sir Henry Havelock*, (London, 1860), p. 289; Maude, Lt. Col. F. C., *Memoirs of the Mutiny*, (London, 1894), I, p. 33

with the charred ruins of forsaken villages. Not a living man was to be seen ; only here and there some loathsome swine gnawing the flesh from a dead body. It seemed as though the destroying angel had passed over the land. Renaud, not interpreting his instructions too literally, had put to death every man upon whom a shadow of suspicion could be thrown ; and Havelock's soldiers smiled grimly as they pointed to the dark corpses which hung from the sign posts and the trees along the road."<sup>1</sup>

### **Havelock's Column proceeds to Kanpur**

Havelock joined Renaud before dawn on 12 July ; their combined forces met the Revolutionaries near Fathpur and defeated them in a battle. Maude who participated in the action attributed the defeat of the Revolutionaries to a panic caused by the flight of Tantia Topi. "Stuart Beatson (our D. A. A. G.) and Fraser-Tyler (D. Q. M. G.) were . . . close beside me on the road," he writes, "and urged me to knock over on that chap on the elephant. Accordingly I dismounted, and laid the gun myself, a 9-pr., at 'line of metal' (700 yards) range ; and, as luck would have it, my first shot went in under the beast's tail, and came out at its chest, of course rolling it over, and giving its rider a bad fall. It was said at the time that the man on the elephant was Tantia Topee . . . his fall that day certainly completed the panic of the enemy." The real cause of the defeat of the Revolutionaries was that they had come out to give battle to a small party which they had found reconnoitering the area, and were taken by complete surprise when they found themselves ranged against a large army.<sup>2</sup>

1 Holmes, p. 284. Other historians corroborate this account. See, for instance, Trevelyan, pp. 323-24.

2 Maude, I, pp. 43-44. Trevelyan, (p. 324) says that Jwala Prashad was encamping at Fathpur "with all his chivalry". Tantia Topi definitely asserts that the sepoys were anxious that the Nānā should go with them to Fathpur, but he refused.

In answer to a question about the Commander of the Revolutionaries at Fathgarh one of the witnesses examined by Colonel Williams said : "I

The British soldiers entered Fathpur and plundered the town to their hearts' content.<sup>1</sup> Havelock resumed his march on the 14th, and on the following day he met another army sent by Nānā under the command of his brother, Bālā. He was defeated and wounded in the battle fought near the village of Aung. Having managed to escape from the battle-field, Bālā came to his brother and informed him of his defeat. In a hastily summoned council of the Nānā's advisers it was decided that they should be ready for a major battle south of the city of Kanpur. When this decision was taken Tika

myself saw Tika Singh, the General, and the Allahabad Maulavi and Jwala Prashad, going off to command". Kaye and Malleson, II, p. 273n.

1 Fathpur: It was about forty miles from Kanpur. Robert Tudor Tucker, the District Judge of Fathpur, was a zealous Christian and took an active interest in the activities of the missionaries. "At the entrance of Fathpur he had erected four pillars of stone, on two of which were engraved the Ten Commandments, in Persian and Hindi, and on the others, in the same characters, scriptural texts containing the essence of the Christian faith. And the good Judge made no disguise of his efforts to convert the people; " Tucker went further, he allowed the missionaries to exploit his name and official position in preaching Christianity to the prisoners in jail. Rev. Gopinath Nandi, a Bengali clergyman who worked as a missionary at Fathpur appreciates the services of the District Judge and other civilians in these words: "The judge and the magistrate, as well as other gentlemen, took a deep interest in the mission, and helped us with their prayers, good advice, and pecuniary aid. When the number of native converts began to increase, six of them at the suggestion of the late Honourable Mr. Cowin, became small farmers." The same writer tells us how Mawlawi Hikmat Allāh, a Deputy Collector, objected to the practice of sending *patwāris*, to a Missionary school to learn Nagri, on the ground that the missionaries preached Christianity to the candidates. See Rev Sherring, M. A., *The Indian Church during the Great Rebellion*, (London 1859), pp 184-86.

At Fathpur, "the Muslim conspiracy" to use Sir John Kaye's term, was organized by Hikmat Allāh who was a pious Muslim. The Revolutionaries rose on 9 June, captured the treasury, released the prisoners and established their Government with Hikmat Allāh as the head of the district. These arrangements continued to work until the town fell into the hands of Havelock on 13 July. Mawlawi Hikmat Allāh was taken captive and executed. See Kaye and Malleson, II, pp. 273-76, also see Shihabi, Mufti Intizamullah *Mashāhir-i-Jang-i-Āzādī*, (Karachi, 1957), pp 231-32.



Singh asked the Nānā "if he had made up his mind as to what should be done with the prisoners," hinting at the same time that it would be of some advantage to put them out of the way, because "the British were approaching solely for the purpose of releasing their compatriots, and would not risk another battle for the satisfaction of burying them." Nānā was obviously impressed by the argument.<sup>1</sup> About five o'clock in the afternoon the five men who were among the prisoners of Bibigarh<sup>2</sup> were summoned by the Nānā; "at the gate which led into the road they were stopped by a squad of sepoy and shot dead." An hour later "the women and children were hacked to pieces by five ruffians of the Nānā's own guard." On the following morning the bodies of the murdered women and children were thrown into a well hard by.<sup>3</sup>

The Revolutionaries had rallied at the Pandū Naddi, a small stream flowing into the Ganges, and wanted to blow up the bridge by which it was spanned, but Havelock having reached there in time seized it and saved it from destruction. Early in the morning on the following day (16 July) he resumed his march towards Kanpur. The Nānā had also come out with his forces and taken position at a short distance to the south of the city. In the battle that followed the Revolutionaries were pushed back; "a terrific fire was opened upon the beaten enemy, who were soon in confused flight; . . ."<sup>4</sup> On the morning of the 17th, the British entered Kanpur, but when "they saw the house where the women and

1 Trevelyan, p. 330.

2 This house was originally built "by an English officer for his native mistress (thence called the Bibigarh) but had more recently been the residence of an humble Eurasian clerk." Kaye and Malleon, II, 266.

On 1 July the European prisoners who had been lodged in the Savada House had been shifted to Bibigarh, which was near the hotel building where the Nānā was living.

3 The sepoy who were ordered to go and shoot the women and children, it has been stated, could not harden their hearts to carry out these orders, "they contented themselves therefore with firing at the ceiling instead". Nānā was displeased at this and ordered his guardsmen to perform the act of butchery. Holmes, pp. 242-43; Maude, pp. 108-21.

4 Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 287.

children had been massacred on the previous evening their hearts sank within them." Next day Havelock moved to Nawabganj where he learnt that the Nānā had left. Major Stephenson marched on Bithur and destroyed the Peshwa's palace (19 July). The city of Kānpūr was also subjected to "excesses on the part of our soldiery far greater than any which are recorded against them". Besides wholesale plundering by the soldiers, the people of Kānpūr had to pay heavily for the misdeeds of their leader. Nānā's massacre of the women and children was an act of heinous cruelty, but far more heinous was the revenge of the British soldiers who butchered many times more than the persons killed by him.<sup>1</sup>

Havelock was ultimately compelled to stop his men from plundering the citizens ; "the marauding in this camp," said his order, "exceeds the disorders which supervened on the short-lived triumph of the miscreant Nana Sahib A Provost Marshall has been appointed, with special instruction to hang up, in their uniform, all British soldiers that plunder. This shall not be an idle threat."<sup>2</sup>

### **Neill's atrocities at Kanpur**

On 20 July Brigadier-General Neill arrived in Kanpur ; four days later Havelock leaving him to look after the defence of the city left for Lucknow Neill, it appears, was not satisfied with what had been done ; he gave finishing touches to the story of excesses which form one of the darkest chapters in the history of the Revolutionary War. His own words will give a correct idea of the nature of his atrocities. After referring to the sufferings of the women and children "who were massacred under orders issued by the Nānā he writes : I saw that house when I first came in . . . The floor of one room they were all dragged into and killed was

1 It is difficult to determine the number of persons massacred by the British soldiers, but "it was stated both in Anglo-Indian and in Continental journals that ten thousand of the inhabitants had been killed". Kaye however considers this to be an exaggerated figure. See Kaye and Malleeson, II, p. 291n.

2 Kaye and Malleeson, II, pp. 291-92.

saturated with blood . . . I wish to show the Natives of India that the punishment inflicted by us for such deeds will be the heaviest, the most revolting to their feelings, and what they must remember. I issued the following order . . . 'The well . . . will be filled up, . . . this evening, under the superintendence of an officer. The house in which they were butchered . . . will not be washed or cleaned by their countrymen ; but Brigadier-General Neill has determined that every stain of that innocent blood shall be cleared up and wiped out, previous to their execution, by such of the miscreants as may be hereafter apprehended, who took an active part in the mutiny, to be selected according to their rank, caste, and degree of guilt. Each miscreant, after sentence of death is pronounced upon him, will be taken down to the house in question, under a guard, and will be forced into cleaning up a small portion of the blood-stains ; the task will be made as revolting to his feelings as possible, and the Provost Marshall will use the lash in forcing anyone objecting to complete his task. After properly clearing his portion, the culprit is to be immediately hanged, . . . The first culprit was a Subahdar . . . a fat brute, a very high Brahman . . . He had about half a square foot to clean ; he made some objection, when down came the lash, and he yelled again ; he wiped it all up clean, and was then hung, . . . Some days after, others were brought in—one a Muhammadan officer of our civil court, a great rascal and one of the leading men . he rather objected, was flogged, made to lick part of the blood with his tongue . . . , and I hope I shall not be interfered with until the room is thoroughly cleansed in this way . . . , I will hold my own with the blessing and help of God. I cannot help seeing that His finger is in all this'.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Neill's order dated 25 July, as quoted in Kaye and Malleison, II, pp. 299-300.

It may be noted that some writers including Sir John Kaye have not tried to conceal their appreciation of Neill's atrocities. Referring to this order he writes : "... however objectionable in the estimation of some of our Brahmanised infatuated elderly gentlemen I think (it was) suited to the occasion or rather to the present crisis". Kaye and Malleison, II, p. 299.

Within two months of this heinous performance Neill was killed by a bullet.

In August the Revolutionaries were again reported to be collecting at Bithur under Tantia Topi. Neill wrote to Havelock to come urgently ; he returned to Kanpur and defeated Tantia Topi in a battle fought on 16 August. In November the defence of Kanpur was entrusted to General Windham, and he was asked to strengthen the entrenchment which Havelock had constructed. However, he had hardly set to work when Tantia Topi was reported to have crossed the Ganges on 10 November and moving towards Kānpūr at the head of a strong army. A week later Windham came out of the entrenchment and took a position which covered the town on the west. On 24 November he broke camp, and marching for six miles in a south-westerly direction halted near a bridge over the canal. Tantia also moved out of the village of Akbarpur which he had seized. In a battle fought on the 26th Tantia was defeated, but soon after the action Windham had to return to Kānpūr.

Tantia, taking advantage of Wheeler's inactivity, attacked the town on the following day and defeated a force which was sent against him. In the afternoon he attacked the entrenchment itself, but here he met with a stiff resistance and was ultimately forced to make a retreat. Early in the morning on 28 November, Tantia renewed his attack and opened fire on a British force commanded by Carthew who had taken position near a bridge spanning a small nullah in front of a building known as the Theatre. Carthew soon brought up two guns and silenced the fire of the Revolutionaries, but he could not take advantage of it, because he had no cavalry to support him. Brigadier Wilson, who had in the meantime tried to advance on Carthew's right, was defeated and slain by Tantia's men.<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionaries now forced Carthew back to the bridge-head, and seized the town and Windham's baggage before the day's battle ended. On the morning of 29 November

<sup>1</sup> Windham's despatch, dated 30 November, 1857, in *State Papers*, II, p. 380.

Tantia again opened fire ; the British field batteries swiftly replied. After some time the Revolutionaries gave up their attempt to stop the enemy from crossing the bridge. Colin Campbell's army which had arrived on the previous evening now marched forward ; it crossed the canal and encamped near the entrenchment where Wheeler had surrendered to Nānā's forces five months earlier.

The third and final action in the Battle of Kanpur was fought on 6 December. It began with the opening of fire by Windham's guns ; the Revolutionaries promptly answered, the artillery duel lasting for about two hours. The cannonade having slackened, orders for an attack were given. Greathed advanced by the line of the canal and Walpole rushed in the direction of the city wall. The batteries opened a heavy fire, and under their cover the Brigades of Hope and Inglis proceeded in parallel lines fronting the cannal. The Revolutionaries offered a determined resistance, but when the 24-pounder guns were brought into action they gave way and began to flee. "I must here draw attention", wrote Campbell in a letter to the Governor-General, "to the manner in which the heavy 24-pounder guns were impelled and managed by Captain Peel and his gallant sailors . . . On this occasion there was the sight beheld of 24-pounder guns advancing with the first line of skirmishers."<sup>1</sup> General Mansfield, who had been ordered to move towards the Subahdar's Tank, also met with resistance from the Revolutionaries, who however were forced to retreat on account of the heavy fire of the British field battery. Nevertheless they managed to get off with their guns.<sup>2</sup>

1 *State Papers*, II, p. 390.

2 Mansfield was sharply criticised for this ; he explained his inactivity by saying that he "refrained from giving the necessary orders, being aware that it was contrary to your Excellency's wish to involve the troops among the enclosures and houses of the old cantonment".

The author of Colin Campbell's biography justifies his action : "Prudently refraining from an advance amongst the enclosures and houses in his front", he writes, "which would have involved serious loss, General Mansfield contented

The British reoccupied Kānpūr on 7 December, and on the following day a column was sent under General Hope Grant in pursuit of the Revolutionaries. Two days later he met and defeated them in a battle near Sarai Ghat, a ferry on the Ganges, about twenty-five miles from Kanpur. In this action also, as in the previous ones, the main cause of the defeat of the Revolutionaries was the superiority of the enemy in Artillery. Hope Grant succeeded in finding them; "he poured a concentrated fire into their disorderly and crowded masses with such terrible effect that they gave way, and ran as fast as they could up the bank, leaving fifteen guns behind them."<sup>1</sup> Thus ended the Kānpūr campaign; "not the less satisfactory was Sir Colin's reflection that he had thus disposed of 25,000 enemies, including the formidable Gwalior Contingent, at a cost of only 99 casualties amongst the troops he had led to victory."<sup>2</sup>

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himself with holding what he had won,.... ." See Shadwell, Lieutenant-General *The Life of Collin Campbell, Lord Clyde*, (London, 1881). II, p. 41.

1 Holmes, p. 428.

2 Shadwell, I, p. 45.

It may be added, however, that the number of the Revolutionary forces (25,000) mentioned here seems to have been exaggerated. The British spy, Nanak Chand, says: "I find that, although people speak of the rebels being in great force, they do not exceed 10,000 men, of whom there are not more than 5,000 good fighting men, . . ." See *State Papers*, III, p. CCCLI.

## CHAPTER XIX

### AWADH (I)

#### Ahmad Allah Shah and Hadrat Mahal

#### Nawab Wazirs of Awadh and the Company

One of the richest Provinces of the Mughul Empire, Awadh, like Hyderabad, had become a semi-independent State in the earlier years of Muhammad Shāh's reign. Its Rulers were called *Nawab-Wazirs*, because they had not abandoned their original office of a minister at Delhi. In course of time Awadh had become a prosperous State and the Nawab's Court was known for its patronage of learning, but the defeat of *Shujā' al-Dawlah* in the Battle of Buxar (1764) lowered its prestige. The Nawab had to enter into an alliance with the Company, which opened an easy path for British imperialism to march forward. Within a decade the signing of this Treaty came the Rohilah War, which resulted in the destruction of one of the best governed territory in the Subcontinent.<sup>1</sup>

A quarter of a century later, Wellesly, "like the indignant headmaster about to flog a boy," accused the Nawab-Wazir of incompetence, and imposed on him a new Treaty, according to which half the territories of Awadh including Rohilkhand were taken over by the Company, and thus it was "able, after having pocketed the price, to seize the territories and . . . obtain possession both of price and subject."<sup>2</sup> Even this act of high-handedness

1 *Shujā' al-Dawlah's* relations with the Rohilahs were no doubt unfriendly, but he could not have destroyed them if he had not received encouragement and active support from the British. Under the auspices of British bayonets the Nawab's soldiers first ravaged Rohilkhand and then annexed it (1774).

2 Beveridge, II, p. 731.

on the part of the Governor-General did not rouse the Nawab-Wazirs from their slumber. They remained "embarrassingly loyal" to the Company, ever ready to be utilized as an instrument of its policy of aggression and conquest; "the Nawab-Wazirs of Oudh were . . . good allies. False to their people—false to their own manhood—they were true to the British Government."<sup>1</sup> Lord Hastings, a great annexationist like Wellesley, squeezed the Nawab-Wazir of a crore of rupees, and made him assume the title of a King, and thus become a rival to the Mughul Emperor.<sup>2</sup> In 1837 the death of the Nawab-Wazir provided the then Governor-General, Auckland, to place upon the throne his own nominee, of course with the help of British soldiers. The new Ruler was forced to accept a fresh Treaty according to which a new contingent of British forces, was to be stationed in Awadh. Its expenses were to be met from the Nawab's Treasury. The Treaty was rejected by the Directors of the Company, but Auckland did not have enough moral courage to tell the 'King' that his employers had turned down his recommendations. Nevertheless, "the Treaty was actually included in a subsequent government publication and was referred to as still in force by succeeding Governor-Generals. Upon Lord Dalhousie was thrust the invidious task of explaining to the King that the Treaty, which he and the former Governor-Generals had believed to be in force since 1837, had really been abrogated two years after that date . . ."<sup>3</sup>

1 Kaye and Malletson, I, p. 85.

2 The Mughul Emperors claimed *de jure* sovereignty over the subcontinent; and the Company governed their territories on their behalf. They were, however, very particular about maintaining the etiquette, traditions and symbols of their legal supremacy. Governor-General Hastings wanted to meet Akbar Shāh II on terms of equality, but he did not agree, and they could not see each other. Hastings did not forget this, and revenged himself by 'conferring' the title of Kingship on Ghāzi al-Dīn Haydar, Nawāb-Wazir of Awadh. See *The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings* (London, 1858), I, pp. 318-19; also Beveridge, II, pp. 543-44.

3 Roberts, P., *History of British India*, pp. 355-56 as quoted in Thompson and Garrat, pp. 333-34.



**Wajid 'Ali Shah's reign**

Wājid 'Alī Shāh who ascended the throne in 1847 was anxious to improve the state of affairs in his kingdom. He ordered two boxes to be placed on the road where people could deposit petitions addressed to the King; he also wanted to increase the efficiency of the Army. He rose early in the morning and supervised the parade for three or four hours every day. The British Resident did not approve of these activities of the young king; his displeasure was conveyed to Wājid 'Alī Shāh by the *Wazīr* 'Alī Naqī Khān.<sup>1</sup> Thus balked in his efforts to reform the administration of the State, Wājid 'Alī Shāh changed his way of life. Finding himself unable to improve the state of affairs in the face of British opposition he decided to give himself up to a life of ease and harem pleasures.

The Hanūmāngarhī<sup>2</sup> incident (1856) is an indication of the fast deteriorating condition of the Nawab-Wazīr's Government. A Hindu mendicant had installed an idol in a small shed adjacent to a mosque. In the time of Nawab Sa'ādat 'Alī Khān some Hindu mischief-mongers had attacked the mosque and demolished it. The Government had punished the offenders and ordered it to be rebuilt. Subsequently, however, one of the local zamindars, Darshan Singh, encouraged by the growing weakness of the Nawab's authority, tried to stop the calling of *adhān*; the Muslims defied his orders under the leadership of a Moulvi, named Ghulām Husayn. On hearing this the Brahmīns of a neighbouring temple "came to the mosque, assaulted the Moulvi, and taking from him the Koran which he held in his hands threw it into a fire, and burned it, and then drove the Moulvi out of it."<sup>3</sup>

1 Najm al-Ghānī, *Tārīkh-i-Awadh*, V, pp. 125-26.

2 Hanumangarhi, a small town in the vicinity of Fyzabad, was so called because of a Hindu tradition that Ramchandra, the hero of the epic poem, *Rāmāyana*, had offered congratulations to his ally, Hanuman, at the site of the village. *Tārīkh-i-Awadh*, V, pp. 201-02.

3 T.N.N., p. 34.

Ghulām Husayn went to Lucknow and brought with him a party of Muslims to offer prayers and call the *adhān*. The Brahmins again attacked the Muslims, killing two of them. When the reports of the incident spread in the neighbourhood large crowds of Muslims as well as Hindus arrived on the scene, and took the law into their hands. The Muslims, being numerically inferior, suffered heavy casualties.<sup>1</sup> Wājid 'Ali's Government being too weak to bring the situation under control, the Muslims organized a *jihād* under Mawlawī Amir 'Ali of Amethi.<sup>2</sup> They wanted the mosque to be cleared of the Hindus who now held it. The Nawab's Government, however, unable to control the situation asked Colonel Barlow "to take a regiment of Hindus only, and stop the Moulvi by force, and if necessary he was to blow the Moulvi with a gun in case resistance was offered."<sup>3</sup> Barlow soon overwhelmed the Muslims, 625 of them having been killed in the action.<sup>4</sup> The Muslims of the neighbouring areas were greatly excited by the massacre of their co-religionists, and Aḥmad Allāh Shāh, who was at Agra, decided to proceed to Awadh and prepare the people for *jihād*.<sup>5</sup>

#### Annexation of Awadh

For some time the Company's Government had been trying to find pretexts for tightening its hold over Awadh. In October, 1847, Lord Hardinge had warned the King to improve his admi-

1 According to the author of the *Qaysar-al-Tawārīkh*, "269 Muslims were killed in the mosque, the copies of the *Qur'ān* which most of them had with them were torn into pieces, trodden under foot and burnt to ashes." Vol. II, p. 112.

2 For his life and activities see Raḥmān 'Ali, pp. 29-30; also see *Tārīkh-i-Awadh*, V, pp. 209-30.

3 *T.N.N.*, p. 36.

4 *Tārīkh-i-Awadh*, V, p. 231.

5 For a detailed account of the Hanumangarhi incident see *Ḥadiqah-i-Shuhadā*, by Mirza Jan (Lucknow, 1272 H.). Rais Ahmad Jafri's remark that there is only one copy of this book in Pakistan (*Wajid 'Ali Shāh aur unka 'ahd*, p. 274) is not correct; the present writer has used the copy in the private collection of Muhammad Ayub Qadri in Karachi.

nistration ; he was given "two years of grace" after which "the British Government could, in the interest of humanity, no longer righteously abstain from interfering preemptory and absolutely."<sup>1</sup> Wājid 'Alī Shāh "thanked" the Governor-General for these "councils" which he would regard "as though they had been addressed by a father to his son."<sup>2</sup> He was, however, too much immersed in the pleasures of harem life to bring about any change in his own conduct or public administration.<sup>3</sup> The "two years of grace" passed away with no apparent change for the better. Dalhousie therefore ordered Sleeman to tour the country and report about the state of affairs there. Sleeman was not in favour of annexation ; but the conditions prevailing in Awadh, he thought, demanded interference. His advice was clear ; "assume the administration, but do not grasp the revenue of the country." Later (1854) James Outram took the place of Sleeman. He was also asked to give a report and, like his predecessor, he also recommended immediate interference by the British Government. In the light of this advice Dalhousie reviewed the whole question in a gigantic minute, in which he proposed that the State need not be annexed, but the administration and surplus revenue should be taken over by the Company. The Directors of the Company however decided to annex the State, and asked the Governor-General to take necessary steps. On 4 February 1856 Wājid 'Alī Shāh was asked to sign a treaty according to which he was to surrender his powers and territories. He refused to sign it ;

1 Kaye and Malleeson, I, 95.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Speaking of his indulgence in "the delights of dancing, and drumming, and drawing, and manufacturing small rhymes," Sir John Kaye remarks "Had he devoted himself to these pursuits in private life, there would have been small harm in them. but overjoyed with his success as musician, he went about the crowded streets of Lakhnao with a big drum round his neck, striking as much noise out of it as he could, with all the extravagance of childish delight " Kaye and Malleeson, I, p. 96. Sir John Kaye's criticism is correct, but the responsibility of turning Wājid 'Alī Shāh into a debauch lay entirely on the shoulders of the Company's authorities.

the British "had taken his honour and his country, and he would not ask them for the means of maintaining his life." Outram issued a proclamation by which Awadh was incorporated in the Company's dominions. The injustice of the act is too obvious to need any comments : the Treaty of 1801 had provided that the reform in administration would be carried out by the "King's own officers". The British could interfere but not to the extent of usurping the Nawab's territories. Politically also the annexation of Awadh was a wrong step ; "and who, it was asked, could be safe, if we thus treated one who had ever been the most faithful of our allies ?"<sup>1</sup> Five months had not passed when British statesmen found themselves confronted with a terrible situation ; unrestricted aggression could not but have a sharp reaction.

Coverly Jackson was appointed Commissioner of Awadh ; "no more unfortunate selection could have been made. Jackson was best known for the violence of his temper." His short regime is marked by his quarrel with Gubbins, maltreatment of the royal family and harshness towards all sections of the people.<sup>2</sup> Jackson's tenure of office was less than one year, but even during this short period he created evils which were past remedy. On 20 March, 1857, Henry Lawrence, the new Chief Commissioner, assumed office. He could immediately detect the defects of the British system of administration in Awadh, and soon became convinced that wide-spread discontent prevailed in the Province.<sup>3</sup> He lost no time in taking necessary steps to undo the harm. "The aristocracy of the Court, indeed, who

<sup>1</sup> Kaye and Malleison, I, p. 110.

<sup>2</sup> Holmes, pp 69-70 and notes 1-3; Innes, McLeod, Lt.-Gen J. J., *Lucknow and Oudh in the Mutiny*, p. 64 ; Kaye and Malleison, I, p. 292, *et seq.*

For details of mal-administration in Awadh after its annexation, see Lord Stanley's letter of 13 October, 1859, addressed to Lord Canning, quoted in Appendix X in Innes, pp. 318-31.

<sup>3</sup> "Reports reached him from every corner of the province, all conveying the same story. He could not conceal from himself that the spirit of the people was deeply excited, and excited on the one subject on which to be excited was to be dangerous." Kaye and Malleison, III, p. 236.

... had been ruined", says Malleon, "by the abrupt action which followed annexation, were propitiated by the immediate payment to them of the pensions which had been promised, but till then had been withheld. An early opportunity was likewise taken of assuring the officials, who had served under the previous *regime*, that their claims to employment would receive prior consideration ... The case of the disbanded soldiers was more difficult. These men were promised preference in enlistment in the local corps and in the military police ...". In most cases they refused to avail of these offers frankly saying that they, having "easten the King's salt, ... will not touch that of another".<sup>1</sup> An attempt was made by Henry Lawrence to redress the grievances of other sections of the people also. Early in April, however, a small incident occurred which made it clear that the efforts of the Chief Commissioner had met but with little success. The surgeon of the 48th N.I. applied his mouth to open a bottle of medicine: the sepoys, excited as they were on the cartridge question, attributed his action to design and punished him by putting his house to fire.<sup>2</sup>

Lawrence, alerted by such incidents, took immediate steps to make the Residency defensible and locate the European troops at important places. These preparations were not made a moment too soon, for on 3 May, the men of the 7th Regiment of Awadh Irregular Infantry, stationed at *Mūsā Bāgh*, refused to use the cartridges and were disarmed. On 12 May Henry Lawrence held a *darbār* and addressed his audience in 'Hindustani.' With a view to rouse the communal feelings of the Hindus as well as the Muslims, he told the former that their Muslim rulers had never shown any regard to their religion, and "how Aurangzib

1 Kaye and Malleon, III, p. 238.

2 On 1 May Henry Lawrence wrote a long letter to the Governor-General in which he emphasized the need of redressing the grievances of the sepoys. He added that he had received letters to that effect from Regimental Officers, and one of them had clearly warned that "if the sepoy is not speedily redressed, he will redress himself." See *State Papers*, II, Introduction, p. 14.

had imposed the *jizya* . . . ; and how the flesh of the cow had been thrust down the throats of the unwilling converts. Turning then to the Muhammadans, he reminded them that Ranjit Singh would never tolerate their religion at Lahore". He spoke of the "toleration which for a century the English Government had afforded to both religions."<sup>1</sup> He did not forget to add a few remarks about the power and strength of the British and their vast resources ; his appeals however created but little impression on his audience. He also gave rewards to some of the Hind-Pakistan<sup>1</sup> officers and soldiers for meritorious services ; but "some of the men who were thus rewarded for loyalty were shortly afterwards hanged for proved disloyalty".<sup>2</sup>

On the morrow of Henry Lawrence's *darbar* came the news of the rising at Meerut. He took four days to complete his defences : a moiety of the 32nd Foot was put in command of the Iron Bridge, the second half was sent to the cantonment at Mariaun, the bridge of boats was brought nearer to the Residency, and *Maghhi Bhawan*<sup>3</sup> was put in charge of the sepoys. He telegraphed to the Governor-General to call back the European troops from China, Ceylon and other places and invest him with plenary military authority. Canning accepted this request and authorized him to request Jang Bahadur of Nepal to send his Gurkha troops to assist the British.

#### The rising at Lucknow

On 27 May, Henry Lawrence, apparently satisfied with his arrangements, wrote to Canning that "both the Residency and the *Maghhi Bhawan* are safe against all probable comers". The same day, however, he had to send Captain Weston, Superintendent

1 Kaye and Mallsen, III, pp 244-45. Also see *State Papers*, II, Introduction, p. 18 Gubbins adds that the sepoys "standing round the space appropriated to the *darbar*", attributed the proceedings to the fear of the British. See p 15.

2 *Ibid.*, note.

3 For its situation and defences see Forrest, I, p. 186n.

Military Police, to suppress a rising at Maliḥābād, and three days later, when Henry was dining at Mariaun, came the news of the rising. Earlier in the day his staff officer had told him on the authority of one of his men that the sepoys would rise that night at the firing of the nine o'clock gun. The gun fired, but there was no sign of a rising. Lawrence turned to the staff officer and with a smile on his face remarked ; "Your friends are not punctual". Hardly had he uttered these words when the discharge of muskets proved that his "friends" were quite punctual. On hearing the firing of the muskets Lawrence rushed out of the room and told the guards to remain at their posts. He took care to see that the road connecting the cantonment with the town was properly guarded. The Revolutionaries, in the meantime, had set fire to some of the bungalows of European officers and the mess-house of the 71st N. I. Next morning Lawrence went in pursuit of the Revolutionaries in the direction of the race-course, whither they had gone, and joined the 7th Cavalry. Lawrence, therefore, decided to give up the idea of pursuing them, now that they had become too strong for him ; thirty men had however been captured before the pursuit was abandoned.<sup>1</sup> "We are now positively better off", wrote Lawrence to the Governor-General, "than we were. We know our friends and enemies. The latter have no stomach for a fight, though they are capital incendiaries,"<sup>2</sup> but subsequent events show that Henry's assessment of the situation was not correct.

Soon after the rising of the sepoys in the cantonment the Revolutionary leaders in the town decided to proclaim *jihād*. Āghā Mirzā, previously in the service of Wājid 'Alī Shāh, was persuading the people to rise. He was questioned by Mr Mendes, a clerk on Gubbin's staff,<sup>3</sup> and hot words were exchanged. Mendes lost temper and fired at Āghā Mirzā,

1 *State Papers*, II, p. 25 ; Gubbins, p. 110.

2 Kaye and Malleon, III, p. 252.

3 Martin Gubbins was the Financial Commissioner of Awadh.

but he missed the aim and was overpowered and slain by him.<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionaries assembled in the 'Aysh-bāgh, unfurled the *Muḥammadi Jhandā* and then marched towards Gaūghāt. Captain Carnegie, Magistrate of Lucknow, and Maḥmūd Khān Kotwal were in the *Imāmbārah* nearby, but they did not interfere with the march of the Revolutionaries,<sup>2</sup> who could, therefore, cross the river uninterrupted. They were however disappointed when they learnt that the sepoy had left the cantonment, and on their way back to the city they were attacked by the men posted at *Dawlat-Khānah*. In the fight which lasted for more than an hour a number of the Revolutionaries were killed and wounded by the firing of the British forces. Subsequently many of those who were captured were hanged; Āghā Mirzā and 'Iwāḍ Mirzā also ended their lives at the gallows.

### Sitapur

The outbreak at Lucknow was a signal for the risings of the sepoy in the various districts of Awadh. At Sitapur, fifty-one miles to the north-west of Lucknow, the sepoy rose on 3 June, and killed some of their officers; two parties of the Europeans, however, managed to escape. Adjacent to Sitapur and separated from it by the Sārdā river was the division of Bahraich, Sikora being its principal military station. The Commissioner of the division, Charles Wingfield, had also shifted his headquarters to that place in April 1857. On 9 June the sepoy stationed there were found to be in a state of great excitement; Wingfield, therefore, took his horse and rode to the neighbouring town of Gonda; other officers also fled from Sikora. Wingfield could not stay even in Gonda for long because there also the 3rd Oudh Irregulars rose on the following day; he now fled to Balrampur and took refuge

1 S.e Ḥusayni, II, p. 197; Gubbins, pp. 111-12.

2 Some writers (for instance, Gubbins, p. 113) say that the number of the Revolutionaries was about 6,000; it appears, however, that Ḥusayni's figure (1,500) is more correct; among them only 200 had arms on them. See Ḥusayni, II, p. 197.



with its Hindu zamindar along with some other Europeans. Subsequently they managed to cross into British territory. In Bahraich three European officers including Cunliffe, the Deputy Commissioner of the district, were overpowered and killed by the Revolutionaries.

### Fyzabad

Fyzabad, the headquarters of a division of the same name, was an important town ; it had been the capital of the Nawab-Wazirs of Awadh before its transference to Lucknow. More than that, on the eve of the Revolution the chief organizer of the *jihād* campaign against foreign rule, Aḥmad Allāh Shāh, had been arrested and kept in jail at this place.<sup>1</sup> The men of the 22nd N. I. posted there rose on 8 June and told their officers to leave immediately, if they did not want to place themselves in danger.<sup>2</sup> A party of the troopers with a few sepoy led by Risaldar Barakāt Aḥmad seized the treasure and carried it to their Lines.<sup>3</sup> Early in the morning on the following day four boats containing the officers of the Regiments moved down the river. Some of these boats were attacked and their passengers killed by the men of the 17th N. I. who had risen at Azamgarh and were on their way to Fyzabad.<sup>4</sup> Another party of the Europeans,

1 For Aḥmad Allāh Shāh's arrival in Fyzabad see *Tā'ib*, p. 54 ; also see Hutchinson, pp. 33-37.

2 "The mutineers bade their officers depart, and told them that they might take the boats then lying at the cantonment ghaut." Gubbins, p. 134

It has been stated that the Revolutionaries had held a regular council and discussed the question of the treatment to be meted out to the European officers. Some of the troopers wanted them to be put to death, but the men of the 22nd opposed this and informed their officers that they would be allowed to leave. See *State Papers*, II, p. 32.

3 Gubbins, p. 134 ; Ḥusaynī (II, p. 203) mentions Barakāt Aḥmad as their leader ; he was a disciple of Aḥmad Allāh Shāh. See *Tā'ib*, p. 66.

4 It has been suggested that the men of the 22nd had sent a message to those of the 17th N. I. to attack the boats, but the charge of treachery seems untenable because there was no motive for that. For a discussion of evidence on this charge. See *State Papers*, II ; Introduction, pp. 33-34 and notes.

mainly consisting of the civil officers and their families, had taken refuge in Shāhganj, a fort belonging to "Rajah Man Singh, the notorious ex-Amil."<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionaries had, in the meantime, seized the treasure and released the prisoners from the jail, including Aḥmad Allāh Shāh, who "was chosen by the mutineers as their leader."<sup>2</sup> The Hindu sepoy do not seem to have had full confidence in him because of his sympathies with the *jihād* movement of Mawlawi Amir 'Ali of Hanūmāngarhi fame. "The Molovee's reign", says Gubbins, "was however, not of long duration. After two days he was deposed, and the leadership offered to Rajah Man-sing".<sup>3</sup> The choice was not happy, because he turned out to be a traitor; "this crafty Brahmin", says Gubbins, "temporized, cajoled and flattered the native officers, and dispatched his brother, Ramadeen, to Cawnpoor on a mission to Nana. Meanwhile, through confidential agents, he maintained a correspondence with us".<sup>4</sup>

1 Man Singh, a talukdar, was under arrest at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution. He was released on the recommendation of Captain Alexander Orr, Assistant Commissioner of Fyzabad. See Kaye and Malleon, III, p. 267.

2 See Memorandum of J Reid, Deputy Commissioner of Fyzabad, on the outbreak of 8 June 1857. Quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 35.

3 Gubbins, p. 137.

*Tā'ib* confirms this and says that on assuming the leadership of the Revolutionaries Aḥmad Allāh Shāh issued orders for the destruction of the temple which had been raised on the site of the mosque. The poet adds in a note that the Shāh was intelligent enough to realize its consequences, but he thought it was necessary to redress the grievances of the aggrieved party. This step alienated the Hindu sepoy and they withdrew their support from him. The officers of the sepoy differed among themselves over the question of leadership; however Aḥmad Allāh Shāh started for Lucknow. See *Tā'ib*, pp. 58-59.

4 Gubbins, p. 137. Ḥusayni says that the local leadership of the Revolution was not offered to Aḥmad Allāh Shāh; the Revolutionaries wanted Mirzā 'Abbās, grandson of Shujā' al-Dawlah, to lead them, but he was too old for it; hence they selected Man Singh. See vol. II, p. 203.

Captain Reid (Memorandum in *F.S.U.P.*, II, p. 35) gives Sikandar Shāh as the name of Aḥmad Allāh Shāh; he is also mentioned by some Indian writers.

## Sultanpur

At Sultanpur, on the right bank of the Gumti, symptoms of a rising had become evident as early as 5 June. Two days later, Colonel Fisher, Commander of the 15th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, sent the women and children towards Allahabad. Before the rising of the troops on the 9th, Risaldar Ahmad told Fisher to leave the place, as they had decided to overthrow the British Government, but the latter did not accept the offer.<sup>1</sup> Fisher and his second-in-command, Captain Gibbings, were both shot dead; two civilian officers were also slain. Other officers managed to escape and took shelter in the fort of Derah, belonging to Rustam Shāh.<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries now left for Lucknow. On the way they changed their course and proceeded to Nawabganj, "which, by the 27th of June, became the rendezvous of all the mutineers in Oudh." The leader of the Revolutionaries at Sultanpur was Mahdi Husayn. The reports about Sultanpur reached Saloni on the same day (9 June), and the troops stationed there rose on the 10th. The European officers, managed to escape and reach the fort of Dārāpūr which belonged to a Hindu zamindar, Hanmant Singh who, although he had suffered at the hands of the British Government, did not only give them shelter, but also took them under his own protection to the ferry opposite Allahabad. When bidding him farewell Captain Barrow told Hanmant that he

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It appears from a statement in the *Tārīkh-i-Khurshīd Jāhī* (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1298 H.), p. 707; that Ahmad Allāh Shah was also known by this name. See Sen, p. 186.

1 Husayni, II, p. 204.

He tells us that the Muslim sepoys wanted to punish the officers who had failed to redress their grievances in the Hanūmāngarhī incident.

2 Rustam Shāh had not been treated well by the authorities, and "had suffered unduly at the settlement, and had lost many villages which he should have been permitted to retain." Gubbins adds that he had arranged "that fresh inquiries should be made into the title of the villages which he had lost". Perhaps this had made Rustam Shāh a supporter of the British and "a fine specimen of the best kind of talooqdars in Oudh." Gubbins, p. 139.

hoped that the Raja would help the British in suppressing "the revolt". These words hurt the patriotism of the Rajput chief ; "Sahib", he said, "your countrymen came into this country and drove out our king . . . At one blow you took from me lands which from time immemorial had been in my family. I submitted. Suddenly misfortune fell upon you. The people of the land rose against you. You came to me whom you had despoiled. I have saved you. But now, — now I march at the head of my retainers to Lakhnau to try and drive you from the country."<sup>1</sup>

### **Dariabad**

Dariabad, a district in Lucknow division, also rose on 9 June. Captain Hawes, Commander of the 5th Oudh Irregular Infantry stationed there, tried to remove the treasure, three lakhs of rupees, to Lucknow. This action of the Commandant provoked the sepoys ; they attacked him and seized the treasure. Hawes escaped and, took refuge with Ram Singh, zamindar of Suhee. The Revolutionaries proclaimed Wājid 'Alī Shāh as their ruler.<sup>2</sup> The districts lying near the frontiers of Awadh had also by this time come within the vortex of the Revolution, and the movements of the Revolutionaries in some of these places were closely connected with developments in other parts of the Province. Banaras, Azamgarh and Gorakhpur became important theatres of the activities of the Revolutionaries.

### **Banaras**

The city of Banaras, with a population of nearly two lakhs of people,<sup>3</sup> lay on the left bank of the Ganges, a little over four hundred miles from Calcutta. Besides being a place of pilgrimage for the Hindus it was an important station on the road to Allahabad. The cantonment and the civil lines were at Sikroli, three

1 Quoted in Kaye and Malleeson, III, p. 272n ; also see Gubbins, p. 141 ; and Innes, p. 86.

2 Gubbins, p. 143.

3 Cf Kaye and Malleeson, II, 150 n.

miles from the town ; here were quartered the 37th N. I., the Sikh Regiment of Ludhiana, and the 13th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, besides Artillerymen. Tucker, the Commissioner of the division, was a zealous evangelist. "He went about," writes Sir John Kaye, "fearless and confident, saying to himself, 'The Lord is my rock, my fortress and my deliverer ; the God of my rock, in Him will I trust. He is my shield and the horn of my salvation ; my high tower, and my refuge ; my Saviour.' And in this abundant, over-flowing confidence and resignation he seemed to despise all human means of defence and almost to regard defensive efforts — 'secondary means' — as a betrayal of want of faith in the Almighty."<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, some measurers were taken, and "by the advice of Messrs. Gubbins and Lind, and at the entreaty of the European residents, arms and ammunition have this day been issued out to all who require them. I hope that it will make their mind easy, and that they will rest quiet. I am so thankful we have no place of defence here. We have nowhere to run to, so must stand firm—and hitherto there has not been one particle of panic and confusion."<sup>2</sup>

However, on 31 May the symptoms of a rising became clear ; "at 1.30 a.m. the lines vacated by the 67th N. I. were seen to be in flames ;" the attitude of the 37th was also not above suspicion. In fact preparations for a rising were being made for some time, "for next day some men, who were seen consulting near the spot where the fire had broken out, were tracked, and one party traced to the 'Shirvala', where most of the Delhi Princes lived."<sup>3</sup> Four days later when the civil and military officers were holding conference a trooper brought the report of the rising at Azamgarh ; a prompt decision was taken "that next morning the civilians should assemble at the Collector's Kuchery while the 37th was paraded and disarmed." When returning from

1 Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 157.

2 Tucker to the Governor-General quoted in Kaye and Malleon, II, p. 157.

3 Taylor, Robert, *The Rebellion of 1857 in the Province of Banaras* (Allahabad), paras. 9-10.

the conference Brigadier Ponsonby met Colonel Neill ;<sup>1</sup> he recommended that the corps should be disarmed at once. The Sepoys were laying down their arms, but when they saw the European troops coming on to the ground they picked them up and opened fire ; the Europeans replied. Ponsonby "appeared to be losing all power of mind and body ;" Neill, therefore, came to him and said, "General, I assume command." About the same time the Sikhs were startled by the noise of firing in their rear ; they rushed against the European Artillerymen. Captain Olpherts, who commanded the Artillery, replied by a discharge of grape. "The Sikhs", wrote Neill in a private letter, "did not stand two rounds of grape, but broke and fled . . . I . . . followed them up as far as I could, fired round-shot into them, and set fire to their lines."<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime the Christian families had rushed to the Collector's Court to take refuge on its roof. The people of the town, as well as the sepoy, were now greatly excited ; but the Christian refugees were saved from their fury by the efforts of some loyal citizens.<sup>3</sup> At 2 a. m. on 5 June the refugees were shifted to the Mint which was considered to be a safer place. The party had hardly reached there when news came that the green flag was going to be raised ; the authorities however succeeded in frustrating the scheme of the Revolutionaries by exciting the Rajputs living in the town.<sup>4</sup> The same day Neill was found "busily hanging

1 Neil had arrived at Banaras on 3 June. Holmes (p. 212) says that Ponsonby went to Neill's quarters to consult him as to when the 37th was to be disarmed. Sen is not certain about the place where the two officers met ; he writes : "It is not clear when Ponsonby met Neill, or where, . . ." Cf. Sen, p. 153.

2 Kay, J. W., *Lives of the Indian Officers* (London, 1875), p. 338. In a letter to the *Times* (18 August, 1875) Ponsonby said that "he conducted the whole business, he must bear the blame." Also see Holmes, p. 213 and note.

3 Foremost among those whose efforts saved the refugees were "Surat Singh, a state prisoner, Pandit Gokal Chand, *Nazir* to the judge, Deonarain, a wealthy citizen and the *raja* of Benaras". Cf. Taylor, para. 14 ; Holmes, p. 214.

4 The Revolutionaries had decided that the flag was to be raised in the

batches of mutineers as fast as they were brought in".<sup>1</sup> Neill's tyranny did not spare even boys of tender age. "Some of the officers", says Holmes, "used their power with indiscriminate ferocity. Lads who had been guilty of nothing worse than waving rebel colours and beating tom-tom, were summarily executed. Gentlemen volunteered to serve as hangmen, and gloried in the skill with which they disposed of their victims. But mere executions, however severe, were not enough to restore British authority."<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, for the moment the situation was under control; next morning the Commissioner reported to Canning; "The town is quite quiet".

### **Azamgarh**

The sepoy at Azamgarh, nearly sixty miles from Banaras, had risen a day earlier; in fact their action had expedited the outbreak and accelerated the progress of the Revolution at Banaras.<sup>3</sup> As a precautionary measure the local authorities had fortified the Collector's court-house. On the first day of the month of June, reports were received of "seditious meetings" of the sepoys of the 17th N. I.<sup>4</sup> Two days later a Company of that Regiment and some other troops carrying five lakhs of rupees entered Azamgarh on their way to Banaras; this was a signal for the rising of the 17th. However, "by mingled threats and promises" the officers succeeded in persuading the sepoys to resume their march to Banaras; three hours after their departure the Regiment rose. The Magistrate had asked the Kotwal "to do what he could to check the advance of the sepoys through

Bisheshwar temple. It was, therefore, not difficult for the European officers to excite the Hindu Rajputs, by telling them that the green flag, being a symbol of *jihād*, would desecrate the temple. Taylor, para. 16

1 Holmes (p. 214n) on the authority of *Times*, August 25, 1857, p. 6, col. 4.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 215.

3 Taylor, para. 18.

4 The 17th N. I. were brigaded with the 19th and 34th stationed at Lucknow.

the city. But it was all in vain ; the Kotwal could do nothing and the jail guard, releasing the prisoners, at once joined the advancing rebels".<sup>1</sup> The Revolutionaries, whose numbers were swelled by the released prisoners and the police, seized the contents of the local treasury and hurriedly rushed towards the Banaras road to overtake the treasure-escort. The British officer in charge of the escort "found that he was helpless. The troopers of the 13th Irregulars were wavering. They were not so far gone in rebellion as to desire the death of their officers, but a strong national sympathy restrained them from acting against their countrymen".<sup>2</sup>

The sepoys now brought the treasure back to Azamgarh, from where, in the meantime, European residents had fled to Ghazipur. The Revolutionaries took possession of the town, and then left "with all the pomp of war" for Fyzabad. A few days later an attempt was made by some Europeans to recover Azamgarh for the British. Two indigo-planters, Venables and Dunn who were also among the Azamgarh refugees at Ghazipur, offered to go in search of a few persons who had not been able to effect their escape. With a small party they left Ghazipur ; Venables succeeded in reaching his estate near Duri Ghat and increasing the strength of his retainers by adding to them some men from his tenantry. He now marched on Azamgarh which was surrendered to him by 'Ali Bakhsh, who had managed to seize power by forming a Committee of Public Safety to run the administration.<sup>3</sup> The

1 Taylor, para 22.

"The attack on the jail and the release of the prisoners were carried out in the midst of remarkable enthusiasm, which recalls the revolutionary attack on the Bastille during the French Revolution." See Chatterji, Nandalal *New Light on the Revolt of 1857 at Azamgarh* in the *Journal of Indian History* (Trivandrum), vol XXXIV, part III. December 1956, p. 242

2 Kaye and Malleon, I, p. 161.

3 'Ali Bakhsh enjoyed the confidence of the Revolutionaries although throughout this time he had been in contact with the Commissioner of Banaras.



Palwar Rajputs led by Prithipal Singh seem to have kept the neighbouring area under their control for some time ; another Revolutionary leader Muẓaffar Khān had set up his headquarters at Mahul.

On 16 July Venables was defeated by the Palwar Rajputs at Koilsa, but the latter failed to take advantage of their victory ; "had the rebels pushed on with anything like vigour, it would have gone hard with Venables."<sup>1</sup> However, reinforcements arriving on 18 July, Venables again marched out to meet the Revolutionaries, but once again he was defeated and had to flee. A council was now held to discuss the propriety of abandoning Azamgarh. It was fully realized by Venables and his comrades that their hold on the town was far from satisfactory ; "... on July 23rd" says Taylor, "one Rujub Allee attacked the Kotwalee with some four hundred followers in broad daylight : the Police made no prolonged resistance, and the prisoners were rescued with little loss in conflict, and as little in Mr. Venable's hasty pursuit".<sup>2</sup> The British evacuated Azamgarh on 30 July under orders from the Commissioner.<sup>3</sup> On 13 August, however, it was recaptured for them by their allies, the Gurkhas.<sup>4</sup>

### Jaunpur

A contingent of the Ludhiana Regiment of the Sikhs was posted at Jaunpur. They had "made demonstrations of their fidelity" on 5 June when reports of the rising at Aramgarh had arrived there, but when later came the tidings of the 'slaughter of the Sikhs by the Europeans' they rose ; "the Treasury was plundered. And all surviving Europeans, after a humiliating surrender of their

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Taylor, para 39. Keene thinks, "his name deserves to be recorded perpetually as that of a true hero and faithful servant of an alien Government whose salt he had eaten." See Keene, p. 108.

1 Kaye and Malleison, VI, p. 66.

2 Taylor, para. 41 ; also see Kaye and Malleison, VI, p. 65.

3 Kaye and Malleison, VI, p. 67.

4 *Ibid.*, IV, p. 222.

arms, were driven to seek safety in flight."<sup>1</sup> The British authorities left the charge nominally in the hands of a Committee with a Rajput zamindar as its head. The chief Revolutionary leader was Irādat Khān, the *Nā'ib Nāzim* of Jaunpur, with his headquarters at Mubārakpur. Mirzapur and Ghazipur, the remaining two districts of Banaras division, were also affected by the Revolution. The authority of the British Government was thus overthrown in almost the entire division excepting the city itself.

### Gorakhpur

The news of the rising of the 17th N. I. at Azamgarh reached Gorakhpur on 5 June and naturally disturbed the contingent of that Regiment posted there. On the following morning when orders were issued for a march to Azamgarh they refused to obey, and one of their leaders declared "that the money in the treasury should not leave the station without a fight." On the 7th, however, an attempt made by the prisoners to break open the jail failed, and several of them were killed and wounded in the effort. Four days later (11 June.) the troopers of the 12th Irregulars, who had been sent to Azamgarh with Government money, returned and reported to Wynyard<sup>2</sup> the state of affairs in the neighbouring districts. Wynyard took precautionary measures, and "proclaimed martial law in the district, (and) suspended the ordinary forms of trial, . . ."<sup>3</sup> His position was greatly strengthened by the arrival of Gurkha forces in July. At the end of that month, however, Wynyard was startled by the news that the 12th Irregulars having broken out at Sigauli and seized that station were now on their way to Gorakhpur. He disarmed the contingent of the 17th N. I. but an attempt

1 Kaye and Malleon. II, p. 178.

The British officers found refuge in the house of Hingan Lal; from there they were removed to a factory at some distance from the town; they were taken to Banaras on 9 June. Cf Keene, p. 115.

2 He was the Judge of the district, but being considered a more capable person than the Collector he was given its civil charge.

3 Kaye and Malleon, VI, p. 55.

to take the arms of the troopers of the 12th Irregulars failed; they mounted their horses and galloped off.<sup>1</sup>

Wynyard had by now begun to feel that "the district was no longer tenable". As he had already received Canning's permission "to have no scruples in retiring in time", he decided to quit the place on 13 August. Muḥammad Ḥusayn,<sup>2</sup> who was posted at Khayrābād at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution, had assumed the leadership of the Revolutionaries in this region; he took possession of Gorakhpur and proclaimed himself *Nāẓim*. Soon after assuming power he made necessary arrangements for the administration of the district and recruited men for his army.<sup>3</sup>

The authorities of the Revolutionary Government at Gorakhpur were hardly in the saddle when the British forces launched a campaign against them. They were assisted by the Gurkhas of Nepal, whose loyalty and support proved to be a source of considerable strength to the British. The Prime Minister of the State, Jang Bahadur, was "very unscrupulous but very sagacious;"<sup>4</sup> he decided to exploit the Hind-Pākistān Revolution for his own advantage. He, therefore, made an offer of help to the British through their Resident at his capital and expressed his willingness to send a body of Gurkha mercenaries to help his Government against the Revolutionaries. The offer was accepted and the first detachment of a thousand Gurkhas left Khatmandu on 15 June. Two days later he received a letter from the Foreign Secretary of Canning, "order-

1 Kaye and Malleon, VI, p. 58. A portion of the 12th Irregulars (eighty-three troopers) remained loyal under Risaldar Muḥammad Bakhsh who was later made extra-aid-de-camp to the Governor-General.

2 Cf. Badāyūnī, Mawlawī Muḥammad Sulaymān, *A Note on two little-known Fighters in the War of Independence 1857-58*, in *J. P. H. S.*, V, part II, (1957-58), p. 124 et seq. Also see Ḥusaynī, II, 302-08; *State Papers*, II, p. 208.

3 Ḥusaynī says that the daily expenditure of the new administration was twenty-six thousand rupees. The figure of twenty-five thousand matchlockmen whom the *Nāẓim* is stated by that writer to have employed in his new army appears to be an exaggeration. See Ḥusaynī, II, p. 304.

4 Holmes, p. 166.

ing him to recall the Gurkhas, if they had not passed the frontier."<sup>1</sup> This order was carried out ; the Gurkha contingent was recalled. A week had not passed when a new order came to the Resident at Khatmandu asking him to request Jang Bahadur to send three thousand Gurkhas to the aid of Henry Lawrence. Jang Bahadur conveniently forgot that his offer "had been contemptuously rejected", and scant respect had been shown to his offer of friendliness. The Gurkha forces entered the subcontinent as mercenaries, and throughout the course of the war they never lagged behind their British comrades in perpetrating merciless butcheries, both on the captives taken in battles as well as non-combatant populations of Hindus and Muslims.<sup>2</sup>

The arrival of the Gurkhas raised the morale of the British ; they reoccupied Azamgarh on 13 and Jaunpur on 15 August. In the third week of September they made a surprise attack on Beni Madho's camp at Manduri, about ten miles from Azamgarh, and routed his Rajputs. Then they were led by Bird, Joint Magistrate of Gorakhpur, on a campaign against another Revolutionary leader, Muẓaffar Khān ; the latter's fort at Shamsābād was burnt, but he managed to escape and had evacuated his headquarters, Mahul, before the enemy arrived there.<sup>3</sup> On 27 September Mubārakpur was also taken and its defender, Irādat Khān, was captured along with his supporter, Faṣāhat Jahān; both were hanged.<sup>4</sup> Atroulia, the stronghold of Beni Madho was also occupied.<sup>5</sup>

1 Holmes, p. 166.

2 The Revolutionary leaders made several attempts to remind Jang Bahadur that the policy of supplying mercenaries to a foreign power against his neighbours and co-religionists was not good. Muḥammad Husayn was the first of these leaders to make an attempt to persuade the Nepalese Minister to change his policy, but he failed in his efforts. See Husayni, II, 305.

3 Taylor's *Narrative*, para. 65.

4 *Ibid.*, para. 68. Irādat had offered a stout resistance and yielded only when he became helpless against the guns of the enemy, Cf. Keene, p. 117.

5 Kaye and Malletson, IV, p. 223.

In the meantime arrangements were being made at Banaras for the despatch of reinforcements to strengthen the Gurkhas. Before their arrival, however, the Gurkha-British forces had to offer battle to Mahdi Husayn who had collected a strong force at Chandah and was engaged in preparations for an attack on Jaunpur. In a hotly contested action fought on 30 September, the Revolutionaries were defeated, but the losses of the Gurkhas too were not insignificant; their Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Madan Man Singh, was among the slain. In spite of these reverses the position of the Revolutionaries was still intact. The British now decided to send three different armies into the region during the coming winter. Jang Bahadur commanding a force of 10,000 men reached the frontier on 20 December; Colonel McGregor was attached to him. The Jaunpur force was strengthened by large reinforcements and placed under the command of Brigadier-General Franks. A third army under Colonel Rowcroft moved from Tirhut and marched along the Gandak towards Gorakhpur. After defeating a small band of the Revolutionaries at Sohanpur on 26 December, it crossed that river and came up to the Burkai Ghat on the Gogra. Jang Bahadur marched straight in the direction of Gorakhpur, and the combined forces of the British and Gurkhas defeated the Revolutionaries in a battle fought on 6 January, 1858, and occupied the town.<sup>1</sup> In February Rowcroft was ordered to

1 The occupation of Gorakhpur was followed by the usual acts of retaliation. In a letter dated Gorakhpur, the 12th January, 1858, the writer refers to the British occupation in these words: "This town has now been almost a week in our possession, . . . several of those who held posts under the Nizam (as Mahomed Hossein is called by the natives) are being brought in for trial, and execution quickly follows . . . No regard is shown to a man's former rank; all alike are made to do sweepers' work so far as clearing up and removing rubbish goes . . . We expect hourly the arrival, at Goruckpore, of that consummate villain Mushurruf Khan, who was apprehended a few days since by the rance of Bustie . . . Ten men were hung the day after we arrived, and six on the following day; how many more since, it is not easy to say, as the gallows was removed from the conspicuous spot it occupied in consequence of an intimation

take charge of Gorakhpur and keep open the communications ; Jang Bahadur proceeded towards Lucknow, and crossing the Gumti near Sultanpur reached his destination on 10 March. The third army under General Franks moved in the direction of Allahabad (21 February); he was to expel the Revolutionary leader, Faḍl-i-'Azīm, who was encamping at Saraun. On hearing about Franks' march Faḍl-i-'Azīm broke camp and moved to Sikandarāh, the stronghold of another Revolutionary leader, Beni Bahadur. Franks attacked it on the 23rd; the Revolutionaries offered resistance but were ultimately forced to fall upon the frontiers of Awadh.

### Sultanpur

After making necessary arrangements for the administration of the districts bordering Allahabad, Franks started on his way to Sultanpur. At Chandah he had to fight a short battle with Bandih Ḥasan, an officer of the *Nāzīm*, Mahdī Ḥusayn. Bandih Ḥasan had written to his chief for reinforcements, but before any help could come he was attacked and defeated (19 February). Franks knew that Mahdī Ḥusayn was on his way to Chandah; he proceeded in that direction and met him near the village of Hamirpur in an indecisive action. Two days later Franks occupied the strong fort of Budhāyan, while the *Nāzīm* took position at Bādshāhganj, two miles beyond it. General Ghafūr Beg, who had been sent by the Revolutionary Government to check the advance of Franks, had now joined Mahdī Ḥusayn and assumed command of the Revolutionaries. The position taken by Ghafūr Beg was vulnerable at the point where the Allahabad-Lucknow road crossed the *nālah* which protected his front. This weakness of Ghafūr Beg's from the Nepaules chief, that it was displeasing to him to see bodies hanging."

Musharraḥ Khān was among those who were hanged ; Boid who had accompanied Jang Bahadur as Joint Magistrate, "had the satisfaction of hanging his uninvited visitor, whom he first had paraded in a cart through the streets of Goruckpore, where, during the five preceding months, he had been accustomed to ride about with a species of regal pomp."

For the letter quoted above see Ball, II pp. 227-28 ; also note on p. 228.

defences was mainly responsible for his defeat in the battle of Sultanpur fought on 23 February.<sup>1</sup> On the following day Lieutenant Aikman arrived from the Panjab, and took the road to Lucknow which was now supposed to be clear, but on 1 March, he had to fight a brief action on the banks of the Gumti. Manṣab 'All, who commanded the tiny band of the Revolutionaries, offered stiff resistance but was ultimately pushed back, and Aikman was able to cross the river. Franks, who had reached Amethi on his way to Lucknow, learnt that the fort of Daurarah was held by the Revolutionaries; he decided to capture it. The Horse Artillery guns were brought into action, but they could make no impression on its walls; the 24-pounder howitzers were then tried and proved effective. The Revolutionaries now barricaded themselves in a strong building with a heavy gate; Franks tried his best but failed to capture it. He justifies his repulse from Daurarah in these words: "The shot from one of their guns which we turned against it, making no impression on the massive gate, a fire kindled against it having no effect, and my only Engineer officer, Lieutenant Innes, having been severely wounded while trying to burst open the entrance, I determined to withdraw from the place."<sup>2</sup>

1 Kaye and Malletson, IV, pp. 233-35; Innes, pp. 274-76.

2 Quoted in Forrest, II, p. 271.

## CHAPTER XX

### AWADH (II)

**Ahmad Allah Shah and Hadrat Mahal**

**Lucknow :**

Early in June 1857, when the Revolutionaries were trying to overthrow the British authority in different parts of Awadh, Lucknow was comparatively quiet. On the 9th of that month Henry Lawrence, whose health was deteriorating rather fast, handed over charge to a Council, but he took it back two days later, because he did not agree with the latter's policy of dismissing the loyal sepoys. He was however fully sensible of the delicate situation in Awadh. On the 12th he wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Province: "We still hold the cantonment, as well as our two posts, but every outpost (I fear) has fallen, and we daily expect to be besieged by the confederated mutineers and their allies. The country is not yet thoroughly up, but every day brings it nearer that condition ... we are agreed that, on the whole, the Residency is the point to hold"<sup>1</sup> About the middle of the month the fortification of the Residency was earnestly taken in hand: the setting up of a strong battery of heavy guns, on the north, afterwards called the Redan Battery, was started on the 18th; a few days earlier the construction of the Kānpur Battery had already commenced on the south.<sup>2</sup>

**Rasul Bakhsh Kakurawi and others hanged**

Along with these defence arrangements some persons were apprehended because their "previous conduct and present

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Kaye and Mallsen, III, p. 275

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed account of the defence see Gubbins, pp. 153-64. The defences were made on such a large scale that "before the end of the month one would scarcely have recognised the Residency enclosure".



behaviour threw suspicion upon them".<sup>1</sup> Among the leading persons who were thus put behind the bars were Muṣṭafā 'Alī Khān, a brother of the ex-king Wājid 'Alī Shāh, and Muḥammad Humāyūn and Mirzā Muḥammad Shukoh, who were connected with the Imperial family of Delhi, Rukn al-Dawlah, son of Sa'adat 'Alī Khān, and the zamindar of Tulsipur. A few days later, "on the 16th or 17th", a number of Revolutionary workers led by Rasūl Bakhsh Kākūrawī were arrested. The story of his arrest is interesting. His son, Mīr 'Abbās, was one evening chatting with a havildar near the Husainabad tank and trying to persuade him to join the Revolution. They were overheard by two spies who informed Captain Hughes about the "conspiracy". On the following morning a party led by the City Magistrate raided the house where Munshī Rasūl Bakhsh was giving directions to his workers. All the occupants of the house were captured and taken to *Machhi-Bhawan*. Munshī Rasūl Bakhsh, his son and two other persons were hanged. When his colleagues heard about the execution of Rasūl Bakhsh they attacked the police station of Kākūri and killed two policemen: "it was deliberated whether a force should be sent out to punish the town; but it was thought advisable to defer the measure to a season when we had less upon our hands."<sup>2</sup> Husayni adds that in all twenty-two persons were captured and taken to *Machhi-Bhawan*; they included even innocent acquaintances of the Munshī and some members of a Hindu marriage party, which had come from Banaras and was staying in a house hard by.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Ahmad Allah Shah's victory at Chinhut**

Sayyid Ahmad Allāh Shāh was at this time encamping at Nawabganj about eighteen miles from Lucknow; some contingents of the Revolutionary sepoy and troopers had also come there to join him. The Revolutionaries in the camp of Nawabganj

1 Gubbins, pp. 164-65.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 171-72.

3 Cf. Husayni, II, pp. 206-08.

were in touch with the Nānā,<sup>1</sup> and it was after the surrender of General Wheeler at Kānpur that the Shāh began to move towards Lucknow. Kānpur had already fallen to the Revolutionaries when the Shāh had arrived at Chinhut, eight miles from Lucknow, on the 29th. Henry Lawrence sent a small party to reconnoitre the position of the Revolutionaries ; on its return at sunset, he decided to launch a major offensive against them early next morning. The British forces accordingly assembled at the Iron Bridge and marched towards Kokrail, a small river about half way to Chinhut. From this point the army had to march on a raised embankment of loose and sandy soil ; it had proceeded nearly a mile and a half when the advance guard was fired upon from Ismā'il-ganj, a village, on the line of march. The men of the 32nd attacked the village and occupied it. Soon after this the British forces sighted the Revolutionaries who were occupying a thick mango grove near Chinhut. They lost no time in bringing their guns into action, but the Revolutionaries being at a distance of nearly 1,300 yards, they produced no effect. After a gun duel lasting for about twenty minutes, "there was lull in the firing of the enemy, which led Lawrence to believe that they were losing heart ; and presently they fell back into the groves and disappeared. But Lawrence was soon undeceived."<sup>2</sup> They were advancing in two parties on either flank of the British : on the right the Cavalry of the Revolutionaries was moving steadily, defying the enemy's fire, while their Infantry was proceeding towards Ismā'il-ganj on the left. They soon captured the village and expelled the British soldiers who had occupied it. A band of Revolutionary horsemen led by Sayyid

<sup>1</sup> Gubbins, p. 181.

The sepoy regiments of Nawabganj were commanded by Barakāt Ahmad, while the volunteer corps supplied by the talukadars, were under Khān 'Alī Khān, the lieutenant of Nawāb 'Alī Khān, the Talukdar of Maḥmūdābād, "the first of his class who openly rebelled". *Trial Proceedings ; Govt. vs. Raja Jullā Singh ; Govt. Decision*, quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 51.

The Shāh was supreme Commander and leader of the Revolutionaries ; this is clearly mentioned in *Talib's* account of the battle, pp. 59-63 ; also see Innes, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Holmes, p. 265.

Aḥmad Allāh Shāh himself fell upon the British Artillery and rendered their guns ineffective. He was wounded in the thigh, but this did not affect his zeal as a fighter.<sup>1</sup> As the British were suffering heavy losses, "Lawrence, seeing that he was in danger of being surrounded gave the order to retreat. The retreat soon became a rout".<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries pursued the fugitives right up to the suburbs of Lucknow and inflicted heavy losses on them. "Our loss in this sad defeat," remarks Gubbins, "was very severe . . . The loss in European soldiers was very severe, the killed being 112, and the wounded 44 and not a few of the natives had fallen, while more had deserted."<sup>3</sup> The Revolutionaries followed up their victory at Chinhut by a march upon Lucknow. The British offered resistance, but their guns could check the advance of the victors only to a limited extent. Most of them managed to ford the river at a distance where they were safe against the fire of the enemy. The defeat at Chinhut demoralized, at least for the moment, the defenders of the Residency. Before the Horse Artillery of the Revolutionaries and the bulk of their forces crossed the bridge, "the blaze of their watch fires and the

1 *Tā'ib* refers to the battle in these lines :

عدو کش، سپہدار، لشکر شکن	شہ شیر قوت، یل پیل تن
گئے توپ پر، صورت شیرنر	کیا قتل اعدا کو للکار کر
کہ ہاں، حان سے دست بردار ہو	اجل آگئی سر پہ ہشیار ہو
ہمارے ہے قضہ سین تیغ عمر	لڑائی سین گوروں کی ہین شیرنر
دبایا جو گھوڑے کو سب ہٹ گئے	پرے فوج بد خواہ کے جھٹ گئے

[ *Translation*.—The killer of the enemy, the leader of the forces and destroyer of the armies,—the Shāh a wrestler having the strength of a lion and the body of an elephant, rushed on the enemy's Artillery like a lion, and killed the enemies after challenging them: he told them to wash their hands of their lives and be ready for it, because death was hovering over their heads. We have (he continued) the sword of 'Umar in our hands, and we are like a lion in fighting against the tomnies . . . When he pushed his horse the enemy abandoned his position, and the ranks of his forces were split.

Ḥusaynī (II, pp. 212-18) gives a detailed account of the battle, II, p. 213.

2 Holmes, p. 265.

3 Gubbins, pp. 188-89.

For a detailed statement of casualties see *State Papers*, II, p. 62.

flash of their guns lighted up the darkness of the night, the first night of the siege of Lucknow."<sup>1</sup>

Immediately after his triumphant entry into Lucknow, Aḥmad-Allāh Shāh set up his own machinery of administration with *Tārā Kothi*, which he had selected for his residence, as its headquarters. The new Government soon found itself confronted with a number of problems. The sepoy's began to plunder the palaces of the ex-King and the houses of the leading citizens.<sup>2</sup> More serious than the plundering of the houses was however the change in the attitude of the sepoy's towards the Shāh, which ultimately led to differences in the ranks of the Revolutionaries. Aḥmad-Allāh Shāh was a *Mujāhid*, *par excellence*; he had risen against the rule of the foreigner, because he genuinely believed that it had created conditions, which made *jihād* obligatory on the Muslims. One of the important requisites of *jihād* was the presence of an *Imām* (leader) and the Shāh had no doubt that he, more than any other individual, was qualified to hold that position. As such he wanted the sepoy's also to follow the rigid discipline of *jihād*; he could not tolerate their plundering of the people or other excesses of a similar nature.<sup>3</sup> The sepoy's on the other hand were anxious to enjoy the 'usual' fruits of a victory; they had done so when serving in the Company's army, and could not understand why they should not do it now. No wonder, therefore, that Aḥmad Allāh Shāh failed in his efforts to stop lawlessness. In fact, on one occasion the *Mujāhids* would have come into clash with the sepoy's, if they had not been stopped by the Shāh who asked them to bear it calmly. He, however, left the house which he was occupying because the sepoy's wanted to plunder it.<sup>4</sup>

1 Holmes, p. 267; also see Kaye and Malletson, III, pp. 284-86.

2 Husaynī gives some details of the plundering raids of the sepoy's who were soon joined by the riff-raffs of the city. He adds, however, that their officers were careful to see that arms and ammunitions were not plundered, Vol. II, pp. 214-22.

3 *Tā'ib's* account is corroborated by Kavanagh's statement. *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 139.

4 *Tā'ib*, p. 64. For the plunder of *Tārā Kothi* see Husaynī, II, p. 224.

Nevertheless, the relations of the officers of the Revolutionary sepoys with the *Mujāhids* became strained. The *Shāh* fully realized the dangerous consequences of a rift between his men and the sepoys.<sup>1</sup> He also knew that the bulk of the Muslim population in Lucknow, unlike Delhi, was *Shi'ah*, and naturally he could not expect considerable support from them for his *jihād* movement.<sup>2</sup> Evidently the situation was critical, but the *Shāh* faced it like a seasoned statesman. He did not insist on forcing his views or authority on the people and decided to let them have their own arrangements ; he would just support them, keeping all differences in the background.

#### **Birjis Qadr becomes Wali of Awadh**

The first problem of the Revolutionary forces was to select the head of the Government in Awadh. They wanted to have a descendant of Sa'ādat 'Alī *Khāh* as their leader ; but Rukn al-Dawlah Nawāb Muḥammad Ḥasan *Khan*, who came under that category, was in British custody in the Residency.<sup>3</sup> They tried another Prince, Nawab Siṭwat Jāh, who, in the words of Ḥusayni, gave a remarkable reply : "even *Shujā'* al-Dawlah could not do anything against the British ; what can we do ? Why should I spoil my (life of) comfort ?"<sup>4</sup> Ultimately the choice fell on

1 Referring to the situation in Lucknow Ḥusayni says : "(it had not been) like Delhi where all (citizens) had joined them (the Revolutionaries) ; there the majority was of the Sunnis and due to their creed they joined them : in Lucknow the majority was of the *Shi'ahs* in whose creed *jihād* was unlawful without an *Imām*. And, when the Sunnis here (Lucknow) had become acquainted with the self-willed and self-loving nature of the (fighters in the) *jihad* they had no reasons to join it". See Vol. II, p. 223. Kamāl al-Dīn himself, being a *Shi'ah*, had little sympathy with Sayyid Aḥmad Allāh *Shāh's* movement. Also see *Tā'ib*, p. 64.

2 For the views of the *Shi'ahs* on the question whether the War of Independence was to be treated as a *jihād* see *Zafarnamah Ghadr*.

Whatever their attitude may be towards *jihād* it is beyond doubt that the people of Lucknow fought with courage and determination in the Revolutionary War.

3 Ḥusayni says that he had taken shelter in the Residency. This does not seem to be correct. According to Gubbins he was imprisoned because he "was believed to be in correspondence with the mutineers." See p. 165.

4 Ḥusayni, II, p. 225.



Begam Hadrat Mahal, wife of Wājid 'Alī Shāh.  
(From S. N. Sen's *Eighteen Fifty Seven*)



Birjis Qadr, the eleven year old son of Wājid 'Alī Shāh ; and on 6 July Risaldar Barakāt Aḥmad and Shāhāb al-Dīn placed the *mandil* (turban) on his head. The proclamation of his assumption of the office of *Wālī* was made by public criers in these words : "The people belong to God, the country to the Emperor of Delhi and the authority of Government to Birjis Qadr."<sup>1</sup>

#### Hadrat Mahal's Government

It was a political blunder on the part of the Army officers to have placed the administration in the hands of a young boy who, it has been stated, was frightened when guns were fired to proclaim his accession to office. Actually the administration was conducted by the Prince's mother, Hadrat Maḥal, a remarkable woman, but a woman, after all. Unfortunately for the Revolutionaries, she was completely in the hands of her private secretary, Mammū Khān, who possessed neither the capacity nor patriotism of a good popular leader. Aḥmad Allāh Shāh's reaction was evident ; the conduct of the sepoys was disappointing because they had not only broken the pledge given to him, but had entrusted their leadership to "an ignorant boy".<sup>2</sup> He concluded his remarks : "If you will not take the right path, you will never succeed against the ill wishing enemy"<sup>3</sup> A very strong man was needed to lead the Revolution, and not the minor son of a dynasty whose record during the last few years had been anything but creditable.

However, the Court of the new *Wālī* was summoned to appoint a *Nāib* and a *Diwān* : after some discussion, Shāraf al-Dawlah Ibrāhīm Khān and Maharajah Balkrishna were selected for the two posts respectively.<sup>4</sup> Besides these some other appointments may also

1 Husayni II, p. 227.

2 The actual words of the Shāh have been reproduced by his biographer in this line :

کوئی کھیل شاید مقرر کیا کہ ایک طفل نادان کو امر کیا

[Translation : They think it to be a child's play ; because they have appointed an ignorant boy as their leader] *Ta'ib*, pp. 64-65.

3 *Ibid*, p. 65 ; also see *F S U. P.*, II, p. 77.

4 It is interesting that an objection to Shāraf al-Dawlah's appointment was



be mentioned. Mirzā 'Alī Raḡā Beg was appointed Kotwal and Ḥusayn al-Dawlah was made the Commander of the forces; Mammū Khān was promoted to the office of the *Dārūghah-i-Diwan-i-Khāṣ* and his supporter Raja Jai Lal was made Collector.<sup>1</sup> The first important step taken by the new Government was to address a circular to the Talukdars to join the Revolution.<sup>2</sup> Ḥusayn al-Dawlah was directed to start recruiting new soldiers for the Army. It was rather unfortunate that most of the officers of the new Government and the advisers of Ḥaḍrat Maḥal were incompetent and unpatriotic. "When the authority of the Christians broke down," says 'Allāmah Faḍl-i-Ḥaqq, "and their Government was overthrown the country passed into her hands; her son was young, conceited, delicate and vain, and was given to playing with boys of his own age, absolutely neglectful of his enemies . . . All the officers of his government and the ministers of the State were worthless, timid, and cowardly, and were foolish and dishonest; they were neither wise nor trustworthy. They were all mean fellows and some of them had been slaves. Amongst them were illiterate, ease-loving, impertinent, noise-making, lazy and feeble fellows and flatterers, hangers-on and sycophants. They were mean and . . . low-born rascals, irresolute and incapable of acting, dishonest and tyrannical, cruel, deceitful, treacherous and scheming . . . their policy led the administration to misfortune, destruction and ruin . . . most of them were allies of the Christians and advocates of their friendship."<sup>3</sup> Indeed it goes to the credit of Ḥaḍrat Maḥal that she fought the War under such handicaps; if her advisers and raised by Mammū Khān on the ground that he was a Sunnī; but it was not accepted because he was considered to be a capable person. Ḥusaynī, II, pp. 228-29.

1 *Ibid.* For Mammū Khān's over-all influence see *Trial Proceedings: Govt. vs. Mammū Khān*, particularly statements of witnesses, quoted in *F.S. U. P.*, II, p. 77 et. seq.

2 Some of the proclamations, *parwānahs* and *ḥukmnāmahs* of Birjis Qadr may be examined in *F.S. U. P.*, II, p. 121 et. seq. Also see Ḥusaynī, II, p. 234; Gubbins, p. 209.

3 *J. P. H. S.*, V., pp. 41-42.

officials had been of the same calibre as she was, the history of the struggle in Awadh would have taken a different course.

### Henry Lawrence killed by a shell

When it became certain that the Revolutionaries would invest the Residency the British decided that *Machhi Bhawan* should be abandoned and destroyed. On the second day of the siege, 1 July, a telegraphic message was given to its Commandant, Colonel Palmer, to "spike the guns well, blow up the Fort, and retire at midnight."<sup>1</sup> These instructions were carried out with success; "fortune . . . favoured the enterprise. The enemy . . . had dispersed to plunder the city."<sup>2</sup> The junction of the two forces at the Residency was "an incalculable gain to us."<sup>3</sup> During the day, however, the Revolutionaries had not been entirely inactive; an 8-inch howitzer which they had captured at Chinhut threw a shell into the apartment of Lawrence. On being advised to move to a safer place he remarked "that the enemy had no artillerymen good enough to throw another shell into the same spot";<sup>4</sup> unfortunately for him, however, "the enemy" did have at least one more gunner who could take an accurate aim. Next morning he made a round of inspection and returned at about eight o'clock; half an hour later, when he was lying in his bed another shell crashed through the wall and burst. Lawrence was mortally wounded; "James prayed with him, and administered the Holy Communion to him . . . He spoke for nearly an hour, quite calmly, expressing all his last wishes with regard to his children."<sup>5</sup> Lawrence died on 4 July, nominating Major Bank as Civil Commissioner and Brigadier Inglis as Commander of the garrison; these

1 Gubbins, p. 196.

2 Holmes, p. 268.

3 Brigadier Inglis refers to this performance in these words: "If it had not been for this wise and strategic measure no member of the Lucknow garrison, in all probability, would have survived to tell the tale;" . . . Quoted in Forrest, I, pp. 240-41.

4 Holmes, p. 268.

5 *A Lady's Diary of the Siege of Lucknow*, (London, 1858), p. 76.

two, with Major Anderson, Chief Engineer, were to form a military council.<sup>1</sup>

#### Main incidents of the siege: 20 July

The first week of the siege was spent by the Revolutionaries in taking positions and establishing batteries around the Residency.<sup>2</sup> It was estimated that they had planted about twenty guns, and some of them were as near as fifty yards of the British defences; their fire was consequently effective and the losses of the British fairly heavy. On 20 July the Revolutionaries launched their first major attack. They laid a mine inside the water-gate, about twenty-five yards from the inner defences. Their objective was the Redan, but fortunately for the British they missed the right direction and the battery remained uninjured. This was, however, followed by a general attack under cover of "a terrible fire of round shot and musketry." The battery returned fire which pushed back the parties of the Revolutionaries; at Innes' post, too, which was a little to the west of the Redan they met with a heavy fire and had to relinquish their attempt of carrying it by an escalade. These were not the only points attacked by the Revolutionaries. The *Mujāhids* attacked the Kānpur battery; "the enemy advanced bravely, led by a fanatical preacher bearing the green standard of Islamism in his hand, but he was shot in the ditch of the battery, and seeing him drop, his followers swiftly retreated from the warm fire poured on them."<sup>3</sup> This attack, it seems, was led by Aḥmad Allah *Shāh* himself who had agreed to join the sepoys in their assault, because he knew that his keeping away from the struggle

1 Forrest, I, p. 265.

2 "They occupied in force the houses which commanded them; they erected batteries; they placed guns in position; they dug trenches to protect their men from our shells; and . . . from the 1st to the 20th July, they kept up a terrific and incessant fire day and night . . . Their fire was very effective. The mosques, the houses which for want of time to destroy them had been allowed to stand, the not very remote palaces, afforded them commanding positions. Their shells penetrated into places before considered absolutely secure." Kaye and Malleson, III, pp. 299-300.

3 Forrest, I, p. 279.

would be suicidal to its cause.<sup>1</sup> The repulse of the Revolutionaries raised the morale of the defenders, but they sustained a great loss in the death of Major Banks who was shot in the head on the morning of the 21st. The same day a Hindu spy, Ungud, brought the news that Havelock had defeated the Nānā and captured Kānpur. He was sent back on 22 July and returned three days later with more detailed information about the arrival of reinforcements. Inglis sent a plan of his defences to Havelock, promising a reward of 5,000 rupees for its safe delivery. Ungud delivered it on the 28th.<sup>2</sup>

### 10 August

The Revolutionaries made their second great assault on 10 August. About 11 a.m. they exploded two mines directed respectively against Sago's Post on the east, and the Martiniere on the south, where the British defences were destroyed for about twenty-five feet. The courageous attempt of a small band of the Revolutionaries to move forward, however, failed, because of a heavy fire opened on them from the Brigade Mess, but at the same time they also attacked the Innes' House, Gubbin's Post and Kānpur battery; "at Anderson's Post.....a Moslem fanatic with the green standard of the Prophet led the ranks and animated the courage of his followers by religious appeals. He fell riddled with bullets. A comrade seized him by the belt, and threw himself with the body of the wounded standard-bearer over the stockade.

1 *Tā'ib* says that a deputation of the officers of the sepoy, led by Barakāt Aḥmad, a disciple of Aḥmad Allah Shāh, had waited on him and requested him to join them in their attack on the Residency. Barakāt Aḥmad fell on the Shāh's knees and said that they could do nothing without his help. The Shāh replied that he would certainly join them, but at the same time he warned them, almost in a prophetic strain, that they would not come out victorious. In the assault the standard-bearer was killed and the Shāh's finger of the right hand wounded. See *Tā'ib*, pp. 66-67.

2 Cf. Gubbins, p. 230.

For taking the message Ungud was promised five hundred rupees. See Germon, Maria, *Journal of the Siege of Lucknow*, edited by Michael Edwards, (London), p. 70.

The rebel mass pushed on through the storm and planted the scaling ladders against the walls."<sup>1</sup> Two hours later the besiegers managed to get close to the wall of Captain Sander's Post, and with extraordinary ability one of them tried to wrench off a bayonet which was protruding from a loop-hole. In the end, however, they were forced to withdraw to their trenches. On the following day the besiegers resumed cannonading the walls of the Residency; four men were killed.<sup>2</sup> In spite of their failure to carry the Residency by assault the Revolutionaries did not relax their efforts to pound its defence by incessant firing.

The men of the garrison were every moment expecting relief from Havelock, but in his camp also the situation was daily growing more critical, and he seemed to have lost all hope of reaching Lucknow. On 6 August he sent a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief; "I must prepare Your Excellency for my abandonment . . . of the hope of relieving Lucknow." He thought that "an advance to the walls of Lucknow involves the loss of this force." Even if he could manage to reach the destination the chances of success were not bright, because "the enemy is in such force at Lucknow that to encounter him five marches from their position would be to court annihilation."<sup>3</sup> However, on 4 August, his Assistant Quarter Master-General, Colonel Tyler, had sent a message from Mangalwar saying, "We hope to reach you in four days at furthest." But the messenger had been made a prisoner and remained under custody for some days. He delivered the message on 15 August; this naturally caused the besieged grave anxiety, because the date mentioned in the letter had passed and the relief had not come. "Much as usual," wrote one of the besieged, "the heart aches while watching for relief, but none comes. Will Cownpore be repeated at Lucknow? Alas, it seems so! Our number is visibly decreasing."<sup>4</sup>

1 Forrest, I, p. 294.

2 "Part of the roof of the Residency fell in this morning, and buried six men of the 32nd; only two were dug out alive". *A Lady's Diary*, p. 99. Maria Germon adds (p. 79) that only one of the two survived.

3 Quoted in *F.S.U.P.*, II, pp. 186-87.

4 Quoted in Forrest, I, p. 301.

The state of despondency resulting from hardships which the garrison was facing at this time is clearly reflected in a letter from Inglis addressed to Havelock. Referring to Tyler's message he wrote : "This has caused me much uneasiness . . . You must bear in mind how I am hampered, that I have upwards of 120 sick and wounded, and at least 220 women, and about 230 children, and no carriage of any description, besides sacrificing 23 lakhs of treasure, and about 30 guns of sorts . . . We are daily being attacked by the enemy who are within a few yards of our defences. Their mines have already weakened our post, and I have every reason they are carrying on others . . . If our native force who are losing confidence leave us, I do not know how the defences are to be manned."<sup>1</sup>

#### 18 August to 5 September

This letter was despatched on 16 August; two days later the Revolutionaries exploded a mine directed against the Sikh Square. Two officers and a drummer were thrown into the air by the explosion, but they descended within the square and escaped with minor injuries; seven other persons who were inside the building were buried beneath the debris. The loss was more than made up by the explosion of a mine which destroyed Johannes' house, which overlooked the Kānpur battery.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless the Revolutionaries continued their efforts to blow up the buildings of the Residency. A mine which was being directed against the Brigade Mess was abandoned by them on 28 August because the besieged garrison managed to throw a countermine;<sup>3</sup> another at Sago's

1 See *State Papers*, II, pp. 196-7.

2 The work of laying the mine had started on 17 August; it was completed on the 21st, and blown up the same afternoon at 5 p. m. Innes says that the mine was fired early at dawn on 21 August and one hundred men were buried in the ruins. Innes, p. 143, also Germon, pp. 81-3.

3 The officer who was entrusted with this work says : "They worked day, we worked nights; the brutes heard me, and I rather feared to follow up 50 to 60 yards of mine, so going about 15 yards I blew up their gallery and destroyed it . . . and defeated a very serious attempt on a most important post

Post was rendered useless by heavy rains. In the meantime, however, they had set up a strong battery at the *Buland Bāgh*, and their discharges of heavy shot effectively hit the defences on the south-west.<sup>1</sup> On the last day of the month a 32-pounder was put into position at the *Latkan Darwāzah* (Clock Tower), which was about a hundred yards from the Baillie Guard; some rounds of shot from it destroyed two waggons that were kept there as a barricade to guard the gate.

On the first day of September, Brigadier Inglis sent another letter to Havelock pleading for urgent relief. "I must be frank," he wrote, "and tell you that my force is daily diminishing . . . should the enemy make a really determined effort to storm the place, I shall find it difficult to repulse them."<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries made their fourth attempt to assault the defences on 5 September; their target this time was Gubbin's bastion on the south-west; this was followed by an attempt to spring a mine close to the Brigade Mess. On 16 September another message was sent to Havelock: "since the date of my last letter, the enemy have continued to persevere unceasingly in their efforts against this position, and the firing has never ceased night or day."<sup>3</sup>

### Havelock's march to Lucknow

Havelock took exactly two months to reach Lucknow. He had left Kānpur on 25 July, and on the same date in September

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filled with ladies and children". Captain Fulton's MS. Diary, quoted in Forrest, I, pp. 313-14.

1 The Hind-Pākistānī servants in the Residency were growing panicky, and desertions had become frequent. A peon of Gubbins deserted on 28 July; two days later "a more serious desertion followed. An East Indian, named Jones, who had been a clerk in one of the offices, had been appointed sergeant; and with ten others, mostly native Christian drummers . . . held charge of the outhouses . . . and . . . looked after the fodder and the oxen. . . . On the night mentioned they all deserted together," . . . Gubbins, p. 274.

2 Quoted in Marshman, John Clark, *Memoirs of Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B.* (London, 1860), pp. 392-93.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 400.

he entered Lucknow. After crossing the Ganget he had encamped at the village of Mangalwar, five miles to the north of the river. On the morning of the 29th he resumed his march ; he had covered only a short distance when he came upon a force of the Revolutionaries who had occupied a bastioned enclosure and a village with the town of Unao in their rear. Havelock attacked their position. The Revolutionaries vacated the enclosure but offered a stiff resistance at the village and did not leave it until it was set to fire by the British forces. Immediately after this Havelock was attacked by another force of the Revolutionaries who rushed headlong to the British line. They were, however, dispersed by the persistent fire of Havelock's guns and rifles. He had to fight a second battle on the same day at Bashīratganj. His men were quite happy that two victories had been won in a single day, but the General knew that they had cost him eighty-eight officers and men in killed and wounded ; nor was he unaware of the Revolutionary forces hovering about his camp. He, therefore, decided to make a retreat and fell back upon Mangalwar.<sup>1</sup> A week later Havelock again arrived at Bashīratganj, and on 5 August "fought a battle which was almost the exact counterpart of the one that he had fought a few days before on the same spot".<sup>2</sup> As on the previous occasion, he again decided to make a retreat to Mangalwar ; from here he went to Kānpur where Neill badly needed his support. On 16 August Havelock fought a battle at Bithur, the last of his career as an independent commander. On returning to Kānpur next morning (17 August) he found a copy of the *Calcutta Gazette*, dated 5 August, which contained the notification of his supersession by General Outram as Commander of the forces in Awadh.<sup>3</sup>

1 Havelock's retreat was a subject of criticism among his subordinates. Neill's letter contained "the most astounding words ever addressed by a subordinate officer to his commander". Havelock's reply was equally bitter : he told him ; "you now stand warned. Attempt no further dictation". Holmes, p. 295 ; also see Havelock's *Memoirs*, p. 437.

2 Holmes, p. 295.

3 Kaye and Malleron, III, p. 344.



**Battle of 'Alam Bagh, 23 September**

Outram reached Kānpur on 15 September<sup>1</sup> but he allowed Havelock to continue in command of the relieving force and attached himself to it in the capacity of the Chief Commissioner. The army crossed the Ganges on the 19th and 20th; on the following day (21 September) it fought a battle at Mangalwar, capturing two guns of the Revolutionaries. Bashiratganj was its next halt. On the 22nd it crossed the river Sai and halted at the village of Banī. Next morning, Havelock resumed the march, and met with no opposition until he arrived in the vicinity of 'Ālam Bāgh' where a short battle was fought. The Revolutionaries withdrew towards the canal while the British decided to pass the night there. 24 September was a day of rest; the two Generals discussed the plan of proceeding to the Residency.<sup>2</sup>

Havelock wanted to bypass the city, cross the Gumti at a distance, and then, gaining the Fyzabad-Lucknow road at the Kokrail bridge, occupy Bādshāh Bagh and recross the river by the Iron Bridge. Outram wanted to cross the canal at Chār Bāgh, take the road to Sikandar Bāgh, and then proceed to the left, across the plain between the river and the Qaysar Bāgh.<sup>3</sup>

At about 8 o'clock on the morning of 25 September the British forces moved towards the canal. The Revolutionaries offered resistance at the Chār Bāgh bridge where they had already planted guns under the command of Mir Najaf 'Alī Dārūghah Artillery and Mirzā Imām 'Alī Beg, Subahdar Artillery: they remained firm at their post.<sup>4</sup> After a contested battle and heavy losses however the British forces carried the bridge and entered the city. The first serious clash took place near Ghulām Ḥusayn's Masjid; Nabī Bakhsh Khān inflicted heavy losses on the assailants and fought unto death. From here the British forces rushed towards

<sup>1</sup> Havelock's *Memoirs*, p. 396.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 405.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 409-410.

<sup>4</sup> The Supreme Commander, Ḥusām al-Dawlah was himself commanding the contingent which guarded the bridge. See Ḥusaynī, II, p. 267.

Aminābād, but they were forced to retire to the *Barf Khānah*. Mammū Khān pursued them for a short distance.<sup>1</sup> They were subjected to a terrific fire from *Qayṣar Bāgh*,<sup>2</sup> but they ultimately managed to reach the *Chatr Manzil* and *Farḥat Bakhsh*, which afforded them "shelter from the storm of musketry." The 90th Regiment which had been left at the *Mott Mahal* was in the meantime expelled from there by the Revolutionaries.<sup>3</sup>

Havelock succeeded in bringing relief to the Residency, but only after paying a heavy price : "the killed, wounded, and missing," he wrote, . . . amounted, up to the evening of the 26th, to 535 officers and men." To these may be added the 207 killed during the six days of continuous fighting after the crossing of the Ganges.<sup>4</sup> Nor was the arrival of the reinforcements an unmixed blessing. The relieving force was too small to force back the besiegers; but at the same time it added to the number of "mouths to feed out of the scanty provisions left us." There was not enough transport to remove the garrison or even the women and children to a safer place. Outram decided to get rid of the Cavalry which could serve no useful purpose inside the entrenchment. When an attempt was made to send them away in the darkness of the night the Revolutionaries heard the sound of the horses' hoofs and started firing from the loop-holed houses in the streets through which they had to pass. In short on Outram's arrival the siege was turned into a blockade.<sup>5</sup> The Revolutionaries, of course, were not now near enough for an effective firing by their musketeers, but they continued throwing cannon-shot and laying mines as vigorously as

1 Cf. Husaynī, II, pp 268-69.

2 "The troops then moved on", says Marshman, "amidst a fire from the Kaiser-bagh, on King's palace 'under which' as the General remarked, 'nothing could live'. Two of the heavy guns . . . opened on the Kaiser-bagh battery . . ." See Havelock's *Memoirs*, p. 415.

3 Gubbins, p. 319.

4 Cf. Havelock's despatch, dated 30 September, quoted in his *Memoirs*, pp. 423-25; also see Forrest, II, p. 63.

5 Havelock referred to the position in these words : "They were as closely

before. There was one hopeful feature of the blockade: they had enough stock of provisions to last until 20 November,<sup>1</sup> and they hoped that Colin Campbell would arrive by that time. On 9 November a European messenger<sup>2</sup> was despatched with necessary information about the route the Commander-in-Chief was to take. Outram had advised him to avoid crossing the canal at the *Chār Bāgh* bridge; instead, he was to strike off eastward from the '*Ālam Bāgh*' and proceed as far as *Dilkushā*, and then cross the canal.

### Battle of Sikandar Bagh

Accordingly he left '*Ālam Bāgh*' on the morning of 14 November and occupied *Dilkushā* which had been abandoned by the Revolutionaries. About an hour before sunset the Revolutionaries attacked the British position from a suburb, but they were driven back by the superior artillery of the enemy.<sup>3</sup> No advance could be made on the following day (15 November); the provisions had not arrived, and throughout the day the Revolutionaries had hung on the rear-guard.<sup>4</sup> Next day the force was put in

blockaded as Marshal Lannes's troops would have been if any portion of them had forced their way into Saragossa, and been there shut in by the Spaniards". Quoted in Havelock's *Memoirs*, p. 431.

1 Actually the stock of provisions could last much longer, but Outram did not know it, because the information presented to him was based on wrong calculations by the supply department. See Kaye and Mallsen. IV, p. 114.

2 Thomas Henry Kavanagh, who had volunteered to go to Colin Campbell, disguised himself in "the garb of a Badmash—a native 'wash buckler.'" With remarkable success he acted the "Badmash" and reached Colin's camp. *Ibid*, p. 116.

3 Shadwell, II, p. 6. Husayni adds that the attack on *Dilkushā* was launched first by Amjad 'Alī and then by Ahmad Allāh Shāh. He also refers to the treachery of Mir Muhammad 'Alī who was in charge of manufacturing cartridges! he used to fill them with straw. When the sepoys enquired from him he confessed his guilt but tried to justify his action by saying that it was necessary to put some straw. He was put to death for his treachery. Husayni, II, p. 282.

4 Forrest, II, p. 141.

motion at about 8 a. m. and crossed without difficulty the almost dry bed of the canal.<sup>1</sup> When the Column was near *Sikandar Bāgh*—a high-walled enclosure about one hundred yards square—the Revolutionaries opened fire. The situation was serious; ultimately, however, the British forces succeeded in forcing their entry through a breach. "Then ensued a scene," writes Colin Campbell's biographer, "which baffles description. The enemy caught in a trap and finding escape impossible fought with the courage of despair. The conflict raged for hours . . . The carnage was frightful. Ultimately, when the building was cleared of its ghastly contents, no less than 2,000 of the enemy were found to have been slain;"<sup>2</sup> the British losses were also heavy.<sup>3</sup>

### Fall of Shah Najaf and Moti Bagh

Early in the afternoon the British forces commanded by Adrian Hope advanced towards the Residency. When they arrived near *Shāh Najaf*<sup>4</sup> they were subjected to a deadly fire

1 The Revolutionary Government seems to have realized that the entry of the British force into the city had created a delicate situation. They sent messengers to Aḥmad Allāh *Shāh* with a request for help. *Tā'ib* says :

اراکین شہزادہ نام ور گئے خدمت شاہ میں بیشتر

(Translation : The supporters of the renowned Prince went to the *Shāh* in large numbers. On this appeal the *Shāh* immediately came to their help. See *Tā'ib*, p. 70.

2 Shadwell, II, p. 101. 10-11

Forbes-Mitchell, who was present, says that the Sikhs were ordered to lead the assault. "The Punjabis," he writes, "dashed over the mud wall shouting the war-cry of the Sikhs, '*Jai Khalsa Jee* !' led by their two European officers, who were both shot down before they had gone a few yards. This staggered the Sikhs, and they halted. As soon as Sir Colin saw them waver, he turned to Colonel Ewart, . . . and said, 'Colonel Ewart, bring on the tartan—let my own lads at them'. See Forbes-Mitchell, *op. cit.*, Also see Forrest, II, pp. 145-53. (London, 1897), p. 47.

3 *Narrative of the Indian Revolt* (London, 1858) p. 194.

4 It was the mausoleum of Ghāzī al-Dīn Ḥaydar who had proclaimed himself as the first King of Awadh; it was given this name because it was a copy of Ḥaḍrat 'Alī's tomb at Najaf-i-Ashraf.

from the building and the gardens surrounding it. The Commander-in-Chief decided to launch an attack. It, however, soon became evident that the Revolutionaries would not yield without a stiff fight. After three hours of incessant fighting "we were no nearer our object; on the contrary, the opposition became every moment stronger, and the fire more deadly." Campbell was "extremely anxious," but after some time he placed himself at the head of the 93rd Highlanders and told them; "the artillery cannot drive the enemy out, so you must with the bayonet"<sup>1</sup> Under cover of a heavy cannonade an advance was made and the assailants reached the walls of the building. The outer defences were successfully damaged, but "an inner wall was standing almost perpendicular, and in attempting to climb up this the men were raked with a perfect hail of missiles—grenades and round-shot hurled from wall-pieces, arrows and brickbats, burning torches of rags and cotton saturated with oil—even boiling water was dashed on them! . . . There were scores of men armed with great burning - torches . . . only these men were in earnest, shouting 'Allah Akbar! 'Deen! Deen!' and 'Jai Kali Mai ki!' The stormers were driven back, leaving many dead and wounded under the wall."<sup>2</sup> When an officer brought "the gloomy tidings of the failure of the attack" to Colin Campbell he sent word to Hope not to retire. Hope with a small party led by a junior officer crept through brushwood and reached a rent in the wall, which he had discovered. He entered the building with a few men and found that it had been vacated by the defenders. The fall of *Shah Najaf* was a great blow to the Revolutionaries; their resistance now nearly broke down. On the following day the British attacked *Moti Mahal* where the Revolutionaries made their last stand. After the capture of *Moti Mahal* only an open space, about four hundred and fifty yards across, separated Colin Campbell's force from the Residency; it was however exposed to musketry fire from the *Qayşar Bāgh* and heavy cannonade

<sup>1</sup> Roberts, I, p. 332.

<sup>2</sup> Forbes-Mitchell, p. 80.

from the *Bādshāh Bāgh* on the other side of the river. However, Outram and Havelock took the risk of crossing it to meet the Commander-in-Chief.

### Qaysar Bagh

*Qaysar Bāgh* was still in the hands of the Revolutionaries. Outram suggested that it should be captured, but the Commander-in-Chief was not prepared to take a risk.<sup>1</sup> The matter was referred to Canning by a telegram on 20 November. On the following day came his reply: "the one step to be avoided," he said, "is the total withdrawal of British force from Oudh. Your proposal to leave a strong movable division with heavy artillery outside the city, and so to hold the city in check will answer every purpose of policy."<sup>2</sup> The evacuation of the Residency having been finally decided,<sup>3</sup> Campbell ordered the bombardment of *Qaysar Bāgh* to make the Revolutionaries believe that an immediate assault was contemplated. At midnight on 22 November the garrison marched out of the Residency. Two days later the Commander-in-Chief moved to *Ālam Bāgh* and on the 27th he left for Kānpur. Outram was left at "*Ālam Bāgh* with 4,000 men and twenty-two guns to "hold the city" in check.<sup>4</sup>

### Mammu Khan opposes Ahmad Allah Shah

After the withdrawal of British forces, the Revolutionary Government had an opportunity of stabilising its administration and strengthening its forces, but Mammā Khān's incompetence had made their administrative machinery ineffective; Haḍrat

1 For reasons given by him see Forrest, II, pp. 170—71; Havelock's *Memoir*, pp. 440-41; Gubbins, pp. 410-11.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Colin Campbell had not waited for a reply from Canning. The women and children were removed on 19 November a day before the telegram was sent to the Governor-General.

4 For Colin Campbell's telegram to the Governor-General see *State Papers* II, p. 361; 'Allāmah Faḍl-i Ḥaqq says that the *Mujāhids* fought with great determination. "The brave *ghāzis*," he writes, "fought against them and many of the white-faced people were killed". *J. P. H. S.*, V, p. 42.

Maḥal was helpless. Instead of improving the condition of the Army and defences of the town Mammū Khān had begun to plunder the rich citizens.<sup>1</sup> When the *mahājans* and other wealthy persons found it difficult to bear any more the burden of these extortions they went to Aḥmad Allāh Shāh, whom the Army had made their chief on 8 December,<sup>2</sup> and appealed to him against the high-handedness of the authorities. The Shāh replied that in future they should immediately inform him if any house was raided by the agents of Mummū Khān or Yūsuf Khān. He also sent fifty sepoy with orders to arrest the looters. Mammū Khān called his advisers and told them that Aḥmad Allāh Shāh was interfering in the work of the Government and, therefore, he should be either expelled or killed.<sup>3</sup> Aḥmad 'Ali, the *Dārūghah* of Husainabad, took with him a party of soldiers and a few guns and blockaded the house of the Shāh at Gaūghāt.<sup>4</sup> The blockade lasted for eleven days.<sup>5</sup> Ultimately, the sepoy defying the orders of their officers; safely escorted the Shāh to another building, *Shi'sh Maḥal*. After two days; he shifted to Garhi Kanausa, but he could not stay here, too; he was now so much harassed by Mummū Khān's men that he began to think of leaving for Fyzabad.<sup>6</sup> His adherents however persuaded him to stay on.<sup>7</sup>

It was unfortunate for the Revolutionaries of Awadh that the administration was in the hands of incompetent persons, who were openly hostile to Aḥmad Allāh Shāh. He was deeply affected by

1 For the names of the leading persons who were plundered by Mammū Khān and his agents see Husayni, II, pp. 298-300.

2 Foreign Secret consultations, 26 February 1858, Nos. 226-28, quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 258.

3 *Ibid.*, II, p. 301.

4 *Tā'ib*, pp. 78-81.

5 Husayni, II, p. 301.

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Tā'ib*, p. 81.

He is stated to have declared that he had been entrusted with the duty of helping the Revolutionaries and would not leave them even if they quarrelled with him. See *Tā'ib*, p. 79.

this unhappy state of affairs and is stated to have remarked : "The Army had by the orders of God fallen into a trap; the people of the city of Lucknow will be trampled under the horses of the enemy; success is not possible for them : they will have to face defeat and destruction; they will all go about tumbling in the mountains and shall be buried under the stones of grief."<sup>1</sup>

#### Attacks and reneves at 'Alam Bagh

Mammū Khan's hostility towards Ahmad Allāh Shāh created serious problems for the Revolutionaries, which ultimately became the main cause of their defeat in Awadh, particularly Lucknow. The lack of unity among their forces demoralized them, and indirectly provided Havelock with an opportunity to strengthen his defences. "Nothing is talked of in the city," wrote Outram's spy from the town on 28 January 1858, "but the peril to which all are exposed by the division amongst the leaders of the rebels".<sup>2</sup> The British lost no time in utilizing the opportunity. Outram encamped his main force about a mile below 'Ālam Bāgh' in the open place across the Kānpur road; batteries and abattis were thrown to protect the camp. The defensive works were spread over a vast area within a circuit of about eleven miles, they were however connected by a continuous trench.<sup>3</sup> Outram, however, felt that to maintain his position in the immediate neigh-

1 The actual lines are (p. 77).

کہا حکم سے ایڑد پاک کے  
یہ آبادی بلدہ لکھنو ہوئی پائے مال سجد عدو  
نہیں ممکن اب فتح یابی انہیں ملے گی شکست و خرابی انہیں  
پھاڑوں میں صب ٹھو کریں کھائیں گے تہ سنگ اندوہ دب جائیں گے

2 Outram considered this report to be correct; in his covering letter to Mansfield he said: "The intelligence from the city today quoted below represents truly I think the state of affairs there" (MS. Correspondance of John Lawrence).

3 Outram was not in favour of encamping at Ālam Bāgh which he thought was in close proximity of the city; he wanted to select a site near Kānpur, "It is immaterial," he argued, "what particular spot in Oude is held as a proof that we have not deserted it, so long as a footing is retained in the province; . . ." See Goldsmit, F. J., *James Outram: A Biography*, (London, 1881), II, p. 285.



bourhood of Lucknow he needed a much larger body of troops than he had. Colin Campbell did not agree with this and asked him to detach to the rear some of his forces. Outram could not comply with this demand.<sup>1</sup> For twenty-five precious days, however, the Revolutionaries did nothing except throwing batteries in front of Outram's defences. On 21 December, British spies informed him that the Revolutionaries were thinking of surrounding his position, cutting off his supplies and intercepting his communications. Without therefore waiting for their charge he moved out early in the morning, defeated them in a surprise attack, and pursued them up to the city.<sup>2</sup>

The Revolutionaries led by Manṣab 'Alī<sup>3</sup> launched an attack early in January, 1858. Outram had received reports that they were collecting their forces to intercept his communications. He therefore, sent a large escort with the convoy which was to go to Kānpur on 8 January. At sunrise on the 12th a force of the Revolutionaries came out and spread itself along the front and the flanks of the British camp, and fighting continued till about five o'clock in the afternoon when they retreated.<sup>4</sup> Four days later, "in the morning they made a sudden attack on the Jellalabad picquet, and were received with a heavy fire, which drove them back immediately leaving on the ground their leader, a Hindu devotee representing Hunnoman, who was advancing bravely at their head . . ."<sup>5</sup> They were not discouraged by the death of their

1 The correspondence between Outram and Colin Campbell on this subject is far from cordial. See *State Papers*, III, p. 416.

2 The leader of the Revolutionary forces was Nawab Miān Ahmad 'Alī, who made a retreat as soon as he saw that a few horsemen were killed in the fight; a second leader, Nawab Mu'in al-Dawlah, remained sitting in the premises of the "Karbala," watching the battle from there. See Husayni, II, p. 308.

3 He was the Chaklahdar of Rasulabad and took a prominent part in the Revolutionary War.

4 Outram and other British authorities say that the Revolutionary forces were 30,000 strong; this is obviously an exaggerated figure. In fact the calculations of the British authorities mainly depending on Captain Orr's information are far from correct.

5 Outram to Mansfield, dated 17 January 1858. See *State Papers*, III, p.

leader and continued fighting till after dusk, when they were obliged to make a retreat.<sup>1</sup>

The reverses suffered by the Revolutionary forces did not make Mammū Khān and his friends wiser, and there was no relaxation in their hostility towards Aḥmad Allāh Shāh. It has already been stated that he was made to leave his camp at Gaūghāt. Later he had to shift from Garhi Kanaurah also and had moved to the village of Kannausi, about two miles to its south-west<sup>2</sup>. He must have reached there some time in the second week of February. Outram refers to his participation in the battle of 15 February in one of his letters. "In the meanwhile", he tells the Deputy Adjutant-General, "a portion of the enemy's cavalry escorting a person in a palankeen having advanced well into the open, Captain Olpherts' two guns and the troop of the military train galloped to the front and opened on them with grape, killing and wounding several and dispersing the remainder. I have since been informed that he was severely wounded. We lost our havildar of gun-lascars"<sup>3</sup>

On the following day another attack was made "on the outposts of the left front village". The sepoy, says *Tā'ib* "fled like bucks which run away on seeing a wolf," but the Shāh and his devoted band of ten or fifteen followers continued fighting until "of their own accord, they (British soldiers) withdrew."<sup>4</sup>

Early in the morning on 21 February the forces of the Revolutionaries emerged from the city and commenced "a simultaneous

428. Husaynī adds that their leader, 'Hanuman' was in league with the British. See Vol. II, p. 310.

1 Forrest II, pp. 283-84; also see *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 267.

2 See Outram's letter to Mansfield, dated, Camp Alam Bagh, 28th January, 1858. It contains the report of a spy who mentions the blockade of Aḥmad Allāh Shāh's camp at Gaūghāt. (MS Correspondance of John Lawrence). Other details are supplied by Husaynī.

3 Letter dated the 17th February 1858. See *State Papers*, II, p. 440; also see Kaye and Malleison, IV, p. 246.

4 *Tā'ib's* statement that the British attacked the Revolutionaries with 200 men is corroborated by Outram. See *State Papers*, III, p. 440; *Tā'ib*, p. 80.

movement round both our flanks at the same time threatening the whole length of our position and attacking the north-east corner of the '*Ālam Bāgh*, and also the picket and fort of Jellalabad." Under cover of long grass and underwood they delivered the assault but "our guns immediately opened on them, killing several, which caused them to withdraw."<sup>1</sup> Four days later a larger force left the city at about 9 a. m. Ḥaḍrat Mahal and her son accompanied the soldiers with a view to encourage them and maintain their morale. A detachment swung round and occupied the groves near Jalālābād from where they could shell the fortress. Outram himself advanced to meet them, and Olpherts opened fire, which forced them to make a retreat after suffering heavy losses.<sup>2</sup> In the afternoon the Revolutionaries reappeared, now directing their attack against the left flank of the enemy. They fought with determination and "repeatedly . . . advanced within grape and musket range," but ultimately they were pushed back. This was the last of the several attacks which Outram had to resist; his successes against the Revolutionaries were mainly due to lack of good leadership in their camp. Bakht Khān, the most capable of the Revolutionary Commanders had arrived in Lucknow, but like Aḥmad Allāh Shāh he was also opposed by Ḥaḍrat Mahal and Mammū Khān and their worthless advisers.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Dilkusha and other buildings captured by the British**

In the meantime Colin Campbell was making preparations for the siege of Lucknow. He had a conference with the Governor-

1 *State Paper*, III, p. 443.

2 *Ibid.*, III, p. 446

3 After leaving Delhi Bakht Khān's Brigade had returned to Bareilly. He attacked Hathras on 4 October 1857 and marched to Badaun via Sikandrah Rao. See Colonel Fraser's letter to the Government dated Agra Fort, 15 October 1857 in *Kaye's Mutiny Papers*.

Muir writes to Sherer on 23 October that Bakht Khān accompanied by Nānā's brother had gone to Farrukhabad via Badaun. He stayed in Farrukhabad for a considerable time and seems to have left it for Lucknow in January or February 1858. See *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 217. He was opposed by Ḥaḍrat Mahal and Mammū Khān, and was allowed to fight on the side of the

General at Allahabād in the beginning of the second week of February to give final touches to his arrangements.<sup>1</sup> On 28 February he left Kānpur and came to Banthara where he had established the headquarters of his large army.<sup>2</sup> Two days later he resumed his march and moved towards *Dilkushā*; in front of a village occupied by the Revolutionaries they opened fire from one of their pickets. This was followed by some skirmishes; ultimately the British occupied *Dilkushā* and *Muhammad Bāgh* and set up their batteries. On 5 March Franks' Column joined the Army; next morning it was possible to detach a force which crossed the Gumti and marching northwards came to the Fyzabad road and occupied Ismā'il-ganj. Outram who was in command of the Column received twenty-two guns on 8 March; on the following day he was able to capture *Chakar Kothi*, one of the key positions of the Revolutionaries to the north of the Gumti.<sup>3</sup> He bombarded *Haḍrat-ganj* and *Qayṣar Bāgh* on 10 March and captured the

Revolutionaries only when he threatened to plunder the city. See Ḥusayni, II, p. 311.

1 Campbell had left Kānpur for Allahabad on 8 February and returned on the following day. See Forrest, II, p. 300.

2 "So powerful a British army had never before been seen in India. There were seventeen batalions of Infantry, twenty eight squadrons of Cavalry, and a hundred and thirty-four guns and mortars". Holmes, p. 438. Shadwell says that the strength of the army was "something like 31,000 men, with 164 guns". Vol. II, p. 144.

3 Late in the evening the story of the fall of *Chakar Kothi* was related to Russel. The defenders had resisted to the last moment; after the fall of the *Kothi* "a detachment of the Sikhs rushed into the house—some of the sepoys were still alive, and they were mercifully killed; but... one of their number was dragged out to the sandy plain outside the house, he was pulled by the legs to a convenient place, where he was held down, pricked in the face and body by the bayonets of some of the soldiers while others collected fuel for a small pyre, and when all was ready the man was roasted alive! There were a few Englishmen looking on, more than one officer saw it, no one ventured to interfere! The horror of this infernal cruelty was aggravated by an attempt of the miserable wretch to escape when half-burned to death. By a sudden effort he leaped away, and with the flesh hanging

Iron Bridge on the following day ; his attempt to take possession of the stone bridge was repulsed. Colin Campbell who had remained at the *Dilkushā* now moved towards the city in the afternoon the *Begam Kothi* was captured but not without a severe contest and heavy losses.<sup>1</sup> Hodson who had earned notoriety for corruption as much as for his cruel treatment of the Emperor and the Princes of Delhi was mortally wounded.<sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries had left six or seven hundred dead bodies<sup>3</sup>

After capturing *Begam Kothi* the British forces moved towards the *Imāmbārah*, the next stronghold of the Revolutionaries, and subjected it to a heavy fire. It was not, however, before the morning of 14 March that an effective breach could be made. The *Imāmbārah* having been carried, the British forces now advanced on *Qayṣar Bāgh* which was seized without any opposition.<sup>4</sup> The fall of *Qayṣar Bāgh* was followed by the occupation of other important buildings—*Tārā Kothī*, *Motī Maḥal* and *Chatr Manzil*.<sup>5</sup> On 15 March fighting continued in different parts

from his bones. ran for a few yards ere he was caught, brought back, put on the fire again, and held there by bayonets till his remains were consumed". Russel's friend added that "the scene will haunt me to my dying hour"; he could not stop it because "the Sikhs were furious." Russel, I, p. 302.

1 Colin Campbell had to return from the scene of fighting to receive Jang Buhādūr who had arrived at the *Dilkūshā* Shadwell, II, p. 156.

2 Hodson was killed, it is stated, when he was engaged in looting. For a discussion of Hodson's corruption and embezzlement, see Holmes, Appendix N, pp. 596-617.

3 Shadwell, II, p. 157.

4 Hadrat Mahal and her son had vacated the palace earlier in the day and escaped by the bridge of Mawlawi-ganj Husayni, II, p. 333.

<sup>5</sup> Allāmah Faḍl-i-Ḥaqq says that Hadrat Maḥal remained in the city for three days after leaving her palace. She made an effort to reassemble the soldiers but they did not respond to her appeals and, therefore, she took to flight. *J. P. H. S.*, V, p. 44.

5 The capture of the famous buildings of Lucknow was invariably followed by unrestricted loot ; "blood-thirst, revenge and greed for gold drove the assailants mad. The strong boxes of the Princes of Oudh were burst open, and their gold and silver glutted the avarice of the Sikh and the British soldier.

of the city; at the same time two Cavalry Brigades were sent in pursuit of the Revolutionaries who had escaped. Next day Outram captured the Residency; meanwhile a determined attack by the Revolutionaries on the '*Ālam Bāgh*' was successfully resisted. The great *Imāmbārah* and *Machhi Bhawan* also fell the same day.

### Ahmad Allah Shah's last efforts

Nevertheless, all the Revolutionaries had not withdrawn from the city. "When the sepoy army left Lucknow," says *Tā'ib*, "the *Shāh* remained firm there". Some of the sepoys however came to him and joined his small force. He now began to move about, and he would go to any place where he found the British forces attacking the Revolutionaries. He offered a stiff resistance in the *Chawk*.<sup>1</sup> On 17 March, Jang Bahādūr proceeded from '*Ālam Bāgh*' via Garhi Kanaurah and wanted to enter the city from the side of *Haydar-ganj*. The *Shāh* moved out from *Sarāi Mu'tamad al-Dawlah*, met the *Gurkhas* near '*Ayūh Bāgh*', gave them a very stiff battle and ultimately pushed them back. A contingent of British forces came to their relief, but the *Shāh* checked their advance and did not allow them to cross the canal. Subsequently, however, the sepoys who were fighting under him could not withstand a fresh attack of the assailants, and he was forced to make a retreat; he now took up position in the *Dargāh 'Abbās*. On the following day the British forces attacked the *Dargāh* where Ahmad Allāh *Shāh* again offered a stiff resistance. The Prime Minister of the Begam, *Sharaf al-Dawlah* was killed by the sepoys because he was suspected of treachery. The *Shāh*, though not happy with *Sharaf al-Dawlah*, was against

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Rough hands tore away the silks, velvets, brocades, laces and gems accumulated by the lights of the harem. Wrought silver plates were torn from the *musnud* (throne) of some favourite mistress or queen; the monuments of Western and Eastern art were broken to pieces, and fragments of rare china and of crystal vessels strewn the floors. When night put an end to the pillage, the palace of the Kaiser had become a ruined charnel-house". Forrest, II, p. 354.

<sup>1</sup> *Tā'ib*, pp. 85-86.

his assassination and, according to *Tā'ib*, had stopped the infuriated sepoys from killing him. But after some time they found an opportunity of putting him to death.<sup>1</sup> Aḥmad Allāh Shāh withdrew from the *Dargāh* to *Lālkoṭhī* in Sa'adat-ganj; ultimately with a very small following he retired to Bārī. The Shāh's firm stand encouraged the Begam and her followers, and they also decided to continue the resistance from *Mūsa Bāgh*, where they had taken position.<sup>2</sup>

They were however unable to bear the pressure of the British forces and soon realized that they could not offer effective resistance without Aḥmad Allāh Shāh's cooperation. Accordingly some of them went to him at Bārī and succeeded in persuading him to accompany them to their young leader, Birjis Qadr. The latter, according to *Tā'ib*, threw himself at the knees of the Shāh and "had the honour of offering *bay'at* to him". The Shāh forced the Nawab's courtiers, who had made themselves rich through plunder, to disgorge their ill-gotten wealth.<sup>3</sup> After this unconditional surrender of Ḥaḍrat Maḥal the responsibility of government was

1 *Tā'ib* definitely rejects the rumour that Shraf al-Dawlah was put to death by the order of the Shāh as baseless he is an eye-witness to the incident. See pp. 88-89. Against his definite assertion the accounts and views of other writers, though contemporary, cannot be accepted, when they differ with him in details. Also see *F. S. U. P.*, II, pp. 148, 321.

2 *Tā'ib*, pp. 85-86; also see Ḥusaynī, II, pp. 343-47.

3 *Tā'ib*, (pp. 90, 91) says :

گئے آپ نزدیک بر جیس قدر	ہوا ماہ نو کی طرح خم وہ بدر
گرا پاؤں پر چاک دامن کی طرح	گلے سے لگایا گریباں کی طرح
دیا ڈال قدموں پہ ماں نے اسے	اٹھایا شدہ با خدا نے اسے
ہوا بیعت شدہ سے بر نور وہ	غبار حسد سے ہوا دور وہ

*Translation* : When he (Aḥmad Allāh Shāh) went to Birjis Qadr, that full moon bent himself like a new moon. He fell on his (Shāh's) feet like a torn skirt, and the Shāh embraced him like a collar. His mother threw him (Birjis Qadr) at the feet (of the Shāh), and the God-fearing Shāh raised him up... He became enlightened with the *bay'at* of the Shāh and it took him far away from dust.

taken over by the Shāh as is indicated by the letters and petitions of some zamindars addressed to him.<sup>1</sup>

The battle of Mūsa Bāgh was fought on 19 March. Colin Campbell wanted to capture the stronghold and also cut off the means of retreat in case an escape was attempted by its defenders; Outram was to attack them and Brigadier Campbell had instructions to fall upon them when retreating. Accordingly Outram attacked the building and forced its defenders out, but, they managed to escape unmolested into the open country and thus "Sir Colin had thrown away nearly all the advantage which he might have gained by the capture of Lucknow."<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, Colin Campbell was not yet in unquestioned possession of Lucknow; he was still to reckon with the greatest leader of the Revolutionaries. Aḥmad Allāh Shāh, "one of the most daring and resolute of rebel leaders. returned to Lucknow, and with two guns and a large body of fanatics occupied a fortified building in the heart of the city."<sup>3</sup> He was attacked on the 21st; "the resistance was wonderfully fierce and violent; several of our men were killed, and the commandant and second-in-command of the 4th Punjab Rifles . . . were desperately wounded."<sup>4</sup> Evidently, the Shāh could not continue for long his resistance against such heavy odds; but it was no small credit to him that he was able to manage his escape from the fallen city; he took the road to Bārī,<sup>5</sup> about thirty miles to the north-west. Hope Grant was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to march to Bārī and, after dispersing Aḥmad Allāh Shāh's forces, move towards Bithauli, on the Gogra, where Ḥaḍrat Maḥal was encamping. Grant halted at a place which was about twenty miles on the route to Bārī. A troop of Irregular Cavalry penetrated the lines of British pickets. They were challenged but

1 Some of these documents may be seen in *F. S. U. P.*, II, pp. 367-79.

2 Holmes, p. 445; also see Roberts, I, p. 407.

3 Forrest, II, pp. 367-68.

4 Kaye and Malletson, IV, p. 346.

5 *Ta'ib*, p. 93.



they boldly replied that they belonged to the 12th Irregulars. After seeing all that they wanted to see they quietly returned to Bārī without having caused any suspicion. On receiving information brought by his troopers Aḥmad Allāh Shāh planned an attack, which "did credit to his tactical skill". About four miles from the British camp he occupied a village which was covered all along its front by a river. His plan was that the Cavalry should proceed by a circuitous route and fall upon the flanks of the enemy, just at the time when he was within range of his Infantry posted in the village; "but the brilliant idea was spoilt by the mode in which it was executed."<sup>1</sup> On the morning of 13 April, Grant commenced his march. The Cavalry of the Revolutionaries was gaining a position on his rear to fall upon the long line of carts carrying his baggage. They were tempted by the sight of two guns in the British advance guard and captured them, but just at the moment when they wanted to carry them a strong contingent of the 7th Hussars came on the scene; the original plan of the Shāh was thus thwarted. Two more efforts were made to attack the baggage train, but they were repulsed. The wrong and precipitate action of his Cavalry had upset the entire strategy of the Shāh, now he had no alternative but to vacate the village.<sup>2</sup> The British forces "advanced close up to the village under a heavy fire and stormed it gallantly."<sup>3</sup> Aḥmad Allāh Shāh now left for Shāh-jahanpur; "Moulvi Faizabadi Badmash, myopic, was defeated by the English troops under Mr. Right at Bari. He came to Khairabad from Bari with 2,500 horsemen, 1,500 foot soldiers and three guns and stayed there for three days, and from there moved, with all his followers, to Maholi at a distance of 6 Kos,

1 Kaye and Malleon, IV, p. 347.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 348.

3 Hope Grant quoted in Forrest, III, 483.

*Tā'ib* adds that the Shāh was greatly annoyed by this foolish action of the officers of the troopers. He asked them to leave him and go anywhere they liked, but they apologized to him and accompanied him to Muḥamdi. See p. 94.

situated in the 'Ilāqa of Loni Singh, Taluqdar of Mithauli, Zila Muhamdi . . . "1

### Hadrat Maḥal establishes her Government at Bondi

Ḥaḍrat Maḥal had left *Qayṣar Bāgh* on the evening of 17 March, and, passing through Bāri, arrived in *Khayrābād* where she was received by its *Nāẓim*, Har Prashad, and 'Imād al-Din. Soon after she left for Maḥmūdābād and stayed there as the guest of Raja Nawab 'Ali *Khān*; the next place where she encamped was Bithauli.<sup>2</sup> The conduct of her host not being above suspicion, she moved on to Bondi and set up her Government there.<sup>3</sup>

On hearing that the Begam had succeeded in establishing herself at Bondi a number of her old servants and sepoys as well as persons attached to the cause for which she was fighting thronged to her Court; artisans and traders followed suit and, to quote Ḥusaynī's words, a *Chawk-bāzār* like that of Lucknow itself was established. More surprising was the fact that the zamindars and talukdars began to send the revenues of their respective lands to the new Government.

### The Oudh Proclamation

Besides the activities of the Begam and Aḥmad Allāh *Shāh* the British were confronted with a new development in the situation, which was the direct result of a foolish step taken by Canning's Government. The Oudh Proclamation, according to which the lands of the talukdars excepting those who had remained loyal were to be confiscated, roused most of them into action. It was, however, now too late.<sup>4</sup>

1 *F. S. U. P.*, II, pp. 413, 417.

2 Ḥusaynī, II, p. 337.

3 The exact dates of the Begam's visits to various places and her arrival at Bondi are not given by Ḥusaynī. but it is certain that she was there in the 2nd week of May.

4 The loyal talukdars exempted were "Drigbiejje Sing, rajah of Bulram-pore, Koolwunt Sing, rajah of Pudnaha; Rao Hurdeo Baksh Sing, of Kutiaree;

## Lakkar Shah holds Sandilah

Like Aḥmad Allāh Shāh another *ṣufi-shaykh* Lakkar Shāh, had with the help of a band of *Mujāhids* established himself at Sandilah.<sup>1</sup> He seems to have maintained his authority for several months, and it was not before the second week of August that the British took possession of the town. In the meantime, Prince Firūz Shāh who had established himself at Ṣafipur had brought under his control the area surrounding Bāngarmau and Sandilah. On 10 August a British force commanded by Captain Dawson advanced to Raḥimābād, where "we were joined by two small Taluqdars, some of the native gentlemen of Sundeela and Muliabad, and Chowdry Hushmut 'Ali, a handsome man, with considerable influence . . ." <sup>2</sup> The Revolutionaries had six hundred horsemen commanded by Prince Firūz Shāh and about two thousand footmen under Nāmdār Khān and Gulab Singh. In the battle that was fought on 11 August, the losses of the Revolutionaries were estimated at 100 while the British casualties were 30.<sup>3</sup>

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Kasheepershaud, talooqdar of Sissaindee; Zuhr Sing, zamindar of Gopaul Kheir; and Chundeeloll zemindar of Moran (Baiswarah)". The relevant paragraph of the Proclamation reads as below: "The governor-general further proclaims to the people of Oude that, with the above-mentioned exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of the province is confiscated to the British government, which will dispose of that right in such manner as it may seem fitting". See Ball, II, p. 276-77. For the effect of the Proclamation on the talukdars see Innes, pp. 291-92.

1 The author of the *Bāstān-i-Awadh* a resident of Sandilah, says that soon after the fall of Lucknow the sepoys seized Sandilah and plundered it, but they abandoned it on the arrival of a British force. "After this", he continues, "a Darwish, by name Lakkar Shāh . . . became the *Nāzim* of this town . . . in short . . . more or less for four months the *Darwish*, Lakkar Shāh . . . held power in the town". See p. 171; *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 453.

2 Kavanagh, *How I won the Victoria Cross* (London, 1860), pp. 172-76; *F. S. U. P.*, II, pp. 396-99.

3 Hutchinson to Edmunstone. See *Secret Letters*, Vol. 170, August 1858; *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 484.



**"Outlying Picket of the Highland Brigade"**  
(From C. Ball's *History of the Indian Mutiny*)



"Sikh troops dividing the spoils taken from the mutineers"

### End of the Awadh Campaign

To restore British authority in Awadh, Colin Campbell's plan was to send several Columns from different directions. These operations were to commence in November, but the Revolutionaries precipitated them by surrounding Sandilah on 3 October. Three days later the besieged garrison was relieved by a British force; on the 8th a strong force under Barker arrived from Lucknow and fought a stiff battle. The Revolutionaries had to withdraw but not without inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.<sup>1</sup> Another force under Brigadier Troup was coming from the side of Shahjahanpur: it had to fight two battles with the Ruhilah Chief, Bahādur 'Alī Khān, on the border of Rohilkhand before it could enter Awadh. By the beginning of December the western districts had been subdued, and all Revolutionary leaders, with one exception, had retreated across the Gogra; Prince Firūz Shāh "escaped past and between our troops with some 1500 men, and doubling back south by Sandeela to the Ganges, crossed it and then the Jumna and finally joined the Central India rebel army."<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime, Colin Campbell had started on his campaign from the eastern side; Amethi was occupied on 11 November. He proceeded to Shankarpur and asked its Chief, Beni Madho, to surrender. The latter refused to comply with this demand and could not surrender his *person*, "because that belonged to his sovereign". Subsequently he evacuated the fort in the night.<sup>3</sup> The British forces pursued him, but he escaped to the north. Colin Campbell now went to Lucknow, stayed there for a week, and left for Fyzabad on 5 December. Six days later he left it and crossing the Gogra came to Sikora, whence he advanced on Bahraich, which the Revolutionaries had evacuated a day before his arrival there on the 17th.

1 Cf. Forrest, III, pp. 502-05.

2 Innes, p. 301.

3 The evacuation was almost complete: "not a soul was left except a few feeble old men, priests, dirty fakcers, and a *must* elephant with some gun bullocks". Forrest, III, p. 517.

On 22 December Campbell wrote to the Governor-General that he had received the "Wakil" of Haḍrat Maḥal who "appeared in camp early in the day with an inquiry from Her Highness as to what she might expect. The scouts say she has travelled north, and is already close to the hills of Nepal. This is probably true."<sup>1</sup> Haḍrat Maḥal had tried her utmost to prosecute the war to a successful end; besides establishing her new capital at Bondi she had tried to enter into an alliance with Nepal against the British. With this object letters were sent to the Ruler and Minister of Nepal on behalf of Birjis Qadr and his mother as well as Mawlawi Sarfarāz 'Alī who was appointed special Envoy of the Wālī of Awadh. To all their appeals, however the Revolutionary leaders received disappointing replies. Indeed in his reply to Birjis Qadr's letter, Jang Bahadur is painfully frank: "As the Hindoos and Mohammedans have been guilty of ungratitude and perfidy, neither the Nepal Government nor I can side with them. Since the stars of faith and integrity, sincerity in words as well as in acts, and the wisdom and comprehension of the British are shining as bright as the sun in every quarter of the globe, be assured that my Government will never disunite itself from the friendship of the exalted British Government, or instigated to join with any monarch against it, be as high as heaven. What grounds can we have for connecting ourselves with the Hindoos and Mohammedans of Hindoostan?" To make himself more emphatically clear the Nepalese leader added: "Be it also known, that had I in any way been inclined to cultivate the friendship and intimacy of the Hindoo and Mohammedan tribes, should I have massacred nearly 5 or 6,000 of them on my way to Lucknow?"<sup>2</sup>

1 Colin Campbell's letter quoted in Shadwell, II, p. 358.

The "Wakil" of the Begam was evidently not an envoy sent by her; she had fought against the enemy till the last moment and was now moving to the north in order to enter Nepal. Perhaps some influential persons were making efforts to bring about a surrender of the Begam. Sen thinks (p. 362) she "had little faith in British sincerity". The more probable explanation is that she was not prepared to accept suzerainty of the British. According to Ḥusaynī she was offered amnesty by Havelock on a previous occasion also.

2 *F. S. U. P.*, II, pp. 444-49.

The British forces left Bahraich on 23 December and advanced towards Nanpara ; it had been evacuated by the Revolutionaries. A short battle was fought, not far from Nanpara, on the 26th ; next day the fort of Musjidia was shelled and captured. On 31 December the last battle of the campaign was fought near Banki at a place where the Rapti enters the plains. The site of the battle was not far from the pass by which the Sunar Valley in Nepal is entered. After their defeat in the battle most of the Revolutionary leaders entered Nepal ; the Nānā and the Begam were among those who had escaped.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps Mawlawi Sarfarāz 'Ali was also among the leaders who migrated to Nepal. The close of the year saw the end of the Revolutionary War ; only minor actions were fought in the succeeding months.

<sup>1</sup> Some of the leaders surrendered themselves : among them were Mammū Khān and Tafaddul Husayn Khān.



## CHAPTER XXI

### ROHILKHAND (I)

Khan Bahadur Khan

#### Rohilkhand : early history

Rohilkhand, the country of the Ruhilahs, comprised the fertile regions of the upper Ganges valley with the territories of Awadh in the east and the Jamuna in the west. It was a loose confederation of Ruhilah Sardars who had come from Ruh<sup>1</sup> and settled in this region ;<sup>2</sup> they had appeared on the political map of the subcontinent early in the eighteenth century. The first of the Ruhilah Chiefs who migrated from his homeland, and settled in this area was Dāwūd Khān.<sup>2</sup> In the beginning he was a mere adventurer serving one or the other of the local chiefs in their internecine quarrels, but in course of time he created for himself an extensive estate

1 The territory known as Ruh extended from the hills of Kashmir in the east to the regions of Bhakkar and Baluchistan in the south and the river Helmund in the north and west. The people inhabiting the region came to be known as *Ruhilahs*. We find the Ruhilah fighters in the Imperial forces as early as the middle of the sixteenth century; some of their families were given lands for meritorious services and had settled in the districts below the Himalayan mountains. It was, however, in the decades following the death of 'Ālamgīr I that they were able to establish their rule in the region which later came to be known as Rohilkhand or the land of the Ruhilahs. For the origin and early history of the Ruhilahs see Khān, Nawab Sa'ādāt Yār, *Gul-i-Raḥmat* (MS. Pakistan Historical Society) and Khān, Nawab Mustajab, *Gulistan-i Raḥmat*; the latter has been translated into English by Elliot (London, 1831) see Najm al-Ghani, *op. cit.* I, pp. 55-95. Also see Bareilvi, Altaf 'Alī, *Hayāt-i Hāfiz Raḥmat Khān* (Badayun, 1933), pp. 1-4; Nevill, H. R., *District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh: Bareilly* (Allahabad, 1911), XIII, pp. 155-59.

2 He had built a mud fort for himself in the jungle area below the hills; this was called Bangarh. Cf. Najm al-Ghani, p. 67.

and became one of the leading zamindars in the region. His adopted son and successor, 'Ali Muḥammad Khān, extended his *jāgirs* at the expense of the neighbouring zamindars and became the real founder of the Ruhilah power with Aonla (in Bareilly district) as his seat of government. Subsequently, for his meritorious services to the Mughul Empire he was given the title of *Nawwāb* (Nawab) and was recognized as the 'Governor of Rohilkhand' (1740)<sup>1</sup>. In the meantime some other Ruhilah Sardārs had come and joined service under him. Among these, Ḥafīz Raḥmat Khān and Dūndī Khān deserve to be specially mentioned; the former was 'Ali Muḥammad Khān's chief adviser while the latter held the supreme command of the forces. On 'Ali Muḥammad's death in 1749, his young son, Sa'd Allāh Khān, succeeded to his office; Ḥafīz Raḥmat Khān acted as his guardian. The latter soon became the most influential Sardār among the Ruhilah Chiefs and was generally regarded as their leader. He was a capable administrator and a zealous reformer. Under his benign rule Rohilkhand became one of the best governed regions of the Mughul Empire.<sup>2</sup>

In 1774, however, the state of the Ruhilahs was attacked and devastated by the combined forces of the Nawab of Awadh and the British. The extermination of the Ruhilahs has remained a black spot on the reputation of the Company's Government. There was no justification for Warren Hastings to "enter into a private engagement with the said Nabob of Oudh . . . to furnish him . . . with a body of troops, for the declared purpose of

1 Strachey, Sir John, *Hastings and the Rohillah War*, (Oxford, 1893), p. 13, *Gul-i-Raḥmat*, f. 7.

2 "It is completely proved, that their territory was by far the best governed part of India; that the people were protected; that their industry was encouraged; and that the country flourished beyond all parallel!"  
Mill, James. *The History of British India* (London, 1858), III, p. 386.

Of another Ruhilah Chief, Nujīb al-Dawlah, whose headquarters was at Najibabad in the district of Bijnor. Verelst wrote, "as a man and a prince he is perhaps the only example in Hindostan of at once a great and good character . . . He is a strict lover of Justice, . . ." Quoted in Strachey, p. 289.

thoroughly exterminating the nation of the Rohilahs".<sup>1</sup> After the victory of the allies the territories of Rohilkhand were plundered and destroyed by the soldiers of the British and Awadh armies in a most barbarous manner.<sup>2</sup>

Hastings admits in a Minute, dated 10 January, 1775, that "there are destroyed upwards of a thousand villages. Had not the rains etc. prevented, we should have done very considerable more damage."<sup>3</sup> The British Parliament absolved Hastings of this charge, but the verdict of history has been different. Nor could the Rohilahs easily forget the part played by the Company's Government in the destruction of their power and country. It was not without reason that some of the toughest actions of the war were fought on the soil of Rohilkhand.<sup>4</sup>

As a result of the defeat of the Rohilahs the entire territory of Rohilkhand, excepting the small State of Rampur,<sup>5</sup> was annexed by the Nawab of Awadh. Twenty-seven years later Lord Wellesley forced Sa'adat 'Ali Khān, the then Nawab of Awadh, to cede

1 First Article of Charge against Hastings, Mill, p. 174.

2 "The inhumanity and dishonour," wrote Colonel Champion, the Commander of the British forces, in a letter of 12 June, 1774," with which the late proprietors of this country and their families have been used, is known all over these parts . . . I could not help compassionating such unparalleled misery." In another letter he said, "Above a lakh of people have deserted their abodes in consequence of the death of Hafiz." Mill, Book V, chap. I, p. 403 n.

3 Fifth Report, quoted in Mill, *Ibid.*.

4 In referring to Sayyid Ahmad Shahīd's early activities, Hunter rightly remarks: "The first scene of his labours lay among the descendants of the Rohillas, for whose extermination we had venally lent our troops fifty years before, and whose sad history forms one of the ineffaceable blots on Warren Hastings's career. Their posterity have, during the past half-century, taken an undying revenge, and still recruit the Rebel Colony on our Frontier with its bravest swordsmen. In the case of the Rohillas, as in many other instances, where we have done wrong in India, we have reaped what we sowed." Hunter, W. W., *The Indian Mussalmans*, (Reprint from the third ed., Calcutta, 1945) p. 4.

5 In the War of Independence the Ruler of Rampur supported and fought for the British.

nearly half of his dominion to the Company ; thus Rohilkhand came under British rule early in the nineteenth century.

### The rising at Bareilly, 1814-16

In 1814 house-tax was levied in the town of Bareilly ; the people opposed it and rose against the district authorities under the leadership of Mufti Muḥammad I'wāḍ.<sup>1</sup> He asked the Magistrate, Dumbleton, to withdraw the tax, but the latter paid no heed to the popular demand and thus allowed disaffection to spread and grow. On 16 April 1816 the Kotwal went round the city with a view to disperse the people who were roaming about and assembling in different places. He excited them by ordering his men to fire at a crowd near the house of the Mufti ; several persons died as a result of firing. The Mufti now came out of his house, led the people to a garden, known as *Ḥusaynī Bāgh* outside the city and proclaimed a *jihād* ; a number of men rallied round him and attacked the Government forces (21 April). They were, however, overpowered and dispersed when reinforcements arrived from Moradabad under Captain Cunningham, but not before many of them had sacrificed their lives. Mufti Muḥammad I'wāḍ managed to escape to Tonk.<sup>2</sup>

### Bareilly in 1857

Bareilly, the premier city of Rohilkhand, had been the capital of Ḥāfiẓ Raḥmat Khān ; in 1857 it was the headquarters of a Divisional Commissioner. During the course of the Revolution it became one of its strongholds and played a vital role in the War of

1 Mufti Muḥammad I'wāḍ son of Darwish Muhammad, was a man of literary tastes and sufistic inclinations. He lived a retired life and was "a man of great age and reputed sanctity, who was held in profound veneration throughout Rohilkhand." For his life see Ya'qūb, Muḥammad, *Akmal al-Tārīkh* (Badāyūn, 1916), p. 47 ; Khān, Nawab 'Alī Ḥasan, *Ma'athir-i-Siddiqi*, (Lucknow, 1924, I, pp. 67-68 ; *District Gazetteer, Bareilly*), pp. 169-70.

2 The place where these men were buried came to be known as *Ganj-i-Shahidān* (Martyrs' Treasure) and is near the tomb of *Shāh Dānā Wali*. See Beveridge, II, p. 32.

Independence. Of the leading organisers of the Movement at least two appear to have worked in Bareilly: the great *Mujāhid*, Mawlawī Sarfarāz ‘Alī, was in the city in *Rabī‘ al-Awwal* 1273 H.<sup>1</sup> Muftī ‘Ināyat Aḥmad,<sup>2</sup> the *Ṣadr Amin*, was engaged in publishing literature pertaining to Islam, and in a subtle manner was preaching *jihād* through it.<sup>3</sup> A *faqīr*, named Jhandā Shāh, also seems to have worked for this Movement among the citizens of Bareilly, who had a great faith in him. He was tried for creating disaffection and sentenced to transportation for life; even in the Andamans he was respected by the people.<sup>4</sup>

1 See *Al-‘Ilm* (Quarterly, Karachi, October 1958), p. 84.

2 Muftī ‘Ināyat Aḥmad was born in 1228 H. He had studied *Hadīth* with the well-known scholar, Shāh Muhammad Ishāq. After completing his course of studies, he became a *mudarris* (teacher) at the *Jāmi‘ Masjid* of Aligarh. Later he joined Government service as a *Munsif*. From Aligarh he was transferred to Bareilly and was still there when the Revolution broke out. After the Revolution he was arrested and sentenced to transportation for life. During his stay in the Andamans he translated the *Taqwīn al-Buldān* at the instance of a European officer; and it was for this work that the officer secured his release in 1277 H. On his return to the subcontinent he settled at Kānpur where he established the *Madrasah-i Fayḍ-i-‘Ām*. In 1279 he decided to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca; the ship in which he was travelling crashed against a rock and Muftī Shāhib, like other passengers, met with his death.

For his life see Haydar, Mawlawī Muḥammad ‘Alī, *Tadhkirah-i-Mashāhīr-i-Kakūri* (Lucknow, 1927) pp. 24-25; Shīrwani, Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān Khān, *Usūd al-U‘lāh* (Aligarh, 1937), pp. 8-20; ‘Abd al-Shāhid Khān, *op. cit.* p. 173; Aḥmad, Muftī ‘Ināyat, *Tawārīkh Ḥabīb-i Ilāh* (Lahore, 1932), pp. 2-3.

3 In 1271 H. a Society called *Anjuman Ta’id-i-Dīn-i-Matīn* was established in Bareilly; Muftī ‘Ināyat Aḥmad was one of its founders. Apparently its main object was to publish literature on religious topics; an attempt was made to enlist enthusiastic supporters and members from the neighbouring cities and towns, such as Aligarh, Badāyūn, Moradabad, Mainpuri and Etawah etc. See notification of the *Anjuman* at the end of the work, *Diwān al-Firdaws (Matba‘ Nizāmī, Kānpur, 1273 H.*

4 Thanasari, Muhammad Ja‘far, *Tārīkh-i-‘Ajīb*, (Lucknow, 1892), p. 78. Also see his *Tawārīkh-i-‘Ajīb* (ed. Ayub Qadri, Karachi, 1962), for an account of some prisoners in the Andamans.

Khān Bahādur Khān, the most important leader of the Revolutionaries in Bareilly, was a grandson of Hāfiz Raḥmat Khān. He had completed his career of service as a civil officer in the Company's Government and was now living as a pensioner ; besides this, he also received a pension as the descendant of the last Ruler of the Ruhilāhs. He enjoyed the confidence of the Commissioner, Robert Alexander, and had great influence over the people of Bareilly and the neighbouring area. Until the last moment the local authorities thought that Khān Bahādur Khān's loyalty could not be doubted.<sup>1</sup>

The reports of the uneasy feelings of the sepoy's manifested in Bengal in March 1857 had reached Rohilkhand in the following month. The officers were asked about the cartridge affair, and although their answers seemed to be convincing the people did not remain uninfluenced by the revolutionary ideas which were finding their way into various sections of the civil population, as well as the units of the Company's Army. In May the outbreak of the Revolution in Delhi excited the people, and fresh reports of the fast moving events at Delhi brought by persons coming from that side continuously added to their uneasiness. Forrest is right when he says that "the news that a Mughul Emperor once more reigned in the Imperial city aroused the fanaticism and martial spirit of the Pathan Rohillas, who were mainly followers of the Prophet and had old traditions to excite them." He adds that the landlords were dissatisfied because their estates had been sold for debts by orders of civil courts; the rural population was ready to support their leaders. The banking classes feared a depreciation in the State loans and "ridiculous stories were spread abroad by the leaders and promoters of rebellion that Government was issuing leather rupees and intended to seize all the silver of the country.<sup>2</sup>

On 14 May definite reports of the outbreak at Meerut reached Bareilly ; immediately after the receipt of this information European

1 Cf. Keene, p. 128 ; also see Kaye and Malleon, III, pp. 205-06.

2 Forrest, III, pp. 302-03.

ladies and children were sent to Nainital.<sup>1</sup> Brigadier Sibbald, Commander of the Station, was absent on a tour of inspection; Colonel Troup was acting in his place. Of all the Regiments under his command, Troup had the greatest faith in the loyalty of the 8th Irregulars;<sup>2</sup> Captain Mackenzie was the Commander of this Regiment. Colonel Troup took necessary measures to meet an emergency; he increased the strength of his trusted Regiment, the 8th I.C. and paraded the Brigade and told them that no new cartridges were coming to Bareilly, adding, "If any should come, he would destroy them on the parade-ground in their presence." The Commissioner asked Mawlawi Muḥammad Aḥsan, a teacher at the local college, to deliver a *wa'z* (sermon). Accordingly he addressed the congregation at the mosque of Naw-Maḥlah on Friday, 22 May, and tried to explain to the people that it was unlawful for them to rebel against the Government.<sup>3</sup> His sermons had an effect, contrary to the wishes and expectations of the officers, and he had to leave Bareilly in shame.<sup>4</sup> On the following Monday, which was 'Id al-Fiṭr day, Mawlawi Raḥīm Allāh wanted to preach *jihād* at the same mosque, but

1 Nainital : a hill station in the north of Bareilly.

2 The troops stationed in Bareilly consisted of the 18th and the 68th N. I. and the 8th Irregular Cavalry, besides a battery of Artillery.

3 Extracts from the *Narrative of events at Bareilly* in the interval between 12 and 31 May 1857, quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 170. It may be of some interest to note that the Mawlawi's sincerity was suspected in official circles, because the result of his *w'as* "whether intended or not, was a very general excitement among his hearers, which spread throughout the town, and so nearly involved a rising against the man himself that the Kotwal strongly urged the deportation of the man before the following Friday with or without his will." See *Narrative of events of Bareilly* as quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, V, 166. Mawlawi Muḥammad Aḥsan Nānawātī was professor of Arabic and Persian in the Bareilly College. He had written a number of books and was known for his translation of Imām Ghazzālī's monumental work, the *Iḥyā' al-'Ulūm al-Dīn*. He had established the famous Siddiqi Press of Bareilly, from where a number of books were published. The Mawlānā died at Deoband in 1312 H. For his life see *Anwār al-'Ārifin*. (Bareilly, 1290 H.) Bakḥsh, Mawlānā Hāfiz *Tanbih ul-Juhāl* (Lucknow 1292 H.) pp. 6-25.

4 Cf. *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 170.

the Kotwal stopped him from delivering a *wa'z*. Bakht Khan was also present at this gathering.<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to add that another teacher of the College, Mawlawī Qutb Shāh has been stated to have been the writer of Khān Bahādur Khān's proclamations. In the judgment delivered in his case the Mawlawī is mentioned as a "Wahabee" and "a Teacher in the Bereilly College." He joined the Movement in the earliest stages, preached *jihād* and took service under Khān Bahādur Khān on Rs. 150/- p.m. He was in Prince Firūz Shāh's army when he captured Moradabad. On being arrested, after the collapse of the Revolution, his courage failed him and he pleaded not guilty at the court. The Judge did not accept the plea and sentenced him to be hanged to death.<sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding these precautionary measures of the authorities the excitement continued to grow, "having been fed by the evil-disposed of the city, by emissaries from Mirath, from Delhi, from Firuzpur, and especially by intriguers from the districts instigated by one, Khān Bahādur Khan".<sup>3</sup>

On his return Sibbald ordered a general parade on 21 May; he made an appeal to the men, and "begged them to dismiss from their minds the causeless dread that pervaded them."<sup>4</sup> He was perfectly satisfied with the result of his efforts; two days later he wrote to the Government: "From the cheerful and obedient spirit now evinced by the troopers I augur the happiest results, and am convinced that should their services be required they will act as good and loyal soldiers."

1 F. S. U. P., V, p. 170.

2 Qutb Shāh was the owner of a printing press which published revolutionary literature. It was called Bahāduri Press.

*Ibid*, pp. 373, 380, and pp. 584-85.

3 Kaye and Malletson, III, pp. 205-06 It may be noted that Khān Bahadur Khān was helping Bakht Khān in preparing the people of Bareilly and the neighbouring areas to join the Movement. "It is proved," says the judgment delivered in the case against Khān Bahadur Khān, "that before the Mutiny, the prisoner was in communication with Bakht Khān, subahdar of Artillery and other native officers and that he incited them to mutiny!"

4 Brigadier Sibbald to the Secretary to Government, North-West Provinces, Bareilly, May 23, 1857, quoted in Forrest, III, 304.



Sibbald's assessment of the situation was not correct. Within a week of the despatch of his letter Colonel Troup received information through a Hindu Risaldar that the men of the 18th N.I. and the 8th I.C. "had sworn to rise at 2 p.m.": nothing happened that day.<sup>1</sup> Early in the morning on the last day of the month, however, the house of a British officer was set on fire. This put the Europeans on guard; at about 11 a.m. one of the battery guns was fired and was followed by a volley of musketry. It was now clear that the sepoys had risen. Brigadier Sibbald, on hearing the roar of the guns, rushed towards the Cavalry Lines; on the way he was shot in the chest; soon after this another officer, Lieutenant Tucker, was hit in the head. Troup and several other civil and military officers reached the Cavalry Lines; they now decided to flee to Nainital. Mackenzie, who commanded the Regiment of the 8th Cavalry, tried to persuade his men to remain loyal to the Government, but when he was speaking to them "there arose from the ranks of the infantry a loud cry calling on them to be true to their religion. A green flag, the symbol of the Muslim faith, was hoisted and the two wings ranged themselves around the banner.<sup>2</sup> When the Europeans vacated the city the Revolutionaries released the prisoners and set up their own administration.<sup>3</sup>

1 The day (29 May) had passed without any incident, but the officers were uneasy; on 30 May the Commissioner is stated to have told Khān Bahādur Khān that he "was expecting an outbreak in the city and therefore he should take over its administration because it belonged to his ancestors." Khān Bahādur warned him saying that the situation was becoming critical and therefore he should make necessary arrangements for his own protection. His actual words were: "*apni jan bachāo*." See *Narrative of events in Bareilly*, *op. cit.* Also see *Tārīkh-i-Sulaymānī*, quoted in Bareilvi, p. 326.

2 Forrest, III, p. 308.

Muir says that the flag "was planted in the front of the Cotwalee," and that Khān Bahādur Khān went daily to salute it. *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 47.

3 On reaching Baherī a tehsil of Bareilly the European officers asked the local *pishkār* to surrender the contents of the treasury, but he refused and the party thought it advisable to continue their journey. See *District Gazetteer, Bareilly*, p. 172

**Khan Bahadur Khan takes over the administration**

**Khān Bahādur Khān**, now proclaimed by general consent Viceroy of Rohilkhand, was "a venerable man of dignified manners and considerable ability, much respected by both Europeans and natives". Among the leaders of the Revolutionaries who requested him to accept the responsibilities of Government was **Shubahdār Bakht Khān**.<sup>1</sup> Immediately after assuming the powers of government **Khān Bahādur Khān** issued orders for the recruitment of soldiers and the setting up of an ordnance factory.<sup>2</sup> The *tahsils* and *thānahs* were set in order and their officers started functioning under the new regime.<sup>3</sup> Besides confirming the officers who were serving under the Company's Government he appointed<sup>4</sup> some persons of his own confidence to important posts. For obvious reasons the new Viceroy paid his greatest attention to the building up of an efficient and powerful army. With the confirmation of his own appointment as Viceroy through an Imperial *farmān* which was received on 21 June, the position of **Khān Bahādur Khān** was considerably strengthened. By his tact and ability he did not only secure the

1 **Khan Bahādur Khān** stated in his petition to the Governor-General, dated 14 February, 1860, that **Bakht Khān** had sent a message to him through **Muhammad Shafi** and **Risāldar Imdād 'Alī** that he should assume leadership of the Revolutionaries. Being nearly eighty years old and having no means at his disposal to conduct a war, he was reluctant to accept the responsibility, but he accepted it at **Bakht Khān's** personal request. See *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 183-84.

2 In November 1857, one hundred and fifty men were working in the foundry. See *Intelligence Records*, I, p. 273.

3 Cf. *District Gazetteer*, p. 174.

4 Some of the leading officers of the Revolutionary Government were :—

**Madār 'Alī Khān**, Commander-in-Chief ; **Hori Lal**, son of **Sobha Ram, Bakshi** ; **Sobha Ram, Diwān-i kul** and the chief appellate officer ; **Muhammad Yūsuf Khān** **Risāldar** ; **Husayn, Kotwal** ; **Muhammad Ahsan Khān, Munṣif** ; **Muhammad Amīn Khān, Ṣadr Amin** ; **Muẓaffar Husayn, Ṣadr al-Sudūr** ; **Mawlawī Sayyid Aḥmad Badāyūni, Mufti**, **Mullā Munīr, Mullā-i-Qurānī** ; **Hāfiẓ Kālī Khān, Executor** ; **Mawlawī Ḥaydar 'Alī, Rūznāmchah-nigār**. For a complete list see *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 279—351.

support of the influential Muslim citizens and zamindars but was also able to win over some of the Hindu leaders "Khan Bahadur Khan", writes Nevill, "endeavoured to win them to his side by profuse compliments and partially succeeded."<sup>1</sup>

Nominally, Khān Bahādur Khān had "91 Cavalry corps with 4,618 men of all ranks, 57 infantry regiments with a strength of 24,330 men and 40 guns, for the most part cast in his foundry at Bareilly."<sup>2</sup> The expenditure incurred on the up-keep of his army came to rupees two lakhs, sixty-five thousand and six hundred. The monthly pay of a horse-trooper was fixed at twenty rupees, while a foot-soldier got six rupees.<sup>3</sup> Zahir Dihlawi gives an eye-witness account of the condition and activities of this army. He says there were fifty thousand horsemen in Bareilly; of these nearly thirty thousand came from Rampur. Each of them carried with him four pistols and two swords.<sup>4</sup> Soon after assuming power, Khān Bahādur Khān had to lead a punitive expedition against Raghubar Singh of Budhauri, who had rebelled against the new Government. The revolt was suppressed and the situation brought under control but the incident "estranged the Rajputs from Khan Bahadur"<sup>5</sup>

1 *District Gazetteer : Bareilly*, p. 175

2 *Ibid.*

3 In December 1857, he was supposed to have at his disposal "35 guns . . . and a great number of very small ones of native make. His infantry are estimated at 18,000 . . . of 5,000 cavalry; the 2,000 are said to be fit for service . . . : 10,000 men and 8 guns are at Budaon, 5,000, and 4 guns at Buheree, between Bareilly and Nainital, 2,000 and one gun at Meerungun, 5,000 and 10 guns at Bareilly : the rest scattered detachments" *Intelligence Records*, I, pp. 307-08.

4 Zahir Dihlawi, pp. 187-88.

5 *District Gazetteer : Bareilly*, pp. 175-76.

Another awkward incident which impaired the mutual relations of the Hindus and Muslims was a quarrel between Khān Bahādur Khān's Minister, Sobha Ram, and the influential Sayyids of Nawmahlah. The Sayyids charged the Minister with being in collusion with the British - the accusation was not wholly groundless. However, a reconciliation was ultimately effected.

Khān Bahādur Khān decided to send his quota of forces to Delhi under Bakht Khān.<sup>1</sup> He had already sent a petition to the Emperor, and the latter had confirmed him as his Viceroy by sending a *farmān*. It appears that the Ruhilah leader sent several envoys at different times; Jiwan Lal mentions one under 8 July;<sup>2</sup> in his report of 1 September the British spy, Gauri Shankar, says, "Yakoob Allee Khan of Bareilly, according to the talk of the Palace, has brought 200 gold mohurs, a gold cup and an elephant as presents for the King, but he has not presented them yet." Next day, however, he sends the information that "the King then said there were 101 gold mohurs recently presented to him by the Nawab of Bareilly and they might have them."<sup>3</sup> Evidently the two statements made on two consecutive days refer to *naghars* by two different envoys.

In addition to Bareilly the jurisdiction of Khān Bahādur Khān extended over the districts of Pilibhit, Badaun and Shah-jahanpur; Moradabad and Bijnor collaborated with him.<sup>4</sup>

### Pilibhit

As in other parts of Rohilkhand "the Musalmans of Pilibhit were in an obviously excited state, as was evident from the posting of seditious placards on the mosque and 'Idgah on the occasion of 'Id festival." The report of the outbreak at Bareilly reached Pilibhit on the first day of June. The Magistrate, Carmichael, left the place the same day, taking the road to Nainital; other Europeans also managed to escape to places which they thought were safer than the town.<sup>5</sup> The people accepted Khān Bahādur Khān's rule. Some of the Rajput families, however, did not extend

1 *Najm al-Ghanī (Akḥbār al-Sanādīd)*, pp. 550-51.

2 *T. N. N.*, p. 143.

3 *Secret Letters*, Letter No. 191 of 7 September, 1857

4 For details of the machinery of government set up by Khān Bahādur Khān, see *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 279-351.

5 A. Bremner, for instance, took shelter in the house of one. Rahmān Khān, See certificates of Asad Allāh Khān, printed in Bareilly in 1915.

Also see *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 230-32.

full co-operation to the Revolutionary Government, and a small force had to be despatched under Madār 'Alī Khān to bring them to reason. A few of the old officers had to be removed and trustworthy men appointed in their places; Aḥmad Yār Khān was the Taḥşildār of Jahānābād. Subsequently this post was given to Zafar Yār Khān; he was succeeded by Ayyūb Khān who remained in office till the end. The town of Pilibhit itself was given in the charge of Abu al-Ḥasan with Maṣṣūr Khān as his assistant.<sup>1</sup>

### Aonla

Aonla, a small town in the district of Bareilly, had at one time been the capital of the Ruhilah Chiefs; some of their descendants still lived there. Khān Bahādur Khān placed it in the charge of Kallan Khān, a grandson of Bakhshī Sardār Khān.<sup>2</sup> Kallan Khān was an extremely handsome person and was known for his personal prowess; he was considered to be a capable administrator and it was for this reason that he was given the charge of Aonla by Khān Bahādur Khān. He was assisted by several local leaders of the Revolution: among these Mawlawī Muḥammad Ismā'il, who was appointed *Ṣadr Shari'ah*, Ghālib 'Alī, Shaykh Khayr Allāh and Ḥakīm Sa'id Allāh deserve to be specifically mentioned.<sup>3</sup>

1 For some of these incidents see *F. S. U. P.*, Vol. V, pp. 228-34; also see other relevant references

2 Sardār Khān, son of Mawsam Khān, belonged to the Kamālzaī clan. He had migrated from Ruh along with Dāwūd Khān. Dāwūd Khān's successor, 'Alī Muḥammad Khān, appointed him as his *Bakhshī*. Sardār Khān was a brave and pious man and was very anxious to give stability to the Government of the Ruhilahs. He built four mosques in Aonla and was buried in the *Jāmi' Masjid* there on his death in 1187 H. See Najm al-Ghānī, (*A. S.*), pp. 288-89.

3 Ḥakīm 'Abd al-Ghāfūr, author of *Sawānīḥāt al-Muta'akhkhirin-l-Āunlah* (MS) had seen Kallan Khān in his old age. Ḥakīm Abd al-Ghāfūr's work contains biographical notices of the leading persons of Aonla, whom he had seen, or who had worked with his grandfather during the Revolution of 1857. See ff. 50-51.

Ghālib 'Alī collected funds and provisions for the army of Prince Firūz Shāh when the latter was encamping in Aonla. See *Sawānīḥāt*, f. 12.

Shaykh Khayr Allāh was a zealous *Mujahid*; he suppressed the revolt of the Thakurs at Urla. (f. 12.) Ḥakīm Sa'id Allāh was an important worker of

**Badaun (Badāyūn)**

Badaun, one of the most ancient towns in the upper regions, had been an important cultural centre under the Sultans of Delhi, and was once governed by the great Sultān Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish,<sup>1</sup> Like other parts of Rohilkand it had passed under the rule of the Company in 1801 and was in the beginning under the collectorate of Moradabad. In 1857 however it was a separate district in the charge of William Edwards. The reports of the outbreak of the Revolution reached Badaun on 15 May, and its reactions soon became visible in the different pargana<sup>h</sup>s of the district. Nevertheless, the city remained calm on account of the efforts of some prominent persons. Mawlawī Faḍl-i-Rasūl, for instance, at the "risk of his own life, exerted himself . . . to ensure peace and security to the people . . ."<sup>2</sup> On the eve of the 'Id festival Edwards was told by his informers that the Muslims of the town had planned a rising for the following day. He immediately invited the leading Muslims to his house and detained them until the hour of the 'Id prayers had passed off. He thought that his action had averted the crisis, but, in fact, it had added to the commotion already prevailing in the city.

The actual rising came on 2 June, soon after the arrival of a contingent of the 68 N.I. from Bareilly. The administration of

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the Revolutionary Movement. He had intimate contacts with Mawlawī Sarfarāz 'Alī, generally known as the *Amīr al-Mujāhidīn*, and Mawlawī Kifāyat 'Alī of Moradabad. Sa'id Allāh took part in fighting at the siege of Delhi, and later in the battle of Kakrālāh. After the War of Independence he went underground; he was pardoned by the British Government at the intercession of Ḥakīm Sa'ādāt 'Alī Khān of Rampur, who originally came from Aonla. He died in 1907. See *Sawānīḥāt*, ff. 14-15.

The MS. of the *Sawānīḥāt* used by the writer is in the personal collection of Muḥammad Ayub Qadri.

1 Iltutmish's *Jāmi' Masjid* is even today the biggest mosque in the city; another monument of his time is the 'Idgāh *Shamsī*.

2 *Ḥabīb al-Akḥbār*, dated 3 *Dhu al-Qa'dah*, 1272 H., quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 221. For the life of Faḍl-i-Rasūl, See Qādri, *Ḍiyā'*, *Akmal al-Tārīkh* (Badaun, 1916).

the district was seized by the Revolutionaries, and Edwards, accompanied by some other Europeans, fled from the town and took refuge with Sharaf al-Din of Shaykhupurah.<sup>1</sup> The party reached Kānpur on 1 September.<sup>2</sup>

The Revolutionary Government appointed new officers to important posts and confirmed those who were considered trustworthy. On 17 June, 'Abd al-Rahmān Khān was made *Nāzim* of the district, with Shaykh Faṣāḥat Allāh as his deputy. The new *Nāzim* "at once endeavoured to restore order to the best of his ability, driving away the Rajputs, who had already made an unsuccessful attack on Shaykhupurah, and a few days earlier, had raided the city. He restored 'Aziz Khān at Bisauli, and then directed all the subordinate Government officials to return to their duties."<sup>3</sup> Tafaḍḍul Ḥusayn, Ashraf 'Alī and Munshi Maḥmūd Ḥusayn had retired from service; they were called back and promoted to deputy-collectorships. Dhu al-Faqār al-Dīn was appointed Deputy-Magistrate and Bād Allāh Khān was made the Kotwal of the city; Raḍī Allāh, Mawlawi Mājīd 'Alī and Lachhman Singh were given the charge of the *tahsils* of Bisauli, Gunnaur and Ujhāni respectively.<sup>4</sup> To maintain peace in the city and the district a few military officers were also associated with the administration. General Niyāz Muḥammad Khān was made *Sipāh-Sālār*, and 'Aẓmat Allāh Khān, *Bakhshi* of the local forces;

1 See Graham, G. F. I., *The Life and Work of Syed Ahmed Khan* (London, 1885), p. 66 Sharaf al-Din was rewarded with "a *Khil'at* of Rs. 3000 and a village worth Rs. 2,500 per annum in perpetuity." Also see Kaye and Malletson, III, pp. 217-18

2 Edwards has written an account of his adventures; it was published in London in 1858 under the title : *Personal Advantures during the Indian Rebellion in Rohilkhand, Futtahgurh, and Oudh*. It has been rendered into Urdu by Mawlawi Naẓīr Aḥmad of Delhi and published under the title, *Maḥd'ib-i-Ghadr*.

3 *District Gazetteer : Badaun*, p. 154.

4 See Inḥā' Allāh, Mawlawi Muḥammad, *Tārīkhī Banī ḥāmid*, (Badaun, 1917), pp. 27-29.

Wali Dād Khān, Chaudhri Tafaḍḍul and Karāmat Allāh were given junior commands.<sup>1</sup>

In July, regular work of the collection of revenue was started. The Rajputs opposed the new Government and assembled their forces under a zamindar who assumed the title of *Dhapū Dhām*. He advanced on Badaun but was defeated in the outskirts of the city and fled back to his village;<sup>2</sup> another rising of the Rajputs at Dātāganj in August was also quelled by the Revolutionary troops. The Thakurs of Gunnaur remained loyal to the British and with their support their officials remained at their posts till November. Similarly the zamindars of Bisauli raised the standard of revolt against the new Government; they were defeated and severely punished by General Niyāz Muḥammad. In October, Khān Bahādur Khān gave some villages in lease to influential chieftains who succeeded in bringing the recalcitrant Rajputs under control. By these measures Khān Bahādur Khān's rule was established throughout the district of Badaun.<sup>3</sup>

### Shahjahanpur

Another important district of Rohilkhand, which acknowledged the authority of Khān Bahādur Khān was Shahjahanpur. It was among the several places where Mawlawi Sarfarāz 'Alī<sup>4</sup> had preached *jihād* before the Revolution: "This evening," says the report of the Collector of Shahjahanpur regarding the outbreak of the Revolution, dated 9 September 1858, "the sepoy went off in a body towards Bareilly and a *Molwee* by name Surfuraz Ulee, a resident of Goruckpore, accompanied them; it appears that this man had arrived at the station about 20 days before the mutiny, and doubtless was chiefly instrumental in exciting the sepoy to revolt; Surfuraz Ulee was frequently in the habit of

1 Manglori, Mawlawī Tufayl Aḥmad, *Musalmanun ka Rūshan Mūstaqbil*, (Badaun, 1945). Also see *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 312 *et seq*.

2 *District Gazetteer*, p. 155. Also see *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 315.

3 For details see *District Gazetteer : Badaun*, p. 154; *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 315;

4 *District Gazetteer : Shahjahanpur*, p. 144.



coming to Shahjahanpur where he had several disciples in the city, among the number Koodrut Ulee (naib Foujdaree Surishtahdar) and his brother Neaz Ulee, both of whom are with the rebels . . .”<sup>1</sup>

The district authorities fearing a rising on the day of ‘Id increased the number of guards and sentries. The sepoys took this as a slight, and symptoms of excitement began to appear. On 31 May, they found their opportunity and attacked the Europeans who had assembled in the church; Ricketts, the Magistrate of the district, was killed. After some time a detachment of the Sikhs arrived on the scene, but in the meantime the Revolutionaries had rushed to the cantonment and overpowered Captain James, the Commanding Officer, and some other Europeans. The Joint Magistrate, Jenkins, fled away, leaving the town in the hands of the Revolutionaries who released the prisoners from the jail and seized the treasury.

The administration of the district was entrusted to Qādir ‘Alī Khān,<sup>2</sup> who led a procession through the streets of the city and proclaimed the assumption of the government of Rohilkhand by Khān Bahādur Khān. On 16 June Nawab Ghulām Qādir Khān who was the most respected leader of Shahjahanpur returned from Bansi, in Basti district, whither he had gone to meet his spiritual guide, Sa‘ādat ‘Alī Khān. From Shahjahanpur, Ghulām Qādir Khān went to Bareilly to offer his services to Khān Bahādur Khān. The latter appointed him *Nāẓim*; a few days later Ghulām Qādir Khān returned to Shahjahanpur and took over from Qādir ‘Alī.<sup>3</sup> Nizām ‘Alī Khān, Hāmid Hasan Khān and Khān

1 Letter from G. P. Money, Collector of Shahjahanpur to R. Alexander, Commissioner of Rohilkhand Division, dated 9 September 1858, quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 297. Also see *District Gazetteer, Shahjahanpur*, p. 144.

2 It may be noted that after putting Qādir ‘Alī Khān in charge of the district the Revolutionary forces accompanied by Mawlawi Sarfarāz ‘Alī Khān left for Bareilly.

3 Paras. 23 and 24 of G. P. Money’s letter dated 9 September 1858; see *District Gazetteer: Shahjahanpur*, pp. 143-45. Also see *Sābiḥ-al-Dīn, Tarīḥ-i-Shahjahanpur* (Lucknow, 1932), p. 129.

'Ali Khān were appointed his deputies, while the command of the forces was given to 'Abd al-Ra'waf Khān; Nawāb Hashmat Khān was put in charge of the Artillery. After some time 'Abd al-Ra'waf Khān resigned, and was succeeded by Wājid 'Ali. Najib Khān was appointed in the vacancy caused by the transfer of Hāmid Hasan Khān to Kanth, where the Rajputs were causing trouble. The Rajput menace became so acute that Nizām 'Ali Khān who was assigned the task of suppressing it had to ask for assistance from Bareilly. In response to his appeal Khān Bahādur Khān sent a force under Mardān 'Ali Khān, one of his trusted officers. He suppressed the rebellion of the Rajputs and punished the ring-leaders for their mischief.<sup>1</sup>

#### Tilhar, Miranpur and Jalalabad

In the countryside also steps were taken to put the administration on sound lines. At Tilhar the Revolutionaries, led by Ghulām Muḥammad Khān, seized the police station and the *tahsil*. Khān Bahādur Khān confirmed him as officer in charge of Tilhar; subsequently this parganah was given to Kifāyat Allāh and Hidāyat Allāh on a lease, but Ghulām Muḥammad Khān "continued throughout the disturbances to play a prominent part, accompanying the expedition to Haldwani and leading his troops in at least two expeditions".<sup>2</sup>

In Miranpur Katrah the leaders of the Revolutionaries were Fayḍ Muḥammad Khān and Ghulāmī Khān;<sup>3</sup> each of them raised a Regiment of Infantry. At Jalālābad the old Tahsildar, Aḥmad Yār Khān, was retained in office by the new Government; he took part in the Battle of Bichpuria.

Jagannath, the Raja of Powain, defied Khān Bahādur Khān's Government, but when a force was sent to punish him he surren-

1 *District Gazetteer : Shahjahanpur*, pp. 143-45; also see *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 298-311.

2 *District Gazetteer : Shahjahanpur*, pp. 145-46.

3 *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 310.

dered and agreed to pay a lakh of rupees as annual revenue of his *tahsil* and thirty thousand as a *nadhrahānah* to Khān Bahādur Khān.<sup>1</sup> Khan Bahadur Khan's efforts to secure the cooperation of Hindu chiefs

Khān Bahādur Khān was fully conscious of the need and advantage of Hindu-Muslim unity. He had, therefore, appointed prominent Hindus on some responsible posts. Sobha Ram, the most influential of his Hindu officials, was, however, suspected of being in collusion with the British and of harbouring the Europeans. The Sayyids of Nawmahlah, who were the most zealous supporters of the Revolution, and "largely instrumental in raising the Nawab to power," attacked Sobha Ram's house, but Khān Bahādur Khān, despite the convincing evidence produced by the accusers, treated him with indulgence. No doubt he was obliged to use force against the recalcitrant zamindars, but the basic elements of Khān Bahādur Khān's policy towards the Hindus were co-operation and friendliness. In a Proclamation addressed to "the virtuous, illustrious and brave Rajahs, preservers of their own faith and props of the religion of others," he advised them to join the Revolution and made a direct appeal to their sentiments about religious duties and obligations.<sup>2</sup> With a view to win their goodwill and cooperation and persuade them to join the Revolution he issued orders that cows were not to be slaughtered in quarters where the Hindus were living.<sup>3</sup> However, in spite of these concessions and the efforts of Khān Bahādur Khān to enlist their active support, many a Hindu zamindar remained loyal to the British.

#### **Expedition sent to Nainital**

Soon after setting the machinery of administration in order and punishing the rebellious zamindars, Khān Bahādur Khān sent an expedition to Nainital in July 1857, which had

1 *F.S.U.P.*, V, pp. 145-56; also see Keene, p. 130.

2 For his proclamations Eng. Trans. see *Kaye's Papers*.

3 See *The Delhi Gazette*, 16 June 1858.

become a stronghold of the British fugitives.<sup>1</sup> The expedition was led by Banney Mir who could not however proceed further than Baheri. Subsequently, another force was sent under 'Alī Khān Mewati who seized Haldwani and Kathgodam. In August an expedition was despatched under Kallī Khān.<sup>2</sup> Another Revolutionary leader, Haydar Khān, also marched up to Baheri. The guide of the army proved to be a traitor, and he was suddenly attacked and routed on 6 October. As the main cause of the defeat was treachery, Khān Bahādur Khān took severe steps against all who were suspected of it.<sup>3</sup>

In February 1858, the Revolutionary Government organised another and a bigger expedition against Nainital; Baheri was to be the base of operations. The commander of the forces, Kallī Khān, proceeded towards Haldwani. Faḍl-i-Ḥaqq marched from Sāndah, and was to join them in force. The battle which was fought on 10 February is described in a letter by one who participated in it.<sup>4</sup> The Revolutionaries were forced to withdraw and returned to Bareilly, but a small contingent remained at Baheri. Khān Bahādur Khān sent Ghawth Muḥammad Khān to its help, and ordered him to stay there, "with the object of holding off an advance on Bareilly,

1 Yūsuf 'Alī Khān, the Ruler of Rampur, rendered great help to the refugees of Nainital. He entrusted the task of sending provisions and making necessary arrangements for their comfort to 'Alī Bakḥsh Khān who, it may be interesting to add, was the grandfather of Mawlānā Mahomed 'Alī (d. 1931), one of the greatest fighters for the freedom of the subcontinent. Among the duties assigned to 'Alī Bakḥsh, besides the supply of provisions, the collection of reports from Delhi Moradabad, Najibabad, Bijnor, Meerut and Bareilly, recruitment of men for the British forces and handling of confidential matters may specifically be mentioned. See *Shawq*, Ḥāfiẓ Ahmad 'Alī, *Tadhkirah-i-Kāmilān-i-Rāmpūr*, (Delhi, 1929), p. 487.

2 See Colonel Mc Cousland's letter, dated Almora, 8 August, quoted in *F.S.U.P.*, V, p. 358.

3 *District Cazetteer, Bareilly*, p. 176; also *District Gazetteer, Pilibhit*.

4 Cf. *The Mofussillite*, 19 February 1858.

while Fazl Haq was directed to resist a possible descent from Almora.”<sup>1</sup>

### Other engagements

In the meantime Khān Bahādur Khān’s forces had fought some battles at other places. In October 1857 a body of horsemen, commanded by Cracroft Wilson, had appeared on the banks of the Ganges. He had received a request for help from Captain Gowan of the 18 N. I., who had managed to escape from Bareilly and was now at Dātāganj under the protection of a Hindu zamindar. He directed the Captain to reach Kachla on 28 October, but when he arrived there himself a day earlier he found that the place was in the hands of the Revolutionaries. He dared not risk a battle, and decided to move downwards. After some difficulty Wilson succeeded in reaching Qādirganj on the last day of the month ; soon after, Gowan and his party also arrived, “disguised as native women in a closed waggon.”<sup>2</sup> Khān Bahādur Khān immediately sent a force under ‘Abd al-Rahmān against Wilson.<sup>3</sup> Niyāz Muhammad Khān had, in the meantime, captured the town of Gunnaur which was still held by officers loyal to the British Government. Mubārak Shāh Khān was appointed *Nāzim* of Badaun.

Niyāz Muhammad Khān was now directed to march on Fathgarh. He crossed the Ganges at Surajgarh and occupied the town of Shamsabad. On 27 January 1858, Sir Hope Grant arrived at Sutia ; in a brief engagement the Revolutionaries suffered a defeat and had to withdraw to Badaun.<sup>4</sup>

1 *District Gazetteer : Bareilly*, p. 178.

2 *District Gazetteer : Badaun*, p. 157. For some details, see Keene, pp. 133-35.

3 *District Gazetteer : Badaun*, p. 157. Also see *Intelligence Records*, I, pp. 231-242.

4 Kaye and Malletson, IV, p. 219

Niyāz Muhammad Khān, however, engaged himself in suppressing the refractory Hindu zamindars of the region.

### British plan of the Rohilkhand campaign

Several of the most important Revolutionary leaders<sup>1</sup> had arrived in Badaun, and it had now become clear that Rohilkhand would become the most active theatre of war. The British Commander-in-Chief therefore took steps to organize a large scale campaign in the region.<sup>2</sup> Under this scheme three Columns starting from different places were to converge on Bareilly, now the main stronghold of the Revolutionaries. General Penny was to move from the Duāb and after crossing the Ganges he was to join the Commander-in-Chief. Brigadier Walpole was to march along the west bank of the Ganges and join him. Another Column was to start from Roorkee under Brigadier General Jones.

### Firuz Shah's victory at Kakralah

Accordingly, Penny left Bulandshahar for Fathgarh on 24 April to join Colin Campbell. Crossing the Ganges on the 27th he pushed on to Usehat which the Revolutionaries had evacuated. His Column being only four miles from Kakralah, resumed march after midnight on 29 April. "As Kakralah was approached towards dawn, some horsemen were descried in front, but as they retreated, the General continued his advance, only to be surprised by the discharge of four guns from a

1 Doctor Wazir Khān, Mawlawi Fayḍ Aḥmad and Muḥsin 'Alī Khān were sent by Sayyid Aḥmad Allāh Shāh from Shahjahanpur, while Prince Firūz Shāh had come from Moradabad; Nānā Rao, the Nawābs of Farrukhabad and Jhajjar as well as Walidad Khān were also present.

2 Colin Campbell wrote to Lord Canning on 24 March asking his advice on the future plan of operations. The Governor-General in his reply emphasized the need of urgent action in Rohilkhand, because "the Mussulmans were for the most part opposed to us, the Hindus were almost universally friendly". He added that "their numbers are about equal; but the Mussulmans are the more active and warlike . . . ." It may be mentioned that Colin Campbell was not convinced by his arguments, but he accepted his advice and decided to act upon "his Lordship's views with the same earnestness as if they were my own." Cf. Forrest, III, pp. 336-37.

plantation on the outskirts of the town. The British artillery at once returned the fire, and at the same time were assailed by a body of Ghazis, who had remained in concealment; but the disaster was averted by a charge of the Carabineers, . . . In the meantime, it was found that the General had disappeared . . . it seems that . . . his horse had carried him into the enemy's ranks where he met his death at the hands of the Ghazis." The Revolutionaries, who were commanded on this occasion by Prince Firūz Shāh withdrew to Badaun, while the British army, now led by Colonel Jones, moved towards Miranpur Katrah to join the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>1</sup>

After the Battle of Kakrālah the Revolutionary leaders who had assembled at Badaun, proceeded to Bareilly to join Khān Bahādur Khān. The local leaders, however, continued the struggle even after the fall of Bareilly (7 May 1858), and stray actions were fought in the various parganahs of the district. The British forces were strengthened by the arrival of troops from Rampur under Ḥakim Sa'adat 'Alī Khān. Badaun was occupied and Sharaf al-Dīn Khān was appointed its Tahsildar. Most of the *tahsils* and parganahs of the district were entrusted to Hindu zamindars who had opposed the Revolution and had remained loyal to the British Government.<sup>2</sup> Nor did the British officers

1 Cf. *District Gazetteer : Badaun*, pp. 159-60; also see *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 445-46; 499; and Kaye and Malletson, IV, pp. 35-52.

2 "Under the first category . . . Panjab Singh and Pitam Singh of Usawan, Parbat Brahman of Miaon, Indar Singh of Salempur, and Bakhtawar Singh of Bela Dandir received gifts of money and confiscated land . . . Himmat Singh of Gidhaul, Jagannath Kurmi of Nagla Sharqī, and Hira Singh of Gurgaon were similarly rewarded; as also was Ajit, a Brahman of Nizamabad . . . while 63 others obtained grants of money. Under the second class came Sharf-ud-din, of Sheikhpur, already mentioned; Har Lal Singh, who was appointed tahsildar of Dataganj . . . Het Singh and Dal Singh, Bais Rajputs of Kot, who were placed in charge of the Sahaswan tahsi'; Dar Singh of Pipraul, who guarded the Ganges ferries, re-established the Ujhani and Bilsī *thanas* and held the Islamnagar rebels in check till their defeat by the Rampur troops; and Parasram of Isanpur . . . all obtained grants of land, while Wazir Singh, the brave thanadar of Gunnaur, Parbhu Lal, the peshkar;

forget the patriots ; they were made to pay heavily for their participation struggle for freedom. "On the 3rd of June," writes Nevill, "Brigadier Coke's column for Shajahanpur marched to Usehat, and after burning three rebel villages on the road, reached Badaun on the 6th." Colonel Wilkinson left Bareilly for Badaun : "on the way two guilty villages were destroyed, and several more rebels were taken at Sahaswan ; they thence proceeded to Islamnagar, where summary punishment was inflicted on several persons concerned in the recent disturbances."<sup>1</sup>

### **Walpole defeated at Ruiya**

Walpole who commanded the third Column left Lucknow on 7 April. He reached Ruiya, a small fort, fifty-one miles to the north-west of Lucknow, on 15 April ; it belonged to a zamindar who had joined the Revolution but "had not the smallest inclination to run his head against a British force." A trooper who had been captured by the Revolutionaries had managed to escape from the fort and had informed Walpole that the zamindar, Nirpat Singh, was ready to receive the British. Walpole did not accept the man's story and decided to attack the fort.<sup>2</sup> The garrison opened fire on the British and inflicted heavy losses. Among the officers who lost their lives was Adrean Hope ; "The death of this most distinguished and gallant officer causes the deepest grief to the Commander-in-Chief."<sup>3</sup> In spite of this repulse of the British attack

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and Irshad Ali and five other Sheikhs, who saved the records, came in for similar recognition."

*District Gazetteer : Badaun*, pp. 161-162.

1 *Ibid.*

2 For a description of the jungle fort of Ruiya see Brigadier Walpole's letter to the Chief of Staff, dated 18 April, 1858, quoted in Forrest, III, p 340 *et seq.*

3 Colin Campbell, quoted in Forrest, III, p 344. Colonel Malleeson's remarks on Walpole's incompetence are interesting : "It is a curious commentary on the principle, then, as now, in fashion, of conferring honours on men, not for the deeds they achieve, but for the high positions they occupy, that the general who lost more than one hundred men and Adrian Hope, in failing to take this petty fort, was made K. C. B.



Nirpat evacuated the fort the same night.

Walpole resumed his march on 16 April; a week later he fought a short battle at Sirsa. On 3 May, he reached Miranpur Katrah to join the Column lately commanded by General Penny. Colin Campbell, who now "had under his orders a very considerable force," reached Faridpur, a day's march from Bareilly, on 4 May.

### Fall of Bareilly

Bareilly was now preparing to offer the enemy a most stiff resistance. Some of the most prominent leaders of the Revolutionaries, including Doctor Wazir Khān, Prince Firūz Shāh, Nānā, Rao.<sup>1</sup> Tafaddul Husayn Khān of Farrukhābād and Ismā'il Khān of Fathgarh, had arrived there with their respective contingents. Besides them there were a number of Ghāzis who were "fine fellows, grizzly-bearded elderly men for the most part, with green turbans and cummerbunds, and everyone of them wearing a silver signet ring, a long text of the Koran engraved on it."<sup>2</sup> Khān Bahādur Khān was not unaware of the strength and preparations of the British forces now advancing on his capital. He could avoid a battle, the road to Pilibhit being open to him, but "the hot Rohilla blood of the descendant of Hafiz Rahmat Khan forbade him to flee without striking a blow for his cause. He determined to meet the British force in the open plain outside the town."<sup>3</sup>

"Though he failed to take the fort, he was yet a divisional commander."

Kaye and Malleson, IV, pp. 355-57 and note on p. 357. Also see Shadwell, II, p. 201.

1 He occupied the building of the college. It appears that Khān Bahādur Khān had the greatest regard for him, and had in fact allowed him to dominate over the affairs at Bareilly. Evidently he had done this to keep with him at least a section of the Hindus. The Nānā is however stated to have spoiled the atmosphere of accord and harmony by offending the Muslims by shutting up the mosque, *F.S.U.P.*, V, pp. 430, 435.

2 Russel, *Diary*, p. 16.

For the names of the leaders assembled at Bareilly see *F.S.U.P.*, V, p. 384.

3 Colin Campbell had "two brigades of cavalry, the first commanded by Brigadier Jones, 6th Dragoon Guards, the second by Brigadier Hagart, 7th



Khān Bahādur Khān



Conflict with the Ghāzīs (Bareilly, 6 May 1858)  
(From C. Ball's *History of the Indian Mutiny*)

Soon after hearing about Colin Campbell's march towards his capital Khān Bahādur Khān emerged from the town and, crossing the Nakatia Nadi, which covered it on the south, he took position in an open place. A second line of defence was in the old cantonment nearer to the town. Early in the morning on 5 May, the British forces came face to face with the Revolutionaries. At about 7 A. M. the latter opened fire ; the British Cavalry and Horse Artillery advanced at the trot from both flanks ; in the meantime the Infantry together with the heavy field-battery also pushed forward. The Revolutionaries finding the pressure of the attack too heavy withdrew to their second line of defence. Their retreat enabled the enemy to cross the bridge with their heavy guns. The Ghāzis made an onslaught at 11 A. M., which, to quote the official despatch of the Commander-in-Chief, was "the most determined effort that I have seen made in this war" Shouting their war cry, "Din Din ; Glory to Allah," they fell upon the 4th Punjab Rifles. "They went straight and eager at the Sikhs, and drove them back upon the 42nd Highlanders, whom Sir Colin, as soon as he saw the rush of the *Gazees*, had formed in line so as to support them . . . With well-fashioned shields held high and their swords flashing as they whirled them over heads, the fanatics dashed against the centre of the wall of bayonets . . . Then right desperately *Gazees* and Highlanders fought, shield and sword against the bayonet . . . Two or three of the *Gazees* attacked General Walpole and slashed him across the hand, and he would have perished if the quick steel of the

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Hussars ; Tomb's and Remington's troops of horse artillery, Hammond's light field battery ; two heavy field batteries under Francis ; and the siege-train with Le Mesurier's company and Cookworthy's detachment, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Brind ; some sappers and miners under Colonel Harness ; the Highland brigade under Leith Hay, consisting of the 93rd, 42nd, 79th, 4th Punjab Rifles, and the Baluch battalion ; Brigadier Stisted's brigade, consisting of seven companies, 64th Foot, 78 Highlanders, four companies 82nd, 2nd Panjab Infantry, 22nd Panjab Infantry." Kaye and Mallsen, IV, p. 367.

Black Watch had not saved him.”<sup>1</sup> The *Ghāzis* were thus ultimately overwhelmed, but “none attempted to escape ; they had evidently come on to kill or be killed, and a hundred and thirty-three lay in one circle in front of the colours of the Forty-Second.”<sup>2</sup> The commotion caused by this action was hardly over, when Firūz Shāh “swept round the flank and among the baggage, cutting down camels, camel-drivers, and camp-followers in all directions.”<sup>3</sup> On 6 May Jone’s Column attacked Bareilly from the opposite direction. The Revolutionaries were thus sandwiched between two armies ; they decided to vacate the town and withdrew towards Pilibhit. Some of their commanders who tried to escape to other places were captured and hanged.<sup>4</sup> Colin Campbell entered Bareilly on the 7th. After a week he returned to Faridpur.

#### **Khan Bahadur Khan hanged**

Coke was sent in pursuit of Khān Bahādur Khān,<sup>5</sup> but he escaped into Awadh and ultimately entered Nepal about the end of the year. Subsequently, he was betrayed by the Nepalese authorities and hanged at Bareilly in front of the Kotwali.<sup>6</sup> Khān Bahādur Khān deserves a position in the first rank of the many

1 Forrest, III, pp. 369-70 ; also see, Shedwell II, pp. 212-16, and Kaye and Malleon, IV, pp. 368-70.

2 Forbes-Mitchell, p. 255 ; also see Forrest, III, p. 370.

3 Forbes-Mitchell, p. 257 ; cf Russel, Chapter XXI.

4 For instance Kabir Shāh, Wazīr Muhammad and Quṭb Shāh were hanged. *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 485-585.

5 Khān Bahadur Khān’s arrival in the district of Pilibhit encouraged the local leaders Nizām ‘Alī Khān, the most prominent of them, offered a stiff resistance at Sirpura. The Revolutionaries were defeated but only after “a fierce engagement.” Nizām ‘Alī Khān was wounded in the action but he was carried off by his men. See Kaye and Malleon, V, pp. 191-94.

6 *District Gazetteer : Bareilly*, p. 181. For details of the betrayal of Khān Bahādur Khān and his trial and execution see relevant extracts in *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 588-614.

Also see Husayni II, pp. 369-70.

heroes who laid down their lives in the cause of freedom. Reporting his execution, *The Hindu Patriot*, dated April 7, 1860, says :  
"The man died glorying in his crimes."<sup>1</sup>

1 Quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 613.

**Khān Bahādūr Khān** was publicly hanged on 24 March 1860 at "precisely ten minutes passed 7 O'clock A. M. His body remained suspended one hour". He was buried in the old jail. See letter of H. R. Clarke, Joint Magistrate, Bareilly, to W. Roberts, President of Special Commission for the trial of **Khān Bahādūr Khān**.

## CHAPTER XXII

### ROHILKHAND (II)

**Mahmud Khan, Firuz Shah and Ahmad Allah Shah**

#### **Bijnor**

Bijnor had once formed part of the *jāgīr* of Najib al-Dawlah who had, by his ability and tact, sustained the Mughul Empire for over a decade (1761-70) as the Chief Minister of Shāh 'Ālam II. In the War of Independence, Najib al-Dawlah's great-grandson, Maḥmūd Khān,<sup>1</sup> played a role which was worthy of the traditions of his illustrious ancestor. On receiving reports of the rising at Meerut, Shakespear, the Collector of the district, lost no time in taking necessary precautions; he cancelled the leave of the officers and sent instructions to police stations that the number of *barq-andāzes* should be raised; two parties led by Muhammad Raḥmat Khān, Deputy-Collector, and Syed Ahmed Khan respectively, were asked to patrol the town and keep watch during the night.<sup>2</sup> These precautions, however, proved ineffective and inadequate when the crisis came. Some residents of Bijnor, who had been lodged in the Moradabad gaol, returned to their homes on being released by the Revolutionaries. They narrated to their kinsmen the story of the overthrow of British authority at Moradabad. In the meantime, a contingent of 300 sepoy of the Sappers,<sup>3</sup> who had risen at

1 Maḥmūd Khān's father was the son of Najib al-Dawlah's son Ḍābiṭāh Khān.

2 Khan, Syed Ahmed, *Sarkashī, Dīlā' Bijnawr* (ed. S. Moinul Haq, Karachi, 1962), p. 138.

3 The sepoy of the Sappers first went to the Rani of Landhara, not far from Roorkee, and requested her to accept their leadership. She refused to join the Revolution. See *Sarkashī*, p. 140. Also see Kaye and Malleeson, VI, pp. 104-05.

Roorkee, arrived in Najibabad on 20 May. Their officers went to Aḥmad Allāh Khān, the Tahsildar of Najibabad, and had secret discussions with him. Then they all went to Maḥmūd Khān, and plans for a rising were finalised.<sup>1</sup>

The sepoys, as advised by Maḥmūd Khān, attacked Nagina on 21 May and captured the *tahsil* and the contents of its treasury.<sup>2</sup> The same day the prisoners broke out of the gaol in Bijnor, and the majority of them escaped. Syed Ahmed Khan who was entrusted with the keys of the treasury however succeeded in "throwing one lakh and fifty thousand rupees in a well with my own hands."<sup>3</sup> Maḥmūd Khān who had come to Bijnor, evidently with the intention of transferring the contents of the treasury to Najibabad, was sadly disappointed to learn that they had been thrown into a well. He decided to leave the place as he had with him only a small band of sixty or seventy men, but returned a week later with a large following of the Pathans. Although he had not done so far anything which could betray his intentions the officers had begun to suspect his movements. Nevertheless, he was requested to help the authorities in maintaining peace and "to move a little distance to settle some Mewati marauders". Maḥmūd Khān, who was waiting for a suitable opportunity to rise openly, accepted the offer, but instead of going to the town of Chandpur, as had been agreed upon, he went to the village of Dārānagar.

#### **Mahmud Khan takes over the administration of the district**

The report of the outbreak at Bareilly reached Bijnor on 3 June. Shakespear, unable to keep the situation under control,

1 Aḥmad Allāh Khān was a nephew of Maḥmūd Khān

2 The total amount seized by the sepoys was rupees ten thousand three hundred forty-eight, annas fourteen and eleven pies

*Sarkashī*, p. 142. Also see Kaye and Malleon, V, p. 105

3 *Sarkashī*, p. 142. It is interesting that the gaol of Bijnor was not attacked from outside, but the door was opened by the custodians themselves. Shakespear asked Palmer, Joint-Magistrate of Bijnor, to pursue the prisoners with a contingent of horsemen - two hundred and fifteen of the released prisoners escaped, seven were killed, and one hundred and twenty-six were rearrested. Kaye and Malleon, VI, p. 105.



entered into negotiations with Maḥmūd Khān and agreed to hand over to him the charge of the district. On the latter's request a document to that effect was prepared by Syed Ahmed Khan: it was dated 7 June and was signed by Shakespear.<sup>1</sup> Without losing time he announced his assumption of authority<sup>2</sup> and began to take necessary steps to set the machinery of administration in order. He appointed 'Aẓmat Allāh Khān as his *Nā'ib* and Aḥmad Allāh Khān as a Deputy-Collector; Aḥmad Yār Khān and Ḥabīb Allāh were given the posts of *Sipāh-Sālār* and *Bakhshī* respectively. As a matter of policy he retained most of the officers who were then in the service of the East India Company. Some of them, however, remained loyal to the British Government.<sup>3</sup> Shortly after the establishment of the Revolutionary administration at Bijnor, Mawlawī Munir Khān arrived there and brought with him a band of four hundred *Ghāzīs*. Subsequently he left for Delhi, where he died fighting.<sup>4</sup>

#### Bahadur Shah's *farmān* confirming Mahmud Khan

Maḥmūd Khān took nearly a month to establish his authority and restore peace in the district. On 10 July he sent an envoy to Delhi with a petition to the Emperor for the confir-

1 For the letter drafted by Syed Ahmed Khan see *Sarkashī*, p. 161. The treasury when entrusted to Nawab Maḥmūd Khān had more than a lakh of rupees. Also see Kaye and Malleon, VI, pp. 1089.

2 Immediately after taking charge of the district he ordered the following proclamation to be made: *Khalq Khudā kī, Mulk Bādshāh kā, awr ḥukm Nawāb Maḥmūd Khān kā* (Tr. The people belong to God, the country to the Emperor and the authority to Nawab Maḥmūd Khān). See *Sarkashī*, p. 163.

3 Syed Ahmed Khan, Turāb 'Alī and Rādhā Kishen held a secret meeting and decided "that none of us should do his duties unless this Committee so orders him". It was agreed that only as much revenue should be realised as would be required for the payment of the salaries of the staff. Accordingly persons who came to deposit the taxes were asked not to do so. *Sarkashī*, pp. 165-67.

4 Syed Ahmed Khan adds that he had a discussion with Munir Khān on the nature of the War, and was able to prove that it was not a *jihād* in the strict sense of the term. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

mation of his viceroyalty.<sup>1</sup> He returned on 28 July with an Imperial *Farmān*: "Your request that the arrangement of the whole Zillah be made over to you shall be complied. Until a perfect *sunnud* is issued, you are to keep in deposit the revenues of the District, after paying the Troops and the Revenue Officers, and you are to remit the balance to us".<sup>2</sup>

**Hindu zamindars (*Chaudhris*) rebel against the Nawab and plunder the town and the neighbouring villages**

Mahmūd Khān's main problem, like that of Khān Bahādur Khān, was to keep the Hindu zamindars under control. He was anxious to maintain cordial relations with the Hindus, but some of his officers were acting as British agents; they did everything that lay in their power to widen the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims. He has been charged by some writers for maltreating the Hindus,<sup>3</sup> but these accusations are baseless. In fact there are cases on record to show that he took special care to guard the temples against the plunderers.<sup>4</sup> However, his efforts to conciliate the Hindu zamindars did not succeed; the *Chaudhris* of different villages combined together against the Revolutionary authorities and refused to pay the revenue. Mahmūd Khān sent his *Nā'ib*,

1 He issued an order regarding the change of weights and measures on 18 July. The main alteration was that the *seer* of 80 *tolas* introduced by the Company was replaced by the old *seer* of 100 *tolas*; it also had the words 'royal seal' (*Muhr-i Shāhi*) inscribed on its upper surface. Turāb 'Alī did not encourage its use in the town, but when he was removed from the office of Tahsildar the *seer* was accepted by the people. *Sarkashī*, p. 174.

2 *Trial*, p. 25. For the Persian (original) text of the *Farmān* see *Sarkashī*, pp. 176-78.

3 For instance, Malleon says that "he had scarcely consolidated, as he thought, his usurped authority than he began to use it against the Hindus, leaguering himself with that object with co-religionists without birth and without character, and whose cooperation under other circumstances he would have spurned." Kaye and Malleon, VI, p. 110.

4 The temple at Tajpur, for example, was put under guard when it was threatened by the plunderers although it belonged to the Hindus who had defied Mahmūd Khān's authority. *Sarkashī*, p. 180.

Aḥmad Allāh Khān, to punish them. He achieved some success in the beginning, but was soon surrounded by a host of their retainers who were numerically far superior to his forces. He fought well but could not repel the enemy and had to vacate the fortress of Sherkot, which he had occupied, retreating towards Najibabad.<sup>1</sup> This triumph emboldened the rebel zamindars who now marched on Bijnor and surrounded Maḥmūd Khān (6 August). He had with him only a small garrison of nearly four hundred footmen and thrity to forty troopers. None-the-less he made an attempt to resist the assailants -- the *Chaudhris* of Haldaur and Bijnor—, but when he found that the enemny besides being superior in numbers had brought heavy guns with them, he decided to leave Bijnor and withdrew to Najibabad.<sup>2</sup>

The *Chaudhris* now seized the town and gave it up to plunder : the courts and offices along with the records were burnt by their men who "had joined the *chaudhris* simply with the hope of plunder . . ." Taking advantage of Maḥmūd Khān's differences with the Hindu zamindars and his discomfiture at the hands of the *Chaudhris* the Special Commissioner (Wilson) directed Raḥmat Khān, the Deputy-Collector and Syed Ahmed Khan, the *Ṣadr Amīn*, to take charge of the district. They carried out these instructions and returned to Bijnor on 16 August<sup>3</sup> to assume their new duties, but they were not allowed to remain in office for long.<sup>4</sup> The triumph of the Hindu zamindars over Maḥmūd Khān

1 *Sarkashi*, p. 188.

2 Kaye and Malleson, VI, p. 110.

3 Syed Ahmed Khan, Turab 'Ali, Tahsildar, and Radha Kishen, Deputy-Inspector, had left Bijnor on 12 August, retiring to the small town of Haldaur, which they thought was safer for them. They had kept the European officers at Moradabad and Meerut fully informed of the developments at Bijnor. It was on the basis of these reports that the Commissioner authorised them to assume charge of the district. *Sarkashi*, pp. 197-203; also see Kaye and Malleson, VI, pp. 110-11.

4 Syed Ahmed Khan and Raḥmat Khān were in charge of the district for a week only. Mawlānā Ḥālī (*Ṭayāt-i-Jāwīd*, Pt. I, p. 60) is wrong when

and the encouragement which they had received from British officers in their opposition to the Revolutionary authorities had made them bold and aggressive. They began to plunder the defenceless people, particularly the Muslims, in the neighbouring villages. A body of the Hindus led by Ram Dayal attacked Nagina, slaughtered the Muslims and plundered the town; this led to a regular fight between the Hindus and Muslims, in which a number of men were killed on both sides.<sup>1</sup> Maḥmūd Khān was greatly annoyed at this, and despatched a small force under Aḥmad Allāh Khān to recapture Nagina. The latter defeated Ram Dayal and seized the town. When the *Chaudhris* of Haldaur and the neighbouring villages heard of the defeat of Ram Dayal they collected their followers and rushed to Nagina. The Muslims of Nagina were again subjected to great hardships. "Sayyid Turab Ali told me," writes Syed Ahmed Khan, "that the hardships inflicted on the women and children of Mawlawī Muḥammad 'Āli and other respectable Muslims and the dishonour to which they were subjected are simply indescribable."<sup>2</sup>

However, as reports had been reaching Bijnor that the Nawab's forces would soon recapture the town, Syed Ahmed Khan and his colleagues as well as their main supporters, the *Chaudhris*, became panicky. On hearing that Aḥmad Allāh Khān had arrived at the neighbouring village of Basi Kotlah, one of the *Chaudhris*, Randhir Singh, came to Syed Ahmed Khan, and told him that his party had decided to leave Bijnor and that it would be advisable for him and his colleagues also to make arrangements for their escape. Accordingly, "Deputy Sahib and I, the *Sadr Amin*, left Bijnor the same night, reaching Haldaur early in the morning on 24 August, 1857".<sup>3</sup>

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he says that they held this office for a month. In fact they had to leave Bijnor on 23 August. See *Sarkashi*, p. 227.

1 "More than fifty Muslims were butchered, women were dishonoured." For details see *Sarkashi*, p. 233.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 234.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

### Ahmad Allah Khan's campaign

Ahmad Allāh Khān now decided to go to Nagina where a section of the Hindu population, the *Bishnois*, had to be punished for creating disturbances. On arriving there he was approached by some Muslims who requested him to forgive the offenders, but, before he could take a decision, reports were brought to him that the *Bishnois* had killed one trooper and two footmen of his army in the Bishnu-Sarai. This, of course, was unforgivable: Bishnu-Sarai was plundered and burnt. The Tahsildar, Turāb 'Alī, who had persistently opposed the Revolutionary regime, was captured and orders were issued that he should be put to death. But Mawlawī Muḥammad 'Alī and other leading Muslims intervened and requested Ahmad Allāh Khān to forgive him, because he was a *Sayyid*. Ahmad Allāh Khān accepted their recommendation but ordered the prisoner to be kept under close custody.<sup>1</sup>

On 26 August Ahmad Allāh Khān, accompanied by Mārey Khān and Shafī' Allāh Khān, arrived in Nahtawr on his way to Haldaur which had now become the chief stronghold of the *Chaudhris*. On the following day a battle was fought on the banks of a small river, called Bān. The *Chaudhris* had collected a large number of men, but they were easily routed, and Ahmad Allāh Khān advanced on Haldaur. Seeing that a number of houses there had caught fire<sup>2</sup> he decided to march on Bijnor. Some of the *Chaudhris* who were still in Bijnor left the place on hearing of Ahmad Allāh Khān's intended attack.

### Syed Ahmed Khan and his colleagues escape from Haldaur

After Ahmad Allāh Khān's departure from Haldaur the *Chaudhris* again plundered its Muslim residents and burnt their houses.<sup>3</sup> They did not spare even those who were loyal to the

1 *Sarkashī*, p. 239.

2 The dyers and confectioners (*chhipīs* and *halwā'īs*) of the town had some grievances against the *Chaudhris*. When they found an opportunity of taking revenge, they set fire to their houses. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

3 The plunder and massacre of the Muslims had started early in the morning (28 August) and lasted throughout the day. *Sarkashī*, p. 242.

British. Syed Ahmed Khan, thinking that it was not safe for him or his colleagues to remain in the district of Bijnor, quietly left Haldaur in the night (29 August), and passing through the village of Pilāna he reached Chandpur; it was held by two Revolutionary leaders, Rustam 'Alī and Šādiq 'Alī, who had been ordered by the Emperor to maintain peace in the surrounding area and employ some troopers and footmen for that purpose.<sup>1</sup> In spite of their political differences with Syed Ahmed Khan they extended to him their full protection and saved him from the hands of a party of the Revolutionaries who had surrounded him and Raḥmat Khān, and wanted to kill them. Šādiq 'Alī escorted them to the next stage, from where they proceeded to Bachraon in the district of Moradabad. Syed Ahmed Khan ultimately reached Meerut in safety.<sup>2</sup>

#### Mahmūd Khan extends his authority

The *Chaudhris* of Haldaur had in the meantime collected another force to oppose the Revolutionaries. On hearing this Aḥmad Allāh Khān, assisted by Mārey Khān, moved in that direction and attacked the town (30 August); the *Chaudhris* shut themselves up in a well-defended building. Aḥmad Allāh Khān could not capture it and had to withdraw to Bijnor on the 31st. Maḥmūd Khān who now held nearly the whole district of Bijnor<sup>3</sup> was anxious to conciliate the *Chaudhris* whose opposition was proving to be a serious obstacle in his path. He knew that Aḥmad Allāh Khān was not liked by the *Chaudhris* and they would not change their attitude towards the Revolutionary Government as long as he held the office of *Mukhtār*, but he also realized that Aḥmad Allāh Khān had been associated with the Revolution since its outbreak in the district and was greatly respected by the Revolutionaries. He decided therefore to entrust

1 Syed Ahmed has reproduced the text of Bahādur Shāh's original *farman* which was in Persian and was dated 5 *Dhī al-Hijjah*.

2 *Sarkashī*, p. 244.

3 Maḥmūd Khān changed the inscription on the seals. They were now to have at the top the following verse of the *Qur'an*: *وَاللَّهُ مَلِكُ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ*.

(*Tr.* And the sovereignty of the Earth and the Heavens is for Allāh.)

The *hijrah* date took the place of the Christian year.

the powers and duties of the *Mukhtār* to a Council comprised of Aḥmad Allāh Khān, Aḥmad Yār Khān, Muḥammad Shafi' Allāh Khān, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Khān and Sayyid Aḥmad Shāh.<sup>1</sup> Even this drastic step by Maḥmūd Khān did not help him; the hostile attitude of the *Chaudhris* did not change; on the contrary, they became more active in their preparations for a decisive action, and invited the zamindars of the neighbouring villages to join them in an attack on Najibabad. Aḥmad Allāh Khān assisted by Shafi' Allāh Khān moved out of Bijnor to meet the enemy. In a battle which was fought on 18 September near the village of Pamrawli, the Hindus were completely routed.<sup>2</sup> Shafi' Allāh Khān was the real hero of this battle; for his bravery he came to be called General *Jarrār* (a brave commander).<sup>3</sup> Maḥmūd Khān made fresh efforts to win over the *Chaudhris*, but, as before, he failed. The failure of the negotiations necessitated military action. Accordingly, Aḥmad Allāh Khān marched on Haldaur and attacked it for a third time (2 November). The *Chaudhris* put up a stiff resistance. On the following morning, however, Aḥmad Allāh Khān's men seized the town and the leader of the *Chaudhris*, Randhir Singh, was taken captive.<sup>4</sup>

Maḥmūd Khān's officers had now begun to extend the area of his jurisdiction beyond the Ganges. On 5 January 1858 Raḍā Ḥasan seized Mirānpur and "proclaimed the Nawab. . . Two days later they carried out the same programme at Khankal and Hardwar".<sup>5</sup> The Revolutionaries emboldened by these successes contemplated an attack on Roorkee. If this had been carried out, the Roorkee Field Force, which was to undertake a campaign in Rohilkhand and was later to join Colin Campbell in Bareilly could

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Another important step taken by Maḥmūd Khāns was the cancellation of the orders of the East India Company regarding the resumption of rent-free holdings. For his orders see *Sarkashi*, pp. 264-71.

1 The order creating the Council was issued in September 1857; it has been reproduced in *Sarkashi*, p. 249.

2 Kaye and Malletson, VI, p. 111; also see *Sarkashi*, p. 252.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 252.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 258.

5 Kaye and Malletson, VI, p. 112; *Sarkashi*, pp. 259-61.

not have started. The plan of the British campaign in Rohilkhand would thus have been upset and the chances of the success of the Revolutionaries would have considerably improved. Maḥmūd Khān's plans were however thwarted by a surprise attack by the British forces on their camp at Khankal on 9 January 1858.<sup>1</sup>

### Mahmud Khan captured by the British

Brigadier Jones, who was given the charge, of the Roorkee Field Force commenced his march on 17 April, 1858, by crossing the Ganges at Hardwar. He had hardly proceeded four miles when he fell in with a wing of the Revolutionary army in a jungle near the village of Bhagniwala. In the battle that followed the Revolutionaries could not withstand the charge of the British Artillery. Four of their six guns were taken by the enemy, and they had to make a retreat towards Najibabad; their casualties were also fairly heavy. Jones followed them and advanced towards Najibabad which had been vacated by the Revolutionaries; it was plundered and set to fire (18 April).<sup>2</sup> Jalāl al-Dīn Khān and Sa'd Allāh Khān<sup>3</sup> were captured from the village of Kot

1 The information that the Nawab's forces were crossing the river was supplied by Shiva Prashad, "Native agent of the Canal". Immediately on receiving this report the British officer had the water of the canal directed into the river bed, which made its crossing difficult. He then attacked those Revolutionaries who had already crossed the stream. Raḍā Ḥasan was among those who were slain in this action. Shafi' Allāh Khān could manage to escape. Shiva Prashad was given a hundred rupees as a reward. See *Sarkashi*, p. 263.

Malleson has given the details of the surprise attack but has not mentioned the name of the leaders of the Revolutionary force. Kaye and Malleson, VI, pp. 112-13.

2 Syed Ahmed Khan thinks that the town was set on fire not by the British soldiers but by the Hindus who wanted to revenge themselves on the Muslim population. *Sarkashi*, p. 135; also see Kaye and Malleson, IV, p. 362.

3 Jalāl al-Dīn Khān was the younger brother of Maḥmūd Khān. Sa'd Allāh Khān was the *Munif* of Amroha before joining the Revolution. He had played an important role in the negotiations between Maḥmūd Khān and the Hindu *Chaudhris* of the district of Bijnor. For Sa'd Allāh Khān see 'Abbāsi, Maḥmud Aḥmad, *Tārikh-i-Amrūhah*, (Delhi, 1930), I, p. 59.



Qādir, and, under orders from Jones, were shot dead on 23 April at Nūrpūr. From Najibabad the British force moved towards Nagina which was captured on 21 April. The Revolutionaries having been taken by surprise could not even make use of their guns. The bulk of their forces however managed to escape towards Moradabad<sup>1</sup> to join Prince Fīrūz Shāh who had arrived there on the 21st :

Maḥmūd Khān had also tried to escape but he was captured and sentenced to transportation for life. He died in prison before he could be actually deported to the Andamans; his property was either destroyed or confiscated.<sup>2</sup>

### Moradabad

Moradabad, founded in the time of Shāhjahān,<sup>3</sup> had developed into a prosperous and important town under the Rūhilāhs. It became the headquarters of a district after the cession of Rohilkhand to the Company by the Nawab of Awadh in 1801.

The Muslim residents of Moradabad had taken an active part in the *Jihād Movement* of Sayyid Aḥmad Shahid.<sup>4</sup> It is not

1 On the way to Moradabad lay the small town of Seohara, which may also be mentioned, as to this otherwise insignificant place belonged Shāh Būlan, who became a victim of British retaliation. He was a *darwīsh* and in his *anqah* food was served to every one who visited it. On the re-establishment of British rule after the Revolution he was charged with providing food to the Revolutionaries and sentenced to be transported for life. He died in imprisonment at the Andamans on 2 *Rabi' al-Awwal*, 1276 H. He was closely connected with Moradabad where the tomb of his distinguished ancestor, Shāh Bulāqī, is situated, See *Anwār al-Ārifin* (Bareilly, 1290 H.), p. 547.

2 Kaye and Malleon, VI, p. 115n; *District Gazetteer* . Bijnor, p. 212.

3 Moradabad was founded by Rustam Khān, an officer of the Mughul Empire, in the time of Shāhjahān and named after Prince Murad. Rustam Khān was killed in the Battle of Samūgarh, fighting on the side of Prince Dārā See *District Gazetteer : Moradabad*, pp. 152-53.

4 According to a contemporary authority the leader of that Movement wrote in one of his letters that the first donation received by him was from Moradabad. The author of the *Anwār al-Ārifin* was a young boy when Sayyid Aḥmad Shāhid visited Moradabad before going to Calcutta on his way to Mecca. He says that he had an opportunity of seeing the great Sayyid on that occasion.

surprising therefore that it became a stronghold of the Revolution in Rohilkhand. "Throughout the district," says the *District Gazetteer*,<sup>1</sup> "the Musalmans as a body had shown in the clearest manner their antipathy to the British Government . . . there can be no doubt that in Moradabad, as in other districts of Rohilkhand, there was a general revolt on the part of the Musalman community, inflamed by an intense hatred of everything English." Among the '*ulamā*' of Moradabad, who played an active role in the Revolution, three names may specifically be mentioned: Mawlawī Wahhāj al-Dīn popularly known as Mawlawī Mannū,<sup>2</sup> Mawlānā Kifāyat 'Alī *Kāfi*<sup>3</sup> and Mawlānā 'Ālam 'Alī<sup>4</sup>. The local Revolu-

"On 9 *Ṣafar*, 1243 H. the Muslims of the city of Moradabad", writes Muḥammad Husayn, "sent (a sum of) three thousand seven hundred and seven rupees and eight annas to him (Sayyid Aḥmad *Shahīd*) . . . the first *hundi* that reached him was from Moradabad." See pp. 519-20.

1 P. 166.

2 Mawlawī Mannū was not a distinguished scholar, but he belonged to a family of the '*ulamā*': Mawlawī Muḥammad Ismā'īl, who was sent by the Nawab of Awadh as his envoy to London, was his uncle Mawlawī Jamīl al-Dīn, the father and Mawlawī Wajīh al-Dīn, the grandfather of Mawlawī Mannū, were well-known scholars. Mawlawī Mannū had a number of influential persons attached to his circle: among his friends and co-workers the names of Mawlānā *Kāfi*, Mawlawī Wazīr 'Alī, Sayyid Akbar 'Alī, Sayyid Gulzār 'Alī may be mentioned. See *Madīnah*, Bijnor, dated 9 June 1957; *Anjām Dailly* (Karachi), 11 May 1957; also see *Tadhkirah-i-'Ulama-i-Hind*, p. 179.

3 Mawlānā *Kāfi* who was a poet and is known for his poems in praise of the Holy Prophet had toured the districts of Rohilkhand to popularise the *fatwā* of *jihād*. His translation (in Urdu poetry) of *Sharḥ Shāmā'il Tirmidhī* was published in 1845 (Kānpur), in 1847 and 1871 (Lucknow) and in 1939 (Barqi Press, Moradabad). He was hanged on 30 April 1857, for taking part in the Revolution. His grave is behind the district jail in Moradabad. see *Nassākh 'Abd al-Ghāfir, Gulistan-i-Bilḥizān*, (Lucknow) p. 201, *Ṣafā*, 'Abd al-Ḥayy, *Tadhkirak-i-Shāmīn-i-Sukhūn*, (Imdād al Hind Press Moradabad) p. 191.

4 Mawlawī 'Ālam 'Alī was a pupil of the famous Shaykh Muḥammad Ishāq of Delhi. Syed Ahmed Khan saved him by recommending his case to British Government. He died in 1295 H. See *Ḥiyāt*, Pt. I, pp. 67-68; Raḥmān 'Alī, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-01; *Shiqwq*, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-89; Najam al-Ghānī, p. 552.

It is interesting to add that his house had been plundered by the Revolutionaries because he had protected the lives of some Christians.

tionary leaders were Majd al-Dīn Khān and 'Abbās Khān.<sup>1</sup>

When the news of the outbreak at Meerut reached Moradabad<sup>2</sup> "we were somewhat startled;" writes Cracroft Wilson, "we saw also that, the sepoy who had got the news in the lines as soon as we had, were rather excited; in consequence, a parade was ordered that evening, for the purpose of addressing the men, and informing them that their caste and religion would not be interfered with." Wilson thought that the sepoy had returned from the parade perfectly satisfied, but two days later "about 10 a.m. a false alarm was raised to the effect that the city was up, and coming to attack Cantonments . . . The corps got under arms, and we all ran to the lines expecting a brush with the city people, but it turning out to be false, things returned to their usual course." Soon it became clear that Wilson's assessment of the situation had not been correct; "on the night of the 18th, about  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 10, I was called up . . . and . . . I was to proceed with fifty men, to about four miles off on the Meerut road, to act against some insurgents encamped there . . ." The "insurgents", a small party of the 20th N. I., coming from Muzaffarnagar, were taken by complete surprise as they were attacked when they were asleep; "we captured eight prisoners, 16 stands of arms, and about 11,000 rupees treasure. A Sikh of my party, shot one of the prisoners . . . our fellows got a lot of loot on this occasion."<sup>3</sup> Five of the men of the 20th, however, escaped and entered the Lines of the 29th; their leader was shot dead by the Sikhs<sup>4</sup> and the other four were captured and put in the jail. This excited the sepoy, and at about 10 a.m. a large number of them belonging

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1 For the arrest and execution of Majd al-Dīn Khān and some other leaders see *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 480-81.

2 The official report of the offg. Magistrate, Dunlop, says that a *sawār* brought the news of the outbreak at Meerut on the 11th May. See *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 239.

3 Cracroft Wilson. *Narrative of the Mutiny of the 29th N. I. at Muradabad*, p. 1.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

to the 29th N.I. rushed to the jail and released the prisoners. It was however not a planned action, and the bulk of the Regiment did not join the party that had rushed to the jail. It was, therefore, not difficult to pursue and capture most of them. In the afternoon a parade was held, and Wilson again harangued the troops "with apparent effect". For a time, it seems, the British officers brought the situation under control, but the incident was a clear symptom of the coming storm.<sup>1</sup>

### Mawlawi Wahhaj al-Din alias Mannu killed

On 21 May the citizens of Moradabad rose under the leadership of Mawlawi Wahhāj al-Din. At his invitation a large party of the *Ghāzīs* led by Bahādur Khān came from Rampur and joined the Revolutionaries. The green flag was hoisted on the left bank of the Ramganga and the entire city was in a state of excitement.<sup>2</sup> Wilson asked the military authorities to come to his aid, and taking with him a Company of the 29th he went to the ferry on the Ramganga and fell upon the Revolutionaries. In the action that followed Bahādur Khān "levelled at Mr. Wilson's head a blunderbuss loaded with slugs. Mr. Wilson seized it in time. The fanatic then drew a pistol from his belt; but before he could discharge it a Sipahi of the 29th knocked him down".<sup>3</sup> The leader of the Revolutionaries, Mawlawi Wahhāj al-Din, was killed the same evening.<sup>4</sup> His death on the first very day of the fight was a great blow to the cause of the Revolutionaries.

1 See *District Gazetteer, Moradabad*, p. 163.

2 Kaye and Malleeson, III, pp. 219-20; *District Gazetteer, Moradabad*, p. 163.

3 Kaye and Malleeson, III, p. 220.

4 The house of Mawlawi Mannū was attacked by a party led by a European officer. The spy who was acting as the guide of the party had been a frequent visitor to the Mawlawi and enjoyed his confidence. When he sent word, the gate of the house was opened; the party rushed in and shot the Mawlawi dead. For details see *Madinah*, (Bijnor), dated 9 June, 1957; also see *District Gazetteer, Moradabad*, p. 163. Dunlop says, in a letter dated the 18th November 1858, that the Mawlawi was shot dead on 24 May, 1857. See *F. S. U, P. V*, p. 240.

He was the chief organiser of the Movement in the district of Moradabad, and his death deprived the people of a sincere and influential leader. However, the Revolutionaries continued their work; the sepoys stationed in the cantonment were "every day . . . seeing and talking with men who appealed to the sentiment lying nearest to their heart—to their religion and their caste; . . ."<sup>1</sup> In the last week of May a number of persons seem to have come to Moradabad from Rampur and other neighbouring places. On the 2 June came the report of the rising at Bareilly. It had a magical effect on the people, and their attitude as well as that of the sepoys in the Lines suddenly changed.<sup>2</sup> Early next morning the sepoys threw off all disguise; they seized the contents of the treasury and other property belonging to the Government. It was obvious that the Europeans could save their lives only by resorting to flight: the civilians left for Meerut with a party of the 8th Irregular Cavalry, while the military officers escaped with their families to Nainital.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Majju Khan leads the Revolutionaries**

After the flight of the Europeans the Revolutionaries set up their own machinery of administration under the leadership of Nawab Majd al-Dīn Khān, popularly known as Majjū Khān.<sup>4</sup> Another prominent leader, Asad 'Alī Khān, a descendant of the Ruhilah leader, Dūndī Khān, was his rival, but realizing that their mutual differences would prove suicidal to the cause of the Revolution he agreed to serve under Majjū Khān as an Artillery officer;<sup>5</sup>

1 Kaye and Malleson, III, p. 221.

2 The report of the events at Bareilly was sent to Wilson by the Nawab of Rampur through a special messenger; it was received by him at 2 o'clock in the morning. *Ibid.*

3 See *District Gazetteer : Moradabad*, p. 164.

4 He was the son of Muḥammad al-Dīn Khān, a descendant of 'Azmat Allāh Khān who had at one time been a popular administrator (*Fawjdār*) of Moradabad; another member of the same family, who took an active part in the struggle, was Shabbar 'Alī Khān Tanhā. See Gilani, *Manāẓir Aḥsan*, p. 137.

5 Asad 'Alī Khān was later hanged. See *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 487-88.

Mawlana Kāfī was appointed *Ṣadr al-Shari'ah*. The assumption of authority by the Revolutionaries was proclaimed by "tom tom."

#### Nawab Yusuf Ali Khan's duplicity

Yūsuf 'Ali Khān, the Ruler of the small State of Rampur, took advantage of the rising at Moradabad to demonstrate his loyalty to the British. He secured a formal permission from the Commissioner to take over the administration of Moradabad and sent an army under his uncle, 'Abd al-'Ali Khān, who was assisted by Ḥakīm Sa'ādāt 'Ali Khān. Two days later, the Nawab himself came there and proclaimed his rule over the city, but fearing a rising of the people he declared Majd al-Dīn Khān to be the *Nāẓim* of the district. Ḥakīm Sa'ād 'Ali was appointed Judge, Niyāz 'Ali Khān, a Deputy-Collector, and Mūsā Raḍā became the Kotwal of the city.<sup>1</sup> Khān Bahādur Khān took immediate steps to deliver Moradabad from the grip of the Ruler of Rampur. He consulted Bakht Khān, who had been made a Brigadier, and was about to leave with an army for Delhi.<sup>2</sup> It was decided that Bakht Khān should punish the Nawab of Rampur and help Majd al-Dīn Khān in expelling his forces from Moradabad. The Nawab was so unnerved by the report of Bakht Khān's departure from Bareilly that he rushed back to Rampur.<sup>3</sup>

Bakht Khān reached Rampur on 9 June and encamped outside the town near Ganesh Ghat. He asked the Nawab to join the Revolution. Yūsuf 'Ali Khān could not dare to defy his order, nor did he possess enough courage to become a Revolutionary. Quite cleverly however he managed to gain the sympathy of the Revolutionaries by offering them some money and provisions as his contribution to the War and telling them that he was with them. By making false promises he deceived Mawlawī Sarfarāz 'Ali who had been carrying on negotiations with him on behalf of Bakht

1 *District Gazetteer, Moradabad*, p. 165

2 Kaye and Malletson, III, p. 212.

3 According to the official *Narrative* the Nawab had arrived on 6 June and returned the same evening. See *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 328.

Khān and thus saved his position and State.<sup>1</sup>

Bakht Khān resumed his march reaching Moradabad on the 14th.<sup>2</sup> Here he reinstated Majjū Khān as *Nāzim* of the district, and then left for Delhi (17 June).<sup>3</sup> On 24 June, Yūsuf 'Alī Khān, knowing that Bakht Khān was far away, again sent his forces under Sa'ādat 'Alī Khān to recapture Moradabad. Majjū Khān was now appointed *Nāzim* of Sambhal, and Moradabad was given in the charge of 'Abd al-'Alī Khān. The citizens of Moradabad were however opposed to the Nawab's rule, and had accepted it only reluctantly. His agents, therefore, thought it inadvisable to interfere with the propaganda work of the Revolutionaries; *jihād* was openly preached to the congregations in the mosques, western dress and the speaking of English were condemned by the people and exaggerated reports about the victories of the Revolutionary forces were spread in the town.<sup>4</sup>

The hatred of the Nawab's rule had become so intense that a small incident on 29 July developed into an open clash between the men of the Rampur army and the citizens of Moradabad. A soldier of the Nawab's forces, who was purchasing a

1 The main reason of Yūsuf 'Alī Khān's perturbation was that Khān Bahādur Khān was stated to have favoured his removal from the throne and the installation of his cousin, Tājdār Begam, who was the granddaughter of the elder son of Fayḍ Allāh Khān, the founder of the State; Yūsuf 'Alī Khān belonged to the junior branch.

2 *District Gazetteer: Moradabad*, p. 165; Najm al-Ghāni, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 552-53.

3 Some Europeans and Christians had embraced Islām at the hands of Mawlawī 'Ālam 'Alī. He had consequently showed sympathy with them; Majjū Khān had actually kept them in his own custody. Bakht Khān, however, warned the two leaders that the Christians who accepted Islām under pressure should not be trusted. He took the men who had changed their religion along with him to Delhi, leaving the women and children with Majjū Khān. One of them was given the charge of the Artillery in the Revolutionary forces who defended Delhi, *cf.* Forbes-Mitchell, pp. 281-82; Najm al-Ghāni, I, p. 55-3-54; Kanhyya Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

4 Najm al-Ghāni *op. cit.*, I, pp. 561-62.

pumpkin in the market, fell out with a man named 'Uthmān Khān, and in the scuffle that followed the latter was wounded. This excited the people who attacked the soldier and killed him. As the report of the incident spread, open clashes between the Rampur forces and the citizens began to take place in the streets of the town. Throughout the day stray cases of these clashes were reported, and it was only on the following morning that peace could be restored.<sup>1</sup>

### Amroha and other Tahsils

Besides the headquarters other parts of the district were also affected by the Revolution. Amroha, about twenty miles to the west of Moradabad, on the road to Delhi, was an important place ; it was an old town and had a number of influential Muslim families. On 17 May the leading citizens held a consultation meeting at the tomb of Shāh Wilāyat.<sup>2</sup> A couple of days later, one Gulzār 'Alī<sup>3</sup>

1 The incident is generally called *Kadū-gardī* (pumpkin riot). It may be added that 40 men of the Rampur forces were killed ; the number of the Revolutionaries who lost their lives does not seem to have been large. The *Kadū-gardī* was in fact an attempt of the citizens of Moradabad to overthrow the rule of the Nawab of Rampur who was an agent of the British Government. For details see Najm al-Ṭhānī, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 501-64 ; also see *District Gazetteer : Moradabad*, p. 166.

2 Shāh Sayyid Hasan Sharaf al-Dīn, popularly known as Shāh Wilāyat, was a contemporary of Sultān Ghiyāṭ al-Dīn Tughluq. For his biography and tomb see 'Abbāsī, *op. cit.*, I, p. 36.

3 Gulzār 'Alī belonged to a leading family of Amroha, but he practised as a *Mukhtār* (legal practitioner) at Moradabad. On hearing of the outbreak of the Revolution, he left that place on 19 May and assumed the leadership of the Revolutionaries at Amroha. Before he could establish his machinery of administration on proper lines, Wilson attacked and captured the town ; Gulzār 'Alī escaped to Delhi. On the fall of that city he returned to Rohilkhand, and once again captured Amroha, expelling the *Nāzim* appointed by the Nawab of Rampur. The latter sent an army under Sa'ādat 'Alī Khān to recapture the town. On 19 November, Gulzār 'Alī fought a contested battle, but he was overpowered, because a number of the leading citizens of Amroha supported the Nawab's forces, while he had only a small band of followers. He was a brave and courageous fighter,



accompanied by a number of Revolutionary workers came to Amroha. He joined the deliberations of the people, and ultimately succeeded in preparing them for a rising. The authority of the British Government was overthrown, and a new machinery of administration was set up. Gulzār 'Alī's administration was however short-lived; on 25 May, Wilson attacked Amroha and recaptured it.<sup>1</sup> Gulzār 'Alī managed to escape and ultimately joined the Revolutionary forces at Delhi.<sup>2</sup> The *tahsils* of Sambhal, Thakardwara and Hasanpur were also affected, but the Revolutionaries, unable to organize themselves, could not succeed in establishing their administration at these places.

The Nawab's rule at Moradabad was a thorn in the side of the Revolutionaries, but Khān Bahādur Khān, having his hands full with problems elsewhere, had left this district undisturbed for the time being, because after all it was in the hands of a Muslim Prince.

#### Prince Firuz Shah at Moradabad

After the collapse of the Revolution in Awadh the districts of Rohilkhand had become the main centres of the War. Several of the most prominent leaders of the Revolutionaries were now trying to organize their forces for a final and decisive effort against British imperialism. Prince Firūz Shāh who had also arrived there was asked by Khān Bahādur Khān to restore the Revolutionary Government in Moradabad and Sambhal.<sup>3</sup> The Nawab of Rampur issued immediate instructions to his officers to resist the Prince, but his men could not stop him from capturing Sambhal

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and his enemies were so afraid of him that they distributed sweets on his defeat and presented offerings at the tomb of Shāh Wilāyat. He again succeeded in escaping alive and is stated to have lived in hiding in the jungles near Bareilly. See Najm al-Ghānī, *Akhbār al-Sanādīd*, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 565-66; 'Abbāsī, I, pp. 58-59, 83.

1 *District Gazetteer : Moradabad*, p. 164. Also see *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 239.

2 *Cf. Trial*, p. 77.

3 Kaye and Malletson, IV, p. 364.

and then proceeding to Moradabad where he reached on 21 April.<sup>1</sup> The officers of the Nawāb were unnerved by his arrival. One of them made an attempt to find out the attitude of the citizens of Moradabad; he was told by his agents that they would support the Revolutionary leaders. They now decided to leave the place, the first man to flee being Ghālib 'Alī Khān. He was followed by others, including his brother 'Abd al-'Alī Khān, the *Nāzim* of the district. Firūz Shāh had therefore no difficulty in occupying the town.<sup>2</sup> He divided his forces into three contingents: one was posted at the right bank of the Ramganga to guard the city against an attack from the side of Rampur, the second was on the other end of the town near the tomb of Shāh Bulāqī; between these two was the third one. Early in the morning as had been guessed by him the Nawab's forces launched an attack. A hotly contested action was fought on 24 April in which more than 600 men of the Nawab's forces were killed; the casualties of the defenders were much fewer. Firūz Shāh would have completely routed the enemy, if he had not been obliged to withdraw his forces on hearing of the arrival of Jone's Column from Bijnor. He vacated Moradabad which was occupied by the British forces on 26 April. Majjū Khān with a number of other Revolutionary leaders was put to death.<sup>3</sup>

1 *District Gazetteer : Moradabad*, p. 167.

2 The citizens of Moradabad presented to Firūz Shāh a memorandum signed by 16,000 men; it contained a statement on oath that the signatories would support the Revolution. On being thus satisfied as to the general attitude of the people he made necessary arrangements for the administration and defence of the city. See Najm al-Ghāni, I, p. 583.

3 The British retaliation on the citizens of Moradabad was as usual terrible. "Majjū Khān", says the compiler of the *District Gazetteer*, "was captured and shot, twenty other notorious ring-leaders were apprehended and many others were slain". Edmonstone's telegram from Allahabad to E. A. Reade, Agra, dated 30 April, 1858, says: "Mujjoo Khan and four of his men were surrounded. Angelo shot three of them with his revolver and a Sikh shot the fourth". Original telegram is in Secretarial Records Room, Lucknow. Wilson "succeeded in tracking down a number of rebels and mutineers, who were capitally sentenced, including two of the Delhi princes who were captured in

### Shahjahanpur

The last of the important actions of the War were fought at Shahjahanpur where the Revolutionaries were under the direct command of Sayyid Aḥmad Allāh Shāh. After leaving Bārī, he had gone to Khayrābād as is indicated by a letter of Sayyid Kāzīm 'Alī Dārūghāh, addressed to him, dated the 28 April, 1858.<sup>1</sup> He seems to have soon left that place also for Rohilkhand and reached the vicinity of Shahjahanpur which had fallen into the hands of Colin Campbell on 30 April, 1858. Two days later he proceeded towards Bareilly, leaving Colonel Hale to guard the place. Aḥmād Allāh Shāh who had set up his headquarters at Muḥamdi came to know of this on the same day, and "with the presence of a capable general . . . resolved to avail himself of the opportunity thus offered to make a raid upon Shahjahanpur."<sup>2</sup>

the guise of mendicants." See *Gazetteer*, p. 168. A more detailed version of Majrū Khān's end may be read in Najm al-Ghānī Khān's book. He says that on 25 April he was besieged in a house. He offered a determined resistance, "climbed over the roof and shot three of the seven soldiers who attacked him. Subsequently a bigger party of the assailants rushed at him. He was overpowered and killed." Najm al-Ghānī, *op. cit.*, p. 587.

As an illustration of the ruthless treatment meted out to the people the case of Mawlawī 'Ālam 'Alī may be mentioned. His only crime was that some Christians had embraced Islām at his hands; he was arrested and would have been treated like others if Syed Ahmed Khan had not saved him.

According to local tradition the two quarters of the city, known as *Gali Shahīd* and *Katār Shahīd*, have been given these names because the Revolutionaries were hanged and put to sword at these places.

1 Letter quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, II, p. 378.

2 Kaye and Malletson, IV, p. 372; Forrest, III, p. 373.

After the loss of Awadh Aḥmad Allāh Shāh had set up his headquarters at Muḥamdi in the district of Kherī (in Awadh) near the eastern border of Shahjahanpur. He appointed his officers in the neighbouring areas and introduced his own coins with the following inscription :

سکہ زد بر ملت کشور خادم معراب شاہ  
حابی دین مجدد احمد الله بادشاہ

[Tr.—The slave of Mihrāb Shāh struck his coin in the seven countries; a supporter of the Faith of Muḥammad is King Aḥmad Allāh Shāh].

He decided to launch the attack almost immediately, although he had with him only a small contingent of fifteen hundred armed men.<sup>1</sup> Soon after sunset he was on the move in spite of the fact that he was unwell. If the Revolutionaries had pushed on and reached the town in the dead of the night as the Shāh had planned, "he might have reaped all the advantages of a complete surprise." Unfortunately, however, his men halted for rest, when within four miles of the place; this proved to be a fatal step, because the British spies alerted Hale, who gained time and managed to shut himself up within the enclosure of the gaol. Aḥmad Allāh Shāh seized the town and the fort, and subjected the British garrison to occasional bombardment; this state of affairs lasted for more than a week.<sup>2</sup>

Colin Campbell sent reinforcements under Brigadier Jones who reached the vicinity of Shahjahanpur on the morning of 11 May 1858. Soon after his arrival he was met by a small band of the Revolutionaries, who withdrew to the city after a sharp engagement. Jones joined Hale at the jail, but he soon realized that without further reinforcements they could not face the Revolutionaries in an open battle. Accordingly he wrote to Bareilly for help. On the side of the Revolutionaries too some of their top-most leaders—Ḥaḍrat Maḥal, Khān Bahādur Khān, Firūz Shāh<sup>3</sup> and Ismā'il Khān—had reached Shahjahanpur and joined Aḥmad Allāh Shāh. Nānā Rao could not come; he "loved his life too well

1 This is the figure given by *Tā'ib* and should be accepted as correct. The British writers exaggerate the numbers of the Revolutionaries: Malleison, for instance, gives the number as 'about eight thousand'; Forrest calls it a 'large force'. Other western writers have made similar statements.

See *Tā'ib* p. 99, line 17; Kay and Malleison, IV, p. 373; Forrest, III, p. 373; Shadwell II, 217.

2 Aḥmad Allāh Shāh utilized these days in stabilizing his administration. See *Tā'ib*, pp 104-05.

3 *Tā'ib* (p 107) refers to Prince Firūz Shāh as: 'The killer of enemy, Lord of prowess and dignity, the Prince of Hind, Firuz Shāh'.

to risk it in a battle with the English."<sup>1</sup> On 15 May the Revolutionaries struck the expected blow. Jones offered courageous resistance, but he had to remain on the defensive. He sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief, which was delivered to him on the 16th at Fathganj.<sup>2</sup> On the following day he turned towards Tilhar, about fourteen miles from Shahjahanpur. The same evening he learnt that "the Maulavi, whilst still pressing Shahjahanpur, had withdrawn the bulk of his troops in the direction of Muhamdi, the entire length of the road to which he commanded."<sup>3</sup>

### **Battle of Banni**

The withdrawal of Aḥmad Allāh Shāh proved to be a source of encouragement for the Commander-in-Chief; "the news spread in Shahjahanpur," says *Tā'ib*, "that Ḥaḍrat (Aḥmad Allāh Shāh) had gone to some other place. The Christians became happy in their hearts for they got what they wanted."<sup>4</sup> Colin Campbell entered Shahjahanpur and effected a junction with Jones on the 18th. He was, however, still reluctant to fight a battle with the Revolutionaries, because he thought that "his force was too weak in cavalry to encounter the enemy with any hope of a decisive result"; but the 'enemy' would not let him remain idle for long. The British forces were attacked the same afternoon, and "in the artillery and cavalry skirmish which followed, the rebels displayed more than ordinary skill and courage, and, although in the end they gave ground, no attempt was made to pursue them."<sup>5</sup> It was not a complete

1 Kaye and Malleon, IV, p. 375.

2 It appears that Colin Campbell had not correctly assessed the situation at Shahjahanpur. On 10 May he had written to Canning, congratulating "your lordship very heartily on the success of the Rohilkhand campaign . . . I hope to hear that the relief of Shahjehanpoor will have been effected tomorrow". He left Bareilly on the 15th; next day he received Jones's message. For Colin Campbell's letter, see Shadwell, II, p. 220.

3 Kaye and Malleon, IV, p. 377.

4 *Tā'ib*, p. 111.

5 Kaye and Malleon, IV, pp. 378.

victory for the British. "The soldiers," writes Russell, "were much fatigued, and so, posting strong pickets all along our front and exposed flank, we retired before sunset, having gained large accession of position without any material loss."<sup>1</sup> Aḥmad Allāh Shāh retired towards the road to Fathgarh, because he wanted to intercept a convoy coming from there, leaving one of his followers, Lakkār Shāh, to look after the affairs in that area.<sup>2</sup>

### Fall of Muḥamdi

The British Commander-in-Chief had sent a despatch to Brigadier Coke asking him to come to his help. Coke joined him on 22 May. Two days later Colin Campbell sent Brigadier Jones to assault Muḥamdi, now the headquarters of Aḥmad Allāh Shāh. Jones was near the village of Barnai when the Revolutionaries opened fire on his forces. The British promptly replied with their heavy guns. It appears that the bulk of the Revolutionary forces, unable to stand the charge of heavy guns of the enemy, escaped from the battle-field, but a tiny band of the *Ghāzīs* continued the fight against the whole army, and fought in the spirit of martyrs. "The rebel chief," says the writer of an article in the *Cornhill Magazine*, "with about twenty followers—Ghazis—made such a furious onset that in an instant they had pierced the line. The regiment did not waver for an instant, and almost immediate death was the reward of their temerity. Not a man of the twentyone escaped, but ere they fell they had succeeded in killing and wounding several of the Mooltanecs."<sup>3</sup> Next day

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The telegram reporting the battle to General Reade said: "On the eighteenth the chief, (C-in-C) engaged the rebel forces at the Hatora and Bunce some two half coss east from Shahjehanpore; the fighting went on till night, one of the entrenchments of the rebels taken. This information is very correct". Original telegram in Secretariat Records, Lucknow, as quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 510.

1 *My Diary*, II, 25, also quoted in Forrest, III, p. 383.

2 *Ta'ib*, p. 112.

3 Quoted in Forrest, III, pp. 386-87.

(25 May) Muḥamdi, which had been vacated by Aḥmad Allāh Shāh, was captured and blown up. It has been rightly pointed out that once again the Commander-in-Chief had been baffled by the Shāh.<sup>1</sup>

### Aḥmad Allah Shah's death

Aḥmad Allāh Shāh had now lost all hope of success. In *Tā'ib's* verses we can clearly read his disappointment at the lack of cooperation on the part of the sepoys and their officers. He rebukes them for not carrying out his instructions and tells them rather frankly that "victory could not come to such unruly persons".<sup>2</sup> He could

1 "Whilst his light cavalry did their utmost to hinder the British advance on Muḥamdi, retiring the moment the pursuers halted to discharge their guns the Maulavi and his allies evacuated that place, after destroying the defence". Kaye and Malletson, IV, p. 378.

2 *Tā'ib* says :

ہوئے ملتنت پھر نہ ست سپاہ	کیا تیز زحمت کا آماج گاہ
کہا بہتری ہم نے جاہی بہت	دل و جاں سے کی خیر خواہی بہت
تمہارے لئے غم اٹھایا کئے	راہ راست پر تم کو لایا کئے
نہ کی تم نے افسوس فرمان بری	نہیں اب کوئی صورت جان بری
یہ ہوتا ہے ارشاد یزدان پاک	کہ ان سرکشوں کی ہو کیا فتح خاک
سزاوار انعام کا کون ہے	طرف دار اسلام کا کون ہے
کیا تم نے فرمان حق سے عدول	ہوئی تمکو رحمت سے زحمت حصول

### Translation :

He then turned to the army, and sharpened the aim of rebuke (زحمت)  
 He said: "I always desired your welfare, and sympathized with you most sincerely;  
 I suffered hardships for you, and wanted you to take the right path;  
 But unfortunately you did not obey me, and now, there is no possibility of the safety of your lives,  
 It is now the command of the Almighty God that 'Victory could not come to such unruly persons'.  
 Who deserves a reward? who is supporting Islām?  
 You have disobeyed the commands of God, and have thereby changed mercy into sufferings. See p 112,

even foresee his own end. He is stated to have met a *darwish*, named Alf Shāh and told him of the distressed condition of the Revolutionaries, adding that his only desire was to sacrifice his life in the cause of his Faith and freedom.<sup>1</sup> This desire for martyrdom was soon fulfilled, when he was shot dead at Powain, about sixteen miles to the east of Shahjahanpur. The Collector of the district had been pressing upon its zamindar, Jagannath, to do 'some signal act' of loyalty. A reward of Rs. 50,000/- had also been notified for the arrest of the Shāh.<sup>2</sup> According to *Tā'ib*, Jagannath's brother, Baldeo Singh, had smuggled himself into the Shāh's forces and persuaded him to come to Powain. The official version however is that the Shāh had attacked the place because the Raja had given shelter to the Tahsildar and Thanahdar. However, when the Shāh reached the fortress of the Raja he found the gates closed on him. He directed the mahout (driver) of his elephant to make the animal strike at the shutters of the gate and smash them, but before he could force his entry into the fortress a volley was fired at him from the roof of the building, killing him on the spot (15 June).<sup>3</sup> His head was severed from the body and taken by Jagannath to the Magistrate of Shahjahanpur, who recommended the traitor for the promised reward.

1 The Shāh expressed his desire of martyrdom before Alf Shāh in the following words:

تمنا ہے یہ ایزد پاک سے      کہ چھٹ جاؤں آلائش خاک سے  
 رہ یار میں سر فدا ہو کہیں      یہ بار اسانت ادا ہو کہیں  
 بہت ہے مشتاق خنجر گلو      کہ ہو جان نثاروں میں کچھ آبرو

*Translation* :—I pray to God that I might be delivered of this impurity of the earth, and that my head be sacrificed in the path of the Friend, and the burden of this trust be thus unloaded . . . My neck is anxious to meet the dagger, so that I might gain a position of honour among the devotees of God.

2 Kaye and Malleeson, IV, p. 380. also see *F S U. P.*, p. 539 Savarkar suggests that the British encouraged the Raja to commit this act of treachery ; "if the English sword is too blunt to cut to pieces this Indian patriot," he writes; "let the dagger of treachery accomplish the task." See p. 454.

We cannot, however ignore the fact that the promised reward of 50000 rupees was too great a temptation for the greedy Jagannath to resist.

3 *Tā'ib* (p. 120) gives Tuesday 2 *Dhī Qa'dah*, 1274 H , i. e. 15 June 1858.



The body of the Shāh was publicly burnt and the ashes thrown into the river; his head was later buried in the vicinity of Shahjahanpur. In his letter, G. P. Money pays a tribute to the Shāh's patriotism, and bravery by calling him "the most determined and influential of the rebel leaders" and "a most troublesome enemy owing to the wonderful influence possessed by him over his followers."<sup>1</sup>

The defeat of the Revolutionaries in Rohilkhand marks a decisive stage in the War. No doubt some of their leaders continued the struggle for another few months, but they had to fight a losing battle; the final collapse of the Movement was now only a question of time. Despite their tremendous sacrifices the Revolutionaries failed to achieve their goal but even in their failure they wrote one of the most glorious chapters of eastern history.

بنا کردند خوش رستم به خون و خاک غلطیدن  
خدا رحمت کند این عاشقان پاک طینت را 2

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1 For details of Jagannath's treachery see *Tā'ib*, pp. 115-19; Kaye and Malleon, IV, pp. 378-81. Also see letter of G. P. Money, Magistrate of Shahjahanpur to the Commissioner of Rohilkhand, dated 17 June, 1858, quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, V, pp. 537-39.

It may be added that the coward Raja of Powain had been afraid of showing sympathy to the British cause in the early stages of the War when the Revolutionaries were scoring victories over them. *The Friend of India*, 3 March 1859, as quoted in *F. S. U. P.*, V, p. 198.

2 Translation :—They have created the fine tradition of rolling in blood and dust. May God shower His mercy on these noble lovers !

## EPILOGUE

( Much has been written on the causes of the failure of the Revolutionaries to liberate their homeland from alien rule. Their bravery and determination were beyond question, and on a number of occasions their performance, particularly of the *Ghāzīs*, was remarkable. The latter were always ready to sacrifice their lives for the sacred cause. Being inspired by a spirit of martyrdom, they were undoubtedly more determined in their opposition to the British than the sepoy themselves. Few of them would try to escape alive from the battlefield, even though they knew that their defeat was inevitable. ) The Revolutionary sepoy also fought with courage, at least in the earlier stages of the struggle, but in spite of their determination and sacrifices the Revolution ended in failure.

(The foremost and perhaps the most obvious reason of the ultimate defeat of the Revolutionaries was that the organizers of the Movement had not made any preparations for a long and protracted struggle. They had not planned, nor, it appears, had they expected a regular war on a large scale. ) They had counted upon a series of coups and surprises by the Regiments of Hind-Pakistani sepoy against European soldiers and officers stationed at different centres ; these were to come simultaneously. If the Revolutionaries had succeeded in carrying out their programme the position of the British would have been greatly jeopardized, and in that case they would not have received support from any section of the people, for, "no wise man fights for a lost cause".

The Mughul Emperor who was the *de jure* sovereign of the subcontinent was an old man of eighty-two. He had to be made the chief leader of the Revolution because the organizers of the Movement knew that no other person would be acceptable

to all sections of the people. The Revolutionaries had a capable military leader in Bakht Khān, the supreme commander of their forces at Delhi, but his ability and devotion were more than neutralized by the incompetence and interference of the Princes. (Among other handicaps of the Revolutionary forces the lack of organization and inadequacy of provisions and equipment may specifically be mentioned.) The British Government had the full support of the Sikh States and a number of big zamindars in the neighbouring areas. The line of communications between the Ridge, where the British forces were encamped, and the main stations of the region lying at their back right up to Peshawar remained open to them throughout the siege. This was one of the major factors which contributed to the ultimate victory of the British in the Battle of Delhi.

Equally important was the fact that besides the Sikhs some influential sections of the Hindus and Muslims also supported the British cause. The bitter memories of Sikh tyranny in the Panjab and the neighbouring regions were still fresh in the minds of the Muslim population. Ranjit Singh had created and maintained a system of Government which was hardly different from the medieval type of military rule. It is therefore not surprising that the advent of British rule was welcomed by the majority of the people as a lesser evil. Indeed, for nearly half a century the Muslims of the Panjab and the north-western regions had lived in conditions which had killed all initiative in them. The Great Revolution came only eight years after the end of Sikh rule and obviously this was too short a period for the Muslims of these areas to recover from the effects of the tyrannies and hardships which they had suffered in the preceding decades. It was for these reasons that the British were able to enlist the support of a number of influential zamindars and crush the efforts of the Revolutionaries of these areas in a short time.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a list of the big landlords who supported the British cause in these areas as well as other parts of the subcontinent see Shafi, Mian Muhammad, *Pahli Jang-i-Āzādī: Wāqt'at wa Ḥaqd'iq*, (Lahore, 1957) pp. 324-40.

( Throughout the course of the War, the Revolutionaries were handicapped by the absence of a Central Command ; consequently there was neither cohesion nor unity in their military policy and operations. In Delhi as well as in Lucknow, two of the most important centres of the Revolution, there were parallel and rival commands and separate military units which often failed to coordinate their movements and activities. Bakht Khān's efforts in Delhi failed to produce substantial results because of the open opposition of Mirzā Mughl ; in Lucknow Aḥmad Allāh Shāh was not allowed to organize the Revolutionaries by Mammū Khān and his supporters. The local leaders, in most cases, did their best to push forward the cause of the Revolution, and some of them were really good fighters, but the advantages of their victories in the fields of battle were confined to limited areas only. They could not even send reinforcements to places where they were most needed. )

The Revolutionary leaders did not have enough funds to meet the mounting expenditure of the War. No doubt they often seized the local treasures, but the money thus obtained was not sufficient to meet the requirements of a new Government. It was not easy to collect the revenue, particularly because its authority was not accepted by large sections of the zamindar class. In the towns also the monied people were reluctant to support the Revolution and take the risk of losing their wealth.<sup>1</sup>

1 "The sepoys, the armed Budmashes of our towns, the predatory tribes, and many of the Mussulmans, were rebels or mutineers during the disturbances:" writes Dunlop who is a contemporary authority, "on the other hand, most of the Hindoos—the principal Hindoo chiefs as a rule—declared for, and fought faithfully on the side of the Government. Some few Mussulmans also showed an extraordinary and preserving attachment to a cause, which must be supposed adverse to all their natural and religious sympathies." Dunlop, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-55.

Besides the *mahājans* and Hindu *seths* "the educated citizens of Calcutta and the landed aristocracy of Bengal did not lag behind their compatriots of Madras in their open denunciation of the Mutiny and mutineers." Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

(The British officers were able to employ a large number of capable and influential persons as their spies. In Delhi, for instance, daily reports were received of the plans and actions of the Revolutionary Government. The most useful of their spies was Mawlawi Rajab 'Ali who was rewarded richly for his services. Ilāhī Bakhsh, a near relative of Bahādur Shāh, was a co-worker of Rajab 'Ali. Ḥakīm Aḥsan Allāh Khān, who enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, and Chunni Lal and Mahesh Das, two of the richest citizens of Delhi, also acted as British spies and sent valuable information about the city and the Court to their camp at the Ridge.<sup>1</sup> (Of the spies, the English versions of whose reports have been preserved, the names of Gauri Shankar and Turāb 'Alī may specifically be mentioned.<sup>2</sup> / The Revolutionaries also had their spies, but they were much inferior compared to those of their enemy.

(With these and other handicaps, particularly their inferiority in Artillery, the defeat of the Revolutionaries in a protracted War, was a foregone conclusion.<sup>3</sup>) The leaders of the Revolution must have started realizing this soon after their reverses in Awadh and Rohilkhand, where some of the stiffest actions were fought, but as they were fighting for a cause they were determined to fight to the end. No doubt some of them surrendered or were captured, but

1 *Dilli ki Saza* (Delhi, 1946), pp. 49-50.

2 For other spies see *Mutiny Records* (Lahore, 1911), Vols VII and VIII; Najm al-Ghani Khān, *Akhhār al-Sanādīd*, (Lucknow, 1904), II, pp 578-79; Kanhaiya Lal, pp, 100-103. Other cases and names are also mentioned in different works.

3 The correspondence between Khayr al-Dīn, a prominent spy and supporter of the British, and Muḥammad Ḥusayn, the Revolutionary leader at Gorakhpur, gives a fairly correct idea of the attitude of the patriots. In reply to Khayr al-Dīn's appeal that he should surrender himself and that he would obtain favourable conditions from the British Government, if he agreed to do so, Muḥammad Ḥusayn said: "If I had valued my life and worldly wealth more than my *īmān* (faith in Islam) I would have followed you." For the original letter see Sen, pp. 364, *et seq.* For Khayr al-Dīn's services to the British see Syed Ahmed Khan's account in *Loyal Mohammedans*. }

the majority of the most distinguished of these patriots were either killed in the battles or managed to escape and ended their lives in exile and poverty. They had certainly failed to achieve their goal, but this does not vitiate the glory and importance of their tremendous sacrifices in the cause of freedom.

(The Revolution had been mainly organized by the Muslims. Some of the Hindu leaders, and a large number of Hindu sepoys had joined them, but when symptoms of weakness in the ranks of the Revolutionaries became apparent their enthusiasm began to cool down. There were however conspicuous exceptions, as, for instance, Lakshmi Bai, Nānā Bāo and Beni Madho. Nevertheless, the British held the Muslims to be the chief "culprits," and as a community they had to suffer the consequences. It was obvious that of the two communities, the Hindus and Muslims, which constituted the overwhelming majority of the population, the latter alone could be a potential danger to British imperialism. They had been defeated in the War, but they could rise again in future, unless they were totally suppressed. The natural sequence of this logic was the ever-stiffening attitude of the British authorities towards the Muslims in the decades following the collapse of the Revolution.)

Within their own ranks too the Muslims were threatened with moral degeneration and social disintegration. For centuries Muslim society had been receiving inspiration and guidance from the two influential groups of their religious leaders—the *'ulamā* and the *mashā'ikh*—, the *madrasahs* and *khānqāhs* being respectively the centres of their activities. The former were educational institutions devoted to teaching and research while the latter were training centres for moral and spiritual discipline. A number of the leading *madrasahs* and *khānqāhs* were either totally destroyed or severely hit by the catastrophe of 1857. Delhi, Lucknow and Rohilkhand were of course completely ruined, but even in other regions the structure of Muslim society was rudely shaken.

The few leading *'ulamā* and *mashā'ikh* who survived the struggle tried to restore the broken edifice of socio-religious life,

but they could not achieve much, at least in the post-1857 years. A great hurdle in their path however was their attitude towards the British Government and western civilization. Few of them could tolerate the idea of an all-out loyalty to alien rule, although they knew that opposition to its authority would mean further ruin. More unwise was their indifference to modern trends in civilization, particularly education and science. Unable to lead the community in the changed conditions of life the activities of the '*ulamā*' were mostly confined to teaching. The *madrasah* of Deoband which was founded in 1867 became the leading centre of oriental learning ; Firangi Mahal of Lucknow, which had survived the strain of the Revolution, and some other newly-founded *madrasahs*, like that of Bareilly, also became important institutions.

The *khānqāhī* system of the *ṣūfīs*, which had played so vital a role in building and maintaining the structure of Muslim society in the past, had been showing signs of decline since the beginning of the eighteenth century ; now it totally collapsed. Some of the *Ṣūfī-shaykhs* kept the tradition of their predecessors alive and enrolled large numbers of disciples, but they were not able to maintain and run the *khānqāhī Nizām* in a systematic and useful manner. Nor could they continue the missionary work in which the *ṣūfī-shaykhs* of the earlier centuries had attained a remarkable success. The result was that the influence of the '*ulamā*', and *mashā'ikh* became weaker with the passage of time, and a void was created in the leadership of the community. It was indeed a dark period for the Muslims. They had to face widespread ruin and destruction, their properties were being confiscated on an extensive scale, their leaders had been hanged, imprisoned or exiled, and efforts were being made by the Government to push them back into a position of obscurity and helplessness. Politically, they already a broken community; in the economic field they were threatened with a total collapse.<sup>1</sup>

1 In W. W. Hunter's *The Indian Mussulmans* one can read the sufferings and disadvantages to which the Muslims were subjected.

From this state of despondency and frustration the Muslims were pulled out by their great leader, Syed Ahmed Khan, who has been rightly called the harbinger of Muslim renaissance in Hind-Pakistan. Born in 1817 in a family which had direct access to the Mughul Court, he had the fullest opportunities of studying the decline of Muslim life. Unlike his ancestors he decided to join service under the Government of the East India Company. At the time of the outbreak of the Revolution he was posted in Bijnor as *Şadr Amin*. (Syed Ahmed Khan believed that a violent Revolution would not succeed, and that its failure would bring disaster to the people. He, therefore, threw himself heart and soul into the British camp, fought on the side of the Company's forces and tried his best to help its cause. It would however be wrong to conclude that he had any personal motives<sup>1</sup> and that he wanted to exploit the situation in his own interest. The storm, however, was too violent for his efforts, and soon after the establishment of the Revolutionary Government at Bijnor, he left the place and remained a silent spectator of what happened in the next two years. )

After the collapse of the Revolution Syed Ahmed Khan gave some thought to the problems and difficulties confronting his community. His main anxiety was that the Muslims should be saved from falling into total oblivion. This, he thought, was possible only if they could keep themselves aloof from politics, for some time at least, and devote their entire attention and energy to education and social reform. The Hindus in Bengal and the southern Presidencies had accepted the western system of education much before the Great Revolution, and under the changing conditions of life it had proved of immense advantage to them. It had given them a lead in important professions, particularly law and medicine, and had enabled them to enter into the various branches of State service. Thus, in course of time a new class had arisen among the Hindus, who had received their education on western lines. They had discarded most of their medieval prejudices in social and economic

1 He was offered a *jāgīr* by the Government, but he refused to accept it.



life, and had become the leading element in their community. It was under the leadership of this group that the forces of Hindu nationalism had grown in strength in pre-1857 decades. The outlook of these leaders was marked by loyalty to the Government and a strong feeling of communalism. Of course, the Hindus and Muslims had always been two separate peoples, representing two different civilizations, but during the long period of Muslim rule they had lived in peace and happiness in a common politico-economic set-up of life. As far as their cultures and social structures were concerned neither of them was prepared to lose its separate identity. With the establishment of British rule the relations of the two communities were subjected to new pressures and challenges. The British statesmen believed that they could best stabilize their control over the people by following a policy of *divide et impera*. No wonder then that the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims had become wider with the growth and expansion of British imperialism. Rammohun Roy, who has rightly been regarded as the father of Hindu nationalism, had received his education under the oriental system. He lived like a Muslim nobleman, cherished Muslim dishes and wore Muslim dress, but in the programme of his reforms he showed no concern for the Muslims as a community.<sup>1</sup> The traditions left by him were not only kept alive but had been strengthened by other Hindu leaders. The situation became worse after the collapse of the Revolution. The Muslims could not forget that in the concluding stages of the War the bulk of the Hindus had begun to withdraw their support, leaving them and the *Mujāhids* almost alone to continue the struggle. Moreover, after the War many Hindus had earned rich rewards by helping the British authorities in their hunt for "rebels". This attitude further separated them from the Muslims, and as the concepts of modern nationalism began to influence the political life of the subcontinent both started behaving as two separate nations.

1 It is rather interesting that he accepted Emperor Akbar Shāh's offer to go to England and plead his case.

Syed Ahmed Khan's greatness lies in the fact that he was able to assess the situation correctly, and give a proper lead to the Muslims. He has sometimes been criticized for advising them to keep themselves away from the Indian National Congress, but history has given its verdict in his favour. He had taken a realistic view of the situation and was not dazzled by the glamour of the propaganda of Hindu leaders that there was only one nation in the subcontinent. Before he died in 1898 he had prepared his community for a struggle to maintain its identity as a separate nation. When the Congress campaign against the partition of Bengal early in this century revealed the hollowness of the one-nation idea the Muslims were in a position to set up their own organization—the All India Muslim League—in December 1906.

The story of Muslim struggle for freedom during the next forty years (1907-47) need not be repeated here. It was soon realized by the Muslim leaders that as far as their community was concerned the battle of freedom was to be fought on two fronts. To expel British imperialism from the subcontinent and win the freedom of the people was no doubt important, but the Muslims could not at the same time ignore their interests as a separate people. India (later Hind-Pakistan) was to remain, as it had ever been, a subcontinent with at least two (if not more) nations living side by side within its borders. The British Government accepted this fact in 1909 when the system of separate electorates was introduced, and a few years later the leaders of the Indian National Congress also changed their viewpoint by signing the Lucknow Pact (1916). The unity thus achieved did not last even for a decade, but during a short period of six or seven years when the leaders of the two communities worked in close collaboration, they were able to strengthen and intensify the freedom movement. In the early years of the third decade however the symptoms of disunity once again became too clear to be missed even by a casual observer.

Although many a prominent leader of the two communities still cherished hopes of seeing an independent united India, far more realistic were the rather faint voices advocating schemes of partition as the only possible solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem, which was the main hurdle on the way to freedom. Ultimately the All India Muslim League, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, demanded and successfully fought for the division of the subcontinent, and in August 1947 Pakistan and Bharat appeared as two sovereign states on the map of the world.

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Besides Sir John Kaye's papers bound in several volumes and other collections, the India Office Library has a vast treasure of secret official letters written during the course of the Revolution. I had an opportunity of examining a number of them when they were released for research purposes in 1957. I have no doubt that a further and more detailed study of these secret letters and other documents and papers would bring to light much new and useful information on the various aspects of this problem. Some other documents, as, for instance, Mubārak Shāh's narrative of the Siege of Delhi (English Translation by R. M. Edward) have also been utilized. An anonymous treatise, *Zafarnāmah Waqā'i Ghadr*—written in 1859 by a Government servant for the information of the Secretary of State for India and his Council—mentions some very interesting incidents throwing light on the activities of the organizers of the Movement. The only copy known to exist (scribed in 1869) is in the India Office Library (No. 431).

Some of the Provincial Governments in India have published collections of original documents and records in the form of books. The series of volumes dealing with the districts of Uttar Pradesh contain many an important document.

<sup>1</sup> For a fuller, though by no means exhaustive, bibliography, particularly for Hindi, Marathi and Bengali works, see Sen, S. N., *Eighteen Fifty-seven* (Delhi, 1957) pp. 419-36.

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## III—Journals, Magazines and Papers

The Persian and vernacular papers of the period contain ample material on the Revolution of 1857. The tone of most of these papers was anti-British. By publishing the reports of the activities of the Revolutionaries as news-items about different places they popularized the Movement and thus indirectly helped its cause. That this attitude of the vernacular press was considered to be a serious threat to the British interests is indicated by the fact that "on the 13th of June he (Lord Canning), for the first and only time during his tenure of office, went down to the Legislative Council, and declaring there that the incendiary tone of the native press had driven him to the conclusion at which he had reluctantly arrived, brought forward and carried a measure to place the native press under restrictions so galling that compared to them, the restrictions on the press of France during the darkest days of the reign of Napoleon III, were light and easy."<sup>1</sup>

In Delhi, besides the Imperial weekly bulletin, *Sirāj al-Akḥbār* another important weekly paper, *Ṣādiq al-Akḥbār*, may be mentioned. It was edited by Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn who, according to a statement of Zakā Allāh, was sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment for spreading disaffection. The British spy, Chunni Lal, supplies some information in his statements as a witness in the trial of Bahādur Shāh. The *Dihli Urdū Akḥbār* may also be mentioned; though compared to the *Ṣādiq al-Akḥbār* it was not only mild in tone and its comments, but often supported the British cause. Its editor, Mawlawī Muḥammad Bāqir, was, however, shot to death and his property was confiscated for not having saved the life of Principal Taylor of the Delhi College.

<sup>1</sup> Kaye and Malletson, III, pp. 12-13.

Some of the modern Urdu<sup>1</sup> magazines and papers cited in this book may be mentioned<sup>2</sup>.

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*Zebunnisa* (Monthly), (Special Number, May 1957) Karachi

1 For a list of English magazines and papers see Sen, pp. 434-36

2 The Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, and the Journal of the Punjab Historical Society, Lahore, may be added to the list.

3 For further reference, see Šabūrī, Imdād., *Tārīkh-i-Šaḥāfat-i-Urdū* (Delhi, 1953) Vol. I.; also see ʿIddīqī, 'Atīq, *Athārah saw Sattāwun. Aḥbār awr Dastāwīz*, in *Dastāwīzin* (Delhi, 1966), pp. 83-277.



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101	1	Gosh	Ghosh
102	2	a plunder	and plunder
102	8	paralize	paralyse
102	30	dislroy	destroy
103	16	paralizing	paralysing

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111	25	Collector	Collector
122	35	aad	and
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178	5	Standrd	Standard
179	13	thosand	thousand
182	4	conncil	council
189	30	not come	not to come
196	13	Me calfe	Metcalfe
198	17	battaery	battery
203	2	ali	all
205	33	quarelling	quarrelling
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232	37	peoples	people
235	19	Commisshioner	Commissioner
235	23	egrees	egress
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239	14	pharnalia	phernalia
240	22	suspicion	suspicion
242	11	a appeal	an appeal
243	9	decendants	descendants
245	23	Commisioner	Commissioner
249	3	occurence	occurrence
254	21	eorps	corps
254	21	harrangued	harangued
255	19	Revolutionaaries	Revolutionaries
256	30	Sepays	sepoys
259	2	Campanies	Companies

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264	32	indespensable	indispensable
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280	8	durgs	drugs
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290	6	who	(to be deleted)
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294	15	inforcements	reinforcements
295	35	plow	pillow
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299	19	preptory	prompt
305	30	occured	occurred
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314	19	place	palace
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323	18	ond	and
323	23	unsuccesfully	unsuccessful
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327	6	came; then	come; than
36	11	lop	lap
38	4	participate	precipitate
39	3	well-nigh	well-nigh

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